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Abstract
The aim of the study was to examine whether people who use mental health services
occupy the status of citizens in contemporary English society or whether they occupy
the status of a socially excluded group. A discussion group with three mental health
service users was followed by a series of in-depth interviews conducted with 15
individuals who had used mental health services. Participants were asked to define
citizenship and were asked to discuss their experiences in response to the question of
whether people who use mental health services enjoy the same opportunities to
participate in society as other citizens.
The findings were analysed in accordance with the three areas of citizenship
conceptualised by Marshall in 1950, namely civil, political and social citizenship.
Participants defined citizenship in terms of the opportunities that are available to other
citizens but exclusion of mental health service users from such opportunities.
Participants described exclusion from citizenship through broad denial of valued
social roles (e.g. employee, property owner, consumer, friend, partner, parent) and
refuted Marshall's (1981) claim that state welfare enables mitigation of social
inequality caused by a capitalist economic system in their descriptions of mental
health services as undermining their status as citizens.
In conclusion, participants related instances of blatant discrimination and described a
disadvantaged position in society. However, participants were not passive victims of
discrimination but formulated their own forms of inclusion inmeaningful activity as
an alternative to the patienthood role. The study provides comprehensive confirmation
of previous research which suggests the marginalised status of mental health service
users in English society but also reveals a complexity of experience that perhaps has
not been explored inprevious research.
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Introduction
The aim of the research described in the following thesis is to explore the question of
whether people who use mental health services occupy the status of full citizens in
contemporary British society or whether they occupy the status of a socially excluded
group. In addition, the research aims to obtain service users' definitions and
conceptualisations of citizenship and to examine their thoughts on how they compare
on measures of citizenship with other citizens.
The thesis begins with a definition of citizenship as involving membership of the
community (Marshall, 1992: first published in 1950) and participation in normative
activities, including the rights and duties expected of community members (Rees,
1995a). However, a critical stance towards the concept of citizenship is adopted,
given the contentious nature of citizenship, community and membership.
Citizenship is relevant to people who use mental health services because there is a
growing body of literature which suggests that mental health service users continue to
be excluded from valued social roles. For example, Barham and Hayward (1995)
identified the status of the 'community mental health patient' as the only role
occupied by mental health service users in the absence of alternative social roles,
caused by extensive discrimination and social exclusion. They identified high levels
of unemployment, poverty due to receipt of welfare benefits and poor housing
conditions among users of mental health services.
Similarly, Read and Baker (1996) identified high levels of discrimination against
mental health service users in employment, harassment from members of the public,
unreasonable questioning of parenting ability and rejection by family and friends.
Sayee (2000) indicated that mental health service users experience high levels of
disadvantage in the labour market, poverty, physical ill health, homelessness,
imprisonment and blame for violence in society. Sayce indicated the prevalence of
negative public attitudes towards service users in her comment, ''we have not
successfully made the case to the public for full citizenship" (p.78).
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At the time of writing, the citizenship status of mental health service users appears to
be threatened further by the probable increased rapidity of the proposals to reform the
Mental Health Act 1983 following the ordering of an inquiry into the killing of Denis
Finnegan in September 2004 by a 'paranoid schizophrenic' John Barrett, given that
such inquiries tend to be followed by introduction of new mental health policy and
legislation (Muijen, 1995). Moreover, on the same day that John Barrett pleaded
guilty to the manslaughter of Denis Finnegan, a young woman was made the subject
of an Anti-Social Behaviour Order (ASBO) prohibiting her from jumping into rivers
or canals or onto railway lines following three suicide attempt using these methods.
Therefore, users of mental health services look likely to be subject to increasingly
coercive and condemnatory forms of control by the State.
Furthermore, until recently, mental health service users were the only group in society
to be subject to preventative detention. However, the Government's Terrorism Act of
2001 enabled the preventative detention of terrorism suspects whereby the
Government is, at the time of writing, hoping to introduce even greater controls over
civil liberties in the form of house arrest of terrorism suspects (The Observer, 27th
February 2005). Therefore, at present, the only citizens to be subject to preventative
detention are mental health service users and people suspected of terrorism; both
represent discrimination and an affront to basic civil liberties whereas the latter has
provoked an outcry from lawyers and civil liberties groups but the former remains a
minority interest (see Lister, 2001).
In addition, the emergence of a user movement and demands for greater user
involvement in mental health services indicates a dissatisfaction with welfare services
that refutes Marshall's (1992) assertion that state welfare serves to realise equal
citizenship within the context of inequality linked to 20th century capitalism.
Moreover, the potential for increased power of service users in services must be
examined within the broader context of power within society. given the indication that
service users experience significant discrimination and exclusion in British society
(Barham and Hayward, 1995; Read and Baker, 1996;Dunn, 1999; Sayce, 2000).
Ultimately, however. the citizenship of people who use mental health services is of
paramount importance because citizenship implies equality with other citizens
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(Marshall, 1950; Parshad Griffin, 2003) whereby it is important to examine whether
service users have achieved equality since deinstitutionalisation, given that they are
more likely to be located amongst other citizens than was the case during the
institutional era.
The research described in this thesis is significant because it is the first to examine a
broad range of areas of citizenship in relation to mental health service users and which
employs a wholly qualitative methodology. Barham and Hayward's research was
seminal in this respect whereby my research seeks to extend their research, given that
they examined a relatively narrow range of areas with a relatively homogeneous
sample of participants. My research is also the first to apply Marshall's (1992)
tripartite model of citizenship as a conceptual framework for the analysis of the
citizenship status of people who use mental health services.
Citizenship was examined by conducting interviews with 18 people who have used
mental health services in order to examine their experiences in a broad range of areas.
The research topics were organised in accordance with Marshall's tripartite model of
civil, political and social citizenship by exploring experiences and views in relation to
employment, income, housing, education, social networks, public attitudes,
community mental health services, psychiatric inpatient treatment, medication,
parenting, the Mental Health Act 1983, mental health policy and user involvement.
The overall paradigm adopted in the current research is congruent with the
'discrimination paradigm' described by Corrigan and Penn (1997) who contrast the
discrimination paradigm with the 'disease paradigm'. The latter is descriptive of
conventional psychiatry in depicting 'mental illness' as an objective medical
phenomenon that attributes causality to biological factors and assumes the
effectiveness of biological treatments. The discrimination paradigm, on the other
hand, argues that social participation is not inherently limited by mental illness but is
impeded by social categorisation, stigma and assumptions concerning the impairments
suffered by people with mental health problems. In examining the citizenship status of
people who use mental health services, I intend to avoid the implication that service
users are passive victims of discrimination but I assert that assumptions concerning
the incapacity, dangerousness or otherness of people with mental health problems
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determine their position within society. Within this framework, power is central to an
examination of citizenship.
Chapter One provides a brief introduction to theoretical approaches to citizenship,
using T.H.Marshall's (1992) model as a starting point. Marshall asserted that
citizenship rights had been realised by the majority of citizens by the zo" century in
Britain. The chapter will provide an overview of the most common criticisms of
Marshall's analysis and will describe more recent developments in citizenship theory.
Chapter Two examines the concept of civil citizenship and how this relates to the
experiences of community participation of mental health service users. The increasing
emphasis on coercion and control in mental health legislation and policy is examined
in relation to public attitudes and perceptions of dangerousness, the discriminatory use
of compulsion and the influence of notions of consent, compliance and insight on the
operation of mental health legislation.
Chapter Three examines the political citizenship of mental health service users within
the context of New Labour discourse on community membership and social inclusion.
I will argue that current mental health policy is incongruent with New Labour
discourse on social inclusion.
Chapter Four reviews the literature that describes the social location of people who
use mental health services. The chapter is organised in accordance with the concept of
social exclusion and examines literature relating to employment, poverty, housing,
social networks, parenting, mental health services and user involvement in mental
health services.
Chapter Five describes the qualitative methodology adopted in the study in order to
examine the experiences of citizenship described by users of mental health services.
Chapter Six presents the findings obtained from interviews with service users,
presented in accordance with the tripartite model proposed by Marshall (1992).
Chapter Seven discusses the findings in relation to the research questions and Chapter
Eight examines the implications of the findings for mental health policy, practice and
research.
4
A Note on Language
The use of language in relation to people who use mental health services IS
contentious due to the implications of language for beliefs concerning mental health
issues. I have used the terms 'mental illness' and 'the mentally ill' when referring to
literature that uses such terms. In addition, the participants in the research described in
this thesis used terms such as 'mental illness'. However, I have attempted to avoid the
use of terms such as 'mental illness' and 'mental disorder' because such terms imply a
medical view of mental health issues. I have preferred to use terms such as 'mental
health problems', 'people with mental health problems', 'psychiatric service users',
'people with a psychiatric diagnosis' and 'mental health service users' in an attempt
to distance myself from the medical view of mental health issues and I have included
terms such as 'mental illness' only when such terms reflect the language used in the
literature described or by research participants.
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Chapter One: Theories of Citizenship
Citizenship is an ambiguous concept that requires explication through reference to
theories of citizenship, followed by an examination of the problems associated with
such theories. Because citizenship is a relatively ambiguous concept, it is appropriate
to seek clarification on the characteristics of citizens and definitions of citizenship.
Definitions of Citizenship
Marshall (in Marshall and Bottomore, 1992) states:
Citizenship is a status bestowed on those who are full members of a community. All who possess
the status are equal with respect to the rights and duties with which the status is endowed (p.18).
Barbalet (1988) claims that citizenship:
Defines those who are and who are not, members of a common society (p.l).
Rees (1995a) argues:
Citizenship is a matter of rights and duties attendant upon membership of a specified community
(p.313).
Therefore, definitions stated in accordance with Marshall's typology emphasise that
citizenship is a status to which rights are attached (Lister, 1997) but also comprises
duties demanded of citizens. However, the simultaneous emphasis on citizenship as a
status that involves membership and one that involves duties indicates the nebulous
nature of the concept in that liberal and communitarian conceptions of citizenship
often overlap.
T.H.Marshall (1992)1 is the typical starting point for discussions of contemporary
conceptions of citizenship because he provided the seminal exposition of the social
liberal model of citizenship in 1950 (Faulks, 1998). He discussed the role of the
welfare state in the development of citizenship rights and espoused a tripartite model
of citizenship whereby civil, political and social citizenship rights were suggested to
1 Marshall's original exposition of citizenship appeared in 1950 but this edition in now out of print,
therefore the more recent print inMarshall and Bottomore (1992) will be referred to throughout this
thesis.
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have been realised by all citizens by the mid-20th century with the advent of the
welfare state. Marshall (1981) argued that state welfare distributed risk more
equitably in British society. Therefore, Marshall (1992) identified three dimensions
of citizenship, namely civil, political and social.
Civil citizenship refers to the equality of all citizens before the law and particularly
relates to the enjoyment of individual freedoms and the right to due process/
(Marshall, 1992). Individual freedoms pertain to the freedom of speech and thought,
ownership of property, the right to justice and the freedom to engage in contractual
relations (Heater, 1999). Marshall (1992) argued that civil citizenship rights were
realised by the 18th century whereby reform targeted individual rights, defended
through a formal system of courts (Turner, 1990). Therefore, the development of
civil citizenship rights is related to the development of legal institutions such as the
civil and criminal courts. Emphasis on individual freedoms is a significant defining
characteristic of the liberal approach to citizenship (Oliver and Heater, 1994).
Political citizenship refers to political participation and influence over political
decision-making (Marshall. 1992). Marshall described the growth of political
citizenship by the 19th century as being associated with the development of formal
political institutions and as the outcome of working class struggle for
enfranchisement. It is particularly associated with the emergence of new political
parties, the expansion of franchise and with the emergence of Parliament as the seat
of political decision-making (Turner, 1990). However, the liberal conception of
political citizenship has been criticised as being restricted to voting rather than broad
political participation (Prior, Stewart and Walsh, 1995).
Social citizenship refers to economic welfare and social participation (Rees, 1996)
or, as Marshall stated, to the "right to a modicum of economic welfare and security to
the right to share in the full social heritage ... and according to the standards
prevailing in society"{Marshall, 1992, p.8). He argued that social citizenship rights
were realised by the majority of the population by the 20th century with the
2 Due process has been defined as the way in which liberty should only be denied following legal
procedures that safeguard the rights of the individual (Cavadino, 1989) or a general right to a hearing
before a court of law in order to examine the justification for deprivation of liberty (Gostin, 1985).
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emergence of the welfare state that was thought to offer protection from the risks of
unemployment, sickness and poverty. Such risks were argued to have been
distributed more equitably rather than being eliminated altogether. In other words,
Marshall asserted that welfare renders inequality more tolerable rather than achieving
an aim of equality of outcome. Social citizenship appears to refer to a general
conception of quality of life in that minimum conditions should be met to provide
opportunities for a standard of living within a specific society and encompasses
health, education, housing, income, employment and consumption (Roche, 1992).
Roche, like Marshall, argued that the welfare state is the primary provider of social
rights. However, Heater (1999) asserts that social rights are ill defined and
impossible to legislate for.
Heater (1999) highlights the distinction that civil citizenship involves rights against
the state whereas social citizenship establishes rights provided by the state via
taxation. Marshall focused on substantive citizenship in describing the rights that
citizens can expect rather than formal citizenship, which examines who should enjoy
such rights (Heater, 1999).
A Critique of Marshall's Analysis
Marshall's analysis has been accused of being Anglocentric. For example, Turner
(1990) argued that Marshall's analysis is restricted to the growth of citizenship rights
in England. England is an atypical case because its citizens are subjects of the Crown
rather than citizens of the state (Wilson, 1998a; Pattie, Seyd and Whitely, 2004).
Citizenship in the US, for instance, has followed an entirely different course and
assumes a different character to English citizenship due to America's absence of a
monarch, pervasive individualism and the absence of a welfare state in a highly
fragmented society (Turner, 1990). Turner argues that American citizenship has
developed from the bottom-up: from grass-roots pressure for the extension for
citizenship rights to marginalised groups, as exemplified by the Black civil rights
movement of the 1960s. Moreover, Turner asserts that, while American citizenship
has followed an 'active' course, the development of citizenship in England has
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developed 'passively' whereby citizens have passively acquired rights from the top
downwards (i.e. from the state) (see also Wilson, 1998a).
Marshall's analysis assumes that the state is neutral in relation to citizens (Heater,
1999) whereas Marx challenged the liberal view of rights in claiming that rights fail
to guarantee true equality in society (Wolff, 2003). Marxist analysis argues that the
state exists to manage capitalism and, in doing so, promotes the interests of the
powerful in society (Finlayson, 2003). In addition, Marxists argue that civil and
political rights are meaningless without full realisation of social rights (Heater, 1999)
and that liberal notions of rights represent an individualistic bourgeois hegemony
constructed to obscure class divisions in society (Lister, 1997).
A fundamental question in relation to rights is whether rights are absolute or
conditional (Waldron, 1984). Currently, rights are depicted as conditional on the
fulfilment of certain obligations that risk reinforcing the exclusive nature of
citizenship. T.H. Marshall (1992) depicted rights as absolute. However, rights are not
absolute in the sense that the rights of different groups may conflict and thus groups
are either treated preferentially or detrimentally. For instance, the right to liberty of
people who use mental health services is subordinated to the right of people without
such diagnoses to be free from the perceived dangerousness associated with
psychiatric patients (Laurance, 2003). This argument will be further explicated in the
chapter concerning political citizenship, particularly in a discussion of the nature of
current mental health policy.
Social rights are also conditional on resources. T.H. Marshall (1992) argued that
rights are absolute but service users are finding that resources impact on the
availability of services. For instance, a number of elderly service users challenged
the decision of Gloucester County Council to withdraw services on the grounds of
resource constraints. The High Court, in a decision upheld by the Appeal Court,
ruled that service users do not enjoy an absolute entitlement to services and that
resources can be taken into consideration when assessing individual need under the
NHS and Community Care Act 1990 (Drewett, 1999). This ruling highlights the
problematic relationship between formal and substantive citizenship rights in that
formal rights may not necessarily be realised in practice. Formal citizenship
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guarantees individual rights whereas substantive citizenship involves a status that
provides opportunities to enjoy rights but cannot guarantee rights (Prior, Stewart and
Walsh, 1995). Prior, Stewart and Walsh indicate that substantive rights require the
provision of sufficient resources to guarantee entitlement to rights. Therefore, the
ability of welfare services to facilitate social citizenship depends, in part, on adequate
funding of such provision.
In addition, rights do not necessarily bestow equality (Waldron, 1984; Young, 1989).
For instance, the US has a well developed constitutionally based rights system,
including the most comprehensive disability discrimination legislation in the western
world, yet also features the most extreme economic and social polarisation (Sayee,
2000).
Marshall's original analysis appears to have been optimistic in claiming that there
had been a dramatic reduction of inequality. He later discussed the role of 'welfare
capitalism' in mitigating the effects of capitalism in that the role of welfare was no
longer considered to ensure rights and equality but to mitigate the effects of
capitalism on the individual (Marshall, 1981). He also acknowledged that increasing
emphasis on means testing in welfare meant that absolute rights are fallacious
(Marshall, 1981). Therefore, the welfare state has not led to greater social equality,
the 1970s witnessing increasing levels of unemployment and poverty (Dahrendorf,
1988; Walker, 1997) and the 1980s onwards witnessing an increase in workless
households from 9% in 1979 to 20% in 1995-6 (Callinicos, 2000). Marshall (1981)
diverged from a discussion of rights to a discussion of 'legitimate expectations' in
which citizens can expect minimal standards of welfare provision rather than
enjoying absolute rights of citizenship. Therefore, T.H. Marshall's later work was
pragmatically liberal rather than egalitarian, as is commonly assumed (Rees, 1995b).
Marshall has also been accused of producing a gender-blind analysis of citizenship.
Lister (1990a, 1990b, 1997, 1998a) argued that citizenship is not a gender-neutral
concept, claiming that Marshall essentially wrote the history of men's citizenship.
She asserts that women continue to be excluded from certain citizenship rights and
advocated 'differentiated universalism' which recognises the impact of social
inequalities on public participation (Lister, 1997). Lister (1990b) argued that
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women's participation is undermined by the artificial division of public and private
in orthodox citizenship theory, which fails to recognise that women's oppression in
the private sphere impedes their participation in the public sphere. Lister argues that
state welfare undermines public participation by treating families as homogeneous
units rather than individuals requiring individual economic rights. Therefore, she
argues, state welfare reinforces women's economic dependency on men and fails to
facilitate a balance between paid work and family responsibilities, primarily because
the state welfare system is based on male employment patterns and on the
assumption that women fulfil a primarily reproductive role in the family (Lister,
1990b).
Citizenship has been described as a potentially exclusive category (Lister, 1997;
1998a). The way Marshall excluded certain categories of people from his analysis
(e.g. ethnic minorities, women and disabled people) partly reflects the era in which
he was writing (Heater, 1999), but also reflects the way citizenship can be employed
as an exclusive category (Lister, 1997, 1998a). Rees (1995b) states:
...citizenship, like another favourite, community, shuts people out as much as it welcomes them in
(p.367)
Those not conforming to the ideals of citizenship can be excluded from rights
attendant on fulfilment of certain citizenship obligations (Rees, 1995b).
Marshall's (1992) analysis combined classical and liberal notions of citizenship
(Lister, 1997). In Ancient Greek polity, citizenship was based on political
participation and excluded women, children and adult slaves (Aristotle, Book III,
'The Politics'. Trans. Ellis, 1986). In fact, only propertied wealthy males were
considered to possess the education and time to engage in public duties required of
citizens of the polity. In more recent years, citizenship analysis has emphasised
plurality in society and the diverse groups of people who remain excluded from
certain citizenship rights (e.g. Young, 1989, 1995). Citizenship can also be a useful
tool in highlighting the way certain groups lack full citizenship status (Lister, 1997).
It is a useful concept because it has intuitive appeal and thus its value is difficult to
refute, in the same way that human rights and democracy are generally agreed to be
valid aims.
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The reputed validity of citizenship has meant that it is employed to satisfy a broad
range of political agendas (Kymlicka, 2002) and is a hegemonic concept (Faulks,
1998). For example, the neoliberals of the 1980s used the notion of 'active'
citizenship to denote a property-owning consumer (Held, 1991; Ignatieff, 1991) in
order to advance its ethos of individualism and philanthropic welfare to detract from
citizens' rights to state welfare. New Labour has used the concept to invoke
authoritarian demands for adherence to community norms (Levitas, 1998).
It is also unclear whether Marshall (1992) was presenting a historical analysis or was
positing an ideal type of society (Bulmer and Rees 1996), although his thesis is
usually interpreted as a historical analysis. Furthermore, Faulks (1998) claims that
Marshall's analysis is 'elitist' in producing an asocial theory that negates continuing
social inequalities; is 'exclusive' in producing a weak analysis of power differences
in society and 'abstract' in allowing dominant liberal political discourse to direct his
analysis of citizenship.
Alternative Models of Citizenship
The 1980s witnessed a renewal of interest in the concept of citizenship within the
context of consumerism and individual autonomy in order to detract from state
welfare provision (Mulgan, 1991). However, citizenship has also been employed to
demand responsibility from citizens in return for citizenship rights. This approach is
posited as a response to social problems ascribed by the New Right and New Labour
to diminishment of citizens' sense of obligation to the community (Rees, 1995b).
Marshall's (1992) analysis was somewhat atomistic in examining the development of
individual rights. However, New Labour has responded to the narrow consumerist
interpretation of citizenship adopted by neoliberals by advocating 'governmental
communitarianism' (Delanty, 2003) which emphasises participation in public
decision-making and fulfilment of obligations to the community (Prior, Stewart and
Walsh, 1995). Social welfare is no longer regarded as providing protection against
market mechanisms whereby the role of the state is to support individuals to help
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themselves (Lund, 1999; Tonge, 1999). Governmental communitarianism
emphasises redistribution of opportunities rather than redistribution of wealth, as the
original social liberal conception of citizenship described.
Communitarianism is informed by the notion of civic virtue which dates back to
classical Greco-Roman societies in which a 'good citizen' is one who participates in
legal and political decision-making (see Aristotle, 'The Politics'; Oliver and Heater,
1994). Nevertheless, communitarianism is argued to be a modification of liberalism,
except that it eschews moral individualism in favour of emphasising public
participation for the common good of the community (Delanty, 2003).
However, classical citizenship was exclusive (only adult, indigenous males were
included in decision-making) and citizenship was based on small tightly knit
communities (Oliver and Heater, 1994), thus the notion of civic virtue draws on
archaic, idealistic notions of community and political participation. Civic
republicanism also demands homogeneity of citizens in fulfilling obligations defined
by the powerful, thus negating group differences and power inequalities (Young,
1989).
In summary, the renewal of interest in citizenship in the late 20th century has
witnessed a transformation of emphasis from the rights and entitlements of
Marshall's approach to a greater emphasis by neoliberals and New Labour on rights
in return for fulfilment of obligations. Oliver and Heater (1994) failed to predict the
increasing similarity between right wing and left-wing conceptions of citizenship.
Both emphasise obligations rather than placing exclusive emphasis on rights.
Therefore, a crude distinction involves the liberal model of citizenship in which
individual rights are emphasised and the civic republican model that emphasises
individuals' obligations to the community (Lister, 1998a).
Citizenship theory has also been influenced by the emergence of postmodemist
thinking that places an emphasis on plurality in society (Lister, 1998b). Therefore,
recent conceptions of citizenship examine the claims to citizenship of a broader
range of social groups than included in T.H. Marshall's analysis. Marshall has been
accused of over-emphasising class at the expense of other social divisions (Heater,
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1999). Iris Marion Young (1995) referred to 'differential citizenship' to emphasise
group differences and to eschew the universality of Marshall's conception of
citizenship. She argued that equality in modern citizenship theory is problematically
equated with homogeneity, thus failing to encompass plurality in modern society.
T.H.Marshall regarded citizenship as a shared identity that integrates disparate
groups (Kymlicka and Norman, 1995) but this notion has been referred to as 'false
universalism' in its failure to recognise the needs of specific marginalised groups and
conflicting social rights (Lister, 1998a).
Hall and Held (1989) indicate the tension between the universal status of citizenship
and meeting diverse needs within this status and Young (1995) argues that, because
citizenship was thought to transcend group differences, people not thought able to
exercise citizenship rights have typically been excluded from traditional analyses of
citizenship. Postmodernism also demonstrates how Marshall's emphasis on class
struggle is archaic in the light of the struggle by diverse social groups for citizenship
rights (Rees, 1996). The 'modern social conflict' described by Dahrendorf (1988)
involves a struggle for membership by marginalised social groups who are
increasingly challenging the social inequalities that serve to undermine their
community membership by laying claim to entitlements which enable realisation of a
more complete citizenship status.
Therefore, the role of contemporary citizenship theory has increasingly involved
examining the citizenship status of marginalised groups. People with mental health
problems have been described as "incomplete citizens" (Bulmer and Rees, 1996).
The relevance of citizenship to people who use mental health services lies in their
greater risk of experiencing exclusion from citizenship than other members of
society. For example, Barham and Hayward (1995) described people with mental
health problems as occupying a 'community mental patient' role whereby alternative
social roles were difficult to attain due to discrimination. Similarly, Sayce (2000)
identified discrimination against people with mental health problems as underlying
social rejection, denial of housing, unemployment, violent victimisation, increased
mortality and denial of the role of parent. Sayce stated:
People with a diagnosis of mental illness experienee exclusion across every sphere of social and
economic life, from holidays to work, driving cars to raising children (Sayee, 2000: 60).
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Read and Baker (1996) found that discrimination impedes participation in a broad
range of institutions, particularly employment, housing, parenting and financial
services. Dunn (1999) identified exclusion from a similar range of institutions,
including education and training and Rogers and Pilgrim (2003) summarised a
comprehensive range of research which suggests that mental health service users are
significantly more likely to experience social inequality than other social groups, for
instance, in terms of high unemployment, poverty and homelessness.
As mentioned previously, Turner (1990) drew a distinction between active and
passive citizenship whereby active citizenship involves a struggle for rights by those
denied full citizenship status. The struggle by new social (welfare) movements, such
as the disability movement, for further development of citizenship rights represents
the emergence of more active forms of citizenship (Lister, 1998a, 1998b). Such
movements critique the paternalism of state welfare services (e.g. Ignatieff, 1991)
and the failure of state welfare to achieve equality for welfare service users (Croft
and Beresford, 1989, 1992).
Runciman (1996) argues that citizenship is problematic in that the middle class tends
to define valued rights. This analysis can be extended to argue that dominant social
groups defme valued rights and that the value of new social movements ('new'
because their interests extend beyond traditional class interests: Merlucci, 1995;
Young, 1995) lies in marginalised groups gaining a greater stake in the defmition of
crucial rights. This point also indicates the importance of examining mental health
service users' views on valued rights.
A final criticism of Marshall's analysis involves a refutation of his assumption that
state welfare is a positive ascriber of social citizenship rights. Oliver (1994) refers to
'welfare paternalism' as indicating the destructive nature of state welfare services in
undermining, rather than enhancing, disabled service users' citizenship.
The following chapters will examine citizenship as a status in relation to people who
use mental health services. The analysis will follow Marshall's (1992) tripartite
model of citizenship as a conceptual framework, in accordance with Lister's (1997)
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suggestion that citizenship can be employed to highlight the social position of
marginalised groups. Marshall (1992) argued that citizenship rights enable more
equitable distribution of risk but I will examine the claims that risk is not equally
distributed because people who use mental health services bear a disproportionate
amount of risk in relation to broad social inequalities (Barham and Hayward, 1995;
Read and Baker, 1996; Sayee, 2000; Rogers and Pilgrim, 2003).
Kymlicka and Norman (1995) argue that confusion often occurs between citizenship
as a legal status bestowing rights and citizenship as an activity, implying public
participation in citizens' duties. Moreover, Faulks (1998) draws a distinction
between legal definitions of citizenship, encompassing the rights and duties of
citizens in relation to the state; philosophical definitions which examine normative
issues such as the most useful model of citizenship; and socio-political approaches
which argue that citizenship is a status denoting social membership.
The analysis in the current thesis adopts the socio-political approach in its
examination of the community membership and social participation of people who
use mental health services. Faulks (1998) argues that socio-political analyses are the
most appropriate in relation to citizenship due to their examination of the power
relationships that serve to define citizenship.
In summary, citizenship is an ambiguous concept in that it carries a number of
meanings and has been utilised by differing political approaches. Therefore,
citizenship can be a highly contentious, problematic concept when used uncritically.
The thesis will examine the citizenship status of people who use mental health
services in relation to Marshall's (1992) tripartite model whilst noting the inherent
contradictions in the concept of citizenship.
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Chapter Two: Civil Citizenship
Civil citizenship refers to equal access and representation in relation to legal
institutions, including the right to due process, to engage in contractual relations and
the right to enjoy individual freedoms such as freedom of speech, thought and
ownership of property (Marshall, 1992).
This chapter will examine the role of mental health legislation in England and Wales
in defining the legal status of people with a psychiatric diagnosis in hospital and in
the community. It will be argued that increasing use of coercive measures has
occurred in the community and that this level of compulsion is related to negative
public attitudes, in particular, the postulated association between mental illness and
dangerousness. The chapter will also trace the development of compulsion in mental
health legislation within the context of community care. The relationship between
notions of rationality, compliance and consent will be examined as corollaries of the
treatment of people who use mental health services.
The Mental Health Act 1983
The Mental Health Act 1983 primarily governs the admission of individuals to
psychiatric hospital or forensic units. Mental health legislation provides the
framework for compulsory treatment and detention of mental health service users
(Pilgrim and Rogers, 1994). The compulsory admission of individuals to hospital
('sectioning') involves the denial of autonomy in treatment decision-making and
involves the state, via doctors and approved social workers, exerting control over the
individual (Barnes, Bowl and Fisher, 1990). Essentially, sectioning is based on a
fundamental distinction between physically and mentally illpatients in that the latter
are deemed to lack competence in decision-making due directly to the presence of
mental illness and thus psychiatric patients relinquish the power to make treatment-
related decisions to medical professionals (pols, 1989). The legal perspective is
intended to protect the individual from over-zealous medical decision-making and to
ensure that deprivation of liberty is in accordance with the principles of natural law
and due process (Bames, Bowl and Fisher, 1990). However, Bean (1986) and
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Pilgrim and Rogers (1994) argue that the Mental Health Act is discriminatory
because the principles of protectionism and paternalism enshrined in the Act are
selectively applied to people who use psychiatric services and not to other members
of the community who represent a danger to themselves or others.
Hotopf et a1.(2000) conducted a Department of Health commissioned analysis of the
patterns of use of the Mental Health Act 1983 between 1984 and 1996. They
discovered an overall increase in the number of formal admissions, especially in
relation to Sections 2 and 3 in Part II of the Act. The use of section 47 (transfer from
hospital to prison) more than doubled in the study period and use of section 48
(transfer from prison to hospital) increased from 77 in 1987 to 481 in 1996.
The trends observed in this study occur within the context of a huge reduction in the
number of in-patient beds available, thus suggesting that the increase in the number
of formal admissions predominantly impacts on the most severely ill patients who
are likely to be subject to repeated periods of relatively brief hospitalisations
(SCMH, 1998; Hotopf et al., 2000). The authors concluded that the steady increase in
the use of formal admissions indicates increasing public concern over risk posed by
mentally illpeople in the community, thus demonstrating an emphasis in psychiatry
on risk management and indicating a steady increase in the use of compulsion over
psychiatric service users.
The overall picture is that formal admissions now comprise 12% of all psychiatric
admissions, compared with 7% in 1986 (Barnes, Bowl and Fisher, 1990). The results
of a survey by Wall et al. (1999) suggest that the average urban resident with a
psychotic illness will experience at least one formal admission in the course of their
illness and that formal admissions are most likely to involve young males from an
ethnic minority with a psychotic illness. The authors argue that this group
demonstrates poor compliance with medication, greater denial of mental illness and
greater delays in seeking help, indicating the authors' uncritical acceptance of
medical explanations of mental distress and negation of racist assumptions in
psychiatry (see Browne, 1997).
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The Mental Health Act 1983 is intended to be based on the 'least restrictive
alternative' principle in which informal admission or diversion into community
services is preferred to compulsory hospital admission (Barnes, Bowl and Fisher,
1990; Hoggett, 1996).
However, the aim of the 1983 Mental Health Act to provide a social perspective on
mental disorder and to pursue the 'least restrictive alternative' has not been achieved
in practice due to the ineffectiveness of approved social workers in tempering
medical dominance of decision-making in compulsory detention (Barnes, Bowl and
Fisher, 1990; Hatfield, Mohamad and Huxley, 1992).
In addition, the least restrictive alternative principle has itself been subject to
criticism. Munetz and Geller (1993) argue that the least restrictive alternative is
typically interpreted as referring to location thus any service located outside the
hospital is regarded as less restrictive than hospital-based care. However, the authors
argue that this assumption fails to consider that community-based services may be at
least as restrictive as hospital-based intervention. They also argue that there is great
variability in the restrictiveness of facilities with restrictiveness mediated by staff,
activities and rationale rather than location per se. The least restrictive alternative
also ignores the impact of the development of inpatient-type facilities in the
community, such as 24-hour staffed beds or secure facilities (see DoH, 1998a).
There are a number of differences between the Mental Health Act 1983 and its
predecessor, the Mental Health Act 1959. Cavadino (1989) argues that the 1959
Mental Health Act was heavily committed to the medical model whereby medicalism
dominated legalism in the Act. The 1983 Mental Health Act, however, represents an
attempt to revert to the legalism, which predominated prior to the 1959 Act. The
increased emphasis on legalism is demonstrated by the introduction of numerous
additional legal safeguards to protect patients from unjustified medical intervention.
For instance, the 1983 Mental Health Act narrowed and clarified admission criteria,
clarified the law on compulsory treatment and increased access to the appeals system
(mental health review tribunals). However, despite the introduction of such
safeguards, Cavadino (1989) argues that the medical perspective continues to
dominate. This is exemplified in the broad definitions employed by the 1983 Act that
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enable considerable scope for professional discretion in interpretation (Hoggett,
1996). For example, the Mental Health Act 1983 fails to provide a precise definition
of 'mental illness'. It is also unclear what 'harm' (e.g. 'harm to self or others') refers
to but is typically interpreted as dangerousness (Hoggett, 1996). In addition, it is
clear that the way most types of patients can be compelled to accept treatment
without consent confirms the dominance of the medical profession over any
safeguards offered by mental health law (Pilgrim and Rogers, 1994) and treatment is
defined under the Mental Health Act in narrow terms to refer to medical treatment
(Bean, 1986).
Consent, Insight and Compliance
Bean (1986) argues that the concept of insight lies at the root of compulsory hospital
detention given the range of assumptions held about the capacity of people with
mental health problems to engage in rational treatment-related decision-making. As
mentioned previously, a fundamental distinction in the treatment of physical and
mental disorders lies in the way psychiatric patients are typically excluded from
decision-making on treatment.
Under common law, medical intervention performed without consent constitutes the
tort of trespass to the person whereby:
It has been held that an adult of sound mind and full understanding should be able to refuse
treatment, even if the treatment is necessary to save his or her life... Only where there is doubt as
to the patient's free will and capacity will no trespass take place. (Giliker and Beckwith, 2001:
267)
However, under the Mental Health Act 1983, treatment can be administered without
consent (with the exception of psychosurgery) on the grounds of being in the
patient's best interests, expressed in the common law principle of necessity which
states that a person can be treated against their will in their best interests due to the
doctor's duty of care to the patient (Hoggett, 1996).
The common law doctrine of necessity was central to the Boumewood case (House
of Lords: Re L (By His Next Friend GE) (DoH, 1998b». The Lord's ruling on the
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case argued that the patient was detained as an informal patient, despite lack of
consent, in his best interests. The ruling indicated that patients can be held in
hospitals informally without the patient providing explicit consent as long as they do
not make a deliberate attempt to leave. The ruling recognised a distinction between
voluntary patients who have the capacity to consent to admission and do so and
informal patients who lack the capacity to consent but do not demonstrably object to
admission. The subject of the Bournewood case was a man with severe learning
difficulties who fell into the latter category. Therefore, lack of dissent is inferred
when a patient does not attempt to leave hospital. However, some patients may be
fairly heavily sedated whilst in hospital and thus may be unlikely to attempt to
physically leave the premises, suggesting that the interpretation of consent as lack of
dissent is ultimately flawed. It is inherently problematic to interpret lack of dissent as
compliance. The Lord's ruling is also problematic because it failed to examine
whether hospitalisation and medical intervention is in the best interests of patients.
Furthermore, the Law Commission (1991) report on the decision-making of mentally
incapacitated adults argues that medical tests of incompetence bias decisions towards
the administration of treatment and typically involve a presumption of incompetence.
Those refusing treatment are more likely to be deemed incompetent decision-makers
and people whose explanation of their mental illness differs from professionals'
views are deemed to lack insight (Beck-Sander, 1998).
Pols (1989) argues people with a psychiatric diagnosis are commonly assumed to
have lost their capacity for rational decision-making and are likely to engage in
irresponsible behaviour due to poor resistance to impulses. Involuntary medical
intervention in psychiatric services is predicated on notions of irresponsibility
deriving from lack of rational thought (Pols, 1989). The Mental Health Act 1983
allows admission on the grounds of irresponsible behaviour: that the individual is a
threat to his or her own health or safety or the safety of others and treatment can be
imposed in the patient's 'best interests' (Pols, 1989).
Psychiatric ideology draws an association between lack of insight and treatment non-
compliance. For example, Altamura and Malhi (2000) claim that the patient's
awareness and acceptance of illness is crucial to compliance but they attribute high
21
rates of non-compliance to lack of insight typically associated with schizophrenia
and major mood disorders. Non-compliance is cited as being at 40-50% for anti-
psychotic medication (Altamura and Malhi, 2000; Hughes, Hill and Budd, 1997;
Bebbington, 1995) and has been associated with high rates of relapse (Hogarty,
1993), rehospitalisation (Bene-Kociemba et al., 1979), suicide (Hogan and Awad,
1983) and homicide (Appleby, 2000).
However, the concept of insight has been criticised for being applied globally (Beck-
Sander, 1998; Hughes, Hill and Budd, 1997) and thus as being poorly defined and
explicated. In addition, non-compliance in general medicine is also high,
approximating levels associated with neuroleptic medication (around 50%) and yet
this fact is rarely acknowledged (Hughes, Hill and Budd, 1997) and unlikely to be
attributed to irrationality in general medicine (Perkins and Repper, 1999).
Furthermore, the association between non-compliance and lack of insight has been
disputed in claims that the side effects of drugs and their questionable efficacy render
non-compliance a rational decision (Perkins and Repper, 1999; Hughes, Hill and
Budd, 1997). Smith, Hughes and Budd (1999) found that non-compliance in a
sample of depot clinic patients was associated with reporting of unpleasant side-
effects, fewer reported benefits of medication and a perception of no longer being ill
as reasons for cessation of medication. Equal proportions of compliant and non-
compliant patients expressed dissatisfaction with the physical and psychological
circumstances surrounding depot administration (e.g. pain and embarrassment) and
equal numbers agreed cessation had improved their condition. The researchers
concluded that non-compliance involved a rational cost-benefit analysis that
examined the pros and cons of medication.
Similarly, Perkins and Repper (1999) claim that most people regard medication used
in general medicine as suitable for short-term use but not to maintain health, as is
expected in relation to psychiatric medication. Therefore, they argue, patients'
cessation of medication once they feel well is rational when compared with orthodox
beliefs concerning medication administration.
In summary, Pols (1989) claims that psychiatric patients are assumed to have lost
their capacity for rational thinking and that they are at the mercy of irresistible
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impulses preventing responsible behaviour. However, notions of rationality are
normative and historically and culturally relative and defined by the socially
powerful (e.g. psychiatrists) without an objective standard by which to judge
rationality (Pols, 1989). Therefore, Pols concludes that involuntary control
predicated on notions of irrationality is not justified and involves a dehumanisation
of the mentally unwell on the grounds that they lack the fundamental human attribute
of rationality (see Moore, 1984).
Mental Health Review Tribunals
Civil citizenship includes the right to due process (Marshall, 1992). The mental
health review tribunal (MHRT) is one example of the opportunity for due process in
mental health legislation. Due process is defined as involving a general right to a
hearing before a court of law when deprivation of liberty is threatened (Gostin,
1985). The 1983 Mental Health Act purportedly introduced greater safeguards into
the use of mental health law, for example, by introducing the right to appeal to a
tribunal under Section 2 and by the establishment of the Mental Health Act
Commission (MHAC) (Crimlisk and Phelan, 1996).
However, Wood (1993) found excessive delays in the arrangement of hearings. Peay
(1989) claimed that reviews tended to endorse professionals' recommendations in
that 86% of decisions concurred with the Responsible Medical Officer's (RMO)
view, although this research primarily examined tribunals in special hospitals where
decision-making may err particularly on the side of caution. However, all of the
MHRTs observed by Richardson and Machin (2000) (50 in total) concurred with the
RMO's view. Similarly, Wood (1993) identified a tendency towards paternalism
rather than deprivation of civil liberties in tribunals. For example, in research
conducted by Crimlisk and Phelan (1996), 44% of the doctors interviewed argued
that the tribunal was untherapeutic in establishing an adversarial relationship
between doctor and patient, thus demonstrating a failure to recognise the importance
of due process in the compulsory detention of psychiatric patients.
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Spencer (1989) found the average rate of discharge is low at 15% (or as low as 10%:
MHAC, 2005) and particularly low rates of discharge for Asian patients have been
observed (Neville and O'Dwyer, 1991). In addition, the discharge rate has remained
approximately the same as under the 1959 Mental Health Act (Webster, Dean and
Kessel, 1987). Therefore, it is questionable whether the Mental Health Act 1983
increased protection against unwarranted detention through mental health review
tribunals.
Bradley, Marshall and Gath (1995) examined why there is such a low number of
appeals under Section 2, an average of 25%, by conducting interviews with patients
the day before the lapse of their right to appeal under Section 2 whereby an appeal
must be made in writing within 14 days of admission. It was concluded that patients'
appeals were impeded by the requirement to make a request in writing either due to
cognitive impairment, literacy problems or difficulty obtaining writing materials in
hospital. Indeed, 97.5% of the patients questioned argued that an automatic right to
appeal ought to be established.
Therefore, research on the use of mental health review tribunals suggests that they
fail to realise the right of the patient to due process primarily due to a tendency
towards paternalism and the failure of legalism to adequately challenge medicalism.
However, there is no reason to believe that legalism would be any more effective in
protecting civil rights than medicalism (Gostin, 1985; Pilgrim and Rogers, 1994)
since medical decision-making is merely transferred to decision-making by legal
professionals, therefore continuing to exclude service users from decision-making.
Compulsion in the Community
This section will examine the growth of compulsion over mental health service users
in the community.
Until 1986, psychiatrists coerced compliance in the community from discharged
patients by invoking an extended leave of absence under which the patient remained
liable to detention at the direction of the RMO without the need for a new admission
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application. In other words, a discharged patient could be recalled to hospital if they
failed to comply with the conditions of discharge, for instance, for non-compliance
with a medication regime (Fennell, 1992). Psychiatrists admitted patients for a
nominal period (possibly only overnight) in order to grant a leave of absence to
ensure compliance with treatment in the community. However, the practice was ruled
unlawful in 1986 in the cases of R v Hallstrom, ex parte W (No.2) [1986] and V.
Gardner and another, ex parte L [1986] on the grounds that admission to hospital is
justified only if the patient requires detention for treatment to be administered
(Ritchie, Dick and Lingham, 1994). Therefore, compulsory treatment was restricted
to compulsory inpatient admission. Thus, the Hallstrom case denied psychiatrists a
means of ensuring compliance from patients in the community.
A number of high profile cases involving homicide and self-harm have generated
demands from the public, politicians, mental health professionals and campaign
groups for greater control over the mentally ill in the community (Laurance, 2003).
Muijen (1995) claimed that the killing of social worker Isabel Schwarz in 1984 by an
ex-client, Sharon Campbell, seminally shaped public attitudes towards community
care. Subsequent cases such as those involving Andrew Robinson, Michael
Buchanan, Christopher Clunis and Ben Silcock (the latter three all occurring in 1992
and involving young black men) reaffirm, in the mind of the public, the need for
greater control over mental health service users. These cases led to demands for a
reversion back to an era of institutionalisation because the publicity surrounding such
cases emphasised the random danger posed to the public by such people (Muijen,
1995).
The inquiry into the case of Sharon Campbell recommended the implementation of
the Care Programme Approach (CPA). The Care Programme Approach was
subsequently introduced in April 1991 and involves the joint co-ordination by the
district health authority and the local authority of a systematic assessment of the
health and social care needs of the individual, construction of an individual care plan,
allocation of a care coordinator, and the conduct of regular multi-disciplinary
reviews of client progress (Bird and Davies, 1996).
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In December 1993, supervision registers were introduced in which the local health
authority is responsible for placing high-risk clients on a register. Harrison and
Bartlett (1994) have argued that the introduction of supervision registers contravenes
the important civil right of the patient to terminate the doctor-patient relationship. In
addition, supervision registers are no more than an administrative tool and fail to
ensure compliance with psychiatric regimes in the community (Bird and Davies,
1996). Their purpose is to ensure follow-up of high-risk patients but the National
Inquiry into Suicides and Homicides by Persons with Mental Illness (Appleby et al.,
1999) found that a significant proportion of those committing suicide or homicide
were either on a supervision register or were subject to supervised discharge,
indicating failure of supervision registers to reduce harm attributed to mental ill
health.
In 1993, the Royal College of Psychiatrists proposed the introduction of community
supervision orders enabling supervision, but not compulsory treatment, in the
community. The Conservative government subsequently rejected the proposal. Prior
to this, the Royal College of Psychiatrists, the British Medical Association and the
National Schizophrenia Fellowship proposed community treatment orders (CTOs)
due to perceptions of problems posed by non-compliance with medication in the
'revolving door' phenomenon and the risk posed to the public by supposed
unmedicated psychotics (Fulop, 1995).
The proposals represented an indication of the large numbers of individuals reputed
to require medication but not hospital admission (Cavadino, 1991), representing an
explicit disassociation between compulsory treatment and hospital admission that
was so prevalent in the 1959Mental Health Act.
The Mental Health (Patients in the Community) Act 1995 introduced supervised
discharge as a corollary of the Royal College of Psychiatrist's proposals for powers
of community supervision. Section 25A (supervised discharge) is applicable to
patients aged over 16 years and subject to detention under the 1983 Mental Health
Act. The requirements imposed by the supervisor are the same as under
guardianship, except that it is operated by the health authority rather than the local
authority (Hoggett, 1996). However, there is no power to impose treatment under
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supervised discharge and no sanctions for patient non-cooperation (Bird and Davies,
1996).
Therefore, dissatisfaction with the limited powers of supervised discharge has led the
current Labour government to renew consideration of community treatment orders in
their proposals for the reform of the Mental Health Act 1983 (see Chapter Three).
However, the criticisms of community treatment orders (which will be explored in
Chapter Three) are the same as the responses to the proposals for CTOs in the early
1990s: that they would deter help-seeking, be problematic to implement, would
represent an unacceptable violation of civil liberties (Burns, Goddard and Bale,
1995) and are based on an erroneous assumption of the efficacy of anti-psychotic
medication (Cavadino, 1991).
It is also questionable whether CTOs are congruent with the least restrictive
alternative principle in probably equalling the restrictiveness of hospital sections
(Cavadino, 1991). Cavadino concludes that CTOs would represent increased
coercion and surveillance in the community and is justified by reference to a
utilitarian philosophy in which the ends are purported to justify the means (Bames,
Bowl and Fisher, 1990; Cavadino, 1989). In other words, deprivation of liberty is
justified by the protection of public safety.
Therefore, since the introduction of the Mental Health Act 1983, there has been an
increasing emphasis on legislative reform enabling greater control of psychiatric
service users in the community. The question remains, however, why such people are
regarded as such a threat in the community?
In order to answer this question, the following sections will examine the nature of
public attitudes towards mental illness, whether evidence is available to support
public perceptions of a link between mental illness and violence (since
dangerousness is typically equated with violence) and how such perceptions recreate
broader discrimination in the community.
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Public Attitudes
Rabkin (1974: 10) states:
Mental patients have for years been regarded with more distaste and less sympathy than virtually
any other disabled group in our society, and in fact their handicaps are partly attributable to public
attitudes of rejection and avoidance.
Research has found that public attitudes towards mental illness are characterised by a
lack of accurate knowledge, exaggeration of disturbance, distrust, dislike and fear
(Star, 1955; Nunnally, 1961; Cumming and Cumming, 1957) and epitomised by a
desire for social distance from the psychiatric patient (Phillips, 1966).
Research on public attitudes has addressed possible difficulties ex-patients
experience finding employment (e.g. Farina and FeIner, 1973; Olshansky, Grob and
Malamud, 1958) and housing (Page, 1977), problems encompassing social isolation
and social support (Link et al., 1989), and government failure to protect the civil
rights of psychiatric patients (Wahl, 1995). Negative public attitudes may also
impede the re-establishment of family, work and social relationships (Schwartz,
Myers and Astrachan, 1974). Negative public attitudes may also determine public
policy in that perceptions of the dangerousness of the mentally ill enable justification
of a regression to more institutionalised forms of care (Laurance, 2003).
Therefore, public attitudes are likely to exert a significant impact on the ability of
mental health service users to achieve adequate community participation. A direct
relationship is therefore postulated between public attitudes and the citizenship of
mental health service users.
The following sections compare empirical data on public attitudes towards people
with psychiatric diagnoses obtained prior to and following the introduction of
community care and the role of the media in generating damaging negative
stereotypes that serve to influence public policy on community care.
Labelling Theory
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Scheff (1966) examined how mental patienthood becomes a stable social role and
argued that symptoms of mental illness are defined as residual rule-breaking in the
violation of behavioural social norms, thus the individual is labelled as deviant and
internalises the label to assume the role of the chronic psychiatric patient.
The critical claim made by Scheff is that social reaction determines labelling (who
gets labelled and which label is attached), is informed by popular stereotypes and is
manifested in discrimination that prevents resumption of ordinary social roles.
Therefore, Scheff's thesis is that labelling produces residual rule breaking and
assumes aetiological significance by causing further entry into the mental patient
role. The implication of his argument is that mental illness does not occupy an
objective existence independent of labelling.
A predominant critique of Scheff's theory derives from Gove (1970; 1975) and Gove
and Fain (1973). Gove (1970) criticised the lack of empirical validation of labelling
theory. The central argument adopted by critics of labelling theory is that aberrant
behaviour, rather than public labelling, is the significant variable in the identification
of mental illness (Cumming and Cumming, 1957; Phillips, 1963). Such studies also
assert that psychiatric intervention is only initiated in response to 'severe behavioural
disturbance' rather than due to adverse public reaction per se (Mishler and Wexler,
1963; Mendel and Rapport, 1969; Bittner, 1967). However, this assertion fails to
consider discriminatory interpretations of behaviour. For instance, data on the greater
use of Section 136 in relation to ethnic minorities (e.g. Rogers and Faulkner, 1987)
represents a possible refutation of such findings by suggesting that Section 136
intervention is likely to reflect dominant racist stereotypes rather than being a
reaction to greater aberrance of behaviour among ethnic minorities.
Gove (1970) argues:
The evidence suggests that stigma is not a serious problem for most ex-mental patients and that
when stigma is a problem, it is more directly related to a person's current psychiatric status, or
general ineffectiveness, than it is to having been in a mental hospital.
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However, other researchers indicate that stigma is a serious problem and that public
attitudes are critical in generating a general context of rejection of psychiatric
patients (Wahl, 1999; Sayee, 2000).
Significant Empirical Studies
The typical research paradigm of early public attitude studies involved the
presentation of social distance questionnaires as measures of social rejection (based
on Bogardus, 1925, who produced the first systematic measurement of social
distance) (Brockman, D'Arcy and Edmonds, 1979).
Star (1955) developed the case descriptions ('Star vignettes') that were employed in
a large number of studies until the early 1970s. She presented five case descriptions,
four of which involved mental illness and a normal control, to 3,500 respondents and
found that only the most disturbed behaviour was identified as mental illness. The
results possibly indicate that people's conceptions of mental illness are stereotypical
in implicating only highly disturbed behaviour as representative of mental illness.
Whatley (1959) produced a study considered important because it introduced the
social distance scale as a measure of public attitudes towards mental illness (Rabkin,
1974). Whatley administered a social distance scale to 2001 people in 1956 and
found that 68% of respondents claimed a willingness to live near an ex-psychiatric
patient, 57% indicated a willingness to employ such a person and 36% would
approve a daughter's marriage to an ex-patient. Whatley identified 'ego involvement'
as the significant variable in determining social distance whereby tolerance was most
likely to be found in relatively impersonal situations. Whatley identified social
rejection as presenting a significant risk of social isolation to ex-psychiatric patients.
He also found that young, well-educated, married white respondents in relatively
well-paid occupations demonstrated the least avoidance.
Phillips (1963, 1964) found rejection to be a function of contact with psychiatric
services and of specific behaviour exhibited by the target individual in case
descriptions (see also Schroder and Ehrlich, 1968; Bord, 1971). Phillips' study
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relates to the fundamental conceptual question addressed by labelling theory of
whether a mental illness label elicits negative reactions independent of behaviour
(Nieradzik and Cochrane, 1985). Phillips' findings suggest that negative reactions
are a direct consequence of behaviour that deviates from behavioural norms. Kirk
(1975) supports Phillips' findings in that only a behavioural description, and not a
label, influenced attitudes of respondents. However, Kirk used college students as
respondents whereas a differently educated general public may fmd labels more
salient in determining attitudes (Nieradzik and Cochrane, 1985).
Nieradzik and Cochrane (1985) found that diagnostic labelling was strongly
predictive of reaction to the target in a case description in comparison with the
impact of a role label. Social distance ratings were higher (indicating a greater desire
for social distance) for the schizophrenic than the neurotic or normal target and
rejection increased with increasing severity of behavioural disturbance.
However, Nieradzik and Cochrane's conclusion that a role not associated with
mental illness can reduce rejection by diverting attention away from the mental
illness is problematic due to their observation that the ex-mental patient may
experience difficulty obtaining alternative roles in the community precisely because
of stigma. They comment:
It may be the case that real-life situations, where the illness is debilitating. the person will be
unable to fulfil any role besides that of the mental patient (Nieradzik and Cochrane, 1985: 31).
This comment might reflect the low expectations of social participation held by
members of the public in relation to people with mental health problems.
However, Bord (1971) interpreted his findings as refuting Becker's (1963) notion of
the 'master status' bestowed by a psychiatric diagnosis because reactions of
respondents differed between classificatory groups in the case descriptions.
Perceived unpredictability and threat were most predictive of rejection. Therefore,
Bord's results are interpreted as a refutation of the assertion by labelling theorists
that a label is more predictive of rejection than the labelled person's behaviour per
se.
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Link et al. (1987) found that behaviour exerted a significant impact on social
distance whereas labelling had no such impact. However, they also found an
interaction between perceived dangerousness and labelling whereby the label elicited
beliefs concerning the target's dangerousness. Link et al. (1989) proposed a
'modified labelling theory' in which patients' expectations of negative labelling are
more significant to rejection than the aetiological consequences of labelling. For
example, 75% of a community sample of ex-patients agreed that employers will
discriminate against former psychiatric patients; 80% and 66% expected rejection in
dating relationships and close relationships respectively; 71% thought former
patients would be regarded as lacking trustworthiness; 62% expected perceptions of
lower intelligence and 70% believed their opinions would be devalued. Therefore,
former psychiatric patients recognised the negative impact a mental illness label can
have on social acceptance, thus appearing to support labelling theory.
In a summary of the literature on labelling theory, Weinstein (1983) claimed that
labelling theory receives some support in patients' acceptance of mental illness
stereotypes and that ex-patients feel stigmatised by mental hospitalisation but most
studies suggest an absence of problems relating to shame, embarrassment and
problems of community integration. However, Weinstein conceded that most of the
studies in his review did not directly test the core propositions of labelling theory and
he ignored suggestions that community integration is impeded by negative attitudes
in the areas of housing, employment and social relationships (See Farina and Felner,
1973; Olshansky, Grob and Malamud, 1958; Page, 1977; Link et al., 1989).
Public Attitudes in an Era of Community Care
Most of the studies cited so far were conducted in an era of mass institutionalisation,
when people with mental health problems were possibly less visible in the
community and were possibly perceived as less of a threat. The critical question now
becomes whether community care has served to diminish negative attitudes towards
mental health service users or has exacerbated negative attitudes. Bhugra (1989)
argues that public attitudes towards mental illness are crucial in determining the
success or failure of community care.
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Crocetti, Spiro and Siassi (1971) suggested that public attitudes indicate increased
acceptance of people with mental health problems by claiming their sample
demonstrated lower levels of social distance than in previous studies. For example,
only 2% of the sample was unwilling to work with ex-psychiatric patients, 13%
would not consider a romantic relationship with an ex-patient and 15% would not
share a room with an ex-patient. However, the fact that responses related to ex-
patients might have decreased social distance and whether or not respondents would
be willing to have contact with currently ill persons was not examined in this study.
In addition, the 'halo effect' might have predominated in producing socially
desirable responses (see Judd, Smith and Kidder, 1991). This is a fundamental flaw
in public attitudes research.
Aviram and Segal (1973) claimed that deinstitutionalisation has led to a desire to
create greater social distance from mental health service users in order to compensate
for the disappearance of the physical distance enabled by institutionalisation. More
recent studies of community attitudes confirm this assertion.
Wolff et al. (1996) examined public attitudes towards psychiatric facilities in the
community. They administered the Community Attitudes to the Mentally III Scale to
305 people residing close to two new group homes following closure of a large
mental hospital in the locality. They found higher rates of fear and exclusion than in
previous studies (e.g. Taylor and Dear, 1981), possibly due to the salience of the
proximity of community facilities, therefore inducing greater anxiety concerning the
threat posed by the new community residents. The researchers found that fear and
exclusionary attitudes were particularly associated with having children under the
age of 18 years, higher age and lower occupational status. Attitudes pertaining to
social control were particularly associated with higher age, lower social class,
African-Caribbean and Asian ethnic origin, lower educational level, children in the
household, longer duration of local residence, being divorced, widowed or separated
and, possibly suprisingly, knowing someone with a mental illness. The finding of
attitudes demanding social control in ethnic minority respondents is of concern due
to the experience of greater coercion used against African-Caribbean mental health
service users (Wilson, 1998b; Keating et al, 2002; Keating and Robertson, 2004).
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However, the study suffered from a number of methodological weaknesses,
including its use of a relatively small sample (N=350: a relatively small proportion of
the local community) and respondents who were self-selected, thus possibly
including people with greater motivation to object to psychiatric facilities in the
community. Therefore, the study might have over-estimated the prevalence of
attitudes pertaining to fear and exclusion.
Brockington et al. (1993) compared public attitudes towards mental illness in an area
served by a traditional mental hospital with attitudes in an area served by community
psychiatric facilities. They presented 2000 respondents with vignettes and a
community attitudes questionnaire and found 85% of responses indicated an absence
of fear and a significant degree of benevolence expressed towards mental health
service users. There were no significant differences in attitudes between the two
study sites.
Those exhibiting the least fear had the highest level of education and personal or
professional contact with people with mental health problems. Those exhibiting the
greatest fear had no previous contact with mental health service users, were of lower
socio-economic class and were most likely to be aged over 65 years. However,
greater age was also associated with higher levels of benevolence felt towards people
with psychiatric diagnoses.
However, tolerant attitudes expressed on the questionnaire were contrasted with
intolerance demonstrated in response to vignettes. Only 59% said they would be
willing to work with a mentally ill person and only 51% said they would live next
door to such a person. The place of residence exerted a minimal impact on attitudes
in that residing near to a community-based facility did not increase tolerance. This
finding was attributed to a lack of knowledge of community psychiatry. Knowledge
of mental illness was associated with lower levels of fear and a higher level of
benevolence. However, benevolence is not necessarily desirable because it may
produce institutionalised attitudes on the assumption that people with mental health
problems are unable to care for themselves. The outcome, for instance in demanding
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the exclusion of mental health service users, might be the same as when fear is
elicited in response to people with psychiatric diagnoses.
The results from the Brockington et al. (1993) study suggest that absence of contact
with people with mental health problems leads to fear and exclusionary attitudes. The
question remains of where attitudes derive from when there is lack of contact with
the attitudinal targets. Numerous researchers have suggested that negative public
attitudes derive from media misrepresentations of mental illness.
Media Representations
A growing body of research indicates that the media misrepresent mental health
issues in accordance with popular stereotypes of mental health service users. For
example, Philo, McClaughlin and Henderson (1996) found that 66% of television
coverage of mental illness, in one month in 1993, related to violence towards others;
18% involved sympathetic coverage; 13% featured self-harm; 2% involved comic
images and 1% critiqued accepted definitions of mental illness. Items referring to
violence towards others occupied a higher profile than sympathetic or self-harm
items.
Moreover, a sample of the audience of these programmes (N=70) was able to
accurately relate a storyline of a soap opera involving threat posed by a
psychologically disturbed individual and were able to faithfully reproduce tabloid-
style reporting of mental illness with great accuracy (Philo, 1996a). Almost two-
thirds believed that mental illness begets violence and familiarity with mental
disorder failed to prevent absorption of negative stereotypes. Two-thirds of the
sample cited the media as the source of their beliefs. Therefore, the authors
concluded, the media has a significant influence over the formation of public
attitudes towards mental illness and has a huge potential to generate misinformation
on the subject of mental illhealth.
Scheff (1966) claimed that children are socialised into negative attitudes towards
mental illness at an early age and that these attitudes form the basis of adult
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attitudinal orientations. Therefore, the content of media directed towards children can
exert a significant influence over the formation of children's attitudes towards mental
illness.
Wilson et al. (2000) examined the content of children's television programmes in
New Zealand and found frequent references to mental illness which involved
stereotypical depictions based on the use of derogatory names (,wacko', 'cuckoo',
'loony' and 'freak') and stereotypical physical characteristics, especially physical
abnormalities. Moreover, characters depicted as insane were either comic or
villainous.
Similarly, Wahl (1995) found a high frequency of offensive depictions of the
mentally ill in the media. He argued that media representations emphasise a
fundamental distinction between the mentally ill and the general public, involving
references to odd physical appearance, bizarre behaviour and a dehumanisation
inherent in the link postulated between mental illness and violence. Wahl claims:
When one sees or reads about a person with a mental illness in the media, it is more likely that the
person will be shown as a criminal and dangerous than in any other way. (Wahl, 1995: 65).
Wahl claims that the media present mental illness in this way because such
representations produce the fear, suspense and excitement that the audience demand,
thus increasing consumption of media products. Similarly, Henderson (1996) found
that television producers expressed greater concern to entertain audiences than to
educate them.
The misrepresentation of mental illness lays in the way the postulated link between
violence and mental illness is not supported empirically. Wahl (1995) estimates that
72% of media depictions of mental illness make an explicit link with violence
compared with an average rate of 12% of violent incidents involving mentally ill
people. The danger of such misrepresentation is that the public tend to believe that
media representations are an accurate reflection of reality. For instance, Wahl (1987)
found that 62% of lay respondents thought multiple personality is a primary
symptom of schizophrenia, as is suggested in fictional and non-fictional accounts of
schizophrenia.
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The consequences of media misrepresentations are serious for users of mental health
services. Wahl (1995) claims that the fear induced by media misrepresentations
causes a desire for social distance by the public and leads to demands for the
exclusion of the mentally ill on the grounds of their dangerousness, thus undermining
the integrationist aims of community care.
The Schizophrenia Media Agency (no date) claims that media representations imply
that violence is a core symptom of schizophrenia and emphasise the random nature
of attacks schizophrenics commit on strangers, thus leading to demands for greater
institutionalisation in the name of public protection.
Negative stereotypes also encourage non-disclosure of mental health problems for
fear of being labelled dangerous or incompetent, thus leading to delays in help-
seeking, social isolation and loss of social support (Wahl, 1995). Negative public
attitudes also serve to prevent people with mental health problems returning to
normal social roles, thus impeding full social participation (Hannigan, 1999).
The importance of research into public attitudes lies in its demonstration that
negative public attitudes have far-reaching consequences for social participation (e.g.
in relation to housing, employment and social relationships) and that tolerance of
people with psychiatric diagnoses does not appear to have increased since the
introduction of community care. The issue relating to whether public attitudes are
stereotypical reactions or are elicited by actual behaviour has not been clarified due
to the methodological weaknesses of early studies. Nevertheless, the consequences
(e.g. prevention of community integration) may be the same regardless of
motivational attributions.
In summary, it is open to question whether the media influences public attitudes or
whether the media satisfies demand for sensationalist reporting of mental health
issues. Henderson (1996) reported that television producers claimed to be merely
satisfying public demand for melodramatic representation of mental health issues.
However, numerous other researchers claim that public attitudes are influenced
directly by the media. Wahl (1987) argues that the public believe that media
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representations of mental health problems are accurate, citing the commonly held
view that is propounded by the media that schizophrenia is characterised by a 'split
personality'. However, Wahl (1995) also argued that the media reinforces existing
stereotypes, especially in relation to the stereotypical association made between
violence and mental ill health. Furthermore, Philo (1996a) suggests that public
attitudes are influenced by the media but indicates that the public actively choose
which media to access and thus existing beliefs influence responses to media
representations. However, the relationship between public attitudes and the media is
stated to be complex because the media does not create the social environment but is
simply an important part of the social context and may simply reinforce existing
stereotypes adopted through the process of socialisation. (Philo, 1996a)
Dangerousness
The previous section referred to the predominance of public perceptions of the
dangerousness of the mentally ill. A link is also postulated between mental illness
and violence in empirical literature (Monahan, 1992;Mulvey, 1994), especially when
combined with the use of illicit drugs or misuse of alcohol (Swanson et al., 1990;
Swanson, 1994).
Active symptoms such as delusions are thought to be the most likely factor
influencing violence in the mentally unwell rather than a specific diagnosis (Marzuk,
1996). Haffner and Boker (1982) claimed that delusional content involving jealousy,
injury or persecution is particularly associated with violence, especially delusions of
persecution. Link, Andrews and Cullen (1992) argued that symptoms of psychosis
are most predictive of violence because their study found a link between psychotic
symptoms and violence even in a sample of untreated community residents, thus
suggesting violence is associated with symptoms rather than due to a medica1isation
of deviance, contact with services or labelling.
Link, Andrews and Cullen (1992) concluded that the mentally ill are more dangerous
than members of the public due to the presence of certain symptoms. However, they
also indicated that the risk of violence is not particularly high and that mental illness
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is less significant in predicting violence than age, gender or educational attainment.
The authors argue that if risk is a sufficient justification for containment, exclusion
should extend to young males with poor educational attainment.
However, research on violence in the mentally ill IS beset by numerous
methodological problems. For example, data reliant on arrest rates may under-
estimate levels of violence since mentally disordered offenders may be more likely to
be hospitalised than arrested (Monahan, 1988). The inquiry into the care of
Christopher Clunis noted that police officers failed to arrest Clunis following
repeated involvement in violent incidents, including threatening others with a knife
and one incident of an actual stabbing (Ritchie, Dick and Lingham, 1994).
Moreover, research tends to employ ill-defined terms, relies on retrospective
analyses and fails to standardise methods employed (Marzuk, 1996). In addition, the
location selected for individual studies is likely to influence data in that hospital
studies may underestimate violence due to higher levels of surveillance and
medication than in the community. Therefore, research that suggests an association
between mental illness and violence may not be reliable due to basic methodological
flaws.
Furthermore, the clinical prediction of violence in psychiatric patients is flawed,
despite inaccurate prediction of risk by psychiatrists involving high-cost error
because it is likely to result in the denial of the individual's civil liberties (Steadman,
1983). Psychiatrists tend to over-predict violence (Cavadino, 1989) and errors in
predictions have been attributed to psychiatric assessments occurring in institutional
settings rather than in the individual's social context, thus casting doubt on the
ecological validity of risk assessments (Levinson and Ramsay, 1979). Psychiatrists
are also aware of the consequences of producing a false negative prediction of
violence in which a discharged patient is subsequently involved in a violent incident
(Levinson and Ramsay. 1979; Steadman, 1983). Psychiatrists also encounter
problems predicting behaviour due to social and cultural distance from patients
(Levinson and Ramsay, 1979) and appear better at predicting general violence than
in specifying the conditions under which violence is likely to occur (Mulvey and
Lidz, 1995).
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Although empirical studies of violence and mental illness appear flawed, national
statistics on homicide may be more reliable (although methods of recording are
likely to influence overall figures). Szmukler (2000) indicates that there are
approximately 500 homicides in England and Wales each year and approximately 50
of those are committed by people accepted under Section 2 of the Homicide Act
1957 as suffering from a mental disorder. Therefore, 90% of homicides are
committed by people not suffering from a mental disorder.
The National Inquiry into Suicide and Homicide by People with Mental Illness found
8% of the homicides in the study involved people in contact with mental health
services in the year prior to the incident and 14% had previous contact with services
at some time (Appleby et al., 1999). It was also found that 39% of all people
convicted of homicide had a history of alcohol misuse and 35% had a history of
illicit drug use. A significant proportion of mentally disordered people involved in
homicides had a diagnosis of personality disorder and perpetrators of homicide
tended to have had less contact with services than those committing suicide.
Risk factors for homicide were identified as encompassing a previous history of
violence. alcohol and drug abuse, deliberate self-harm, previous formal detention and
secondary diagnoses. Refusal of medication was implicated in at least 25% of
suicides and homicides and disengagement from services in at least 71% of homicide
cases. Disengagement was associated with broad social exclusion: living alone, being
unmarried. unemployed or homeless.
However, Appleby (2000) concluded that homicides by the mentally ill are rare, that
family members are most likely to be victims and that homicide can be reduced by
services addressing non-compliance and disengagement from services.
Unfortunately, non-compliance with medication has been used to justify compulsion
in service provision and disengagement from services is currently being addressed by
the potentially oppressive assertive outreach approach (Coleman, 1998).
Furthermore, as Szmukler (2000) argues, the majority of people who represent a
danger to themselves or others are not subject to the compulsion that confronts
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people with a psychiatric diagnosis. He indicates that, in the UK in 1994, there were
approximately 5000 suicides, 4000 deaths from accidental falls and 4000 deaths from
road accidents and none of these were subject to official inquiries, unlike the
relatively small number of deaths caused by mentally unwell individuals.
Despite the fact that the chances of being killed by a stranger with psychosis is
approximately I in 10 million (the equivalent chance as being killed by lightning)
(Szmukler, 2000), there is broad public concern of the random danger posed by the
mentally ill in the community. Such concern led to the establishment in 1994 of an
obligation on local authorities to establish formal inquiries into all killings involving
people known to psychiatric services (Muijen, 1995).
Such inquiries are problematic because they emphasise the failings of community
care and exaggerate the dangers involved in failing to exert adequate control over the
mental health service users in the community (Munro and Rumgay, 2000). Muijen
(1995) questions whether mental health policies are determined by the government or
by formal inquiries. For instance, the Care Programme Approach derived from
recommendations made by the inquiry into the case of Sharon Campbell and the
introduction of supervision registers was influenced by the cases of Sharon
Campbell, Andrew Robinson and Christopher Clunis (Bird and Davies, 1996;
Ritchie, Dick and Lingham, 1994). Supervision registers were recommended on the
grounds that Section 117 of the Mental Health Act 1983 was not being implemented
properly and was thus allowing people like Christopher Clunis to become disengaged
from services (Ritchie, Dick and Lingham, 1994).
Munro and Rumgay (2000) claim that inquiries into the care of psychiatric service
users who have committed homicide emphasise the unpredictability of violence:
27.5% of inquiries in their study concluded that violence could have been predicted,
thus implying that 72.5% of homicides could not have been predicted. Therefore,
such inquiries emphasise public safety concerns. Munro and Rumgay argue that the
emphasis of inquiries generates public demand for an avoidance of false negatives
(failure to predict violence) and therefore produce an over-prediction of risk and a
consequential erosion of patients' civil liberties.
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Discriminatory Use of Compulsion
Perceptions of dangerousness disproportionately influence the use of compulsion in
relation to black mental health service users. Moreover, the racist treatment of black
people in the psychiatric system reflects broader societal racial discrimination
(Wilson, 1998b) and indicates that the state does not intervene in a neutral way with
its citizens.
McGovern and Cope (1987) examined the case notes of all male patients aged 16-65
years admitted under the 1959 Mental Health Act between 1975 and 1982. In terms
of Part IV (civil) admissions, the youngest group of West Indian 'immigrants' had
compulsory admission rates 17 times the white admission rate. Differences between
white people and British-born West Indians were also highly significant but there
were no significant differences between British-born and 'immigrant' West Indian
patients. In relation to Part V (forensic) admissions, the youngest age group of West
Indians had admission rates 25 times the rate for white patients.
Schizophrenia was found to be the most common diagnosis amongst West Indian
patients and 'drug induced psychosis' was a diagnosis reserved exclusively for West
Indian patients. However, McGovern and Cope attribute higher West Indian
admission rates to higher actual levels of schizophrenia in the West Indian
population, unlike Littlewood and Lipsedge (1981) who found an excess of
compulsory admissions amongst a West Indian population to be independent of
diagnosis. The McGovern and Cope study is particularly problematic in that it relied
on case note diagnosis that may reflect racial bias in diagnostic practices.
Davies et al. (1996) found the mean number of compulsory admissions was
significantly higher for ethnic minority patients: 42.5% of white patients and 70.4%
of black Caribbean patients and 69010of black African patients had been detained
under the Mental Health Act 1983. Black people were particularly likely to be
detained under Sections 136, 2 and 3, and had greater contact with forensic services.
These findings were independent of diagnosis, total number of admissions in a year
and age, sex and marital status. The study is pertinent in demonstrating different
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pathways into services experienced by black people. For instance, black patients
were more socially isolated, had greater prior contact with the police and forensic
services and were more likely to be compulsorily detained.
Pipe et al. (1991) found the greatest preponderance of Section 136 referrals involved
young black males aged under 30 years who were more likely than young white
males to be regarded by the police and public as 'threatening, incoherent and
disturbed', and yet were less clearly defmed as being mentally ill and were more
likely to be living in stable accommodation.
Rogers and Faulkner (1987) conducted a three-year study of Section 136 referrals in
London across three referral sites: a police station, an emergency and assessment unit
and a hospital. Black people were over-represented in referrals in comparison with
their numbers in the general population and male African-Caribbeans were
particularly more likely to receive a diagnosis of drug-induced or unspecified
psychosis. However, the researchers were unable to specify whether diagnostic
differences were due to actual behaviour, differences in symptoms or to observer
bias. Nevertheless, the results reiterated the racism inherent in the postulated
exclusive use of 'drug-induced' psychosis for ethnic minorities (see Fernando, 1991).
Rogers and Faulkner argue that perceptions of dangerousness are central to Section
136 referrals whereby higher rates of Section 136 use for young African-Caribbean
individuals suggest police and public perceptions of dangerousness are particularly
likely to be applied to this group. Moreover, Section 136 referrals in the Rogers and
Faulkner study were associated with excessive coercion in that all detained cases
were held on a locked ward until expiry of the 72-hour detention period and 70% of
detainees were administered with medication during this period.
In relation to the administration of medication, Littlewood and Cross (1980) found
that the average black outpatient was more likely to receive major tranquillisers than
the average white outpatient (84% vs. 67%), was more likely to receive depot
medication (71% vs. 4')010) and the average dose was higher for black patients (3Smg.
vs. 23mg.). The differences were largely due to a small number of black patients
receiving excessively large doses of medication. Nevertheless, these findings imply
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perceptions of a greater need to control the symptoms and behaviour of black
patients and are likely to reflect perceptions of the dangerousness of black mental
health service users.
Fernando (1998) argued that diagnosis depends on interpersonal interactions between
doctor and patient that allow the doctor's cultural stereotypes to influence assessment
of the patient. Fernando (1991) also argued that the existence of 'cannabis-induced
psychosis' diagnosis demonstrates the impact of cultural stereotypes on diagnosis.
The stereotype of the black mental health service user as 'Big, Black and Dangerous'
(Wilson, 1998b) appears prevalent in the greater use of medication and greater police
involvement due to the implied greater need to control the behaviour of black service
users.
Racist stereotypes and institutionalised racism were prevalent in a study conducted
by Browne (1997) who examined black people's experiences of sectioning and the
influence of cultural assumptions on professional decision-making. Browne
conducted interviews with police officers, approved social workers, GPs and
voluntary service workers. The police were found to hold explicitly racist stereotypes
whereby discussions of dangerousness and control were almost exclusively focused
on black people. The police officers cited 'gut feeling' as directing their responses to
people with mental health problems, thus allowing SUbjectiveand racist decisions to
affect their behaviour. Racist stereotyping is epitomised in the following statement
made by a police officer:
Violence is more of a factor because persuasion can't be used: one race that tends to get excited
are Nigerians. It's the same with people from Arab countries. I mean they really know how to
demonstrate don't they? (Browne, 1997: 15).
Over 75% of the professionals questioned concurred that black clients were more
likely to be perceived as dangerous than white clients, although agreeing that others
hold particular attitudes is not equivalent to admitting such tendencies in one's own
attitudes. Browne concluded that the racist attitudes expressed by professionals in his
study must have been strongly held because they were expressed to a black
interviewer (Browne himself). However, the respondents' willingness to express
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racist views to a black interviewer might also suggest a belief that such views are
acceptable and legitimately held.
However, research on perceptions of the dangerousness of black mental health
service users should be considered in relation to Wilson's (l998b) assertion that the
psychiatric treatment of black mental health service users reflects racism in wider
society (see also Keating et al, 2002; Keating and Robertson, 2004). Therefore, the
treatment of black mental health service users should not be attributed solely to the
actions of individual professionals but should be considered within the context of the
discrimination, prejudice and social exclusion of ethnic 'minorities' generally.
Summary
Increasing rates of formal admissions demonstrate the dominance of the medical
perspective in the use of mental health legislation. Service users' decision-making is
undermined by predominant notions of lack of insight and postulated irrationality in
relation to medication refusal, by the way in which medical professionals are
permitted to act in the patient's best interests and by the way mental health
legislation is predicated on principles of protectionism and paternalism.
The civil citizenship rights of psychiatric service users appear to be increasingly
undermined by the progressive extension of compulsion in the community, as
exemplified by the proposed introduction of community treatment orders (DoH,
1999, 2004). Tolerance does not appear to have increased since the emergence of
community care and the low status of people with mental health problems in the
community is epitomised by the explicit stereotyping and misinformation contained
in media representations of mental illness.
The following chapter will examine current mental health policy in relation to New
Labour discourse on social inclusion in an attempt to determine the relative influence
of service users, the public and the media on policy. An investigation of the relative
influence of each group will elucidate on the political citizenship of people who use
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mental health services, since I have interpreted political citizenship as involving
influence over political decision-making.
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Chapter Three: Political Citizenship
Political citizenship refers to political participation and influence (Marshall, 1992). I
will argue in this chapter that New Labour's preoccupation with the language of
'citizenship' and 'social inclusion' is incongruent with their increasingly exclusionary
mental health policies.'
The Third Way
Tony Blair's aim is to create a centre-left consensus for the 21st century (Giddens,
1998) by advocating the 'third way' as an alternative to the neo-liberal individualism
of the 1980s and the post-war liberal collectivism that dominated left-wing politics
until the mid-1970s. The third way is New Labour's political ideology that aims to
transcend the divide between social democracy and neoliberalism, encompassing
neoliberalism, communitarianism and Christian ethics (Finlayson, 2003). However,
White (2001) claims that the third way is not a coherent philosophy because it
straddles such differing ideological approaches.
The third way was developed by Anthony Giddens (purportedly Blair's favourite
intellectual: Hutton, cited in Giddens, 1998), who is quoted as saying "no rights
without responsibilities" (the 'new social contract': Giddens, 1998: 65). Giddens
claims that post-war social democrats, such as T.H.Marshall, over-emphasised rights
at the expense of responsibility. The third way ethos states that rights must be
attendant on fulfilling certain obligations.
Equality is defined by Giddens (1998) as inclusion in civil society with citizenship as
the guiding principle. Participation in civil society is interpreted as involving the
assumption of responsibility within the community to behave in ways that fulfil
collective obligations. The third way demonstrates the moral ethos underlying New
Labour policy whereby obligations to the community should predominate individual
3 Although user involvement is regarded as a form of political citizenship (Lister, 1997), an
examination of user involvement is included in Chapter 4 rather than this chapter because it is
examined within the context of participation in services rather than in relation to broader political
participation.
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rights. The neo-liberals of the 1980s accused the welfare state of propagating welfare
dependency and as representing an inefficient distribution of public expenditure. They
advocated the 'active citizen' as responsible for their own welfare (Ignatieff, 1991).
Some commentators have argued that New Labour discourse is remarkably similar to
the ethos advocated by the Conservative government of 1979-1997. Fairclough (2000)
claims that both the Conservatives and New Labour emphasise national renewal,
individual responsibility, competition, the limitations of government and the role of
government in initiating cultural change among the populace. Such cultural change is
particularly directed at people thought to be implicated in urban decay (the poor, the
unemployed, single parents and young offenders). Barratt Brown and Coates (1996)
claim:
The alternative [to the Conservatives] has to be discerned through a mist of vacuous aspiration and
moralising sentiment and does not seem to amount to anything real (p.l).
In other words, the differences between New Labour and the Conservatives may be
more apparent than real. Indeed, New Labour has been described as "Mrs Thatcher
without the handbag" (Giddens, 2000). However, Fairclough (2000) argues that
Thatcher and Blair are distinct in that Thatcherite discourse was polemical and
divisive whereas New Labour discourse aspires to be inclusive and consensual.
However, like the Conservatives, New Labour places an emphasis on attacking
welfare dependency due to the 'moral hazard' of such dependency (Giddens, 1998).
Lister (1998a) argues that New Labour has diluted its political aims by transmuting
from a pursuit of equality to emphasising equality of opportunity, implying individual
responsibility for exploiting opportunities provided by the Government's 'welfare-to-
work' programme. Lister also claims that New Labour has transformed its discourse
from one involving poverty to a social inclusion discourse whereby inclusion is
defined narrowly as participation in paid work. Lister (2004) argues that the concept
of social exclusion complements the concept of poverty but is not its replacement.




Ruth Levitas (1998) produced a comprehensive critique of the moral underpinnings of
New Labour rhetoric. She deconstructed the popular language of 'inclusion',
'stakeholding' and 'community' by examining such concepts in relation to three
categories of discourse:
1. RED: A 'redistributionist discourse' places an emphasis on the redistribution
of economic resources as a route to social inclusion. It is informed by
T.H.Marshall's analysis of citizenship and produces a broad analysis of
inequality.
2. MUD: Refers to the 'moral underclass debate' and involves an attack on the
morals of certain social groups, such as social security benefit claimants and
single mothers, on the basis of their hypothesised moral and behavioural
deficits (see Mead, 1986; Murray, 1989).
3. SID: Refers to 'social integrationist discourse' which is influenced by
European discourse on social exclusion (see Chapter Four) but which places a
narrow emphasis on inclusion through paid work (cf. Lister, 1998a).
Levitas states:
To oversimplify, in RED they have no money, in SID they have no work, in MUD they have no
morals (Levitas, 1998: 27).
Levitas argues that the Government's Social Exclusion Unit (SEU) demonstrates
strong MUD influences but that Labour has generally shifted from the redistributionist
discourse of the Commission of Social Justice, to SID, with an emphasis on equality
of opportunity rather that equality of outcome and using the language of fairness
rather than the language of equality.
The Social Exclusion Unit (1998) defined social exclusion as:
... a shorthand label for what can happen when individuals or areas suffer from a combination of
linked problems such as unemployment, poor skills, low incomes, poor housing, high crime
environments, bad health and family breakdown.
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Therefore, New Labour adopts European and Anglo-American approaches to social
inequality that emphasise the multi-dimensional nature of disadvantage in which
numerous factors interact to produce broad social exclusion (Silver, 1994; de Haan,
1998). The stated aim of the SEU is to improve comprehension of specified problems,
to promote co-operation between government departments and to produce
recommendations for more effective solutions to social exclusion (SEU, 1998). The
Social Exclusion Unit does not have access to a separate budget with which to address
social exclusion but merely directs the expenditure of existing budgets in various
Government departments (SEU, 2004).
In 2003, the Social Exclusion Unit launched an investigation into the social exclusion
of people with mental health problems with the aims of examining how to increase
employment rates in this population, how to promote greater social participation and
how to improve access to services. Following consultation with a range of
'stakeholders', the SEU launched a report into social exclusion and mental health in
September 2004. Predictably, the main route to social inclusion was deemed to be
through paid work (see Levitas, 1998; Lister, 1998a) whereby a large proportion of
the report concentrated on policies to enable people with mental health problems to
engage in paid work. However, the report did identify a broad range of risk factors
associated with social exclusion, including stigma and discrimination, low
expectations by professionals, and barriers to housing, transport and leisure facilities.
Nevertheless, the report adopts a discernible individualistic approach in locating the
causes of social exclusion in individuals, specifically the attitudes of professionals,
employers and the public. The report even identifies a (postulated) link between
dangerousness and mental ill health as a 'myth'. This is inconsistent with the
Government's proclamations on the 'failure of community care' and the need for
legislation to address the purportedly dangerous mentally unwell (see DoH, 1998a).
Blair's vision of a modem, socially inclusive Britain is conveyed in a speech
delivered on 8th December 1997, entitled 'Bringing Britain Together':
At the heart of our work, however, is one central theme: national renewal. Britain rebuilt as one
nation, in which each citizen is valued and has a stake; in which no one is excluded from
opportunity and the chance to develop their potential, in which we make it, once more, our national
purpose to tackle social division and inequality (cited in Fairclough. 2000).
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In summary, Tony Blair and the third way considers the relationship between the
individual and the community as central to civic renewal and views a modernised
Britain as a nation in which no one is socially excluded. However, despite New
Labour proclaiming a pursuit of a more inclusive society, the third way represents a
morally authoritarian ethos that emphasises individual responsibility and obligations
rather than rights (Stepney, Lynch and Jordan, 1999; Tonge, 1999). This point is
exemplified in New Labour's conception of community that underlies their
interpretation of communitarianism.
New Labour's Communitarianism
Barratt Brown and Coates (1996) argue that New Labour's conception of community
is ambiguous and can encompass a hypothetical national community or can be
interpreted as common fellowship or common identity. Similarly, Levitas (1998)
indicates that 'community' could refer to neighbourhoods, regional or national
communities, the community of Europe or the global community. Nevertheless, one
of the prime exponents of 'responsive communitarianism', Henry Tam (1998) asserts
that:
At its most basic level, a community is no more than a group of people who have something in
common which brings them (and keeps them) together (p.220)
Etzioni (1997), another prominent exponent of responsive communitarianism, claims
that the "community is a set of attributes, not a concrete place" (p.6).
Such definitions exemplify the nebulous nature of the concept of community, yet
communicate the sense of belonging, social solidarity and membership inherent in
conceptions of community (Delanty, 2003). Driver and Martell (1997) describe
communitarianism as being based on assumptions that individuals are determined by
their communities, that communities facilitate social cohesion and that normative
assertions can be made concerning the characteristics of beneficial communities.
Communitarians espouse the ideal of the inclusive community which includes all
members in decision-making and inwhich each member accepts responsibility for the
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welfare of other community members (Tam, 1998). Responsive communitarianism
claims to be influenced by classical civic republicanism in which participation in
democratic decision-making and subordination of personal needs to the needs of the
community are the fundamental attributes of the citizen (Etzioni, 1997).
Etzioni advocates the 'new golden rule', which espouses that a good society nurtures
both social values and individual rights, thus achieving a balance between social order
and individual autonomy. He states:
The new golden rule requires that the tension between one's preferences and one's social
commitments be reduced by increasing the realm of duties one affirms as moral responsibilities-not
the realm of duties that are forcibly imposed but the realm of responsibilities one believes one
should discharge and that one believes is fairly called upon to assume (p.12-13).
In other words, social order is dependent on voluntary adherence to the norms of the
community which are determined by moral dialogues (Etzioni, 1997) or 'co-operative
inquiry' (Tam, 1998) on the assumption that discussions between community
members can achieve a consensus on core values while enabling relative individual
autonomy on more peripheral concerns. The latter point indicates the importance
placed by responsive communitarians on achieving a balance between social cohesion
and individual autonomy.
The communitarianism of Tam and Etzioni claims to encompass diverse groups by
only seeking consensus on core values. However, it is questionable whether
responsive communitarianism is able to avoid the influence of unequal power
relations in the determination of community norms, Hughes (1996) argues that the
moral authoritarianism of responsive communitarianism is not inevitable by
advocating 'radical egalitarian communitarianism' which argues that a moral
consensus can only be achieved when all citizens are equally able to participate in
society as a result of economic redistribution. Otherwise, economic inequality
undermines each individual's capacity to influence group decision-making, especially
in the case of women (Lister, 1997). Responsive communitarianism assumes that each
individual is equally able to exercise autonomy, thus it fails to address the relationship
between resources and power relations within the community (Bauman, 1997).
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Heater (1999) describes communitarianism as the intellectual foundation of the third
way. Communitarianism emphasises a moral consensus achieved through persuasion
rather than coercion. Indeed, Etzioni (1997) argues that coerciveness in ensuring
adherence to community norms demonstrates a weak society in which there is a
minimal commitment to shared values. Similarly, New Labour emphasise the need for
cultural change in society in order to appraise common values (see Blair, 1998).
However, New Labour has also emphasised coercive means of pursuing social
cohesion, particularly in their assault on youth offending, welfare benefit receipt and
community treatment of mental health service users (Stepney, Lynch and Jordan,
1999; Lister, 2001; Laurance, 2003).
Both communitarianism and New Labour emphasise accountability and transparency
of government in encouraging citizens' participation in political decision-making. The
problem for both communitarianism and New Labour is that neither has managed to
escape from the conservative, authoritarian connotations of demanding consensus in
highly pluralistic societies that are beset by countless conflicting interests.
Driver and Martell (1997) argue that New Labour's brand of communitarianism is
conservative, for example, in adopting moral views on ideal family structure and by
asserting that poor parenting causes youth crime. They also argue that it is conformist
in emphasising strict adherence to community norms; is conditional in demanding
fulfilment of obligations in return for rights; and is atomistic in placing an emphasis
on individual responsibility in human relationships.
New Labour's communitarianism advocates morally prescriptive notions of
community which, although espousing social cohesion, can have a seriously
detrimental effect on people not conforming to the expectations of an ideal citizen.
Communitarianism potentially disadvantages people who use mental health services
in that they are either regarded as being incapable of fulfilling their obligations as
citizens or by not being considered legitimate members of the community.
New Labour's communitarianism also fails to encompass plurality in society and fails
to deal adequately with the resolution of conflicting interests in the determination of
community norms. Levitas (1998) refers to the 'new Durkheimian hegemony' in New
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Labour discourse in its reiteration of Durkheim's emphasis on social inclusion and
social solidarity in small communities based on shared social values. Like Durkheim,
New Labour fails to question whose interests are served by a moral consensus
(Levitas, 1998).
Herein lies the crux of the problem. Communitarianism would enable the most
powerful members of society to define community norms and to determine who has
the power to demand the exclusion of people not conforming to such normative
standards. Communitarianism holds the potential for even greater 'nimbyism' on the
grounds that the presence of people with mental health problems offends community
norms. Sayee (2000) argues that 'nimbyism' against psychiatric facilities in the
community implies that the public regard people with mental health problems as not
legitimate members of the community. Repper et al. (1997) found that two-thirds of
mental health service providers surveyed had experienced 'nimby' opposition: 63% of
Mind associations were forced to delay a community development and 30% had
withdrawn plans altogether. Therefore, 'nimby' opposition is both common and
effective in its exclusionary aims.
Furthermore, communitarianism is paternalistic towards people it considers incapable
of fulfilling citizenship obligations. For instance, Tam (1998) states:
... some people have severe psychological problems which render them incapable of controlling
their behaviour, and they should be treated as victims who deserve the wider community's help to
resist behavioural patterns they struggle to reject. (p.122)
Tam (1998) also refers to "irreversible mental problems" which may leave people
with "little chance of being able to look after themselves in the future"(p.134). This
exclusive notion of citizenship echoes Aristotle's notion that only the propertied elite
possess the skills to perform the duties of a citizen. Therefore, although
communitarians espouse equal participation in society, they qualify this by adopting a
highly pessimistic and paternalistic approach to people deemed incapable of fulfilling
their obligations to the community. This pessimism is also detectable in New Labour
discourse. This is how Peter Mandelson described some sections of the socially
excluded in a speech delivered on 14thAugust 1997 to the Fabian Society:
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Groups such as poor pensioners as well as the chronically sick and disabled who are little able to
help themselves [my emphasis 1and for whom the message of opportunity must seem hollow should
be stakeholders in Britain's economic success and share its rewards (cited in Fairclough, 2000).
Therefore, although the Labour government advocates the social inclusion of all, it
argues that some people may be excluded from their obligations due to the implied
inherent incapacities associated with sickness and disability. Therefore, since rights
are supposedly attendant on fulfilling obligations, enjoyment of rights might be
compromised for those not considered capable of meeting such obligations.
Furthermore, since citizenship is defined according to meeting certain obligations,
those deemed incapable of fulfilling such obligations would seem to be excluded from
occupying the status of citizens. Therefore, one must question the Government's
conception of citizenship of marginalised groups, such as users of mental health
services,
Furthermore. in relation to the problem of the dominant voices in the community
determining legitimate membership of the community, the influence of public
attitudes on current mental health policy demonstrates the power of discriminatory
public opinion on the formulation of national policies (Muijen, 1995;Wahl, 1999).
At the time of the research described in this thesis, the Government's mental health
policy comprised three foremost strands:
• Proposals for the reform of the Mental Health Act 1983 (DoH, 1999b)
• 'Modernising Mental Health Services' (DoH, 1998a)
• The National Service Framework for mental health [sic] (DoH, 1999a)
I will argue that the content of current mental health policy is incongruent with New
Labour's rhetoric on creating inclusive communities and tackling social exclusion.
The Proposals for the Reform of the Mental Health Ad 1983
Laurance (2003) claims that the draft Mental Health Bill (DoH, 2002) exposes the
authoritarian style of New Labour, citing Paul Boeteng's statement that the Labour
government " ... will not tolerate a culture of non-compliance". Boeteng's statement
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and the draft Mental Health Bill is based on the proposition that relapse in mental
illness is caused by non-compliance with medication (Laurance, 2003) and
demonstrates the Government's commitment to the medical model (see Beresford and
Croft, 2001). Therefore, the explicit aim of the Green Paper on the reform of the
current Mental Health Act is to examine how legislation can be updated to enable the
extension of compulsory treatment beyond the hospital into the community. This
reflects the Government's concern that the current Mental Health Act only enables
compulsory treatment within inpatient settings and thus is regarded as inappropriate in
an era of community care.
The proposals argue that people with mental health problems are equivalent to
patients with physical illness. However, this rationale fails to recognise that general
medical patients have the power to refuse treatment (Giliker and Beckwith, 2001) and
generally do not suffer the same degree of stigma typically associated with mental
health problems (Wahl, 1999). The proposals support the medical view of mental
health problems by equating mental and physical ill health, thus continuing to invest
significant power in medically oriented psychiatric professionals.
The main aim of the proposals to secure compulsory treatment in the community
appears to be a knee-jerk reaction to public concerns over the dangerousness of
mental health service users (Laurance, 2003). Therefore, proposals for legislative
reform represent populist concern to satisfy public demands for control or
containment of the 'dangerous' mentally ill. One of the key underlying principles of
the proposals is the prioritisation of public safety over the civil rights of psychiatric
service users.
An additional principle underlying the proposals is that treatment should, whenever
possible, be conducted on an informal basis. However, Cavadino (1989) refers to the
'myth' of voluntary patient status, indicating that coercion of patients to comply with
treatment regimes is enforced through the explicit or implicit threat of coercion. For
example, the patient might comply with medical directives in fear of compulsion
being imposed as a response to perceived non-compliance. Cavadino found that
voluntary patients had been subjected to physical force, locked in seclusion rooms,
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had clothes withheld and had been forcibly administered treatment, thus casting doubt
on the voluntariness of the voluntary patient status.
One of the key features of the Green Paper is the proposal for the introduction of
community treatment orders on the grounds that the Mental Health (Patients in the
Community) Act 1995 failed to address the problem of non-compliance with
medication. Therefore, it is proposed that a new Mental Health Act would permit
compulsory treatment in the community, using the same criteria as compulsory
treatment in hospital (DoH, 1999b).
The Green Paper (DoH, 1999b) proposed the introduction of the community treatment
order which would be able to stipulate a place of residence; define a proposed care
and treatment plan; place an obligation on health and local authorities to comply with
the care plan and non-compliance with their care plan by patients would be met with
the power to enter premises and to convey the patient either to hospital or to a
community treatment centre to receive treatment.
Mind (2000) and Pedler (1999) raised a number of concerns in relation to the
proposed community treatment orders (CTOs). They argued that CTOs would
discourage people from seeking help from services; they would undermine the trust
essential to user-professional relationships and they have the potential to be used in a
discriminatory way, especially in relation to black service users given the currently
high rate of compulsion directed at this group (McGovern and Cope, 1987; Davies et
al., 1996; Pipe et al., 1991; Rogers and Faulkner, 1987).
Community treatment orders also emphasise medication at the expense of other forms
of treatment and assume that medication is effective (pedler, 1999), yet 10-20% of
psychiatric inpatients diagnosed with schizophrenia do not respond to medication
(Davis et al., 1980). The emphasis on medication in the Green Paper demonstrates the
Labour government's commitment to the biomedical approach to mental health.
Moreover, side effects of medication mean that non-compliance may constitute
rational decision-making (Hughes, Hill and Budd, 1997; Perkins and Repper, 1999).
Mind (2000) asserted that the imposition of medication on people with a mental health
problem and not on other groups who pose a risk to themselves is discriminatory.
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They also argued that it is erroneous to claim that mental illness is a predictor of
violence (as suggested by the Government). Mental illness is only a predictor of
violence when combined with other risk factors such as substance misuse (Appleby,
2000). Mind also argued that community treatment orders would be associated with
greater stigma because it involves the public labelling of incompetence in treatment-
related decision-making and would lead to an even greater defensiveness in medicine
with increased emphasis on risk management.
The Green Paper was followed in 2002 by further consultation and in 2004 by the
draft Mental Health Bill. The consultation (DoH, 2002) introduced the Mental Health
Act Order which includes the notion of compulsory care plans in which individuals
can be ordered to reside at a specified location, to attend a day centre, to be assessed
by an authorised mental health professional and to accept medical treatment specified
in a care plan. Failure to comply with the care plan would be met with the power of
mental health professionals or the police to transfer individuals to a 'place of safety',
including hospital. The proposals emphatically indicate that the Mental Health Act
Order would not allow compulsory treatment in the individual's own home. However,
the draft Mental Health Bill (DoH, 2004) introduces the concept of the 'non-resident
patient' who must allow access to professionals to conduct an assessment and, if
necessary, to order treatment in the community. Refusing to make oneself available
for assessment or failure to attend a specified place as part of a care plan could result
in the individual being conveyed to hospital or to a 'clinical setting' in order to
receive treatment. Moreover, treatment is broadly defined in the Bill and seems to
include attendance at a day centre or even living in a specified place. The wording
contained in the Bill conveys the construction of the patient in mental health policy.
For example, it describes how a Justice of the Peace could issue a warrant for removal
of an individual to a place of safety if a person is believed to be suffering from a
mental disorder and "has been or is being ill-treated, neglected or kept otherwise than
under proper control [my emphasis] ... " Such language appears more appropriate to
describe a stray dog than a human being with fundamental human rights.
Although the Bill proposes a statutory right to access an independent mental health
advocate to ensure that the individual's rights are observed, the Bill extends
compulsion beyond the originally-proposed community treatment orders to
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compulsory care plans that even remove the individual's right to determine where
they live, whether to attend a day centre or whether to accept or decline a mental
health service in the first place. However, the Mental Health Act Order appears to
replicate the powers of Supervised Discharge in that the supervisor can stipulate a
place of residence, attendance for medical treatment or rehabilitation and a supervisor
can gain access to a supervisee's residence. Nevertheless, the Mental Health Act
Order introduces the status of a 'non-resident patient' and it is this development that
distinguishes the proposals in the Mental Health Bill from previous mental health
legislation.
Since the completion of the research described in this thesis, a Parliamentary Joint
Scrutiny Committee (2005) has commented on the draft Mental Health Bill, recording
a number of objections to the Bill. Most notably, the Committee expressed concern in
relation to the potential of Mental Health Act Orders to be used as a form of mental
health ASBO (Anti-Social Behaviour Order) in being applied to control the behaviour
of people with mental health issues. The Government (DoH, 2005) responded by
denying that the Orders would be used as a form of social control and rejected the
Committee's recommendation to limit the use of the Orders to a small minority of
people who pose a significant risk to themselves or others. Therefore, proposals for
the reform of mental health legislation remains unchanged since the completion of the
research.
In relation to citizenship, the proposals for Mental Health Act Orders constitute even
further erosion of civil citizenship rights of mental health service users and indicate an
even greater emphasis on surveillance and control (Moncrieff, 2003), thus producing
greater tenuousness of community membership. This theme is reiterated in the
Government proposals for the development of community services as described in the
document 'Modernising Mental Health Services' (DoH, 1998a).
'Modernising Mental Health Services'
On December 8th 1998, the then Secretary of State for Health Frank Dobson
announced an 'extra' £700 million for mental health services. The way this money is
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to be spent is described in 'Modernising Mental Health Services'. The stated aims of
reform of community mental health service provision are to improve mental health
care and to increase public confidence in services. The second aim reflects the
Government's response to public pressure for containment of mental health service
users. The executive summary of the document contains the statement:
There is a relation between active mental illness and violence (DoH, I998a: 2).
This assertion is erroneous. Research conducted by Taylor and Gunn (1999) indicates
that there has been a 3% annual decrease in instances of violence involving people
with mental health problems between 1957 and 1995. However, such evidence is
ignored in the following statement delivered by Frank Dobson in the foreword to the
document:
Care in the community has failed because, while it improved the treatment of many people who
were mentally ill, it left far too many walking the streets, often at risk to themselves and a nuisance
to others. A small but significant {my emphasis] minority have been a threat to others or themselves
(DoH, 1998a: 60).
The 'failure' of community care is attributed to the emergence of a group of seriously-
ill, difficult-to-engage people in need of long-term care (schizophrenics are cited as an
example); over-burdened families; under-funding; problems of staff recruitment and
retention; treatments not reaching those who need them; an archaic legislative
framework unsuited to the demands of community care; mental health legislation
unable to deal with anti-social personality disorder and inadequate provision of
community services.
However, Barham states:
Those who appear determined to show that community care policies have failed are frequently
those who find the challenges of a more egalitarian mental health culture distasteful and threatening
(Barham, 1997: 151).
Furthermore, Leff (2001) argued that the 'community care has failed' discourse is
erroneous because deinstitutionalisation has not caused homelessness nor increased
violence by deinstitutionalised patients. Moreover, Thornicroft and Goldberg (1998)
argue that community care cannot be deemed to have failed because it has not been
fully implemented due to the narrow range of services available in the community.
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They also assert that society seeks to minimise risk by incarcerating those thought to
pose a risk to society. They attempt to counter such tendencies by reiterating the low
level of risk posed to the public by mental health service users. However, they
recommend reform of mental health legislation and the targeting of services at the
most severely mentally unwell, therefore reflecting reforms advocated by the
Government that have been criticised for increasing stigma and reducing civil liberties
of mental health service users (Szmukler and Holloway, 2000; Moncrieff, 2003).
The criticism of inadequate community provision is the focus of 'Modernising Mental
Health Services' which directs that the extra £700 million be spent on an increased
number of inpatient beds, 24-hour staffed beds, assertive outreach, extended secure
and forensic provision and increased availability of atypical neuroleptics.
Although Pilgrim, Rogers and Lacey (1993) found that service users express a
preference for a broader range of more accessible services, the Government's plans
for service development appear to be influenced by the more coercive emphasis of
American-style services, especially in relation to compulsory treatment in the
community and assertive outreach. Assertive outreach in Britain is based on the
assertive community treatment model in America on the basis that the American
model has succeeded in reducing inpatient admissions (Wright et al., 2003). The
American assertive community treatment model involves intensive community Cin
vivo') support for people with 'severe and enduring mental health problems', out-of-
hours support and small caseloads shared within a multi-disciplinary team (Fiander et
al., 2003). Laurance (2003) describes the American model of assertive outreach as
authoritarian and involved in social policing. Moreover, British assertive outreach can
either be viewed positively as supporting users in their home environment or
negatively as enforcing unwanted intervention (Laurance, 2003). Laurance warns that
assertive outreach could emulate the American model in its authoritarianism if it
attempts to enforce compliance with medication. Moreover, Coleman (1998) cites the
example of an assertive outreach team in Madison, US, who control the social security
benefits of clients to ensure compliance with medication; non-compliance leads to the
withholding of benefits. A worker at PACT, an assertive outreach team in New Jersey
is quoted as stating:
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Letting services lapse because of oversight or letting clients be lost because they are tired of being
involved is quite unacceptable to the program (quoted in Mosher and Burti, 1989).
In other words, the clients of such services are not allowed to escape their mental
patienthood status and become permanent community mental health patients (cf.
Barham and Hayward, 1995).
Modernising Mental Health Services is guided by the rubric of "safe", "sound" and
"supportive" services. I would argue that "safe" refers to public safety, "sound" refers
to services that are increasingly institutionalised in nature and "supportive" in
"building healthier communities" is undermined by the other two descriptors and
informed by the atomistic moral authoritarianism of communitarian discourse.
The National Service Framework for Mental Health
One of the main aims of the National Service Framework (DoH, 1999a) is to reduce
regional variations in mental health service provision. It places emphasis on national
standards and assessments of local needs and in meeting those needs. Local
authorities are required to identify gaps in service provision whereby services for
people with 'serious and enduring mental illness' must be prioritised and only when
these needs are met can local authorities begin to meet the needs of people with more
common mental health problems. Therefore, there is an implicit distinction made
between 'serious mental illness' which must be met by provision that emphasises
public safety and common mental health problems that occupy much lower priority.
Therefore, the Government is prioritising populist concerns for the containment of
people with severe mental health problems over the provision of comprehensive and
preventative mental health services (Beresford and Croft. 2001).
However, Standard One in the National Service Framework refers to 'mental health
promotion' and 'tackling discrimination and social exclusion'. It states that action
should be taken to:
Combat discrimination against people with mental health problems and to promote positive images
of mental illness (p.8).
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This statement is paradoxical given New Labour's emphasis on containment in other
policies. Nevertheless, it places an onus on health and local authorities to "promote
health and reduce the discrimination and social exclusion associated with mental
health problems". The document suggests intervention by agencies in relation to
strengthening social networks and communities, introducing holistic forms of
treatment such as exercise and stress management and services to support people
experiencing stress at work or due to unemployment or parenting responsibilities. It
also suggests public education to reduce stigma and support for the mental health
needs of homeless populations. However, the emphasis of intervention appears to be
individualistic in failing to recognise the structural causes of inequality, although one
concession made is in recommending greater use of the Disability Discrimination Act
1995 by employers to reduce discrimination in the workplace. This recommendation
fails to acknowledge the low rates of employment amongst disabled people (see
Barnes, 1992a).
Standard Five of the National Service Framework describes 'effective services for
people with severe mental illness' but presents a convoluted approach to mental
health services by claiming the 'proven effectiveness' of neuroleptic medications and
blaming relapse on non-compliance with medication, yet also advocates user
involvement in care planning and support to access a broad range of services to
reduce the impact of social exclusion.
Summary
Pilgrim and Rogers (1997) argue that mental health policy in the late 1990s could
either impose a narrow focus on containment or initiate a wider debate on the social
influences that impact on mental health. The three strands of mental health policy that
have been examined demonstrate the adoption of a narrow emphasis on containment
and commitment to the biomedical approach to mental health.
Therefore, despite the rhetoric on social inclusion, New Labour's mental health policy
serves to exacerbate the existing exclusion of people who use mental health services
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and demonstrates that service users exert minimal influence over political decision-
making and thus lack full access to political citizenship.
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Chapter Four: Social Citizenship
Social citizenship refers to economic welfare and social participation (Marshall,
1992). This is the area in which the interaction between citizenship and social
exclusion research is most obvious, social exclusion being the obverse of social
participation and membership.
Barham and Hayward (1995) examined the meaning of social participation for
mental health service users and found notable commonality of experience of
disconnection from mainstream society, marginalisation and social isolation, as
exemplified in high levels of unemployment, poverty and little choice in housing
(referring to choice of geographical location or who to live with). Barham and
Hayward describe the plight of the 'community mental patient' as involving a search
for 'personhood' in which the individual attempts to create a meaningful social
identity within the context of structural impediments to participation.
I will examine the evidence in this chapter which suggests that within the general
context of increasing social exclusion in Britain (Walker, 1997), mental health
service users comprise one of the most socially excluded groups in British society.
The following chapter is intended to provide only a brief overview of the public
institutions from which mental health service users might be excluded. The research
described in this thesis aims to elicit indicators of citizenship and social inclusion
from interviews with people who use mental health services in order to enable an
operationalisation of citizenship as defined by people with mental health problems
themselves.
Social Exclusion
It is argued that social exclusion discourse in the 1990s has superseded the poverty
discourse prevalent in the 1970s (Evans, 1998) due to the perceived inadequacies of
individualistic approaches to poverty in dealing with new conditions associated with
economic restructuring and welfare reform since the mid-1970s (Silver, 1994; Room,
1995). The 'new' discourse of social exclusion is thought to reflect the unequal
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burden of risk falling on certain social groups as a result of deindustrialisation,
globalisation and the resultant restructuring of the labour market (Kennett, 1995).
Social exclusion is deemed a new buzz word(s) in Britain since the ascendancy of
New Labour (de Haan, 1998) and is described as " ... currently the most fashionable
term for describing the form of social division in European advanced capitalist
countries" (Byrne, 1997: 27). However, despite being currently fashionable, the
seminal use of the concept of social exclusion is attributed to Lenoir (1974) who
employed the term to refer to exclusion from the employment-based social security
systems of France (Silver, 1994).
The literature concenung the historical development of the concept draws a
distinction between Anglo-American definitions of deprivation and European
concepts of exclusion. Silver (1994) argues that the definitional distinctions are
influenced by conceptualisations of social integration and reflect distinct theoretical
perspectives, political ideologies and national discourses that define integration in
distinctive ways. Silver suggests the existence of three 'paradigms' directing notions
of exclusion.
Firstly, Silver (1994) refers to the 'solidarity' paradigm which is derived from French
republican thought and which defmes social exclusion as the fracturing of the bond
between the individual and society. The approach is influenced by the philosophies
of Durkheim and Rousseau, and in particular Durkheim's emphasis on the normative
basis of social order founded on a collective consensus whereas exclusion is thought
to threaten the consensus by isolating people from the dominant culture (Silver,
1994). Therefore, the republican-based approach to exclusion emphasises the moral
and normative aspects of inclusion and the primary responsibility of the State to
facilitate inclusion. Interestingly, the solidarity paradigm is presented as a 'third way'
between liberalism and socialism and is prominent primarily in France but also
across Europe.
Secondly, Silver refers to the 'specialisation' paradigm which exemplifies Anglo-
American approaches to exclusion and which argues that exclusion derives from
social differentiation and discrimination. Silver defined discrimination within this
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paradigm as "the inappropriate exercise of personal tastes or the enforcement of
group boundaries that individuals are not free to cross" (Silver, 1994: 556).
Therefore, the definition presents an individualistic view of exclusion that contrasts
with the institutional definition of discrimination presented by Sayee (1998).
Nevertheless, the specialisation paradigm argues that inclusion implies a contractual
exchange of rights and obligations, especially the obligation of the able-bodied to
engage in paid work (Lister, 1998a). The specialisation paradigm is argued to
encompass the apparently disparate philosophies of neoliberalism and social
communitarianism.
Finally, Silver refers to the 'monopoly' paradigm in which exclusion is thought to
derive from powerful group monopolies that exclude certain groups through a
process of social closure. Therefore, society is regarded in the monopoly paradigm as
comprising hierarchical power relations, following from the Weberian view of power
and society. It is not clear where, geographically, this paradigm predominates and
appears to be the weak link in Silver's analysis.
However, Silver's (1994) discrete differentiation between the paradigms appears
erroneous since national discourse is currently influenced by conceptions from each
paradigm (de Haan, 1998). For example, although Silver claims that the
specialisation paradigm is representative of Anglo-American thought, elements of
the solidarity paradigm appear in Tony Blair's emphasis on adherence to community
norms, the necessity of a moral consensus underlying those community norms and
the establishment of a national consensus, as exemplified in his 'one nation'
discourse. The influence of the solidarity paradigm is also witnessed in the emphasis
on a 'third way' between Conservative neo-liberalism and old-style socialism in
British political rhetoric (e.g. Giddens, 1998, 2000).
To reiterate, the definition of social exclusion provided by the Government's Social
Exclusion Unit is as follows:
Social exclusion is a shorthand label for what can happen when individuals or areas suffer a
combination of problems such as unemployment, poor skills, low incomes, poor housing, high
crime environments, bad health and family breakdown (SEU, 1998).
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Therefore, the Government defines social exclusion as involving numerous inter-
related problems, linking it to conditions of low socio-economic status. However,
writers such as Hutton (1996) and Giddens (1998, 2000) emphasise that studies of
social exclusion should recognise the voluntary nature of social exclusion of people
in the highest income brackets as they opt out of social participation (e.g. by using
private education and private health care). Therefore, the Government's definition of
social exclusion pertains to involuntary exclusion at the bottom of the social
hierarchy, thus exposing itself to accusations of blaming the poor for their exclusion.
Levitas (1998) indicates the hegemonic nature of discourse that employs terms such
as 'social cohesion' and 'solidarity' due to moral judgements made concerning the
alleged behavioural and moral deficits of an excluded 'underclass' (Evans, 1998).
New Labour's conceptualisation of exclusion obscures inequalities in the labour
market, over-emphasises inclusion through paid work (despite claims of the multi-
dimensional nature of exclusion) and fails to address the fundamental inequalities of
the capitalist system (Levitas, 1998). Indeed, New Labour's 'third way' argues for a
modernisation of socialism that not only accepts capitalism as inevitable, but also
appraises it as beneficial in encouraging national competitiveness in the global
marketplace (Giddens, 2000).
Levitas (1998) questions whether inclusion which is interpreted as inclusion into the
capitalist system would be beneficial, therefore questioning the assumption of much
social exclusion theorising that inclusion is beneficial and a legitimate aim for
governments. Indeed, Byrne (1997) argues that exclusion is beneficial to a capitalist
system in preserving a reserve army of labour, thus being reminiscent of Warner's
(1987) analysis of the labour market location of people with psychiatric diagnoses as
a reserve army of labour, likely only to be employed in times of labour shortage.
Nevertheless, the importance of the analysis produced by Levitas (1998) is to
emphasise the prevalence of exclusion among those in paid work due to low pay,
thus refuting New Labour's strategy of achieving social inclusion by coercing people
into paid employment by the use of welfare-to-work schemes.
Numerous studies identify the key defining factor in social exclusion is its multi-
dimensional nature (Kennett, 1995; Golding, 1995; MacPherson, 1997). De Haan
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(1998) argues that social exclusion definitions converge on suggesting the multi-
dimensional nature of the concept as being the opposite of social integration. Social
exclusion is also defined as involving deprivation of significant duration and
marginalisation from mainstream society (Golding, 1995). However, Ratcliffe (1999)
argues that the meaning of social inclusion is ambiguous given the difficulty of
defining mainstream society. He also argues that social exclusion is an ill-defined
term, lacking in theoretical precision and running the risk of representing "crass
sloganeering" (p.2). He argues that the term tends to be used uncritically without
specification of whether the concept refers to a socio-economic process,
discrimination, an outcome, or is meant in a particularistic or universalistic sense.
For instance, use in a particularistic sense depicts a dichotomy between the included
and the excluded in relation to specific institutions (e.g. the labour market, housing)
whereas the universalistic sense refers to the exclusion of entire groups that are
located on the margins of society (e.g. the 'underclass '), Ratcliffe argues that a more
subtle use of the concept would relate social exclusion to the broader concept of
citizenship in order to extend analysis beyond economic aspects of social exclusion.
Walker (1997) postulates an explicit link between social exclusion and citizenship by
claiming:
Social exclusion ... may be seen as the denial (or non-realisation) of the civil, political and social
rights of citizenship (p.8).
By arguing that people with mental health problems constitute a group who are
located on the margins of society, a universalistic interpretation of social exclusion is
suggested. However, such an analysis runs the risk of constructing an entire class of
non-citizens subject to the stigmatisation associated with the concept of an
underclass. It is important to consider whether people with psychiatric diagnoses
constitute a sub-group within the underclass (Lewis et al., 1989) and whether such an
analysis would simply reproduce existing discrimination.
Nevertheless, Dunn (1999) conducted a large-scale inquiry into social exclusion
affecting people with mental health problems by hearing evidence from a broad
range of individuals and organisations. The Inquiry found exclusion "in every sphere
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of public and private life" (p.3) and ascribed exclusion to prejudice and
discrimination rather than to mental health problems.
The remainder of this chapter will examine evidence indicating exclusion of people
who use mental health services from a wide range of institutions in public life;
therefore examining whether people with mental health problems constitute a
discrete group located on the margins of society, sharing common experience of
impediments to social participation. Therefore, the current analysis combines the
particularistic and universalistic orientations referred to by Ratcliffe (1999).
Employment
Much research on employment in relation to people with mental health problems
examines the psychological sequelae of unemployment. For example, Warr and
Jackson (1984) estimate that 20-30% of unemployed men reported deterioration in
their mental health since becoming unemployed, especially increased anxiety,
depression, insomnia, lack of confidence and lack of energy. However, other
research emphasises the high rates of unemployment amongst people with mental
health problems. For example, Sayce (2000) indicated that, in the late 1990s, 70-90%
of Britons with a diagnosed mental health problem were economically inactive; the
rate is higher for black mental health service users and mentally disordered
offenders. The direction of causality appears to flow in both directions:
unemployment renders people more vulnerable to mental health problems (Mullen et
al., 1998; Perkins and Silver, 1994; Anthony et al., 1995; Link et al., 1997) and
mental health problems render people more vulnerable to unemployment due to
employer rejection (Read and Baker, 1996) and discrimination in the workplace
(Dunn, 1999).
Explanations of such findings differ. For instance, Hutchins and Gower (1993) argue
that mental health problems might impede job seeking, although they fail to explain
how this might occur. Midgley (1990) critiques such individualistic hypotheses by
indicating the prevalence of employment discrimination experienced by people with
mental health problems. Midgley argues that people with mental health problems
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might be disadvantaged in the labour market by rejection in job applications, unfair
dismissal and denial of promotion.
Boardman et al. (2003) argue that the majority of people with mental health
problems want to work, which they define as 'activity done for others' and as distinct
from employment which is defined as paid work. They link lack of employment to
social exclusion in that unemployment means denial of the opportunity to participate
in society as an ordinary citizen. Most research appears to refer to paid work but fails
to specify the distinction made by Boardman et al. between work and employment.
Nevertheless, work, paid or unpaid, is associated with numerous advantages over
lack of work, including personal responsibility, higher self-esteem, structure,
distraction from problems, social participation, social contact and productive
behaviour (Rowland and Perkins, 1988).
Warr et al. (1988) identified eight major consequences of unemployment: less variety
in life, fewer goals, reduced opportunity for decision-making, less practice of skills,
psychological disturbance, insecurity, social isolation and diminished social status.
However, Stansfield (2002) indicated that employment could have negative
consequences for mental health if it involves a high level of stress and a low level of
control (known as the 'job strain model') or a high level of effort for low reward
('effort-reward imbalance'). However, Stansfield also indicated that support from
work colleagues and personality can serve as protective factors, although he fails to
examine whether people with mental health problems are less likely to receive
support from work colleagues due to prejudice or discrimination.
In summary, research emphasises intervention either on an individual level (on the
supply side of the economy) by providing assistance with job seeking (e.g. Hutchins
and Gower, 1993) or provision of employment support from community mental
health teams (Boardman et al., 2003) or on a structural level (on the demand side of
the economy) by addressing employment discrimination directed at people with
mental health problems (e.g. Midgley, 1990).
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Poverty
Lister (1990a) has argued that debates on poverty should be central to discussions of
citizenship due to the inter-dependent relationship between civil, political and social
citizenship rights. However, poverty is a contested concept, involving a range of
definitions and measurements.
Poverty research has postulated a fundamental dichotomy between absolute and
relative definitions of poverty. Absolute poverty refers to falling below a level of
income required to meet basic physical needs whereas relative poverty is defined as
falling below an average standard of living (Alcock, 1997). Townsend (1979) is
particularly associated with the development of relative definitions whereby he
examined exclusion from everyday life and proposed measurement according to key
indicators of deprivation. The relative definition of poverty was developed due to
dissatisfaction with absolute definitions due to their negation of social norms and due
to their prescriptiveness based on expert definitions of basic needs (Gordon, 2000).
However, the dichotomy has been regarded as an over-simplification because even
absolute standards inevitably refer to social norms that vary across place and time
(Alcock, 1997).
An additional definition of relative poverty was proposed by the United Nations
(1995) in which 'overall poverty' referred to a lack of resources and opportunities to
engage in taken-for-granted activities due to lack of material resources or due to
discrimination (Gordon, 2000).
A number of approaches to the measurement of poverty exist that are clearly
influenced by the definition adopted in relation to the concept of poverty. Recent
approaches have examined the level of income required to live adequately. One
method is to calculate the median income for Britain and examine individuals' or
groups' incomes in relation to a certain percentage of the median income. Flaherty,
Veit- Wilson and Dornan (2004) estimate that poverty is 60% of the current median
income level. This is referred to as 'income poverty'. An additional method is to
establish a list of essential items and measure poverty according to lacking in certain
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items. This is the approach adopted by the Poverty and Social Exclusion (PSE)
survey and is referred to as the 'deprivation indicator' approach (Gordon, 2000) or
the 'budget standards' approach (Alcock, 1997). Lacking in three or more items on
the list indicates poverty but is based on a very frugal standard of living (Alcock,
1997). The same criticism is directed at approaches which measure poverty
according to income support levels because such levels are designed to meet only the
most basic of needs and thus are no longer used to measure poverty (Flaherty, Veit-
Wilson and Doman, 2004).
Gordon (2000) estimates that £178 per week is required to avoid absolute poverty
and £219 per week is required to avoid relative poverty. Therefore, income below
these levels is thought to place the individual at high risk of poverty. Flaherty, Veit-
Wilson and Doman (2004) indicate that, in 2001-2, 22% of the British population
were living 60% or more below the median income level in comparison with 13% in
1979. They note that 26% of the population were living at this level at the end of
1999. Therefore, there has been a significant increase in income poverty since 1979
but a slight decrease in poverty since 2000. In addition, between 1979 and 2002, the
number of incapacity benefit claimants trebled to 2.7 million. There has also been an
increase in the number of people claiming means tested benefits from 17% in 1979 to
25% in 1999.
A number of social groups have been identified as being at high risk of poverty
(Flaherty, Veit-Wilson and Dornan, 2004). Unemployment is the predominant
indicator of income poverty: 75% of the poor are unemployed. The long-term sick
are second most likely to be poor, 63% of whom are poor. 20% of the poor are
disabled, according to the PSE. The employment rate for disabled people is 46% for
women and 51.4% for men in comparison with 75.3% of non-disabled women and
85.8% of able-bodied men. Therefore, the unemployment rate is twice as high for
disabled people than the non-disabled population. However, people with mental
health problems experience the highest rates of poverty amongst disabled people;
74% in comparison with 66% for people with a learning disability (Flaherty, Veit-
Wilson and Dornan, 2004). In addition, one third of disabled people who move into
employment will be unemployed by the following year (Flaherty, Veit-Wilson and
Dornan, 2004). Unemployment is strongly associated with poverty. Flaherty, Veit-
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Wilson and Doman claim that disabled people are more likely to experience poverty
because they are likely to lack formal qualifications; endure disability-related
expenses (e.g. heating, transport, paying for care); be employed in manual and low
paid jobs and live in social housing. Disabled people are also more likely to be
excluded from the labour market by discrimination derived from employers'
expectations of incapacity and unreliability and due to structural obstacles to
participation (e.g. access to buildings, lack of flexible working, ect.) (Alcock, 1997)
and earn an average of 25% less than their non-disabled counterparts (Martin and
White, 1998). Disabled people are also more likely to be caught in the 'benefits trap'
caused by low pay and entry into the incapacitated role in order to continue to
receive disability benefits (Alcock, 1997). Alcock does not appear to be suggesting
that disabled people want to be considered incapacitated but that the disability
benefits system demands that claimants prove their incapacity to work and thus
reinforces the view of the disabled person as incapable of working. However, Alcock
asserts that poverty is not an inherent accompaniment to disability because the
problems that disabled people experience in entering the labour market are socially
produced. This view is comparable to the social model of disability in which
impediments to social participation are structural rather than inherent within the
individual (Oliver, 1996).
Women also run a high risk of experiencing poverty (Alcock, 1997), being 14 times
more likely to experience poverty than men (Flaherty, Veit-Wilson and Dornan,
2004). This has been attributed to the concentration of women in low paid, part-time
or insecure occupations; exclusion from contribution-based benefits due to periods of
absence from the labour market and due to the competing demands of caring
responsibilities that dictate the type of working patterns available to women and
which influence attitudes that regard women as financially dependent on men
(Flaherty, Veit-Wilson and Dornan, 2004). Lone parents are particularly at high risk
of experiencing poverty in that only 53% are engaged in paid work (Flaherty, Veit-
Wilson and Doman, 2004) and 90% oflone parents are women (Alcock, 1997). Lone
parent poverty has been attributed to sole financial responsibility for running the
home and the sole responsibility for the expense of childcare (Flaherty, Veit-Wilson
and Dornan, 2004).
74
Ethnic minorities are also at high risk of experiencing poverty. Only 58% of people
from ethnic minorities are engaged in paid work compared with 76% of white
people. People of Pakistani or Bangladeshi origin are least likely to be employed and
most likely to be poor (Flaherty, Veit-Wilson and Doman, 2004). The reasons
postulated for this higher risk of poverty is that ethnic minority people were
previously likely to be employed in the heavy industries that were severely affected
by the recession beginning in the 1970s and thus have borne the brunt of
unemployment (Flaherty, Veit-Wilson and Doman, 2004). Ethnic minorities are also
more likely than white people to be poorly paid and to work part-time, with Pakistani
and Bangladeshi people being the lowest paid of all full-time workers in Britain
(Flaherty, Veit-Wilson and Doman, 2004). Asylum seekers are the social group most
likely to experience extreme poverty due to restrictions on benefit entitlements
(Alcock, 1997).
Researchers appear to argue that most poverty is short-term (Room, 2000; Flaherty,
Veit-Wilson and Doman, 2004). although they fail to define the division between
short-term and long-term poverty. Flaherty, Veit-Wilson and Doman claim that 62%
of people escape poverty by obtaining employment. However, if the unemployment
rate of disabled people is twice that of non-disabled people and one third of disabled
people return to unemployment within one year of obtaining work, this may suggest
that their exclusion from the labour market leads to periods of chronic poverty.
Focus on Mental Health (2001) conducted a survey of the experiences of poverty
amongst people with mental health problems, with a total of 556 respondents. 47% of
the sample were unemployed and 85% were in receipt of benefits. 72% described
their income as low and 66% reported experiencing problems making their income
last all week, representing 68% of those on benefits. 50% of respondents stated that
they felt excluded from the local community by their financial circumstances. An
interesting finding was that 70010of Asian respondents (although the percentage of
the total number of respondents that were Asian is not specified) felt excluded by
their financial situation. Low income impacted on respondents' abilities to access
mental health services, especially due to the cost of transport and childcare.
Respondents also reported a lack of basic items such as food and clothing and as not
being able to pay utility bills. Respondents suggested that the impact of poverty
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could be ameliorated by an increase in benefit levels, greater ease of application for
benefits, especially Disability Living Allowance, and greater availability of
concessionary access to facilities. The report concluded that people with mental
health problems are doubly excluded, by mental ill health and by poverty.
Poverty is strongly associated with unemployment and is a major determinant of
social participation, for example, participation in the consumer society and in leisure
activities. Hutton (1996) argued that income is the key determinant of citizenship,
although as an economist this assertion is perhaps unsurprising. He states:
... the capacity to be a citizen depends on spending power, without which citizenship disappears
(p.218). (see also Lister, 1990).
In a consumer society, consumption is the norm and low income severely impedes
participation in consumption (Bauman, 1998). However, Beresford (1996) argues
that such an analysis is problematic in imposing dominant values associated with the
consumerist ethos in that consumerist values may not be aspired to and that poverty
extends beyond material deprivation. He argues that conventional debates on poverty
effectively emphasise the dependence of disabled people as inevitably reliant on state
benefits and tend to adopt an individualistic emphasis rather than examining poverty
as the broad denial of citizenship rights.
Beresford et al (1999) also critique traditional poverty analysis for excluding poor
people from the process of defining poverty, therefore presenting an argument for the
inclusion of poor people's definitions of poverty in qualitative research.
Housing
The majority of research into the housing experiences of people with mental health
problems examines whether such people are more likely to be homeless than other
members of the population. A smaller amount of research examines the process of
deinstitutionalsiation in comparing the experiences of long-stay hospital residents
and those transferred from long-stay institutions to small group homes.
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Estimates of homelessness amongst people with psychiatric illness vary widely from
15% (Snow et al., 1986) to 91% (Bassuk, Rubin and Lauriat, 1984) but most studies
provide estimates of around 30% (e.g. Bean, Stefl and Howe, 1987; Piliavin,
Westerfelt and Elliot, 1989; Bines, 1997). The reason estimates vary so widely is that
studies adopt differing definitions of homelessness and mental illness. The study that
provided an estimate of 91% (Bassuk, Rubin and Lauriat, 1984) included emotional
and psychological problems in its statistics. The finding is confounded by the
question of whether mental health problems precede or follow homelessness (Bines,
1997) and thus it is difficult to specify whether mental health problems cause
homelessness or whether psychological sequlae are an inevitable consequence of
homelessness (Bean, Stefl and Howe, 1987). Marshall and Reed (1992) found that
psychiatric admissions had preceded homelessness in their sample.
Another problem with homelessness research is that some studies assess the presence
of mental health problems using instruments that conflate psychiatric symptoms and
behavioural manifestations of homelessness (e.g. dirty clothes, poor hygiene and
flattened affect: Bean, Stefl and Howe, 1987). Moreover, Bean, Stefl and Howe
indicate that their estimate of 31% is lower than in other studies due to sampling
from a rural population. Studies presenting higher estimates of homelessness
amongst the mentally unwell tend to sample respondents from urban populations
(e.g. 40% in Westminster: Fisher et al, 1994) and urban areas have been found to
feature greater numbers of mentally unwell homeless people (Burrows, 1997).
Similarly, a number of studies have indicated the co-existence of homelessness,
mental health problems and other forms of social adversity such as unemployment,
poverty, lack of social support, poor physical health and high levels of substance
misuse (Scott, 1993).
The risk of homelessness is highest for black people (although lower among Indian,
Pakistani and Bangladeshi people), lone parents and single males (Burrows, 1997),
although women are more likely to comprise the 'hidden homeless' (defined as
inhabiting temporary accommodation) (Scott, 1993). The female homeless are more
likely to have been married and have children, thus indicating greater social stability
prior to homelessness (Marshall and Reed, 1992). However, there is disagreement
about whether homeless women are more or less likely to have mental health
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problems in comparison with homeless men. Scott (1993) argued that homeless
women are less likely to have mental health problems whereas Fisher et al. (1994)
argued that homeless women are more likely to experience mental health problems in
the over 30 years age group. The typical picture of homeless mentally unwell
females in Marshall and Reed's study was early psychiatric hospitalisation, followed
by stable housing but low skill employment, followed by numerous subsequent
admissions and eventual loss of housing after the age of 30 years. This picture
indicates the potential impact of psychiatric hospitalisation on housing for women
(and probably men) with mental health problems.
One possible explanation of a link between mental health problems and
homelessness is the finding of transience in samples of homeless people with mental
health problems. Caton and Goldstein (1984) found a high level of transience in a
one-year longitudinal study of people diagnosed with schizophrenia. Transience was
defmed as at least one change in housing in the previous year whereby 50% met this
criterion and 21% had changed accommodation at least twice in the previous year.
Their study concluded that psychiatric hospitalisation leads to loss of housing
through repeated admissions. Their finding that the highest likelihood of a change of
housing was within three months of hospital discharge might indicate poor discharge
planning.
Deinstitutionalisation has also been cited as a cause of elevated rates of homelessness
among people with mental health problems (Lamb, 1990) whereas Cohen and
Thompson (1992) claim that the deinstitutionalisation argument is erroneous due to
the time lapse between the beginnings of deinstitutionalisation in the US and in the
1950s and steep increases in homelessness from the end of the 1970s onwards,
largely due to a decline in the post-industrial economies of the West that has led to
less availability of affordable housing and rendered certain social groups more
vulnerable to poverty and homelessness (Mossman, 1997). Indeed, Bohanon (1991)
found that higher rents and higher rates of unemployment were correlated with rates
of homelessness in 60 cities across the US. Therefore, it is postulated that
homelessness is an economic rather than an individual problem. Moreover, Hamid,
Wykes and Stansfield (1993) claim that the 'mentally ill homeless' argument is
employed merely to discredit community care.
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Cohen and Thompson (1992) offer a structural analysis of homelessness that blames
increasing rates of homelessness on a decrease in affordable housing, low pay,
stigma and victimisation. However, they also claim that the mentally ill do not
constitute a discrete subgroup within the homeless population because they are
subject to the same socio-economic forces that cause homelessness. They also fail to
adequately explore whether people with mental health problems are
disproportionately disadvantaged by such socio-economic conditions. Research on
income and employment suggests that people with mental health problems are
disproportionately disadvantaged in relation to income and employment. Rowe et al.
(200 I) argue that the mentally unwell homeless are non-citizens due to the dual
impact of mental health problems and homelessness. However, they also suggest that
assertive outreach interventions are likely to enhance citizenship by promoting
community involvement. Their analysis is incongruous because researchers who
adopt an individualistic emphasis in their work tend to recommend assertive outreach
as a response to homelessness amongst people with mental health problems but also
recommend removal of this population through involuntary outpatient treatment (e.g.
Lamb, 1990) on the assumption that people with mental health problems are
incapable of maintaining independent housing (see Dilks, 1995). Assertive outreach
has also been recommended to encourage engagement in general medical and mental
health services due to low levels of engagement in such services by the homeless
(Scott, 1993).
The other branch of research into housing and mental health compares community
integration and perceived quality of life of long-stay hospital patients and those
residing in small group homes. Leff and Trieman (2000) found higher levels of
satisfaction amongst residents of care homes than long-stay patients but Lewis and
Trieman (1995) discovered that people residing in residential care homes were not
engaged in rehabilitation and did not access community facilities. They concluded
that low turnover of residents and lack of rehabilitation indicated that such homes
were intended to be homes for life. Similarly, Shepherd et al. (1996) concluded in




The social networks of people with mental health problems have been found to be
smaller than 'normal' social networks and tend to comprise other mental health
service users rather than comprising a combination of different types of social
contacts. Albert et al. (1998) found dependent relationships with other service users
were common and likely to produce poorer clinical outcomes (Holmes-Eber and
Riger, 1990). However, Chamberlin (1988) argued that having social network
members who also use mental health services could be a source of mutual support
derived from shared experiences. Nevertheless, a social network that comprises
solely of mental health service users may indicate a combination of social isolation
and social rejection by non-mental health service users.
Estroff (1981) found that users of an assertive outreach programme (PACT) made a
basic distinction between 'crazies' and 'normies', the latter being people who do not
experience mental health problems, thus indicating a them-and-us dichotomy.
Insiders and outsiders was an additional distinction made by the service users in that
insiders were people with whom the clients shared resources and intimacies,
information, time and space whereas outsiders were people with whom PACT clients
had either cursory or indirect contact with minimal, if any, sharing of resources.
A further distinction made was between 'inside crazies', 'outside crazies', 'inside
normals' and 'outside normals'. Each category referred to a degree of symmetry in
relationships whereby relationships with inside and outside normals were
asymmetrical because normals determined access to resources. Inside crazies shared
experience of illness and treatment and had similar access to resources (money,
living space and unemployment). Outside crazies were simply people with mental
health problems who did not share resources or interactions with the PACT clients.
Inside normals were family members and staff with whom the PACT users shared
resources but in an asymmetrical manner. Estroff observed that inside crazies were
not regarded as able to provide true friendship and emotional support but this finding
is refuted by research conducted by the Mental Health Foundation (2000) which
found that friendships with other users are valued due to mutual support in such
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relationships. The research found that people were most likely to value contact with
mental health professionals if they lived alone or experienced familial conflict, thus
suggesting a link between social isolation and evaluation of the role of professionals
in the social networks of mental health service users. Estroff (1981) found that
friendships with 'normals' was rare and attributed this finding to feelings of
inadequacy that PACT clients felt in relation to people without mental illness. She
suggests that clients actively chose to relate to other 'crazies' and thus were not
passive victims of social rejection, as suggested by research examining public
attitudes. Estroff also argued that the patterns of social relationships of mental health
service users serve to reinforce the mental patient role by reminding the individual of
their inadequacies in relation to 'normals' and commonality with 'crazies'.
However, 'Strategies for Living' (Mental Health Foundation, 2000) suggested that
the social networks of mental health service users are likely to be smaller due to
negative public attitudes and because of social withdrawal associated with illness and
the impact of poverty and unemployment on opportunities to develop social
relationships. The research found that service users were more likely to socialise with
other mental health service users due to the greater commonality and sense of
identity that this entails.
Similarly, Green et al. (2002) found that the social networks of mental health service
users mainly comprised family, professionals and other service users whereby
loneliness was a common problem due to small network size and asymmetrical social
relationships. Friends known prior to illness were more likely to drift away rather
than reject the service user outright but respondents also indicated social withdrawal
following illness and the negative impact of medication on the ability to socialise.
Hospitalisation also disrupted social relationships through the removal of the
individual from the community (Green et al., 2002).
However, research on the social networks of people with mental health problems
encounters significant methodological problems in possibly failing to reach the most
socially isolated by virtue of their isolation (Rose, 200 I) and an emphasis on
quantitative aspects of networks fails to examine the quality of social relationships
within those networks (Green et al, 2002).
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Parenting
Sayee (2000) identifies a common belief that people with mental health problems do
not make good parents. Read and Baker (1996), for example, found that 48% of
female respondents and 26% of male respondents with mental health problems felt
that their parenting abilities had been unreasonably questioned.
There exists a large body of literature that indicates the potential harm posed by
mentally unwell parents to their children. However, Sayee (1999) claims that there
exists an entrenched stereotype that people with mental health problems are
incapable of providing adequate parenting whereas she depicts parenting as a basic
citizenship right that should be available to all. She argues that the application of
anti-discrimination principles demands that parents with a mental health problem
should not have to meet higher standards in order to prove the adequacy of their
parenting. However, literature on the impact of a mental health problem on parenting
appears predominantly pessimistic. Such literature almost unanimously assumes that
parents with a mental health problem are incapable of providing adequate parenting.
For example, Pound (1996) argues that children learn social norms from their parents
whereby depressed parents may withdraw from social networks and experience
resultant social isolation, producing inadequate opportunities for modelling of
appropriate social interaction by parents (Hall, 1996). However, Webster (1992)
associated poor social support networks of mentally unwell parents with high levels
of unemployment. Similarly, Pound (1996) argues that high levels of emotional and
behavioural disturbance in children of mentally unwell parents are difficult to
attribute to depression due to high co-occurrence of poor social environments. Rutter
and Quinton (1984) claimed that children of parents with mental health problems are
more likely to be exposed to disturbed behaviour. hostility and anxious or depressed
behaviour, principally associated with high rates of marital discord in such families
(see also Hall. 1996). They indicated that when such risk factors were controlled,
high rates of childhood emotional and behavioural disturbance were eliminated. They
also noted that behavioural disturbances in children may elicit higher rates of
hostility from parents and thus the direction of causality is ambiguous. Hall (1996)
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found that mentally unwell parents were twice as likely as well parents to be single
parents and more likely to experience marital discord and recent separation.
However. controlling psychosocial disadvantage between an experimental and a
control group produced similar rates of behavioural disturbance in the children in the
study.
Beck-Sander (1999) argues that the social withdrawal associated with depression
may produce over-dependence in the relationship between parent and child and that
depressed parents fail to provide adequate stimulation for their children due to
reduced motivation associated with illness. She argues that an assessment of the risks
posed to the child should include questions relating to whether the parent is
compliant with medication and whether the parent can monitor symptoms and seek
help when necessary. However, research exists that indicates the potentially harmful
impact of services on parenting amongst people with mental health problems
(Phillips and Hugman, 1999).
Weir (1999) argues that services are faced with a dilemma between protecting the
right of children to receive adequate care and the needs of parents with a mental
health problem. However. Sayce (1999) counters that this argument negates the
shared interests of children and parents. Sayce argues that research and practice must
acknowledge the difficulties people with mental health problems might experience in
their parenting role but that generalisations on the inadequacy of parenting are
potentially very damaging for parents and children. Furthermore, children of socially
disadvantaged and mentally unwell parents are most likely to be placed in local
authority care (Webster, 1990), children with a mentally unwell parent remain in
foster care for longer periods than other children (Adcock, 1996) and the chances of
returning home are significantly reduced with longer substitute care placements
(Milham et al, 1985).
Moreover, Cobler, Scott and Musick (1996) indicate that changes in adult service
provision from long-term care to short-term crisis provision leads to a higher number
of repeated psychiatric hospitalisations, thus producing greater disruption to the
child's continuity of care. However, regardless of length of stay, psychiatric
hospitalisation invariably disrupts contact between parent and child, therefore
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leading to the question of whether institutional treatment is at least as detrimental to
the child as living with a mentally unwell parent. Indeed, Turner (1993) (who is a
mother with a diagnosis of schizophrenia) argues:
Rather than dump their children into foster homes, it seems more humane and efficient to help
people with schizophrenia to learn to deal with the situation of raising kids while dealing with
long-term illness.
Parker (1999) argues that parents with mental health problems face discrimination in
the provision of mental health services, indicating that both inpatient and outpatient
services rarely have facilities to accommodate children and that caring
responsibilities may exclude parents from day services, psychotherapy or
counselling. Phillips and Hugman (1999) interviewed 24 parents with mental health
problems and identified loss as a recurring theme in parenting. Loss was associated
with loss of the parenting role through hospitalisation, side effects of medication,
attachment of stigma to the child and loss of authority as the parent due to a
blemished status as a mental health service user. Parents regarded professionals as
intrusive and as providing an unwelcome service. They were also regarded as
emphasising pathology and as neglecting practical issues such as housing and
benefits. The participants expressed a desire for greater practical support at home and
more child-friendly services. Sayce (1999) argues that parents might mistrust
services due to the fear of losing their children and thus unsupportive services might
be a barrier to help seeking amongst parents with mental health problems.
Therefore, discrimination appears prevalent in both professional attitudes towards the
ability of parents with a mental disorder to provide 'good enough parenting' and in
the practice of either removing parents from children through hospitalisation or
removing children from parents in the higher use of substitute care than in
comparison with the children of other parents.
Mental Health Services
Marshall (1992) argued that state welfare services enable the realisation of social
citizenship by moderating the inequality caused by a capitalist economy. However,
he later conceded that welfare services might impede citizenship through their
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paternalistic and authoritarian nature (Marshall, 1981). For example, impediments to
community participation have been attributed to the institutional nature of welfare
services that reflect limited expectations of service users by welfare professionals
(Barnes, 1992a). Social citizenship concerns access to valued resources in the
community. However, mental health services might impede social citizenship due to
medication-induced impediments to functioning, removal from the social
environment by inpatient treatment and by the imposition of diagnoses that attract
stigma. The evidence supporting this assertion will be examined in the following
section.
The psychiatric system is based on the medical model (parker et al., 1995) in which
pathology is individualised, attributed to biological causes and is deemed incurable
but treatable with medical intervention (see Corrigan and Penn, 1997). The medical
model will be examined in terms of diagnosis and treatment of mental illhealth.
Boyle (1999) asserts that psychiatric diagnosis claims legitimacy by asserting
equivalence with physical medicine but that there is no evidence that symptoms
cluster together reliably. Psychiatric diagnosis has also received criticism for locating
pathology within the individual (parker et al., 1995; Kutchins and Kirk, 1997; Boyle,
1999) and as negating the context of symptoms (e.g. the content of voices: Boyle,
1999).
Kutchins and Kirk (1997) argue that diagnostic nosology provides psychiatry with a
veneer of scientific respectability by parading as a legitimate branch of medicine.
However, psychiatric diagnoses lack the somatic referents that are usually present in
physical illness (Bowers, 2000; Johnstone, 2000). Kutchins and Kirk argue that the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM) attempts to standardise diagnostic practices
but fails to increase the reliability of diagnosis. For example, Williams et al. (1992)
conducted a seven-centre study in America and Germany using a standardised
interview schedule and DSM-III-R criteria whereby diagnosis still fell below an
acceptable standard of reliability. Kutchins and Kirk (1997) also claim that
diagnostic systems pathologise everyday behaviour and that diagnoses change over
time. Anxiety is cited as exemplifying the latter two claims in that anxiety is a
common response to everyday problems and is not inherently pathological. They also
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indicate the changeability of diagnoses by highlighting that conceptualisations of
anxiety have changed three times since 1979. DSM is also accused of allowing social
values to impede its supposed scientific validity. For example, the removal of
homosexuality from DSM in 1973 is frequently cited as an example of the influence
of social norms on diagnostic nosology. However, Kutchins and Kirk argue that
DSM retained some degree of moral conservatism in its inclusion of 'ego-dystonic
homosexuality' until1987.
A number of researchers have indicated the lack of validity of specific diagnoses.
Boyle (2002) refers to the schizophrenia diagnosis as a 'conceptual dustbin' into
which symptoms not attached to other diagnoses are discarded. Similarly, Pilgrim
(2001) refers to the diagnosis of personality disorder as a 'dustbin category' for
problematic behaviour that is not otherwise categorised as mental illness. Pilgrim
describes personality disorder as a problematic diagnosis due to its lack of somatic
indicators. However, this criticism could be levelled at all psychiatric diagnoses
(Bowers, 2000).
Foucault (1994) argues that psychiatric power is three-fold in distinguishing
competence over ignorance, reality over errors and normality over disorder. The
power of the psychiatrist is derived from their constructed rationality in comparison
with patients. Patients become discredited by constructions of their incompetence,
irrationality and abnormality. Foucault asserts that constructed insanity strips the
patient of knowledge and power in relation to illness. Therefore, psychiatrists possess
the power not only to define mental illness but also to stipulate treatments for illness
in the patient's 'best interests' on the grounds that the patient is incompetent in
treatment-related decision-making (Pols, 1989).
The medical model specifies the biochemical view of mental ill health in which
illness is attributed to defective neurotransmitter action. For instance, the dopamine
theory of schizophrenia states that an excess of dopamine in the brain causes the
illness (Bentall, 2003) whereas depression is thought to be caused by a deficiency of
serotonin in the brain (Valenstein, 1998) or a deficiency of norepinephrine (Breggin
and Cohen, 1999).
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Drug companies promote biochemical causal explanations of mental health problems
whereby 'magic bullets' are claimed to target specific neurotransmitter abnormalities
in specific disorders (Valenstein, 1998). The notion of the 'magic bullet' is claimed
to be erroneous because of the unknown number of receptors for each
neurotransmitter (Valenstein, 1998) and because drugs affect a broad range of
neurotransmitters alongside the target neurotransmitter because the brain is a highly
integrated organ (Breggin and Cohen, 1999). Moreover, cause-and-effect In
biochemical hypotheses is difficult to establish because the administration of
psychopharmacological substances causes chemical imbalances per se (Glenmullen,
2001) due to compensation, sensitisation and tolerance of neuro-chemicals
(Valenstein, 1998). For instance, Glenmullen (2001) refers to 'Prozac backlash'
whereby the ingestion of serotonin-boosting anti-depressants such as Prozac causes
the brain to inhibit re-uptake of serotonin at neurotransmitters, thereby increasing the
amount of serotonin in the brain. An increase in serotonin is thought to produce a
decrease in dopamine whereby it is the deficiency of dopamine that produces
movement disorders sometimes associated with Prozac (Glenmullen, 2001).
The SSRIs (Selective Serotonin Reuptake Inhibitors) are thought to prevent removal
of serotonin from synapses to produce increased firing of serotonin neurotransmitters
(Breggin and Cohen, 1999). Therefore, the over-stimulation of the serotonin system
can produce agitation, anxiety or insomnia (Breggin and Cohen, 1999). Healy (2001)
has referred to the 'SSRI suicides' in indicating a possible association between
SSRIs and suicide or violence caused by agitation attributed to over-stimulation of
the serotonin system. Teicher, Glod and Cole (1990) found preoccupation with
suicide in a small sample of subjects (N=6) following administration of Prozac but
observed marked improvement following discontinuation of the drug. Healy (2004)
observed alarming levels of suicidal ideation in a small sample of healthy volunteers
with no history of suicidal ideation whereas the Teicher, Glod and Cole study was
possibly flawed by including participants with a history of suicidal ideation.
Probably the most famous case examining a possible association between Prozac and
violence occurred in relation to Joseph Wesbecker. Joseph Wesbecker shot twenty
work colleagues (fatally injuring six of them), then shot himself dead following
treatment with Prozac (Cornwell, 1996). The verdict (in a litigation case brought by
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victims and victims' relatives) found in Eli Lilly's favour following a covert
settlement which induced the litigants not to introduce damning evidence into the
trial (Cornwell, 1996).
Research suggesting an association between Prozac and suicidality is in its infancy
but it is clear that evidence is gradually accumulating to suggest adverse effects of
anti-depressant medication. By October 1999, the Federal Drugs Agency (FDA)
recorded over 2000 Prozac-linked suicides in America but this is likely to be an
under-estimation (Healy, 2001). Indeed, even Eli Lilly's randomised controlled drug
trials showed suicide rates of 12.5 per 1000 patients compared with 2.5 per 1000 on
placebo and 3.8 on other anti-depressants (including the particularly lethal dothiepin)
but this data was not published and not reported to the FDA (Healy, 2001).
Furthermore, suicidality has been observed at challenge to Prozac (exposure to the
drug), to disappear at de-challenge (withdrawal) and to reappear at re-challenge (re-
introduction) and this is widely accepted as indicating a strong causal link between a
drug and an effect (Healy, 2001).
Problems relating to discontinuation (withdrawal) of anti-depressant medication have
also been publicised in recent times. Withdrawal is associated with 'poop out'
(Healy, 2004) in which the anti-depressant loses its effect, thus requiring increasing
doses to achieve the same effect. Healy also suggests the existence of 'stress
syndromes' whereby drug withdrawal causes the brain to seek equilibrium following
ingestion of an essentially alien substance. Glenmullen (2001) indicates specific
symptoms of withdrawal from anti-depressants by citing common symptoms as
involving disequilibrium (dizziness), gastrointestinal disturbance (nausea, vomiting),
flu-like symptoms, sensory disturbance (tingling, electrical-shock type sensations)
and sleep disturbance. Glenmullen indicates the general problem that withdrawal
syndromes are frequently attributed to relapse of illness (see also Lehman, 2001) and
thus met with an increase in dosage (Breggin and Cohen, 1999), thus exacerbating
problems of physical dependency and increasing the risk of long-term damage
(Breggin and Cohen, 1999; Crepaz Keay, 1999).
In addition, psychiatric medication is associated with serious side effects. For
instance, the 'chemical cosh' effect ofneuroleptics creates a perception in the patient
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that the drugs are controlling them and this may explain high rates of non-
compliance with neuroleptics (Healy, 1997). Classic side effects of neuroleptics
include akinesia (lack of movement), dyskinesia (abnormal movements), dystonia
(muscular spasm), tardive dyskinesia (involuntary movements of the mouth and
face), akathisia (agitation) and demotivation (lack of interest). Non-dopamine effects
include weight gain, dry mouth, stomach upsets, constipation and impairments in
sexual functioning (especially a decrease in libido) (Healy, 1997). Classic side
effects of anti-depressant medication include sedation or arousal, dry mouth,
palpitations, headache, blurred vision, weight gain and nausea (Healy, 1997).
Martensson (1998) indicates the prevalence of disorders such as tardive dyskinesia as
caused by the compensatory formation of new nerve cells due to the blocking of
dopamine receptors by neuroleptics. Breggin (1993) has argued that neuroleptics
cause the equivalent of a chemical lobotomy due to the inhibition of higher-order
functions associated with the frontal lobes and that damage to the basal ganglia
causes hyperactivity. Furthermore, the visibility of movement disorders can be
humiliating and cause social withdrawal and isolation (Estroff, 1981; Breggin and
Cohen, 1999). Indeed, Valenstein (1998) argued that chlorpromazine was initially
adopted in institutions precisely because of the chemical lobotomy effect that causes
detachment and indifference, thus rendering patients easier to 'manage'. The severity
of such side effects indicates the toxicity of psychiatric medications (8reggin and
Cohen, 1999).
The Joseph Wesbecker case illustrates the unethical behaviour of the pharmaceutical
industry. Healy (2004) examines the tactics adopted by pharmaceutical companies to
ensure a continuation of their dominance of psychiatric treatment. He describes how
the drug companies aggressively promote their products by funding clinical trials;
producing articles that are ghost-written by well-known names in the psychiatric
profession but which involve the analysis of raw data by the pharmaceutical
company; suppressing adverse findings of clinical trials; funding clinicians to speak
at conferences and sponsoring trade fairs that promote their products.
The pharmaceutical industry is a multi-million dollar industry, second only to the
arms trade (Kutchins and Kirk, 1997), whereby Healy (2004) argues that clinical
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trials meet the needs of the industry rather than patients and that drug companies are
only accountable to shareholders and not to the public. The failure of the Federal
Drugs Agency (FDA) in America to protect the public from hazards associated with
medication ingestion has been attributed to the excessive influence of the
pharmaceutical industry on the regulation of medications (Healy, 2004). For
example, it is alleged that Eli Lilly was aware of marked agitation associated with
Prozac ingestion but conspired with the FDA to suppress evidence of a possible link
between Prozac and violence (Glenmullen, 2001).
In addition, clinical trials of psychiatric medication have been described as
fundamentally flawed due to methodological errors that skew findings in favour of
the drug. The clinical trials of Prozac are described as flawed due to the co-
administration of benzodiazepines to reduce agitation (Healy, 2004); suicidal
ideation was labelled depression (Glenmullen, 2001); people who deteriorated on
Prozac were labelled non-responders (Healy, 2004); and trials were conducted on
mildly depressed individuals rather than on more severely unwell subjects (Healy,
2004). It is even alleged that Eli Lilly reported data from non-existent participants
(Healy, 2004). More general criticisms of clinical trails is of the use of short trial
periods (Valenstein, 1998; Healy, 2004), with some trials lasting only 5-6 weeks
(Breggin, 1993); drugs are rarely more effective than placebo and positive effects
that are observed tend to be time-limited (Breggin and Cohen, 1999); a double blind
is difficult to achieve because the side effects of drugs often reveal the treatment
group (Breggin and Cohen, 1999); certain types of patients are excluded (Valenstein,
1998), such as the omission of severely depressed patients in trials of Prozac (Healy,
2004); and the minimisation of reported side effects (Valenstein, 1998). Furthermore,
research on the biochemical action of psychiatric medication is flawed due to the
interference of foreign substances on normal brain functioning (Breggin and Cohen,
1999).
It is also affirmed that neuroleptics act on psychotic symptoms by producing sedation
with no specific action on hallucinations or delusions (Breggin and Cohen, 1999) and
therefore, the anti-psychotic label is misleading because neuroleptics do not exert a
specific anti-psychotic effect (Martensson, 1998).
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Martensson (1998) argues that treatment should only be administered if it is in the
patient's best interests but asserts that the neurological damage attributed to
neuroleptics precludes treatment on the grounds of best interests. The notion that the
harm inflicted by treatment outweighs the potential benefits of treatment has led to
demands for the banning of neuroleptics (Martensson, 1998) or the emergence of
drug-free mental health services (Read, 2000).
In relation to inpatient psychiatric treatment, respondents to the Rogers, Pilgrim and
Lacey (1993) survey indicated the paucity of community facilities as alternatives to
hospitalisation in times of crisis: only 14.5% were offered alternatives to
hospitalisation at such a time. The authors indicate the disruption hospitalisation
exerts over community integration in producing a loss of status in the community.
Hospitalisation also disrupts continuity of accommodation, employment and social
relationships (Estroff, 1981). Rogers' et al. (1993) respondents cited the
dehumanisation of enforced treatment in hospital and the brutal attitudes and
incidents of abuse involving staff.
The Sainsbury Centre for Mental Health (1998) conducted a survey of 215
psychiatric inpatients and interviewed 112 patients prior to discharge from
psychiatric units. The study identified particular problems in relation to lack of
therapeutic interventions and lack of activity on wards. Boredom was reported to be
very common amongst patients. Dissatisfaction was expressed particularly in relation
to lack of freedom, rigid routines, negative staff attitudes and lack of availability of
therapeutic intervention and lack of activity on the wards, high readmission rates,
poor discharge planning with little involvement of community staff in the process
and lack of alternatives to hospital care.
Walton (2000) produced findings that are remarkably similar to the Sainsbury Centre
study in their research involving observation of wards by ASW trainees over a nine-
year period. The trainees observed high levels of aimlessness and boredom in
patients; they also noted the poor physical environment, replete with cigarette smoke
and lacking fresh air. Patients suffered from a lack of physical activity alongside
overall lack of therapeutic activity. Trainees also observed poor staff-patient
relationships, indicated by lack of interaction between patients and nursing staff
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whereby nurses spent the majority of their time engaged in administrative tasks away
from the patients. This was not due to low staffing levels because the same patterns
of interaction were observed on well staffed wards. The author concluded that
inpatient admissions failed to meet the needs of patients by adopting a narrow
biomedical view of problems and low value placed on patients, as evidenced by lack
of interaction between staff and patients.
The dominance of the medical model in inpatient psychiatry is examined by
Shaughnessy (2000), the founder of MadPride:
The medical model is in its element in Acute Wards [sic]. Stigmatised labels are handed out like
Smarties on a daily basis with no regard to the long-term damage to the self-esteem of the patient.
Symptoms of distress are dismissed as illusions.
Shaughnessy highlights the stigma inherent in the medical model that dominates
psychiatry. Coleman (1999) argued that recovery involves a basic citizen right to
make choices, including the decision to reject psychiatric treatment. However,
informed consent is denied by the lack of information provided by psychiatric
professionals on treatment (Crepaz Keay, 1999).
Rose (2001) surveyed 500 users on the Care Programme Approach (CPA) about their
experiences of inpatient and community mental health care. She found that
participants were not provided with sufficient information on the side effects of
medication and one third reported being over-medicated and sedated by medication.
Lack of information from staff extended to the CPA process and even the identity of
the care co-ordinator. The majority of participants reported unpleasant side effects of
medication and medication was found to dominate the lives of mental health service
users. In relation to participants' experiences of inpatient care, respondents reported
lack of interaction with staff and lack of alternatives to hospital in a crisis. Inpatient
care was criticised for failing to provide opportunities to engage in meaningful
activity and respondents complained of boredom, poor diets and the poor physical
environment on wards. Therefore, research on inpatient care and users' experiences
of medication present remarkably similar findings.
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In summary, Coleman (1999) argued that the psychiatric system is characterised by
alienation: alienation from comprehension of one's own experiences because
experience becomes colonised by professionals; alienation from comprehension of
one's own feelings due to ingestion of deadening drugs; and alienation from society
by institutionalised care. Therefore, Marshall's (1992) claim of the equalising effect
of state welfare services is clearly erroneous.
User Involvement
Lister (1998a) argues that dissatisfaction with top-down approaches to citizenship
has led to demands for greater user involvement in welfare services (see also
Ignatieff, 1989; Beresford and Croft, 1989). User involvement is also described as an
active form of citizenship that is proactive in demanding equal rights rather than
awaiting the passive ascription of rights (Lister, 1997). User involvement is also a
form of political citizenship but is included in the chapter concerning social
citizenship because user involvement relates to participation in welfare services and
Marshall (1992) represented access to state welfare as a key determinant of social
citizenship. However, concepts such as 'user involvement' and 'empowerment' have
been deemed opportunistic buzz-words (Thompson, 1998) and colonised by
professionals (Adams, 1996).
The NHS and Community Care Act 1990 introduced the notion of service users as
consumers (Barnes, 1997) whereby the NHS and local social service departments
were exposed to market forces by an expanded role for the private and voluntary
sectors in service provision. However, the service user is a 'quasi-consumer' due to
limited power of exit from services, limited choice between alternatives and no direct
purchasing power (Barnes, 1997). In fact, the notion of exit is clearly erroneous for
service users subject to the imposition of compulsory powers of detention.
Nevertheless, the National Service Framework for mental health argues for greater
involvement of users in the development of services (DoH, 1999a).
The market-based conception of user involvement is contrasted with democratic
notions of user involvement espoused by the disability movement (Beresford and
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Campbell, 1994). However, a number of researchers have argued that the mental
health user movement is not a consumer movement but a resistance movement based
on opposition to the medical model (Laurance, 2003) or founded on common
experiences of oppression (Barnes, 1999) or is a new social movement in comparison
with the disability movement (Pilgrim and Hitchman, 1999), which challenges the
ascribed inferior status associated with mental health service use (Campbell, 1999).
Beresford (2000a) argues that the successes of the disability movement in achieving
anti-discrimination legislation and the establishment of the Disability Rights
Commission should encourage a dialogue between psychiatric system survivors and
the disability movement on how to advance the civil rights of the former. In contrast
to the successes of the disability movement in advancing the civil rights of their
members. mental health service users have witnessed a gradual erosion of their civil
rights that appears likely to culminate in the introduction of compulsory community
treatment orders by the Government.
Nevertheless, the establishment of the disability movement is relevant to mental
health service users because it was founded on an objection to the paternalism and
disablism of welfare services. It aims to re-conceptualise disability in a rejection of
the medicalisation and resultant individualisation of disability. The disability
movement was established on the basis of a challenge to the domination of disability
organisations by non-disabled people and thus sought to challenge predominant
notions of charity and professional determination of disabled people's needs
(Campbell, 1997).
The conceptual foundation of the disability movement is a challenge the medical
model of disability by asserting the social model. The social model draws a
fundamental distinction between impairment ascribed to the individual and disability
that is caused by society organised around the demands and needs of the non-
disabled population (Oliver, 1990, 1996). Therefore, the disability movement
demands societal change rather than individual change through medical intervention.
The disability movement also challenges the 'personal tragedy' model of disability
that involves the notion that disability strikes people at random (Oliver, 1996;
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Abberley, 1997; Priestley, 1999), thus implying impairment is a negative,
undesirable state. The personal tragedy model represents the dominant medical
hegemony (Priestley, 1999) or grand theory of disability (Oliver, 1996).
Medical hegemony is prevalent in the Government's (e.g. Frank Dobson: DoH,
1998a, 1998) discourse which is reiterated virtually verbatim in the forewords to
Modernising Mental Health Services and the National Service Framework for mental
health and which derive from Dobson's speech in the House of Commons on 8th
December 1998 in which he states:
Mental illness is as common as asthma ... it can leave people without insight into the consequences
of their actions, which is very frightening. (Hansard: Co1.145) (Dobson. 1998)
Inherent in medical hegemony is the suggestion of chronicity or incurability of
mental health problems, thus suggesting that patients must continue to be dependent
on medical intervention on a long-term basis. Strauss et al. (1989) assert:
Patients with schizophrenia are often told they have a disease like diabetes. They are told they will
have the disease all their lives, that it involves major and permanent functional impairment and
that they will have a life-long need for medication (p.131).
The disability movement aims to generate collective conscience recognising the
disabled identity as encompassing a discrete social group who occupy an oppressed
status in society: oppression derived from medical hegemony (Abberley, 1997) yet
which serves to obscure social inequalities (Priestley, 1999). The disability
movement seeks to present the obverse of medical hegemony by rejecting
stigmatising labels in favour of celebrating differences and creating a shared identity
based on the common experience of exclusion, prejudice and discrimination
(Shakespeare, 1993). Therefore, the disability movement has developed a 'counter-
hegemonic culture' (Priestley, 1999).
In challenging the dominant medical hegemony of disability, disability campaigners
have advocated user-run services or greater democratic participation as alternatives
to professionally dominated welfare services (Chamberlin, 1988). In addition, user
involvement has been described as encompassing a number of forms of self-
organisation, ranging from patients' councils to self-help groups or direct action
political groups (Peck, Gulliver and Towel, 2002). Nevertheless, user involvement
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operates on at least four levels, including on an individual level between
professionals and service users in care planning; between users in self-help groups;
in the planning of services and in the management of services on a local level (Peck,
Gulliver and Towel, 2002).
On an individual level, users have complained of lacking involvement in their care.
Peck, Gulliver and Towel (2002) found that 49-60% of their respondents were
dissatisfied with the level of involvement in CPA care planning, especially in relation
to lack of information on treatment (cf. MHF, 2000) and the CPA process (et: Rose,
2001).
In relation to self-help groups, Bolzan et al. (2001) depict self-help groups as a
challenge to the professional dominance of psychiatric treatment and as an
expression of social citizenship that encompasses principles of autonomy (self-help).
equality (based on commonality of experience) and democratic participation (mutual
support). However. participants in Bolzan et al's study reported a reluctance of
professionals to recognise the value of self-help groups, as evidenced by their
reluctance to encourage users to attend such groups. The practice of self-help groups
enables users to adopt a more active role in 'recovery' than when occupying the
status of passive users of mental health services (Bolzan et al, 2001).
In relation to planning of services. research reveals that users are rarely involved at
this level (peck, Gulliver and Towel, 2002) whereby involvement tends to be
restricted to the provision of information (Peck. Gulliver and Towel, 2002) or token
consultation (Barnes, 1999). Rose (2001) found that users believed that their local
user groups lacked influence over local services. In addition, lack of user
involvement on a national level can be observed in the increasingly oppressive nature
of national mental health policy (Peck, Gulliver and Towel. 2002. Laurance. 2003).
The National Institute of Mental Health in England (NlME) (cited in Williamson,
2004) identifies a number of obstacles to the realisation of meaningful user
involvement, encompassing lack of information on opportunities for involvement;
the time and expense associated with involvement; professionals' ascriptions of lack
of credibility of users; lack of resources and expertise in user groups; resistance from
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professionals and experiences of mental health services as oppressive as a
discouragement for involvement.
Croft and Beresford (1989) claim that user involvement tends to be interpreted in a
narrow administrative sense and retains traditional power relations in restricting
involvement of users to information provision and consultation. They argue that real
involvement would encompass the power of the user to define their own needs. User
involvement can also represent a mere public relations exercise in which
involvement of users is tokenistic, involving post hoc participation rather than
involvement in critical decision-making or the participation of relatively small
numbers of users (Croft and Beresford, 1992).
Chamberlin (1988) argued that genuine user involvement excludes professionals
because they tend to dominate users' involvement. Therefore, she argued, genuine
user involvement encompasses user-run services due to the inability of conventional
services to include users effectively. She argued that user-run services are based on
voluntary participation, mutual self-help and needs defined by users.
Barnes and Whistow (1994) examined professionals' attitudes to user involvement
and identified defensive reactions to challenges to professional dominance and
autonomy and ascriptions of complaints by users to a manifestation of illness (such
as paranoia). Beresford and Campbell (1994) claim that professionals frequently cite
'lack of representativeness' of users as justifications for negating user involvement
(see also Barnes, 1999). Lack of representativeness is employed to undermine users'
views and there appears to be a preference for relatively superficial consultation
rather than users being involved in crucial decisions (Beresford and Campbell, 1994).
Frequent problems with user involvement are cited as encompassing token
involvement by a small number of users; involvement of individual users rather than
organised groups; a particular failure to involve ethnic minority users and demands
for representativeness of users but not of professionals (Beresford and Campbell,
1994).
Therefore, user involvement is problematic when it depends on the support of
professionals and there is a danger of colonisation of user involvement by
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professionals to meet their own agenda (Williamson, 2004), leading to demands that
user involvement extends beyond influencing services (Barnes, 1999) to meaningful
social inclusion and citizenship (Campbell, 2001). Moreover, some regard user
involvement in services as collusion in an oppressive system and thus reluctance to
engage in this form of involvement should be respected (Williamson, 2004).
Campbell (2001) argues that the user movement in Britain is currently fragmented
due to lack of overall co-ordination. Therefore, he suggests, greater power will be
attained by collaborating with the disability movement to provide a more coherent
campaigning collective.
Summary
This chapter has considered a broad range of literature which examines, within a
social citizenship framework, whether people who use mental health services are
subject to social exclusion and therefore to a broad range of social inequalities.
The following chapters describe the research I have conducted to examine the
citizenship status of people who use mental health services.
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Chapter Five: Methodology
The main research questions were:
1. Do mental health service users occupy the status of citizens?
2. Do mental health service users occupy the status of a socially excluded group?
I sought answers to these questions by conducting a series of in-depth semi-structured
interviews with users of mental health services. Therefore, a qualitative methodology
was employed to examine the research questions.
Qualitative Methodology
The Mind Inquiry into Social Exclusion (Dunn, 1999) recommends the use of a
qualitative methodology in order to examine how 'multiple discriminations' interact and
how exclusion may develop over time. The question is why would qualitative
methodology be most appropriate to examine social inequalities?
Bryman (1996) states that there has been a traditional dichotomy between positivist and
interpretative approaches to research. However, Wight Felske (1994) argues that the
qualitative paradigm has been superseded by critical social science, which depicts
research as a form of social action and argues that critical research is particularly
appropriate for the study of issues relating to citizenship (poverty, housing and social
exclusion are cited as examples).
Epistemology and the question of the production of legitimate knowledge are of
particular importance in the study of marginalised social groups, such as users of mental
health services. The question of the possession of knowledge and location of expertise
is integral to considerations of the status of people who use mental health services
because recognition that users are possessors of expertise on their status and experiences
challenges the conventional dominance of 'experts' in defining and determining the
nature of mental distress. In particular, the user movement espouses the expertise of
users to define their experiences (Campbell, 1999) and research that appraises users'
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accounts as legitimate challenges the construction of the psychiatric service user as
lacking in competence and credibility.
Furthermore, positivism parallels the medical model of psychiatry in its emphasis on a
search for objective biochemical causes of mental health problems. Positivist research
on disability in particular is said to resemble research on physical illness (Rioux, 1994)
by placing an emphasis on a biomedical search for causes and cures, by locating
pathology within the individual and by adhering to a positivist methodology of control,
quantification and standardisation. Therefore, the adoption of a positivist paradigm
would serve to replicate the power relationship between the psychiatrist and patient in
the relationship between 'scientist' and 'subject'.
Holstein and Gubrium (1997) refer to a 'new language of qualitative method' that
denotes a greater awareness of the mechanisms of knowledge production. Similarly, a
'crisis of representation' (Denzin and Lincoln, 1998) questions the authority of the
researcher to construct legitimate knowledge. Holstein and Gubrium (1997) present a
typology of the qualitative paradigm as involving a challenge to positivist assumptions,
with the aim of understanding social worlds rather than attempting to change them (in
the positivist sense of manipulation of variables); questioning taken-for-granted
knowledge; emphasising the process of research rather than merely reporting the
outcome; and expressing a concern for subjectivity where the researcher inhabits the
social world under investigation and thus is also a legitimate focus of attention. The
latter point relates to reflexivity in which the researcher examines their influence on the
production of research. Finally, Holstein and Gubrium (1997) claim that qualitative
research demonstrates a tolerance for ambiguity in contrast to the desire for control and
prediction demonstrated by positivist researchers.
However, Ward and Flynn (1994), concurring with Oliver (1992), argue that positivism
and qualitative research share the same approach to the 'social relations of research
production' (Oliver, 1992). In other words, both retain the researcher's status as the
'expert'. Ward and Flynn refer to a 'new paradigm' of emancipatory research which
supplants both positivism and qualitative methodology in emphasising the expertise of
participants with the implication of significantly greater participation in the research
process and hence, in the production of knowledge. It also implies disabled people as
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researchers (Rogers and Palmer-Erbs, 1994), usurping the conventional dominance of
non-disabled people in disability research, whereby non-disabled researchers are allies
as long as they occupy a subordinate position to disabled researchers (Barnes, 1992b).
Wight Felske (1994) argues that critical social research is an empowering alternative to
disempowering quantitative research in its emphasis on research as a form of political
action that challenges the societal discrimination of disabled people. The critical social
science paradigm postulates that research questions should be generated by disabled
people; disabled people should be partners in research production; researchers should
share the same value base as participants; dissemination of findings should be
accessible to disabled people (suggesting that findings are made available in a range of
formats) and knowledge is regarded as a resource available to all (Wight Felske, 1994).
The latter point implies that findings should be published in publications associated
with disabled people, for example Openmind, rather than scientific or professional
journals.
It could be argued that participatory research retains the social relations of research
production since the researcher retains overall control and ownership of the research
fmdings. Nevertheless, Zarb (1992) argues that participatory research involves the
researcher presenting themselves as a resource to be used by participants and places an
emphasis on participants as a source of expertise of use to the researcher. However,
Zarb (1992) and Oliver (1992) allude to the exploitation and alienation of research
participants and thus effective participatory research would initiate a change in the
relationship between researcher and participants in which the latter are acknowledged as
the experts on disability and as valuable sources of knowledge. It would also imply
participation in all stages of research production, from inception to conclusion and
dissemination whereby the researcher relinquishes overall control over the research
process (Rogers and Palmer-Erbs, 1994). However, most research is conceived by the
researcher and therefore involves participants on a relatively post hoc basis.
It is also argued that disability researchers should acknowledge their political
obligations by contributing to the disability network rather than treating it solely as a
useful resource (Zarb, 1992) or by adopting a campaigning role, using research to
highlight discrimination and social inequalities (Ramc d Grant, 1994).
~ ,.
101
However, although participatory research appears to legitimate political involvement of
researchers (and thus legitimates eschewing the neutrality of research production),
Oliver (1992) argues that research has exerted a minimal effect on policy and the
everyday lives of disabled people. This may be due to the detachment of university-
based research from the lives of disabled people (Zarb, 1992; Whitmore, 1994) and the
pressure for researchers to conform to the expectations of a conservative research
community (Barnes, 1996). Bury (1996), in a reply to Barnes (1996), argued that
research is influential in revealing social inequalities and challenging the status quo.
However, the British higher education system is part of the status quo and rarely
challenges dominant approaches to knowledge production. For instance, Maclure (1990)
argues that political and economic elites protect themselves by controlling knowledge
production, as exemplified in positivist bias in research and professionalisation of
researchers. However, initiatives such as user-focussed monitoring (Rose et al., 1998;
Rose, 2001) and the employment of users as researchers (Mental Health Foundation,
1997, 2000) challenge the notion that only professional researchers can conduct
research successfully. Nevertheless, Barnes (1992b) argues that emancipatory research
is less politically acceptable than conventional research and its success depends on the
researcher's willingness to challenge research institutions.
As Oliver (1992) asserts, much research on disability continues to adhere to
'methodological individualism' in which social problems are located in the individual
whereas Barnes (1996) suggests that research should change its emphasis to studying
the discrimination inherent in able-bodied society. Moreover. Taylor (1985) argues that
professionals are rarely the focus of research because they are more able to erect
barriers to scrutiny. Indeed, Rose (2001) reported that some professionals intervened to
prevent the participation of their clients in user-focused monitoring of services. My
research, in part, turns the spotlight on professionals by examining users' views of the
behaviour and attitudes of professionals.
Furthermore, much participatory research has been tokenistic, adopted merely to secure
funding and credibility and thus primarily benefits researchers rather than participants
(Jahoda, 1980). Maclure (1990) argues:
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... at its most commonplace it [participatory research] is weak research derived from a popular
ideological agenda.
Having examined some of the problems associated with participatory research, it is
useful to examine the feasibility and practical implications of conducting a participatory
research project. The first task is to examine the fundamental pre-requisites of
participatory research.
Researchers have claimed that conventional research is alienating for disabled people
(Oliver, 1992) but has the potential to be empowering, depending on the adoption of a
participatory paradigm (Oliver, 1992; Rioux, 1994; Rapp, Shera and Kisthardt, 1993).
However, researchers remain the prime beneficiaries of research (Barnes, 1993),
exploiting disabled people to advance their careers. The explicit aims of participatory
research are to challenge discrimination of disabled people by highlighting social
inequalities (Reason, 1994), raising awareness of oppression and forming alliances with
marginalised groups (cf. Freire, 1970). Participatory research also challenges the social
relations of research production by awarding primacy to experiential knowledge
(knowledge based on first-hand experience) over prepositional knowledge (knowledge
that is not based on direct experience) (Heron, 1981; Reason, 1994).
In terms of the relevance of research to the real world, Reason and Rowan (1981) assert:
... we need to consider not only 'is it right?' but also 'is it useful?' and 'is it illuminating?' (p.243)
In this respect, participatory research aims to include participants in the generation of
research questions and by providing feedback following completion of research, in
contrast with the 'hit-and-run' approach to research which 'sucks the subject dry and
leaves her by the wayside' (Reason and Rowan, 1981: 248). However, Humphries
(1997) argues that emancipatory research continues to define legitimate knowledge
through reference to a 'metanarrative of emancipation' which argues that the goal of
research is prescriptively associated with emancipation, therefore marginalised groups
continue to be excluded from defining the goals of research.
The distinction between emancipatory and participatory research is not particularly clear
and the two are said to overlap (Beresford et al., 1999). However, emancipatory
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research has been described as a set of principles whereas participatory research
prescribes rules of the research process (Zarb, 1992). Moreover, participatory research
has been deemed more flexible than emancipatory research whereby the former
involves participation in the research process and the latter involves control by
participants over research (Zarb, 1992). Furthermore, participatory research is thought
to be more easily achievable because research is thought to exert relatively little
influence over political or material conditions affecting disabled people (Shakespeare,
1996; Zarb, 1992). Nevertheless, emancipatory research aims to be relevant to the lives
of disabled people and influential in improving the material conditions of participants
(Beresford, 2000b). Furthermore, Barnes and Whistow (1992) indicate that the benefits
of research encompass participants' satisfaction with a number of factors, including
with altruistic participation, solidarity with other participants, being listened to and
exerting influence over services. Therefore, the benefits of research do not necessarily
extend to social or political change but can be personally beneficial to participants.
Nevertheless, participatory and emancipatory research are preferable to alternatives due
to the politicisation of research; by examining social inequalities; by constructing
participants as active producers of knowledge rather than as passive subjects; and by
highlighting issues relating to the ownership and production of knowledge about
marginalised groups. The question remains, however, on the success of participatory
research in changing the social relations of research since researchers appear likely to
retain overall control of the research process and ownership of data, prestige and
remuneration as a consequence of their status as disseminators of knowledge gained
from disabled people.
Given the acknowledged limitations of participatory research and the problems in
realising genuine participation, the next question to arise concerns how research can
strive to become less exploitative and of more use to disabled people. Firstly, numerous
researchers have argued that participants must be involved at every stage of the research
process (Reason, 1994), including prior to initiation (Oliver, 1992) through to
interpretation and dissemination (Rogers and Palmer-Erbs, 1994). In particular,
participants should determine research questions (Wight Felske, 1994; Rogers and
Palmer-Erbs, 1994) and participants should exert an influence over methodological
decisions (Zarb, 1992).
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A strong version of participatory research would suggest that disabled people become
researchers (Rogers and Palmer-Erbs, 1994)whereby a professional researcher provides
training in research methods, thus their knowledge is treated as a commodity available
to disabled people (Ramcharan and Grant, 1994; Barnes, 1992b; Zarb, 1992) and
involves the researcher relinquishing the expert role (Rowan and Reason, 1981). A
modified version would involve consultation rather than genuine power sharing
(Maclure, 1990) and would restrict involvement to providing information and obtaining
feedback rather than enabling influence over crucial decisions.
Importantly, it would be impossible to conceive of research into citizenship as
undermining the citizenship of research participants. Therefore, a modified version of
the participatory approach was adopted to ensure at least a measure of congruence
between research aims and methods.
The research described in this thesis aimed to be emancipatory in publicising the
experiences of citizenship of people who use mental health services, although this
depends on broad dissemination of research findings. The research was participatory in
recognising service users as credible reporters of their experiences; it recognised
participants' expertise in financial terms by remunerating them for participation (an
essential element of involvement in research: Barnes and Whistow, 1992); a small
discussion group influenced the construction of a topic guide for use in the individual
interviews; and participants were asked to provide feedback on their experience of
research participation at the end of the series of individual interviews and were sent a
copy of the findings chapter and asked to provide feedback on their views of the
fmdings.
The research was not as participatory as it could have been due to the resource
constraints experienced by a lone PhD researcher working with a limited budget, given
that participatory research is acknowledged to be more time-consuming and financially
expensive than conventional research (Telford and Faulkner, 2004).
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Grounded Theory
The previous section indicated problems associated with conventional research.
However, the participatory research paradigm is too diverse and ambiguous to suggest
methods of data collection since it primarily relates to the conduct of the researcher and
the power relationship between the researcher and participants. Some of the features of
the grounded theory approach are useful as general guiding principles to research
without necessarily being followed in an over-determined manner. In particular,
grounded theory is congruent with the aims of participatory research in the development
of research questions and conduct of data analysis in accordance with the emerging
themes provided by participants. Therefore, this section will examine the grounded
theory approach and extract its most useful elements. However, the section begins with
a warning that grounded theory must be approached critically due to its retention of
some of the preoccupations of the positivist paradigm.
Grounded theory was originally conceived by Glaser and Strauss (1967). It has been
described as a post-positivist approach (Denzin and Lincoln, 1998) due to having some
aspects in common with positivism yet retaining the basic elements of qualitative
research. Grounded theory was developed in an era when researchers remained
committed to positivist principles of rigour in research (Seale, 1999). Glaser and Strauss
(1967) and Strauss and Corbin (1994) explained the rationale for the development of
grounded theory as involving an attempt to produce empirically-based theory as a
reaction against positivist imposition of grand theory; to legitimate qualitative research
which has traditionally been accused of bias and lack of rigour (Henwood and Pigeon,
1994); and to provide a guide to methods (Strauss and Corbin, 1994; Glaser and Strauss,
1967). Fielding and Lee (1998) describe grounded theory as a 'highly developed
approach to qualitative data analysis.' (p.39)
Strauss and Corbin (1998) define theory as:
A set of well-defined categories (e.g. themes, concepts) that are systematically inter-related through
statements ofrelationsbips to form a theoretical framework. (p.22)
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Glaser and Strauss (1967) argue that theory should be derived inductively, directly from
data, rather than deductively. Therefore, the emphasis in grounded theory is on theory
generation rather than on theory testing. However, Glaser and Strauss (1967) admit to
the combination of induction and deduction in theory development through the process
of deriving hypotheses inductively and testing them deductively, thus leading to a cycle
of induction on the basis of verification. The cyclical nature of grounded theory is
termed 'iterative' and is defined as the exploration of new topics whilst retaining the
fundamental focus of the research (Rubin and Rubin, 1995).
The inductive approach emphasises a need to avoid imposing a priori assumptions on
data interpretation. However, Henwood and Pigeon (1994) ask 'what grounds grounded
theory?' and argue that the imposition of prior assumptions on data is inevitable
(Henwood and Pigeon, 1995) due to the academic convention of conducting a literature
review prior to data collection and the way in which a review of literature is inevitably
influenced by cultural assumptions held by the researcher. Henwood and Pigeon (1995)
advocate the constructivist version of grounded theory which recognises multiple
interpretations and clarifies the researcher's position in relation the interpretation of data
(referred to as interpretive validity: Altheide and Johnson, 1998).
'Theory as process' is a central theme of grounded theory (Glaser and Strauss, 1967),
implying that theory generation is a continual process, subject to many modifications as
data collection progresses. A primary defining characteristic of grounded theory is that
data collection, analysis and interpretation is simultaneous in order to enable data
collection to be determined by findings from previous data collection, thus the findings
are grounded in the data. This process is known as 'theoretical sampling' and suggests
that the content of interviews will be changeable, eschewing the standardisation typical
of positivist-inclined qualitative data collection. The grounded theory approach
advocates data collection until theoretical saturation is reached whereby no additional
data will contribute to further theory development or when no new insights are
forthcoming (Ezzy, 2002).
Grounded theory has been the subject of a number of criticisms. For instance,
Macmillan and McLachlan (1999) argue that grounded theory misrepresents theory
development as involving the linking of categories whereas they argue that theory is
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defined by its ability to explain rather than merely stipulating relationships between
concepts. Moreover, Silverman (2000) questions whether much grounded theory
analysis extends beyond merely producing a list of codes.
An additional criticism is that many qualitative researchers adopt grounded theory
without grasping the full methodological and epistemological implications of doing so
(Bryman, 1988; Fisher, 1995; Denzin, 1998). Furthermore, Denzin (1988) argues that
grounded theory is often adopted as an 'ideological weapon' to convince others of the
credibility of the research due to its emphasis on rigour and systematic data collection
and analysis.
Denzin (1998) claims that grounded theory is often adopted without being fully
understood; that the definition of theory is questionable; that there is an over-emphasis
on theory development; that there is a problematic affinity with positivism; and that
analysis often subordinates participants' explanations to those of the researcher. Finally,
Denzin (1988) has also argued that the grounded theory approach has been superseded
by the postmodemist approach to research as a reaction against grounded theory's
emphasis on scientific credibility. Denzin argues that it is impossible to adopt a
subjective interpretive approach on one hand and emphasise scientific canons of
credibility on the other.
The commonality with positivism is the most problematic aspect of grounded theory
and it is questionable how successful grounded theory is in grounding participants'
accounts because the researcher retains overall control over the process. Therefore,
although the systematic, procedural character of grounded theory is attractive, the
researcher must be aware of the limitations of the grounded theory approach and utilise
the creative, flexible aspects of theory development, bearing in mind the advantages of




A small group discussion was conducted in February 2000 and comprised three female
mental health service users from London. One participant identified herself as black
African-Caribbean and the other two participants were white. All three women were
aged approximately between forty and fifty-five years. The group discussion was
conducted in a London Mind office. The participants were contacted through a fellow
PhD student who had met them previously through her employment as a researcher with
Mind in London. The discussion group was conducted in a loosely structured way
whereby the group members were almost co-interviewers and required minimal
prompting into discussion by the researcher. The PhD student who had organised the
discussion group also asked a small number of questions. I anticipated that the presence
of the other PhD student would help put the group members at ease and facilitate the
discussion, due to participants' familiarity with her.
Each group member was paid £5 per hour (or part of an hour) in cash and was asked to
sign a receipt. Lunch was provided due to the timing of the discussion group. The
discussion group lasted approximately three-and-a-half hours although one member
departed approximately half way through the discussion due to having to attend a prior
engagement. The group discussion was recorded on an audiotape machine with an
external microphone attached. I had prepared a topic guide with which to focus the
group discussion but the members largely determined the content of the discussion. The
determination of discussion content was useful in providing an almost free association
of topics that the members felt were relevant to them within the broad areas of
citizenship and social exclusion and were useful in indicating some of the likely areas of
interest for subsequent interviews.
The advantages of using a small group discussion in the initial stages of data collection
are that they enable clarification of research questions and establish the relevance of
research questions (O'Brien, 1993) and enable generation of new ideas and
identification of potential problems with the research (Stewart and Shamdasani, 1990).
Focus groups and small group discussions also enable the researcher to gather diverse
views and emphasise the views of informants (Frey and Fontana, 1993) and increase the




The topic guide was given to prospective participants as an introduction to the research
and prior to their agreement on participation. It was anticipated to be used as a general
guide in that it was made clear to participants that the guide was intended to be
employed in a flexible way and was not anticipated to be fully inclusive. Therefore,
participants were encouraged to discuss topics they thought might be relevant but were






• Education and training
• Social relationships
• Mental health services
At the point of construction of the topic guide, I intended to examine service users'
views on their status in society by discussing subjective feelings of community
membership and whether participants felt accepted as members of their community.
Abuse from strangers, 'nimby' opposition and expressions of public attitudes were
possible interview topics, alongside views on media representations of mental illness.
In relation to housing, I intended to question participants on their current and previous
types of housing. I wanted to examine community membership in terms of geographical
location, security of tenure and privacy, the latter especially in relation to supported
housing.
In relation to employment, I wanted to discuss participation in non-supported
employment and supported employment schemes. The issues of access and
discrimination in employment were potential topics for discussion, along with whether
employment really is a favoured route into social inclusion. I also wanted to examine
the role of income in social participation in order to establish whether service users
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share the consumerist ethos of mainstream society and how mental health status impacts
on participation in consumption.
The meaning and nature of social relationships were examined in terms of whether
social isolation and rejection had been experienced and whether choice is exercised in
social network composition. Chamberlin's (1988) assertion that friendships with other
service users can be a source of support was also examined.
Experience of mental health services was also included in the topic guide in order to
examine whether such services impede or facilitate social participation. Interviewees
were asked to evaluate services in relation to autonomy, decision-making, medication
(including side effects and compliance), the notion of insight and experiences of
compulsion.
The experience of mental health legislation is particularly pertinent because it is
informed by notions of dangerousness and can produce tenuousness of community
membership in terms of repeated hospitalisation. I also wanted to examine participants'
experiences of the use of the Mental Health Act 1983 and awareness of rights under the
Act.
The aim of the individual interviews was to gain an overall impression of community
membership experienced by users of mental health services since social participation is
identified as a significant defining characteristic of citizenship (Marshall, 1992; Rees,
1995a).
The current study is comparable to the study conducted by Barham and Hayward (1995)
in their presentation of interviews with mental health service users in order to establish
the nature of community membership and social participation. However, their
interviewees comprised a relatively homogenous group of, primarily, young males, and
failed to include ethnic minorities. My research differs from Barham and Hayward's
study by examining a broader range of topics in accordance with broad surveys of
discrimination conducted by Read and Baker (1996) and Dunn (1999) yet retains the in-
depth interview data collection of the Barham and Hayward study.
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Sampling
Following the group discussion, semi-structured interviews were conducted with
individual participants. A series of interviews was conducted with a total of 15 users of
mental health services. The criterion for involvement in the research was previous or
current use of mental health services. The interviewees were all aged less than 65 years.
Eight of the individual interviewees were male and seven were female. All were
unemployed at the time of the study but the standard of educational attainment was
high, with at least two participants having university degrees, one participant held an
HND qualification and two participants had been employed as teachers. One participant
had been a successful businesswoman prior to her mental health service use; three
participants had previously worked as civil servants and two participants had previously
worked as teachers.
Participants were recruited through an introductory visit to a user group in the south east
of England in December 2000, a poster presentation at the Mind annual conference in
November 2000 and through the snowballing method. Three participants were recruited
after seeing the poster presentation, a further seven participants were recruited following
an introductory visit to a user group meeting, two participants were recruited from a
self-help group and three participants were recruited via the snowballing method.
The participants lived in the Midlands, the south east of England and in East Anglia,
thereby ensuring some degree of geographic distribution of participants. Recruiting
participants from different areas of England enabled comparisons to be made in relation
to user involvement, awareness of mental health policy and experiences of mental
health services.
I approached the project co-ordinator of a user group with a written description of the
research (see Appendix 1) and a request to attend one of the groups' regular meetings in
order to introduce the research and discuss it in greater detail. The written description of
the research was circulated to group members at a user group meeting and the members
agreed that they would invite me to discuss the research in further detail at the following
meeting. I spoke for approximately 15 minutes (see Appendix 3) and answered
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questions about the research. It emerged that a number of members had found the
written description of the research difficult to understand due to the prevalence of
jargon. Members commented that the verbal description of the research had been more
useful and a number of members indicated their interest in participation almost
immediately. I left written details of the research, including my contact details.
The poster presentation (see Appendix 2) occurred at the Mind annual conference in
November 2000. I met with a small group of interested conference attendees whereby
one participant was recruited following this informal meeting. Another individual
contacted me by email upon his return from the conference, having seen the poster
presentation. A further participant was recruited after having been told about the
research by his friend who had seen the poster presentation at the conference.
Upon establishing contact with interested parties, I arranged to meet them either at their
home or, in two cases, at a local advocacy centre. One participant was interviewed by
telephone due to the geographical distance between the researcher and participant and a
further participant agreed to be interviewed at my office at the Tizard Centre at the
University of Kent due, again, to the geographical distance between the researcher and
the participant's home.
Demographic Characteristics of the Sample
The sample of participants comprised ten females (including three females in the
discussion group) and eight males. Participants ranged in age from early twenties to
mid-sixties at the time of the interviews. The range in terms of duration of service use
was 4.5 to 30 years. Data was not obtained from all of the participants on the number of
years they had used mental health services, therefore it is not possible to provide an
average number of years spent using mental health services for the entire sample.
However, data was available on years of service use from 12 participants and the
average number of years of service use for this sub-sample was 16.38 years. Therefore,
participants had generally spent a significant period of time using mental health
services.
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None of the participants was engaged in paid work at the time of the interviews. Data
was available from four participants on the exact year since their last paid employment.
The average number of years of unemployment within this small sample was 21.5 years.
Other participants indicated that they had not worked for over five years. None of the
participants had worked in the year preceding the interviews. Therefore, the participants
are characterised as having experienced chronic unemployment, defined as over one
year of worklessness. One member of the small discussion group identified as African-
Caribbean but all other participants were of white British origin.
Interviews
I presented potential participants with a five-page introduction to the research in which
the aims of the research were described along with my intentions for the presentation of
findings. I also included practical details such as the rate of pay and requirement of
consent. The prospective participant was then informed of their ability to exit from the
research at any time and was assured that the initial meeting did not imply an obligation
to participate in the research. I also included brief biographical information about
myself. My full contact details were included at the end of the document. The
anonymity of the research participants was also emphasised at this point. Potential
participants were also presented with a topic guide outlining the main themes of the
research (see Appendix 4) and a consent form (see Appendix 5) that participants would
be required to sign if they decided to participate in the research. The consent form
emphasised the voluntary and negotiable nature of participation, the anonymity of
participants, the recording of the interviews, the potential dissemination of the findings
and included the address to send complaints, if necessary.
Two participants decided not to participate in the research following an introductory
visit but the remainder agreed to participate in the research and proceeded to discuss
their circumstances during the initial visit. No discussions were tape recorded at the
initial visit but preliminary discussions were used to structure subsequent interviews.
The participants were informed that I would prefer to conduct more than one interview
with a likely maximum of three interviews. Most participants agreed to be interviewed
for as many times as was necessary. Following agreement to participate in the research,
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an appointment was made for the first interview. Most interviews took place in the
participant's home, with the exception of five participants who were met either at an
advocacy office or, in the case of one participant, at a day hospital; another participant
was interviewed at the Tizard Centre and one participant was interviewed by telephone.
Participants were informed at the initial meeting that they would be paid £5 per hour or
part of an hour and were paid at this rate at the initial interview, regardless of whether
they subsequently participated in the research. The payments were made in cash. Two
participants were partners and were interviewed together but paid separately at the
individual rate. Participants were required to sign a receipt following each payment (see
Appendix 6). Payments did not exceed the weekly earnings allowed under income
support in that no interview involved payment of over £20. The participants were
assured that their anonymity would be protected by the secure storage of the receipts in
a locked cabinet at the researcher's home and that the University would only require
inspection of the receipts in exceptional circumstances.
The interviews were audio recorded on a portable dictation machine. An external
microphone was attached and the recording equipment was generally placed on a table
on front of the participant. Two participants expressed discomfort at the sight of the
recording equipment and so the tape recorder was placed to the side of the participant
out of their line of sight. The telephone interviews were recorded using two telephones
with one telephone located in another room of my home and set to speakerphone and
recorded from the speakerphone while I spoke to the participant on the other telephone.
The quality of the telephone recording was surprisingly good. The participant's
payment was confirmed at the final interview and sent through the post immediately
following the final interview. The participant then signed a receipt and returned it in a
pre-paid envelope.
The interview structure was flexible and depended on the participant's individual
experiences. Therefore, not all topics were covered in all of the interviews and the initial
discussion with participants revealed the topics that were likely to be of particular
importance to specific participants. Each taped interview was listened to prior to the
following interview in order to avoid unnecessary repetition, to seek clarification if
necessary and to determine the topics to be explored in the following interview. The
majority of interviews were conducted within a short space of time and thus it was not
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possible to transcribe every interview prior to the following interview for each
participant. Therefore, a review of each interview tape prior to the following interview
at least enabled a review of the content without the need to complete the time-
consummg process of transcribing the interview prior to proceeding to the next
interview.
At the beginning of each individual's first interview, the central research questions were
reiterated and the participant was asked to discuss issues of particular relevance to them.
The number of interviews conducted with each participant ranged from one to five, with
a mean number of 2.79 per participant (three interviews rounded to the nearest whole
number).
Data Analysis
Computer Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis Software (CAQDAS) was used to analyse
the data because literature suggests that CAQDAS carries the advantage of being able to
handle the large amounts of data typically generated by qualitative research (Fielding
and Lee, 1998).
The use of computers has been advocated for the analysis of grounded theory data
(Richards and Richards, 1994, 1998) whereby the use of programmes such as NU*DIST
and NVIVO has been particularly associated with the grounded theory method,
although not without significant criticism (Coffey, Holbrook and Atkinson, 1996).
The use of computer software is advocated for the analysis of qualitative data due to the
fact that qualitative methods produce bulky, complex, unstructured, context-dependent
data which is said to be recalcitrant in not yielding data easily (Fielding and Lee, 1998).
It is argued that computers are used in order to enhance the credibility of research by
enabling researchers to deal with large amounts of data, helping to organise complex
data and by addressing issues of validity (Fisher, 1997).
Tesch (1990) argued that computers are useful due to their rapidity of analysis (thus
enabling more efficient use of time), greater thoroughness of analysis, and enabling the
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researcher to experiment with data to a much greater extent than when using manual
methods of analysis. Furthermore, Barry (1998) identified advantages in software
enabling a formal system of memo recording and the facilitation of conceptual
approaches to data through the easy manipulation of conceptual categories.
Therefore, CAQDAS software enables relatively swift navigation through large
amounts of interview data in order to identify patterns and repeated themes. I concluded
that the manual analysis of data would be excessively time consuming and less efficient
in that data would be more likely to be overlooked in the manual handling of data.
The interviews were transcribed either between interviews or shortly following the
completion of interviewing with each participant. The issue of confidentiality was dealt
with at the transcribing stage by referring to the participant by the initial of their first
name. Many of the participants either did not want to remain anonymous or were not
concerned if they were not presented anonymously in the research. However, some
participants stated clearly that they wanted to remain anonymous and this meant that all
participants were presented anonymously in the research report in order to protect the
identities of those who wished to remain anonymous. Similarly, locations and names of
services and professionals mentioned by participants were also anonymised by
presenting a common noun in square brackets in the transcripts to replace the proper
noun mentioned in the interview. I referred to myself as 'MF' in the transcripts in order
to avoid confusion ('MF' was my previous initial) and the participants who particularly
asked to remain anonymous were referred to as either 'P', 'PI' or 'P2' whereby 'P'
refers to 'Participant'. A hospital that was frequently referred to by participants was
referred to as 'KG' in the transcripts. I was faced with a dilemma in choosing the
method of anonymising participants in that using the initial of the participant's first
name could be construed as dehumanising and there was an additional problem that
some participants actively wanted certain institutions to be identified in an attempt to
publicise their negative experiences of the institution. However, to reveal the names of
such institutions would risk revealing the identities of participants who wished to
remain anonymous because the location of participants may be rendered apparent by
identifying institutions.
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Interview data was analysed using the NVIVO programme. The programme is
particularly suited to the analysis of qualitative interview data because its main function
is to enable the labelling and organisation of categories derived from such data.
The unlimited number of hierarchical trees in which to store codes was a major
advantage of NVIVO. It was also selected for its reported ease of learning and ease of
use, its flexibility and due to the developers' reported intention for use with precisely
the kind of data generated in my research (Gibbs, 2002). In fact, I found NVIVO easy
and quick to learn, given that the researcher can achieve a respectable level of analysis
using only the most basic functions of the programme. The most useful functions of the
programme were found to be the ability to import documents into the project in rich text
format and directly from the Word programme, the ease and rapidity of coding and the
organisation of codes into parent, child and sibling relationships, thus indicating the
relationships between codes and sub-categories of codes. The ability to display and print
the text coded at each node was ultimately the most time saving feature of the
programme and represented the greatest advantage over the manual coding of data.
The aim of coding of interviews was the identification of recurrent themes, omission of
themes that appeared in the topic guide but not appearing in interviews, identifying
consensus and dissent within categories and the exclusion of topics that are interesting
but not directly relevant to citizenship.
Coding was achieved by deriving general themes from literature, policy and the small
group discussion that, in turn, generated the topic guide. The transcripts were coded
initially by hand and then imported into NVIVO to attach codes to segments of text.
The hierarchical organisation of nodes enabled the collapse of coding categories as the
visual presentation of categories enabled duplication to be identified relatively easily.
The codes were successively modified in response to themes emerging from interview
data. NVIVO allows the researcher to define categories in the Node Explorer, thereby
proving useful in ensuring consistency of use by referring to clear inclusion criteria.
It is the cumulative process of coding that appears to link the grounded theory approach
to the use of CAQDAS software because the analysis of data is revised according to
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interview responses. Interview data thus directs the generation of codes and subsequent
data collection.
The group discussion was coded first and produced the framework for the coding of
individual interviews. Transcripts were coded manually in the first instance and were
coded in the order in which the interviews were conducted. One or two word codes were
attached to data segments to summarise themes in each data segment. At the completion
of the coding of the transcript, a list of codes was produced for the entire document.
Subsequent transcripts were coded and compared with the list of codes already
produced. Repeated codes were omitted and new codes added to the cumulative list of
codes. Therefore, the coding involved the cumulative creation of codes and the collapse
of codes into general categories, thereby enabling greater inclusiveness and minimising
repetition.
The manual coding of transcripts was followed by transferring the transcripts into the
NVNO programme and then coding the data using the manual coding framework.
Codes were then attached to data segments, enabling the printing of data segments
under each code to allow comparison of participants' discussions under each code.
Recurrent themes were identified, alongside patterns of consensus and dissent between
participants (open coding: Strauss and Corbin, 1998). Overlapping themes between
categories highlighted the inter-relationship between areas of citizenship (e.g. stigma
and disclosure appeared in numerous categories, along with identity and difference).
This represented axial coding (Strauss and Corbin, 1998) in which relationships
between categories and sub-categories were analysed. The final stage of analysis
involved selective coding whereby categories and sub-categories were examined in
relation to the core category of citizenship.
Reliability and Validity
Researchers have adopted the grounded theory approach in an attempt to increase the
reliability and validity of qualitative research in response to criticisms that such research
lacks methodological and analytical rigour. However, Hammersley and Gomm (1997)
accuse qualitative research, and emancipatory research in particular, of bias. They
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identify bias as involving either systematic error or deliberate manipulation of data.
They claim that such bias is due to emphasis being placed on a particular viewpoint in
the collection and interpretation of data in order to produce confirmatory findings. Such
concerns are one reason that grounded theory has been described as a post-positivist
approach due to its concerns with positivist notions of reliability and validity (Denzin
and Lincoln, 1998). However, notions of reliability and validity differ significantly
between qualitative and quantitative research, the latter encompassing notions of
absolute truth (Seale, 1999) and thus greater commitment to concepts such as validity
and generalisation.
Reliability is generally understood as involving the replicability of research fmdings
(Perakyla, 1997; Seale, 1999). However, Seale argues that reliability is difficult to
invoke in qualitative research due to researchers' creativity and the interactional nature
of such research and that credibility is more pertinent to qualitative research whereby
the researcher's methodology is transparent to enable other researchers to examine the
precise process of research production. Mays and Pope (2000) argue that a clear
exposition of the choice of methodology and procedures followed in data collection
should enable others to evaluate the adequacy of the interpretation of data offered by the
researcher.
perakyla (1997) claims that reliability and validity is achieved by accurate recording of
raw data which, in tum, is achieved by the use of multiple researchers, participant
researchers, peer examination and the audio or video taping of interviews (see also
Seale, 1999).
Validity is described as involving the accuracy of findings and is achieved by the clear
explication of the role of the researcher in the research process and how research
problems were defined and analysed (Altheide and Johnson, 1998), although Banister et
al. (1994) claim that validity is more closely related to the adequacy of the researcher's
interpretations of findings. Validity is generally regarded as achieved by reflexivity in
the research process, describing the role and stance of the researcher (Altheide and
JohnsOn, 1998; Banister et al., 1994; Seale, 1999; Perakyla, 1997).
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Triangulation is presented as one way of demonstrating validity in the use of different
vantage points from which to interpret data (Banister et al., 1994). Data triangulation
refers to researching different roles (e.g. staff and patients) in a particular context
whereas investigator triangulation involves the use of more than one researcher
(Banister et al., 1994). Reflexivity of qualitative data collection and analysis allows
transparency in the research process to enable readers to judge the impact of bias on the
interpretation of findings (Banister et al., 1994).
Generalisation in qualitative research is distinct from generalisation of findings in
quantitative research. Generalisation of findings from quantitative data is achieved by
random sampling of a large number of cases whereas generalisation of qualitative data
refers to the application of theory beyond the particular context studied (Maxwell,
2002). It is also referred to as external validity (Maxwell, 2002).
Furthermore, Mays and Pope (2000) argue that the credibility of qualitative research can
be evaluated by examining the relevance of the research and whether it contributes to
knowledge; whether the research questions are sufficiently clear, at least by the end of
the research process; the appropriateness of the design to the research questions;
whether the range of theoretical sampling was sufficiently broad to allow conceptual
generalisation; whether data collection and analysis was systematic; and whether
sufficient data was included in the report to assess the adequacy of the researcher's
interpretations and conclusions.
In relation to Hammersley and Gomm's (1997) accusation of bias against qualitative
research, it is the case that I have adopted a specific viewpoint in the interpretation of
the research findings: that of the participants in the research. I have attempted to present
their views and experiences as accurately as possible. It is also the case that research
examining the experiences of users of mental health services adopts a distinct
viewpoint. For example, possibly less credence would be awarded to participants' views
by a researcher committed to the medical model of mental distress whereas a researcher
committed to the emancipation of mental health service users is more likely to seek the
views and accounts of such individuals. Moreover, the research was conceived as a
result of listening to mental health service users' experiences of discrimination and
disadvantage. Therefore, bias is inevitable in the conception of research but can be
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reduced through a commitment to presenting participants' viewpoints as accurately and
faithfully as possible and acknowledging the sources of the formative development of
research questions. Furthermore, I have attempted to include a sufficient amount of raw
data in reporting the findings of the research to enable readers to evaluate whether
participants' discussions support the conclusions drawn from the interview data. I also
recruited participants from a range of settings and geographical locations in an attempt
to sample a range of viewpoints, although this does not attain the triangulation
described as enhancing validity of findings. I have also included disconfirmatory and
unexpected fmdings in order to capture the complexity of experiences and opinions
expressed by participants.
Furthermore, the research was conducted systematically and described accordingly and
thus fulfils Mays and Pope's definition of rigour in qualitative research. Furthermore,
the research contributes to the current state of knowledge in this area because it is the
first study to examine a broad range of areas of Marshall's (1992) conceptualisation of
citizenship using in-depth interviews with mental health service users.
The current research also attempted to maximise reliability and validity by clearly
explaining the process of the research and rationale for research decisions. The research
involved an attempt to increase the accuracy of data collection by audio recording of
interviews and by checking the accuracy of transcripts by comparing the interview tapes
with the transcripts at least twice per interview, until I was satisfied that the transcripts
were absolutely accurate. In relation to Mays and Pope's question of whether the
research method adopted is appropriate to the research questions, the choice of
qualitative data is the most appropriate method of examining mental health service
users' experiences of social participation and views of citizenship status because it
enables an examination of the complexity of human experience whereas quantitative
methods might be suitable for a more general overview of discrimination experienced
by this population, as in Read and Baker's (1996) research, but is not the most
appropriate method of examining the complex concept of citizenship.
Ethical Considerations
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The discussion of ethics in social research emphasises that harm to participants should
be minimised and the benefits of the research should outweigh harm or disadvantage to
participants (Gregory, 2003). Researchers are urged to be particularly aware of issues in
relation to informed consent and privacy (Rees, 1991; Fontana and Frey, 1998),
deception (Punch, 1998) and confidentiality in the storage of data (Homan, 1991;
Punch, 1998).
Punch (1998) argues that participants in research have the right to be informed that they
are participating in research, thereby eliminating the prospect of covert research. Homan
(1991) asserts that fully informed consent depends upon the provision of sufficient
information on which to make an informed decision. He argues that consent must be
voluntary which involves the exercise of choice in participation without the use of
coercion, fraud, deception or duress. Participants should be presented with
comprehensive details of the research, including aims of the research, expectations of
participants, the time and effort involved and data collection and dissemination
(Gregory, 2003).
The participants in the current study were presented with full written details of the
research prior to an introductory visit to each individual and thus were able to consider
the implications of participation in the absence of the researcher. However, Homan
(1991) questions whether payment constitutes undue duress into participation. This is a
difficult potential criticism to counter. Participants were offered £5 per hour whereby
every participant accepted payment and could be perceived to have been induced to
participate by the payment. However, payment was an important recognition of the
contribution made by participants to the research.
Punch (1998) asserts that participants should be informed of their rights to withdraw
from the research. Participants were informed of this both verbally and in the written
details of the research provided prior to participation. However, Homan (1991) argues
that participants may experience a sense of obligation to continue once participation has
commenced.
The cost of research participation is also an important consideration. Potential costs
might encompass the difficulty of discussing sensitive issues; placing trust in the
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researcher to anonymise data and respect privacy; provision of time (at least one hour
per week for an average of three weeks); the effort of engaging in in-depth discussions
and the intrusion involved in being interviewed at home and being audio recorded.
However, in relation to the penultimate point, participants were asked where they would
prefer to be interviewed and most chose to be interviewed at home.
Maintenance of privacy is also a crucial issue in relation to ethical considerations.
Punch (1998) recommends that not only should researchers avoid naming participants,
but they should also avoid identifying the location of participants and avoid providing
details that might lead to identification of participants (Gregory, 2003). Every attempt
was made in this study to anonymise participants by not naming institutions, services or
individual professionals.
Finally, Dworkin (1992) claims that the ability of people with mental health problems to
provide informed consent might be compromised by cognitive deficits due to illness or
reduced autonomy due to institutionalisation and thus consent should be continuously
confirmed. However, this view represents a somewhat paternalistic approach to the
welfare of people with mental health problems. Participants in the study appeared to
understand fully the implications of participation in the research and determined
whether they wished to be interviewed further and when and where this should occur.
The research was given ethical approval by the ethics committee sitting at the
University of Kent prior to any contact with potential participants.
Methodological Limitations
A serious shortcoming of this research was the lack of diversity of participants in terms
of their ethnicity, sexuality and disability. This may have been due to the way in which
many participants were drawn from a single user group (7 of 18) which comprised
relatively homogenous members in terms of ethnicity, age and physical disability. Ten
of the 18 participants were women but the interviews did not include questions
specifically concerning the impact of gender on citizenship. Only one of the participants
was black, being of African-Caribbean origin. A large body of literature exists to
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indicate the prevalence of racial discrimination in mental health services yet my
research failed to include more than one participant from an ethnic minority. This is
clearly a significant omission.
Secondly, the study was not fully participatory because participants did not determine
the research questions, nor were they involved in the analysis of the fmdings. However,
participants directed the interviews in that the interviews were determined by the topics
that participants defmed as being of particular personal importance. In addition, early
interviews directed topics for discussion in later interviews, in accordance with the
grounded theory approach. However, the research diverged from a strict grounded
theory paradigm in that findings were not comprehensively analysed until the
completion of the interviews. Rather, interviews were reviewed immediately following
completion of each interview in order to allow the topics of discussion to determine the
content of later interviews with the same participants and other participants. Therefore,
data collection and systematic analysis was not simultaneous, as directed by the
conventional grounded theory approach.
Furthermore, the discussion group was too small to be accurately described as a focus
group, given that a focus group should comprise six to twelve members (Stewart and
Shamdasani, 1990); it is more accurately described as a directed discussion with a small
number of group members. The study may have benefited from a number of focus
groups consisting of at least six to twelve people in order for the topic guide to be more
comprehensively directed by mental health service users.
The sampling method did not involve random sampling and mostly involved
recruitment from a user group in the south east of England. However, the snowballing
method enabled recruitment of people not actively involved in a user group and a poster
presentation at the Mind annual conference enabled the recruitment of participants from
other parts of England. However, Rose (2001) indicated that the snowballing method
requires at least a minimal social network and thus may exclude particularly excluded
people. Moreover, none of the participants lived in residential care and thus it was not
possible to examine the impact of living in residential care on citizenship. Furthermore,
the majority of the participants lived in towns rather than large urban areas whereas a
sample derived from urban areas might have generated data indicating greater social
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exclusion than was found in the current study. For example, the experience of
homelessness was relatively rare amongst the research participants whereas rates of
homelessness might have been higher if the research had been conducted in a large
urban area (see Burrows, 1997).
Finally, the interviews were conducted in 2001 whereby it could be argued that the
social situation of mental health service users and mental health services has improved
since this time. However, the similarity between my own findings and those of earlier
studies demonstrates some degree of consistency in fmdings; for example, between my





The following chapter is divided into three sections in presenting the findings
according to T.H.Marshall's (1992) tripartite model of citizenship. The chapter begins
with an overview of participants' conceptualisations of social exclusion and
citizenship. The first section of the chapter examines social citizenship in terms of
employment, income, housing, education, social networks, public attitudes,
community mental health services, inpatient treatment. medication and parenting. The
second section examines civil citizenship. primarily in relation to mental health
review tribunals and the use of the Mental Health Act 1983, although the process of
compulsory detention is largely examined in the section on inpatient treatment. The
third section is entitled political citizenship and examines mental health policy and
user involvement.
A brief explanation of the transcription conventions adopted might facilitate reading
of the findings. I have attempted to ensure anonymity by anonymising not only
participants' names but also proper nouns of services, professionals and locations by
replacing the proper noun with a common noun in square brackets. Inaudible speech
is indicated by 'Xxx' in the transcription and edited speech is indicated by ' ... ' at the
end of the quote. A dash (-) at the end or in the middle of speech denotes an
unfinished sentence uttered by the speaker.
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Social Exclusion
The discourse of social exclusion is integral to New Labour policy, including mental
health policy. Standard One of the National Service Framework for mental health (DoH,
1999a) refers to 'tackling discrimination and social exclusion'. Social exclusion has
been defined as deprivation of significant duration and marginalisation from
mainstream society (Golding, 1995). The question addressed in these findings is
whether people who use mental health services experience significant deprivation and
marginalisation. However, I wanted to examine how participants might define social
exclusion and whether they regarded themselves as members of a socially excluded
group.
In relation to Golding's definition, deprivation is interpreted as the deprivation of
opportunities anticipated to be enjoyed by people who do not use mental health
services. This may be regarded as a description of discrimination, defined as involving
unfair treatment (Sayee, 2000) that leads to deprivation of opportunities ordinarily
available to citizens. This chapter is intended to provide a brief overview of the ways in
which participants believed that they were excluded from ordinary opportunities and the
discrimination that underlies such exclusion. The following sections will identify
numerous instances of discrimination against participants: being excluded from holding
office in a student organisation, being excluded from voluntary work, being denied
access to employment and being subject to verbal harassment at work. Participants'
descriptions of discrimination concur with the specialisation paradigm described by
Silver (1994) in which discrimination and unenforced rights form the basis of social
exclusion.
More general problems were reported in relation to obtaining paid and unpaid work, in
developing social networks and in being subject to negative public attitudes.
Furthermore, service delivery was reported to further undermine citizenship status
through the loss of personal liberty by compulsory inpatient incarceration, by treatment
of mental health problems based on assumptions of incapacity or dangerousness and by
the negative impact of medication on everyday functioning. Furthermore, participants'
descriptions of hierarchical, dichotomous relationships between service users and
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professionals also indicate a reference to the monopoly paradigm in which exclusion is
caused by hierarchical power relationships (Silver, 1994). Moreover, participants
identified mental health policy as coercive, discriminatory and counterproductive.
Therefore, it is important to examine the way participants felt about their position in
society generally and to establish whether they believed that people with mental health
problems are socially excluded. The following sections examining social exclusion and
citizenship are not intended to provide a detailed analysis of these concepts but are
intended to provide an introduction and overview of some of the main issues that arose
in the following research. The discussion of social exclusion will be guided by the
following questions:
• How did participants define social exclusion and inclusion?
• Did participants regard mental health service users as an excluded group?
Defining Social Exclusion and Inclusion
There was general agreement amongst participants that people who use mental health
services are socially excluded. Participants defined social exclusion as being outside of
'normal' society, as being excluded from access to certain resources and by reference to
an underc1ass and downward social mobility. More specifically, some participants
referred to social exclusion as indicated by isolation and lack of choice in life, as the
following participant states:
A: " ... but generally I would say that we are isolated and a lot of us do have some
sort of choice about where we spend our money but if you read books on social
policy, social policy nowadays exclusion, social exclusion tends to be things like
where you live, the transport you use and your access to information. Many of us
are falling behind in the race to live in comfortable conditions, with independent
transport and ability to access information systems. But we are falling behind
quite drastically, some of us. "
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Such lack of choice implies a lack of agency that has been deemed particularly
important to social inclusion (Askonas and Stewart, 2000). Although the participant
refers to social policy definitions of social exclusion, he compares what he regards as
the living conditions of many mental health service users with the definition and argues
that such people do experience social exclusion. The participant employs the metaphor
of life as a race and argues that people who use mental health services are unable to
compete on an equal basis with other citizens. One participant referred to living outside
of 'normal' society and not being expected to participate in the consumer society.
However, she bases her argument on the proposition that the choice of opting out of
mainstream society is one of the advantages of mental health status, involving different
expectations within the group:
K: " ...one of the advantages of living outside of normal society is that you don't
have to be normal, like normal society you have to dress up for certain occasions,
you've got to look good, you've got to have this, you've got to have that; the
video, the tee-shirt, the this, the that. In mental health, we don't expect that. "
The participant indicates one of the common themes of the analysis, that of the
advantages of mental health status. Her comments indicate the problematic nature of the
assimilationist aims of New Labour rhetoric concerned with the assimilation of
marginalised people into dominant norms (Bowring, 2000; Beresford, 2001), such as
into the work ethic through inclusion by participation in paid work (Levitas, 1998). Her
comments also indicate problematic zero-sum conceptualisations of the included and
excluded that assumes consensus on the nature of integration and social membership
(Silver, 1994).
Two participants spoke of social exclusion in terms of the existence of an underclass.
The following participant draws an explicit link between social exclusion and the
underclass within a normative classificatory system:
A: "...1 think there's proposals to re-classify social groups from the five groups
there are at the moment. It's A, R, Cl, Cl, D, E and I think there are plans to
bring in an eight group classification and part of group eight, which is the bottom
group, is long-term sick and ill people who are likely to suffer most from social
exclusion ... Yeah. That is the underclass, yeah.
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MF: Would you describe people with mental health problems as part of that
underclass then?
A: I think we must be, yeah. "
Such comments suggest a universalistic analysis, referring to an entire class of excluded
people (Ratcliffe, 2000), although notions of an underclass are problematic in being
utilised to morally condemn members of the underclass (Robinson and Gregson, 1992).
However, the participant also described the Marxist view of class in that people with
mental health problems were said to be part of the lumpenproletariat. His discussion
was reminiscent of Warner's (1987) representation of mental health service users as
surplus labour, likely to obtain employment only during periods of full employment.
The existence of an underclass is associated with the concept of downward social drift
in the comments made by the following participant:
T: "Well obviously there are different grades of citizen and psychiatric patients -
really, they talk about an underclass don't they? Like many of the working are
like middle class but now there's this smaller underclass. And psychiatric
patients, it's a kind of downward mobility. So you can be someone who's brought
up in a middle class family but you're downwardly mobile and you end up being
regarded as being in the underclass, as a third class citizen ...ljyou've been in
[county asylum] like what happened to me, you try and get ajob with the bank,
the same bank that your parents originally worked for, and the bank manager
says 'oh no, he's been in [county asylum], sorry'."
The participant attributed his failure to obtain the same employment as his parents to the
prejudice and stigma attached to mental illhealth and psychiatric hospitalisation. This is
an example of the 'social drift' hypothesis in which mental health service users are
thought to drift into lower status employment or unemployment (Warner, 1987).
Moreover, downward social mobility was observed among participants in comparison to
their unemployed status at the time of the research and their prior employment.
Participants described a gradual loss of status as others' responses and illness impeded
their ability to engage in paid employment. For instance, prior to mental health service
use, one participant was a successful businesswoman; two participants had been civil
servants, one participant had previously been a housing officer; one participant was an
actress and two had been teachers. As stated previously, none of the participants were
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employed at the time of the study. Moreover, a number of participants were graduates
and thus would be expected to enjoy greater opportunities in relation to employment
that is associated with graduate status.
Did participants regard mental health service users as a discriminated against
group?
Only one of the participants who offered a response to this question felt that mental
health service users were not a discriminated against group, although with the
qualification that some people may invite discrimination by the nature of their illness.
D1: "But there are some people that are so obviously not right, you know, not
people that just go in and out of depressions, but people that - who are in and out
all the time. Or someone like {friend] who has definitely got a problem and is
what {another friend] calls 'a lost cause' because he just won't ever move on. You
know, he just goes round in circles. He gets better to a point and then he goes
right back round. back down to the beginning again. People like that I can
imagine would be discriminated against because other people lose patience with
them. And the likes of {patient] who sees aliens that fixed a radio torch to her.
You know, other people I would imagine would discriminate against her because
of that. They wouldn't bother renting her a home or whatever because she's very
strange. "
Therefore, perhaps the visibility of an individual's mental health problems might
determine the level of discrimination that they experience. The participant suggests that
chronicity of illness or service use may also be instrumental in attracting discrimination.
She also indicates another of the common themes to emerge in the findings, namely a
distinction made between different categories of illness whereby she links
discrimination to severity of illness and level of service use. Another participant (M)
argued that he expected to enjoy the same opportunities as others as long as he could
control disclosure of his mental health status but commented that he would expect
discrimination if his use of mental health services was revealed.
The following participant provided a definition of discrimination:
G: "To be treated difforently to anybody else for the way I am. "
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This definition is simple yet a very useful measure of whether people with mental health
problems are discriminated against. However, it omits the way discrimination against
marginalised groups involves unequal and not simply different treatment (Sayee, 2000).
One participant identified the phenomenon of multiple discrimination involving mental
health, physical disability and sexuality.
P2: "Yeah, well in a way I think the real issues get blurred by having three eggs
in a basket in a way. So if there was just one issue like [partner] was my sister, we
were heterosexual and she had a mental health problem and I was working to
support her, then we could identify any prejudice and that sort of thing as being
due to her mental health issues. But because there's the three together, you can't
quite work out which one is creating the most discrimination in a way. Where
people's attitudes are comingfrom. It all gets fudged over really. "
The participant indicates the complexity of discrimination that is comparable with an
analysis of citizenship whereby it may be difficult to tease out the specific strands of
discrimination that impact on citizenship. However, a number of participants provided
clear examples of discrimination. Participants reported discrimination in relation to
employment, education, parenting, mental health policy and media representations of
mental health issues. Such experiences will be examined in the following sections.
Another example of exclusion was exclusion from primary care services. The following
participant was struck off his GP's list whereby his mental health worker was informed
rather than the participant as the patient:
T: "Yes, well to take an example, I was struck off by my GP six years ago and
what normally happens is that a patient is given seven days notice by the doctor
who's striking you from his list. Well, I didn't even get that because the doctor
didn't notify me directly, he notified my case manager. And that's an example of
psychiatric patients not being treated the same as other people. "
Similarly, a number of participants expressed concern about the neglect of their physical
health problems by mental health and general medical professionals in that
professionals were described as attributing physical illness to psychosomatic factors and
therefore physical complaints were not investigated nor treated. Furthermore, one
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participant (P) identified a tendency of professionals to make an artificial division
between physical and mental health problems despite the two sharing a symbiotic
relationship. She identified the commonality of her experiences to the extent that she
established a self-help group for people with co-occurring physical and mental health
problems and did report receiving the support of a liaison psychiatrist, from whom she
also described having received a good service. Nevertheless, Wahl (1999) attributes
neglect of physical health problems to lack of credibility ascribed to people with mental
health problems. Neglect of physical health problems might also partly explain elevated
mortality rates amongst users of mental health services.
A common theme inparticipants' discussions of social exclusion was that mental health
services and policy contribute to social exclusion, as the following participant
summarises:
T: "Yeah the Government go on about social exclusion and they've got this unit to
deal with it but they haven't - I mean, you're excluded, I mean exclusion is like,
for example it's like being put on the supervision register ...like it's going to be
with the community treatment orders. I mean, that's excluding people. And people
being sectioned for long periods and this idea of locking people up with
personality disorders who haven't committed an offence. That's a way of
excluding people isn't it? "
This concurs with the view of Dunn (1999) who argued that mental health services
exclude by emphasis on medication due to detrimental side effects, containment,
negation of physical health problems, and paternalism based on 'best interests' that
implies incapacity in decision-making. The exclusionary nature of mental health policy
will be discussed in the section concerning mental health policy. The following
participant had been ousted from his role as president of a student union at a further
education college on the grounds of his mental health and forensic history.
M: "Well that definitely makes me think that I'm not seen as a sort of usual
person, Mr Joe Average, because they went out of their way to say 'look; you
can't do this because of your background' and well yeah, they discriminated
against me because in their mind I wasn't fit to be a governor so er my
opportunities there and what I was doing was affected by my involvement with
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mental health services and prison as an off-shoot of that. Hopefully, I will be able
to put the college right. I wouldn't want them to think that they could do that. "
The latter comment reflects the way many participants wanted to publicise their
experiences in the hope of reducing discrimination for other people with mental health
problems. However, the following participant links social inclusion to de-
institutionalisation:
A: " ... If you manage to get out of residential care and you're careful with your
budgeting and you save and things like that, you can afford occasionally to go on
holiday or to go out for a meal or things like that, so you're not entirely socially
excluded financially, like you used to be. Social services and health is becoming
more joined up so if you need to go into hospital there is some kind of continuity
of care and we've got new treatments for mental illness. The atypical medications,
so that kind of is a good thing which acts against social exclusion as well ... I can
use a supermarket a couple of times a week, you know, and rather than getting a
clothing grant or a voucher for clothes, you know, at the hospital clothes sale, I
can go onto the high street and buy a pair of jeans for myself, so yeah, we are part
of the consumer society as far as that goes, which is a lot more satisfactory than
having the institutional kind of affair that used to be the case. "
It is clear from the comment 'I can use a supermarket' that people who use mental
health services can derive a sense of inclusion by having money to participate in
everyday activities such as shopping, going on holiday, eating, ect. His comments
contradict the way in which many participants defined their own exclusion in relation to
the consumption engaged in by ordinary members of society. This point will be clarified
in the following section examining participants' definitions of citizenship.
Summary
There was general agreement among participants that exclusion meant being part of an
underclass, being subject to downward social drift and not having access to valued
resources. Inclusion, on the other hand, was defined as having access to resources to
participate in everyday activities. Discrimination was reported to be a reality in the lives
of people who use mental health services.
135
Citizenship
Citizenship is an ambiguous and contested concept (Lister, 1997) that required
exploration of definitions produced by participants. I hoped that participants would be
able to elucidate the concept using their own terms. The three fundamental questions
that were explored were:
• What is citizenship?
• Do users of mental health services enjoy full citizenship status?
• Are there barriers to citizenship for people who use mental health services?
Defining citizenship
Participants defined citizenship in terms of a comparison between themselves and other
people and by suggesting that they do not participate in the same activities and enjoy the
same lifestyle as people who do not use mental health services. Unsurprisingly,
participants identified aspirations that are shared with people who do not use mental
health services (cf. Bauman, 2000). I refer to these as 'normative aspirations'. The
following participant, a man aged in his thirties, defined a citizen as someone who is not
subject to the stigma of psychiatric hospitalisation and to the debilitating effects of
medication. He argues that a citizen has access to employment, family ties, property and
possessions and financial stability. The implication of his argument is that people who
use mental health services do not enjoy the opportunities to realise such aspirations.
R2: "Well a normal person hasn't got to worry about any stigma, they've never
been in a psychiatric hospital. Start work at eight 0 'ctockfeeltng ftne, without any
tablets drugging them up. Theyfinish atfive 0 'clock; they go home to their wife or
their husband. They've got children. They've got a house. They can afford to put
the heating on. They've got a new car. They're doing all right in life, which is
what everyone wants to do, getting somewhere in life. And there's me who can't
do that, who hasn't settled down, still living at home with his father, money's
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short, haven't settled down, haven't got the girlfriend, haven't got the children. It
is hard to describe what is citizenship, yeah. I feel terribly left out. Most of my
friends now, my actual normal friends, have settled down. They've got
girlfriends ...I'd like to be doing some sort of car racing. If I hadn't been ill, I'd be
doing my own mechanics to the car, the race car. Settle down and married with
children, live in the country. I'd be really happy if all that happened. I'd do some
sort of car rallying I suppose ... "
Therefore, citizenship was also associated with participating in the property-owning
consumer society. Marshall (1981) claimed that consumption is a key desire held by
citizens due to its significance for community membership. Moreover, Bauman (2000)
argued that the socially excluded share the same norms as the included, particularly in
relation to a desire for consumption and share the same aspirations as other consumers.
Furthermore, he argued that identity is determined by ownership of material possessions
in a consumer society. One participant observed the following:
K: "...I'd like to be a part of mortgage earning and I'd like to be able to earn a
mortgage but then again, the only place I'd want to live - because I've lived
outside of [area of London] and the facilities I'd like to live in [area of London).
I'd rather stop at [area] and the same mental health facilities which I notice you
don't get elsewhere. It's very, very expensive to live in [area). Very expensive ...1
mean, I've had a good life. I'm not unhappy now because I feel better but erm
sometimes you think 'well, it's a shame, you know. ' It could have been different.
But one would like it to be substantially better. You know, like being able to afford
a home or even the council flat that I have. If I won a hundred thousand on the
lottery, I'd buy the council flat, that might cost me sixty or seventy thousand I'd
take a holiday. I'd spend my money. I'd redo up theflat then I'd go back to living
on benefits. "
Therefore, a sense of citizenship derives from being part of a consumer society. The
previous participants indicate a common theme to emerge in the analysis, that of the
prevalence of normative aspirations amongst participants. The participant referred to as
R2 made an explicit comparison between himself and his friends to suggest that he is
disadvantaged in comparison with his friends. The participant K expressed normative
aspirations in terms of property ownership, although her comment 'I'd go back to living
137
on benefits' is interesting in terms of her lack of commitment to inclusion through paid
work. The latter comment indicates the problematic assumption of cultural homogeneity
based on dominant norms that underlie universal notions of citizenship (Oliver and
Heater, 1994).
Finally, one participant questioned whether citizenship is a concept that is relevant to
British society by referring to classical notions of citizenship.
T: "There is one remark I want to make about that. Is it not the case that we
aren't citizens in this country, we're subjects? We're subjects of the Queen as
head of state. We are not citizens as such at all. For people to be citizens, there
needs to be a republic ...
It is the case that the British are subjects rather than citizens in a civic republican sense
(Wilson, 1998a; Pattie, Seyd and Whitely, 2004) but citizenship in Britain has been
cited as specifying the relationship between individuals and the state whereby
citizenship rights are passively acquired from the state (Turner, 1990; Pattie, Seyd and
Whitely, 2004).
It is interesting to note that participants defined citizenship in terms of citizenship as a
status (Prior, Stewart and Walsh, 1995), according to the attributes that define the status
rather than citizenship as a practice in terms of activities performed by citizens.
Therefore, participants appeared to implicitly espouse a liberal view of citizenship
rather than a civic republican concept of citizenship.
Barrien to citizenship for people who use mental health services
Participants identified barriers to citizenship as comprising illness, treatment and social
responses to people with mental health problems. Therefore, barriers can be categorised
as broadly individual, institutional and societal.
The following participant blamed lack of recovery from illness and cited his own illness
("I'm not able to cope") as a barrier to citizenship. He also cited treatment as a barrier to
citizenship whilst providing a useful definition of citizenship as involving access to
training, education and employment. More importantly, he attempted to explain the
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distinction between mental health service users who don't become excluded and those
who do suffer significant deprivation and disadvantage:
E: "Er I suppose it's the difficulty they have with relating to situations in society,
perhaps those that don't recover. Those that recover and get on with life get back
into the flow of things, get back into training, back into education, back into
different jobs or start a new career and I think that people like myself that would
like to achieve that way of life, because I'm not able to cope with the challenges
confronting other individuals is something that the stress of that wouldjust throw
up the psychosis. And it's - the disadvantage I have is that I'm not able to break
away from the system. And er - but as long as I remain stable and I'm quite
content with how the system operates at the moment and then Ifeel I've recovered
as far as I can but the disability prohibits me from making a total recovery. And
with the ECT, the disadvantages in study and concentration is really frustrating
because I think 'why can't I concentrate?' It's almost like you've got very mild
Alzheimer's Disease at times, which obviously I know I haven't but it's like you've
lost a little bit of the brain operation that would make things flow smoother, the
memory, the concentration, being able to assimilate knowledge and then write
about it and talk about it. "
Therefore, the participant attributed his own disadvantage to the impact of ECT
treatment on his cognitive abilities but also the impact of lack of recovery from illness
on social participation, especially in relation to employment.
The organisation of services was regarded as an impediment to citizenship by
identifying the individual purely in terms of their 'patienthood' (Barham and Hayward,
1995) and as negating their identity as a person outside of service use. I asked the
following participant for her response to the premise of the current research, that people
who use mental health services do not enjoy full citizenship status whereby citizenship
was equated with membership (''you don't quite belong"):
PI: HI think certainly thefeeling is of not being afull citizen. That sense that you
don't quite belong. But also, I think that the system creates that as well. It sort of,
you know, I told you about going for a meeting with the CPN and she you know, I
went for an agreed meeting and there's no rooms available so she sends me back
home. It was like there was no regard for the fact that you've got a life and that
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you've bothered to come down at all. It's just - there's a sort of feeling that you
actually haven't got a life, that all you have to do is make your appointments, take
your medication, make your appointments and then go away and wait for the next
one. Nothing else goes on. "
The impact of mental health services on citizenship will be explored in greater detail in
sections on medication, community mental health services and inpatient treatment. The
following participant suggested that people who use mental health services lack status
as citizens and laid the blame decisively at the door of societal responses and familial
reactions to those diagnosed with a mental illness.
T: "...Using mental health services has aggravated things. They've exacerbated
the situation I've found myself in because as soon as you're branded a mental
patient, a schizophrenic or whatever, you have no credibility ...So I think that the
way mental health services are constituted and the very concept of mental illness
or mental ill health is like a social evil becausepeople are suffering because of it.
And like I was saying earlier, the mental health services, you know, the
psychiatric nurses, the doctors, what have you, they should take on board the idea
of families being abusive rather than caring. The whole concept of the family
member being a carer of someone with mental ill health, I think is an absolute
scandal. It's a denial of the truth. "
Therefore, the participant attributed lack of citizenship to lack of credibility caused by
diagnosis and service use. The participant's comments also allude to some of the
complexities of the relationship between users and carers. Of fundamental importance is
the suggested refutation of Marshall's claim that state welfare services facilitate social
citizenship by moderating social inequalities. The impact of mental health services on
citizenship suggests that state welfare undermines equality and this was eventually
acknowledged by Marshall (1981) in his admission that state welfare services




It was clear from participants' responses that they regarded themselves as having fewer
opportunities for enjoying the advantages of citizenship in comparison with those
perceived as inhabiting mainstream society. Barriers to citizenship were thought to
encompass factors relating to illness, service use and societal and familial reactions to
psychiatric status.
The following chapters will examine in greater detail the participants' experiences of
employment, housing, education, social networks, parenting, mental health services and
the impact of public attitudes and policy on the citizenship status of people who use
mental health services. Moreover, the significance of user involvement for citizenship
will also be examined.
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Part One: Social Citizenship
Social citizenship encompasses economic welfare and social participation (Marshall,
1992). Economic welfare relates to employment and income whereby social
participation includes participants' experiences of housing, social networks and
parenting. Mental health services and psychiatric inpatient treatment are examined in
this chapter due to Marshall's (1992) claim that the impact of capitalist-based inequality
is moderated by provision of welfare services. Therefore, mental health services are
examined in relation to their impact on social participation.
Employment
The Labour government has identified paid work as a key to the social inclusion of
people with mental health problems (SEU, 2004). Therefore, I wanted to explore the
meaning of work for participants by examining whether they regarded work as
important and whether they were engaged in paid or unpaid work. I constructed a
number of questions that are relevant to the area of employment for people with mental
health problems:
• What were participants' general attitudes towards employment?
• Did participants regard paid employment as desirable?
• Were there particular barriers to obtaining and maintaining paid employment?
• Did mental health status impact on experience of paid employment?
• What were participants' experiences in relation to voluntary work?
General Attitudes Towards Employment
I wanted to examine participants' expectations of obtaining paid employment and
whether they had aspirations to find paid work. It is of note that none of the participants
were engaged in paid employment at the time of the study. A small number of
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participants were or had previously been engaged in voluntary work. At least four
participants expressed a desire to enter into paid work. However, the majority of
participants were pessimistic about the likelihood of obtaining paid employment.
S]: " ... I don't think any of us are really that employable. "
D2: " ...It is virtually impossible to get a job if you've had a breakdown. And if
you've had a long-term problem like schizophrenia or manic depression, you
won't get ajob ... "
Most participants anticipated that, if successful in obtaining employment, they would
obtain only low paid, relatively menial work due to employers' negative expectations of
their abilities (e.g. D2). A number of participants referred to the possibility of obtaining
work as a professional user representative, due either to a perception that this is the only
work they could obtain or due to perceptions of their particular suitability for such
work. However, all of these participants expressed regret either at being restricted to
such opportunities or that they had experienced difficulties obtaining such employment.
K: "No and the job I applied for was within mental health as a user, an employed
user. Icouldn't apply for anything else because of the rejection you face ... "
The following participant complained about the lack of opportunities for employment as
a user consultant whereby his comments demonstrate that service users may experience
exclusion from user representation work even when they possess qualifications
equivalent to those held by professionals.
A: "But you know, I thought I'm now qualified with an MA which is the same
degree as is held by four people that I know in health and social services. And
getting the degree that I got advanced their position. They became more senior
and they had a greater depth of understanding of their jobs by doing the MA. So
it's got them somewhere but it hasn't got me anywhere ... I've had no offers that
would say take me off benefits and into some kind of work in mental health, which
you might have expected would have been available. Or even some kind of paid
work in mental health, but no ...And I think the main difference between those
people and myself is that I've got a history of mental illness and they haven't. "
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The participant attributed his disadvantaged position specifically to his mental health
status by comparing himself with professionals who have advanced their status with an
identical qualification. The lack of opportunities in relation to user representation may
reflect the fact that no paid user representation posts were available in the participant's
local area. Only one participant (M) expressed optimism in being able to obtain and
maintain paid employment, stating that he had worked at an arduous job in his father's
company the previous summer. He was aged in his twenties and perhaps older
participants were more pessimistic due to experiencing greater years of rejection.
Indeed, one participant (E) cited the dual impact of mental health and age discrimination
on the difficulty he experienced in obtaining paid work. One participant (S) commented
on the number of service users who express a desire to work in mental health services
(cf. Wahl, 1999). She attributed such aspirations to either wanting to improve services
or to use their experience of using mental health services to benefit other users.
Did participants regard paid work as desirable?
Some participants identified disadvantages associated with participation in paid work
and some advantages of unemployment and of mental health status in relation to
employment. Paid employment was regarded as desirable because it conferred benefits
on employees and thus the unemployed are excluded from such advantages.
Employment was particularly desirable because it was associated with status and a
network of social contacts. One participant illustrates this through her experiences of
becoming unemployed:
K: "When I lost my job erm I knew a lot of people, mainly people like with my
own background, African community, graduate level. When I lost my job, I lost
the whole of that because they didn't want to know me. They were afraid that they
could easily lose their jobs. Plus I didn't have status any more. I wasn't a person
in the know ... It's very difficult when everybody's quick to, say, networking, 'what
do you do?' It's very difficult for me to say I'm on benefits, far more sickness
benefits and things like that. "
Many participants expressed difficulty in explaining their unemployment to strangers or
their families. Moreover, employment was therefore regarded not only as conferring
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opportunities for social contact but also enables the individual to occupy a valuable role
within society, as the following comments demonstrate:
D2: "And then when I became too ill to work any longer, there was a terrible time
for about three years when I was very isolated because I no longer was meeting
people. I was no longer going out and meeting people. Certainly became a loner
which didn't help the illness and I felt very isolated. I didn't know how to go out
and make contacts and I certainly didn't feel part of society any more because I
wasn't out there in society. I withdrew and became very much a recluse
really ... Well, looking back, I think for myself, I don't know about the rest of
people, but when I was working I did feel very much part of society and you know,
a contributing member. Even though I was still ill at the time, I was actually part
of society because I went to work, I mixed with other people. I had social contact.
And that was my way, I think, of contributing and being part of society. "
The comment, "I withdrew and became very much a recluse" indicates 'resigned
adaptation' in which unemployment produces social withdrawal and withdrawal from
job seeking (Warr, Jackson and Banks, 1988). Such comments raise the question of
whether employment confers an alternative to the patient role of individuals. It is
interesting to note that the participant expresses the view that not only does
unemployment inhibit social inclusion, but also that the isolation accompanying
unemployment inhibits social functioning and may further reduce the individual's
ability to forge new social contacts. However, some participants discussed the
disadvantages of work in terms of being caught in the poverty trap and the impact of
employment on illness and individual freedom. A number of participants discussed a
notional income on which they could live comfortably and used this income to
demonstrate the impact of low wages on their willingness to participate in paid work.
The following participant described the hardship involved in working for low pay:
K: "Because like I used - I went to the church across the road - because on
Sunday morning they gave out tea and after I paid ninety pounds for my rent and
er I paid the monthly direct debit on the electricity and al/ the rest of it and the
insurance and all the rest of it, I didn't even have enough money for milk to have
a cup of tea on the Sunday. I was so broke and I wasn't entitled to anything. I was
earning eight and three quarter thousand and I didn't have money for anything
and I had to spend a lot of my money on my British Rail pass to my place ...And
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then now I'm living on full benefits, I'm now doing more things than I imagined
myself to do. And I'm entitled to it. Ifyou belong to Mind, you go on holiday once
a year and then you have a day trip to Littlehampton. "
The participant's comments introduced the concept of a notional income in which
participants contemplated the level of income required to obtain an adequate standard of
living. Participants not only identified advantages to unemployment, they also identified
some advantages associated with mental health status. Largely this was expressed in
terms of concessionary prices for daytime activities and more time in which to enjoy
leisure activities, although K indicated that not all mental health service users are likely
to be so fortunate:
K: "...The only thing you get in this borough is mental health. And we're just so
lucky to be mental health in this borough. And that gives a whole gloss to
everything we do because on the whole, I think if you tried another borough you'd
find that it's very limiting. But you've got your own time, you're not being ruled,
you can get your buspass, you can go where you like. During the day, you can see
cheap cinema, you can go swimming free, you can join the gym free. Tenpounds
then it's free. You can do a lot of things ... "
The participant demonstrates the second response to unemployment identified by Warr,
Jackson and Banks (1988), that of 'constructive adaptation', involving engagement in
leisure activities, although Rowland and Perkins (1988) warn that absence of work is
not necessarily equated with greater leisure.
A specific advantage of a mental health status identified by participants is the avoidance
of coercion into work. Some participants compared themselves with people who are
expected to be available for work whereas this is not necessarily expected of people
with an illness or disability. However, one participant illustrated how the administration
of disability benefits might leave people with mental health problems vulnerable within
the context of unemployment (cf. O'Kelly, 2004).
K: "... They've got a new regulation that came in three or four years ago which
makes it harder to claim mental health and I met somebody at {group], they had a
craft fair. Her husband had left her, he'd taken the dog, the children didn't want
to live with her, she'd lost her job, she'd lost everything. Now she was having to
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work as a demonstrator at the craft fair because of this law. She was in [hospital]
for jive months and they said all she had was emotional difficulties and it wasn 't
anything wrong with her and she was infor jive months. She wasn't able to claim
incapacity. "
A further disadvantage of employment that a number of participants identified was the
difficulty in managing to maintain paid work and cope with a mental health problem.
Becker et al. (1998) identified this as more problematic than obtaining work although
participants did not make this distinction. A common theme to emerge was that
participants were reluctant to engage in paid employment due to fears of work
exacerbating their mental health problem and they associated employment with an
increased risk of 'relapse'. Some participants commented on the disadvantages
associated with employment that seems to render employment less desirable. For
example, being in employment meant that individuals have less free time and more
restrictions on individual freedom. Participants also generally felt that their mental
health problems would not be accommodated in mainstream employment either due to
lack of tolerance of sickness absence or lack of tolerance of behaviours possibly
associated with mental health problems.
G: "...If you said something strange in the workplace, it might be totally
unacceptable. If you did something strange down here [day centrej, well they
would take it as a joke you know, 'that's just so-and-so, that's the way he is. '
Behaviour in settings in a hospital or day centre setting is different to what they
would be in the workplace...It 'sprobably because some of these people had very
strange behaviour and quirkiness and that they're not going to be able to get jobs
in the outside market because their behaviour's going to be considered strange
and unacceptable. "
Therefore, lack of employment was associated with lack of social contacts, lack of
status and lack of a valued role in society. However, participants also identified various
disadvantages with involvement in paid work. Furthermore, they identified certain
advantages to being able to opt out of employment on the basis of their mental health
status.
Bamen to obtaining and maintaining paid employment
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As mentioned previously, none of the participants were involved in paid employment at
the time of the study. Given this observation, I wanted to examine the obstacles to
obtaining and maintaining paid employment. Barriers were identified either as
associated with personal factors such as illness; environmental factors such as
harassment from colleagues at work; and social factors such as the stigma associated
with mental illness. Chronic unemployment, defined as more than one year spent out of
paid work, was described by a number of participants. The consensus appeared to be
that mental ill health represented a significant barrier to obtaining employment. One
participant (Pl ) referred to a belief amongst service users that an individual stands more
chance of obtaining employment as a convicted offender than if they have a mental
health problem.
Some participants cited their illness and vulnerability to stress as a significant barrier to
maintaining employment. One participant commented:
D2: "Well I suppose what happened with me was I got to the stage where I
realised the stress of work was actually making the illness worse. I was told that
and I wanted to give myself a chance, to reduce the amount of stress. Whatjobs
nowadays aren't stressful? I had an option of not working and trying to have to
keep well or trying to work and not coping very well. I mean, I had tried to do
some courses at the college and I found it far too stressful. A few weeks is all I
managed. "
The participant identified stressful elements of employment as a competitive
environment and coping with cognitive deficits caused by illness and medication.
Factors associated with illness were described as interacting with the impact of
psychiatric treatment and the reactions of work colleagues as accumulating to form
powerful impediments to maintaining employment.
E: "...My understanding of my disability, it seems that one of theproblems for me
is that I have this very bad concentration and short-term memory still ...Well I
believe it's due to ECT, yeah. Now when you're in a job and you're asked to do
something, you can't always write it down as an aid to memory. So if I'm told
something and then I go 'what did he say? What did he say? ' and I've forgotten
and I've got to go back and ask again, and then that's just one aspect. But
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gradually things build up in such a way that the psychosis kicks in, so Ijust try to
avoid it. A stable life because I know what to expect if I have to be admitted, you
see. It's not something I would look forward to...I suppose really it's difficult to
say specifically that a job is bad for me, it's just that's how the mind works.
Because with schizophrenia, it's the delusional problems and the thought
processes that get out of hand. And when you're earning a wage or a salary, you
are expected to do a certain amount of work a day and I think this is where my
disability really makes it difficult to stay in a job. So in a way, that's also helped
keep me stable. But one of theproblems with motivation with me is that some days
I just stay in all day and that's not normal so to speak. And - one of the problems
with schizophrenia or certain psychoses is that it can be very disruptive on being
able to get back into the routine of things ...I think I wouldjind it really difficult to
get into a job because I am aware that under stress or sometimes you get
backbiting situations at work where they lookfor the weakest individual, theypick
on them, which would be me. "
Therefore, barriers to employment are attributed to treatment in that ECT treatment
impacts on memory and concentration, illness reduces motivation to work and
harassment and stress are regarded as inherent aspects of paid employment ("it's a
stressful pressure element'"; ''they look for the weakest individual"). When examining
participants' descriptions of the stress of paid work, the use of language conveys
participants' views of illness and provides an insight into aetiological explanations
adopted by some participants. A number of participants appeared to adopt biological
explanations of aetiology or the basis of problems in functioning, as evidenced by the
terms 'latent defect' and 'chemical disturbance':
G: "Well I don't know how long I'm going to be wellfor. There's still that latent
defect. I wouldn't want to be doing anything foil-time, just something part-time.
But there again, you've got to re-arrange all your benefits. There are various
benefits for disabled folk that are trying to get back into work. I don't think I'll
ever be able to do full-time employment. The (last) work I do at the moment is all
voluntary ...Because of the chemical disturbance I've got. I've tried working on
lithium before and the lithium hasn't withheld and I've collapsed, not literally, but
I've had another breakdown... it's a stressful pressure element. I suppose I could
work in a managed situation but you're not going to get very many managed
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situations that are understanding. There's only something maybe within the
mental health field that may be understanding but they're only going to have a
certain amount of understanding when it comes to time, time off for being sick, it
still remains the same as anybody else. You're still costing them money. "
Therefore, the unpredictability of illness was regarded as too disruptive and paid work
too much a threat to mental health to consider paid work as a realistic option. These
comments indicate why some service users may be keen to work in mental health
services in that they may expect greater acceptance of illness in such work
environments but the last comment indicates that even work in mental health services is
subject to the same expectations of regular attendance. The participant and many others
were unequivocal in attributing problems maintaining employment to the adverse side
effects of medication. Participants complained of medication impeding concentration
and motor co-ordination and producing sedation yet the following participant also stated
that his functioning would be reduced regardless of medication:
G: "The medication keeps me reasonably well but it also stops me working
because it's a concentration problem, it's a co-ordination problem. There's also
thefact that I'm pretty convinced that without the medication, there's some sort of
chemical defect which is prone to pressure and stress. I've tried doing things like
night-shifts and collapsing in six weeks and ended up back in hospital...
The following participant not only concurred that medication exerts an adverse effect on
the individual's ability to work but also reiterated the fatalism of the biomedical view in
the use of terms like 'incurable' that echo the previous participant's use of the terms
'latent defect' and 'chemical disturbance':
SI: "But manic depression is incurable and you're only as well asfar as I can see
as long as we take our medication. You get very severe side effects from
medication. I spend most of my life by typing, having secretarial jobs, and my
hand shakes so much now that I can't hit the right keys because they're shaking. I
can't write my name. And they don't take into effect the side effects of medication
or what would happen if you stopped that medication. I feel like sort of stopping
my medication if I'm requested to go for a medical. I feel like stopping it for two
weeks and saying 'well this is how I am when I'm not taking it' and I'd be all over
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the place then, you know. And how can they expect you to go back to work if
you're on medication? It makes you terrible. "
A previous participant (0) made reference to working in 'a managed situation', by
which he may mean something akin to accommodation in employment. Another
participant (R2) complained that he would be unable to work because his medication
sedates him to the extent that he does not wake up until late morning and this would
prevent him from working conventional daytime hoUTS.Such comments raise the issue
of adjustments in employment, possibly through the use of flexible working hours and
support to overcome specific difficulties. However, two participants expressed some
doubts about supported employment due to a fear of being differentiated from work
colleagues and being perceived as "not pulling their weight" (D2). In addition to factors
relating to illness and treatment, obstacles to employment cited by participants included
stigma. discrimination and unfair treatment. The following participant made an
association between the stigma linked to mental health problems and the likelihood of
being excluded from employment but he also appears to refer to the dominant
stereotype of a psychiatric patient as being violent and dangerous:
T: "Well if you're considered to be a chronic psychiatric patient and there's a
suggestion that you're aggressive or violent, then people don't want to employ
you, even as a voluntary worker. And I last triedfinding paid work several years
ago. I remember I tried to go on courses teaching English as a foreign language
teacher. I tried to work. I tried to become a member of the [organisation] but they
wouldn't have me because there are people I know who have said things about
me, so you know...it's prejudice. It's the stigma attached to mental ill health. The
stigma attached to psychiatric hospitals themselves and so on. "
A major difficulty participants mentioned in relation to employment and housing is that
of having a 'known address'. This is an address that is known to house people with
mental health problems.
T: "...Like I say, I went to [area] in 1978, to the Richmond Fellowship hostel and
the doctor helped me to get there but I applied to [council] for ajob but they knew
that address and they thought 'ah nutter, nutters' house.' So they didn't want to
know. It's like I'm saying, once you get psychiatrized, once you have apsychiatric
label, they kick you when you're down and then they call you lazy. They call you
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workshy. They call you a sponger. You are the victim. You are the victim of your
family and you are being victimised by society. "
The participant's experiences of attempting to fmd paid work contradicts any notion
that mental health service users are capable of finding work but are merely lazy in not
succeeding. In addition, the stigma associated with mental illness resulted in a fear to
disclose mental health status in job applications. Many participants discussed disclosure
in relation to job applications whereby the consensus appeared to be that participants
would prefer not to disclose rather than risk being rejected by a potential employer.
M' HI think I'd probably lie when it comes to filling it [application form] in. It's
like catch 22, you fill it in and you say all these things, you're not going to get the
job. You get thejob and you don't tell them and theyfind out, they'll sack you for
xxx.
A number of participants related first-hand accounts of rejection from employment
either at the application stage or from jobs following disclosure of mental health status.
Such accounts demonstrated that participants' fears of rejection if they disclosed were
well founded.
M' H ... f think it [disclosure] would definitely lessen the chances of getting a
job ...Because you don't meet the person do you? Youjust see a bit of paper and f
think they would just see it as 'oh this could be a problem.' Yeah, hassle.
Problems. No employer likes those so f tend to think 'oh we'l1 disregard that one. '
f applied for a job at a supermarket once, a part-time shelf stacker, which f had
done for a couple of years at Safeways while f was at university. A few
qualifications. f applied. I sent in a letter. f didn't even get a letter back saying
'thank you, we got your application.' f purposely put depression, ie. manic
depression, and f didn't even get a word back. And to be honest, not many people
with - f don't know, what's an HND? Half a degree. I can't remember how many
A 'levels, three A 'levels and nine GCSEs and years and years of working at
Safeways. This isfor apart-time person that works at thefreezer. f didn't even get
a sort of thank you. "
These fmdings reiterated those by Read and Baker (1996) that 59% of their respondents
reported non-disclosure for fear of losing their jobs and 69«'10 had been discouraged from
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applying for a job for fear of unfair treatment (see also Wahl, 1999). Participants
reported harassment from work colleagues as a common experience following the
revelation of their mental health status.
J: ..Yes, yes. I've gone intojobs where I haven't declared it because they haven 't
asked me at the interview or on theform, about mental illness. I've gone intojobs
and I've been accepted, taken out to the pub at lunchtime and all kinds of things
and then in one case, my mother died and a month later [ went completely
haywire and [ was requested not to return. They said 'you can '( do the job you
were doing, you're not well enough and we haven't got another job to slot you
into. ' You see, as long as I kept it hidden, everybody was fine. [was a different
person. [was still the same person. I was rational by the time I went back to talk
to them and they didn't want to know. "
Such experiences strongly suggest that loss of employment is directly related to mental
health status because participants attributed loss of employment directly to disclosure of
mental health status. A common complaint from participants was of experiencing
bullying and harassment at work and that no action was taken to protect the individual
from bullying to the degree that participants reported having to resign from jobs. There
was general agreement that the harassment was directly attributable to the individual's
mental health status, as the following participant illustrates:
R2: "Well in those days [just didn't want anybody to know because it would have
been, it would have been terrible. And it did actually come out later on in a job,
that my sister had said something to her boyfriend in [village] when she was
fifteen and a chap overheard it and when I started work, I was teased terribly by a
chap who knew I'd been ill. And [ had to leave the job eventually and that job I
liked so much that when I left and went to a newjob, it wasn't long before I was
out of work through terrible manic depression and I've never worked since
1989. "
Participants' experiences refute Wahl's (1999) claim that employment discrimination
against people with mental health problems is difficult to attribute to mental health
status due to gaps in work history and poor social skills impacting on interview
performance. Furthermore, it was not uncommon for participants to have been forced to
resign from jobs because their working lives were being made miserable by bullying
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from colleagues. The following case is typical of the reported effects of harassment on
participants. The interesting aspect of this account is that the participant's judgements
and authority were questioned by colleagues following compulsory psychiatric inpatient
admission.
D2: "...Then I got ajob in a residential boarding school [as a teacherJ and I was
fine for three years and then I became ill and I was unfortunately sectioned and it
was quite unpleasant. The police were after me and I was away for about six
months and when I went back to work, I was fine but the rest of the staff really
treated me very differently. They kept looking at me as if I had two heads and they
didn't trust me makingjudgements any more and I mean, I wasfine because I had
been signed off and then signed back on so I was actually well and you - I could
just tell that they really felt uneasy with me being there and it was extremely
difficult because I didn't have any authority any more, because, you know, I
would say something and then somebody would say 'oh I'll just go and ask so-
and-so. ' And I found the children weren't as bad as the adults. I did know that
there were a couple who were quite naughty children and difficult children and
they did use it. They would say something like 'you can't make that decision, you
can't do that to me, you're mad. 'And you know, so I did have to put up with quite
a bit. And I had intended to stay at thejob because I had actually liked the place
there and the accommodation and it was all going quite well and I just felt very
upset afterwards because I felt it was untenable. I couldn't continue in that
environment really. It was making me more ill, sadly, so I resigned ... "
Therefore, a number of participants had been forced to leave jobs because of either
explicit or subtle forms of harassment from colleagues and this was a more commonly
cited reason for leaving jobs than illness. These findings reflect the discrimination
reported to Read and Baker (1996) in that their respondents reported high levels of
harassment, intimidation at work, dismissal and constructive dismissal. None of the
participants had been offered support to retain their jobs and had not been protected
from bullying, which is an indication of the level of discrimination and lack of
protection that people with mental health problems experience in relation to
employment. One of the participants suggested that there is a need for anti-
discrimination legislation to be extended to people with mental health problems to
protect them from issues such as harassment and unfair dismissals. However,
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Woodhams and Corby (2003) argue that anti-discrimination legislation fails to protect
disabled employees from discrimination because employers can justify non-
implementation by citing resource constraints, disability is construed narrowly and
claimants bringing a complaint to an employment tribunal are confronted with the
difficult task of proving their disability and its impact on everyday functioning.
The determining factor in relation to likelihood of rejection, according to the following
participant, is the level of responsibility of the job whereby the assumption by
employers appears to be that a person with a mental health problem would be unable to
manage ajob involving more than a minimal level of responsibility.
D2: "So I mean, I suppose if you were applying to clean floors or something, you
would get a job. Anything higher up with responsibility and stress levels, they
would be disinclined. I mean, it's always been an issue I think, in mental health,
that the discrimination has made most people omit to tell people they have that
illness ... "
Finally, a number of participants commented that their pessimism in relation to
obtaining paid work was also due to having a poor work record and the difficulties this
caused in relation to explaining gaps in the individual's employment history. This was
explained in terms of a dilemma of whether or not to disclose mental health status in an
attempt to explain a poor employment history and the likelihood of rejection following
disclosure. One participant (E) commented that the lack of positive discrimination in
employment of mental health service users leaves users to compete with others in the
labour market but participants' comments indicated that they are unable to compete on
an equal basis due to gaps in employment history, employers' avoidance of sickness
absence, stigma and prejudice against people mental health problems and the stress of
paid work.
Participants' experiences in relation to voluntary work
Ellis and Davis Smith (2004) indicate the importance of voluntary work in providing
structure, direction, social contact, development of skills and access to other vocational
and educational opportunities. One participant (T) commented that employment was so
difficult to obtain that he could not even secure voluntary work. A small number of
155
participants were engaged in voluntary work and did not mention any difficulties.
Indeed, one participant (M) mentioned that he had worked in a charity shop whilst being
treated at a forensic rehabilitation hostel and stated that his address had been no obstacle
to him obtaining such work. However, another participant had applied to be a volunteer
counsellor with The Samaritans and experienced the rejection of her application
following an interview. The participant had expected that her experience of mental
health problems would make her particularly suitable for helping people experiencing
emotional distress and therefore she disclosed that she had been treated in a psychiatric
inpatient unit. Nevertheless, her application for this voluntary role was rejected. No
specific reasons were provided but the participant strongly suspected that she had been
rejected as a result of her disclosure of her previous psychiatric treatment. Another
participant experienced a clear example of discrimination in relation to voluntary work.
D2: "...because I did try voluntary work in 'normal' society and experienced
quite a problem whereas I was actually told I wasn't able to do it because of my
illness andfelt very difficult to integrate into that normaljob, voluntary work ... It
was a playgroup for children and I had been there for about three months when
they did a social services check and found that I had a mental illness and said I
couldn't work there. I had done nothing wrong. I was not a threat. I was never
working on my own with the children anyway. I had previously been a teacher,
working as a teacher full-time. So it was all ludicrous but I was - so to me that
was like a real shove from society saying you've got a mental illness. You can't
even do voluntary work with us normal people. Out you go.' And I was quite
thrown back by it because that was like a xxx. I was making an effort to try and
get out into society and do something, make a contribution, which I thought would
work two ways, help me and be a volunteer in a group. But it wasn't to be. So yes,
I suppose that made me retreat back evenfurther into my own subgroup of mental
illness groups. "
Therefore, at least three participants had experienced rather explicit instances of
rejection from voluntary groups. Only one participant related an instance of acceptance
as a voluntary worker. Paradoxically, this participant felt that his status as a resident of a
forensic rehabilitation hostel might have caused volunteer organisers to be cautious in
employing him as a volunteer. Nevertheless, the denial of voluntary work demonstrates
the additional denial of a role that is an alternative to the patient role. The findings
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failed to replicate the claim made by Ellis and Davis Smith (2004) that barriers to
voluntary work typically encompass factors such as lack of confidence, financial
concerns and concerns about the impact of illness. Participants expressed the view that
obstacles to voluntary work were located in others' attitudes to their mental health
status.
It is interesting to note that many participants spoke of finding alternatives to
employment in recognition of the difficulty of obtaining employment. Interestingly, the
most commonly cited alternative to employment was involvement in user groups.
Summary
Participants expressed general pessimism in relation to opportunities to obtain paid
work and identified a number of disadvantages to engaging in such employment.
Participants did not feel that they could attract a salary that was sufficient to ensure that
they could meet everyday expenses, especially given the additional expenditure
associated with paid employment. The kinds of barriers to obtaining and maintaining
paid employment encompassed factors associated with illness, treatment, harassment
from colleagues and the stigma and discrimination associated with mental illness. Some
participants related how they had been forced to leave their jobs due to harassment from
colleagues. Such behaviour included placing unreasonable demands on the individual
and thus making the job particularly stressful. Other participants had to leave jobs due
to deterioration in their mental health. A small number of participants mentioned
difficulties in obtaining voluntary work or as being asked to leave a voluntary job
following disclosure of a mental health problem. Disclosure was a major issue in
participants' considerations of the likelihood of obtaining paid employment.
At the time the study was conducted, not a single participant was engaged in paid
employment. All participants had experienced unemployment of more than one year and
many participants had experienced more than ten years of unemployment and thus could
be described as being chronically unemployed. It is notable that a large proportion of
participants held advanced academic qualifications and thus should have enjoyed
greater opportunities for employment than the general population. Therefore, it seems
clear that the critical factor in impeding access to employment was participants' mental
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health status, explained by participants as being due to gaps in employment history, to
reluctance of employers to risk sickness absence and due to experiences or expectations
of rejection and harassment. Whilst some participants regarded illness factors as an
impediment to employment, the majority of participants identified others' reactions to
their mental health status as a major obstacle to obtaining and maintaining employment
and this was true even of voluntary employment.
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Income
During discussions of the impact of unemployment on social inclusion, participants
identified low income as an impediment to participating in leisure activities. However,
paid employment was also associated with the poverty trap whereby participants felt
that they would be unable to earn a sufficient income from employment to be able to
meet all of their financial responsibilities, especially as paid employment was associated
with additional costs and low pay. I wanted to examine the impact of income on social
inclusion. Because none of the participants were engaged in paid employment at the
time of the study, they were all in receipt of welfare benefits. Unemployment is strongly
associated with poverty (Alcock, 1997) and therefore it is important to examine whether
participants defined themselves as poor, especially given Alcock's assertion that the
analysis of poverty should address qualitative as well as quantitative aspects. The
interview schedule was designed to answer the following questions:
• What is the impact of income on social inclusion?
• Did participants consider themselves to be poor? How did participants define
poverty?
• What are the implications of living on disability benefits for citizenship?
The impact of income on social inclusion
Some participants observed that dependence on welfare benefits impeded their ability to
engage in social and leisure activities.
G: "...at the moment I'm on income support and I'm in receipt of housing benefit.
The house will never be mine. I'd like to have my own house. Xxx xxx by the fact
that I'm unwell. It's - that's not to say I don't have things that I like because when
you're on welfare benefits you have to choose what you spend your money on. So
I'm able to either spend it on excessive smoking and drink but I don't smoke and
I've got a computer. But it's - that's my entertainment. I can't afford to go out
every night of the week "
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The comment, "the house will never be mine" indicates Bauman's (1998) assertion that
poor people are 'flawed consumers' in being unable to participate in the consumption
expected in a consumer society. Another participant (R2) complained that he could not
afford to pursue favoured leisure activities, such as tenpin bowling, due to insufficient
income. However, the participant who explained the advantages of having a mental
health status in the previous section (K) as involving access to concessionary fares and
admission to leisure activities, complained in a later discussion of social networks, that
her ability to socialise with non-users is limited by lack of money.
K: "...1can afford a cinema ticket because 1can go how 1want to go. 1don't have
to dress up for the cinema and 1can go during the day. I can go with my friends,
fellow users, and it all makes sense. We get cheap tickets. It's all quite fun. We eat
out afterwards and so on and we're home by six, seven 0 'clock. But with ordinary
society, you've got to dress up for every occasion, which costs you money. You've
got to pay the fares, taxi fares. Everybody's going in taxis. But when you say 'I
can't afford it, ,you're not on their level, you can't really mix in with them ... "
Therefore, although the participant espoused the advantages of concessionary admission
to leisure activities, she also acknowledged that she is restricted to socialising with
members of her own group, mental health service users, because her income is not
sufficient to be able to socialise outside of this group ("you can't really mix in with
them"). The participant appears to be describing overall poverty, which is defined as
insufficient income to participate in taken-for-granted activities (Gordon, 2000). The
participant also made a clear distinction between similarity based on service use and
comparable income and differentiation from non-users on the basis of income.
Furthermore, several participants referred to their own frugality to demonstrate how
they are able to engage in social activities despite their low incomes.
Such comments lead to the question of whether participants regarded themselves as
poor and how they would define poverty. Participants generally defined poverty as
relative whereby they produced a notional income at a level they felt would enable them
to meet their needs. They then compared their own position to a notional (or
hypothetical) income. Participants also compared themselves with non-service users and
used a normative standard of living as a benchmark with which to compare their own
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financial situation. A notional income is comparable to the minimum income threshold
discussed by Townsend and Gordon (2000), below which poverty is indicated.
G: "I'm not poor but there are others who are - it depends on the reason you're
saying you're poor. It depends on what you consider being the average standard
of living. I've got a brother who's on sixty jive thousand pounds a year. I'm lucky
if I get seven ...I suppose if I was to go and get a job and hold it down, I suppose
about twelve-and-a-half thousand to fifteen thousand a year, which I don't think is
unreasonable because I wouldn't do manual work anyway. I'd be happy with
something administrative or in a hospital, something related to computers. "
An interesting finding was that many participants did not define themselves as poor,
citing that other people, including other categories of mental health service users,
experience greater disadvantage. This finding has arisen in other poverty research (e.g.
Beresford et al., 1999). However, some participants also explained lack of self-
definition as poor as being due to their own frugality rather than to the stigma of
poverty.
The implications of living on disability benefits for citizenship
Two participants referred to disability benefits as an important vehicle for social
inclusion, thus suggesting that basic benefits are not sufficient to meet the needs of
people with mental health problems. Therefore, the loss of disability benefits would
have a very serious impact on the social inclusion of people with mental health
problems. This must be borne in mind when considering the views of participants
towards the administration of disability benefits, particularly in relation to disability
medicals. The following participant not only discussed disability benefits as a route to
social inclusion, but also provides an interesting insight into how some participants
construct their illness as a biochemical imbalance.
G: "...Basically, I've got an imbalance in my brain, a chemical imbalance, that
hopefully if there was any questions, the medical professionals would give me my
backing, their backing. That's when I do need them sort of thing. Otherwise, if I had all
my benefits withdrawn I would be absolutely devastated because I wouldn't be able to
get any reasonable sort of employment, my income would probably be low and I would
probably would try and kill myself again or something. "
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Disability benefits were reported to have additional advantages such as enabling people
to purchase domiciliary care (cf. Beresford and Croft, 2001).
However, several participants objected to the requirement to prove their incapacity in
order to remain entitled to disability benefits. In particular, participants objected to the
disability medicals associated with certain disability benefits on the grounds that they
felt vulnerable to withdrawal of benefit and dehumanised by the process. Comments
made by members of the discussion group suggested that it is becoming more difficult
to prove one's disability and therefore fewer people are able to claim disability benefits.
The experience of claiming disability benefits rendered participants vulnerable to
scrutiny and subjected them to humiliating questions about their 'incapacity'.
Participants made an observation that disability benefits appear to be directed towards
people with physical disabilities to the detriment of claimants with mental health
problems, especially due to the number of questions about physical incapacity and the
quantification of disability on the claim form for disability living allowance (cf.
O'Kelly, 2004). An added dimension was that the process of applying for benefits is so
complex and stringent that it prevents many people from applying for the benefit.
One participant made an interesting point in relation to the disability benefit system
reinforcing dependency by requiring proof from mental health professionals of the
individual's incapacity:
PI: " ...But the point is, unless you are - even if you don't need assistance with
daily living and quite a lot of people don't qualify almost unless you're up to your
neck in services, which kind of makes you part of that system in order to get what
you need in a way, in financial terms. Because people who I know who are
managing okay on their own and who are still unwell but not - have decided to be
separate from the services for whatever reason, do not qualify for the benefits they
need to live. So that's another way really of dehumanising you and making you -
impoverishing you, keeping you part of that system. "
Such comments reiterate Alcock's (1997) claim that disability benefits encourage the
adoption of a disabled identity.
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The process of attending disability medicals was generally regarded as a humiliating
experience and as a further instance of mental health service users being subjected to
scrutiny.
PJ: "The doctor barely looks at you and all the time they're assessing you. It's a
terrible experience really. And if you've been diagnosed as having manic
depression or multiple sclerosis, I don't think you should have to then prove that
you're unfit for work, but they're saying you've got an incurable illness and, you
know, it doesn't make any kind of sense at all. "
Such comments allude to the vulnerability to scrutiny by the state that accompanies
receipt of welfare benefits (Flaherty, Veit-Wilson and Dornan, 2004). A related
observation is that a number of participants did not appear to regard themselves as
disabled and viewed such a description with some amusement, therefore refuting
Alcock's assertion that disability benefit claimants will identify as disabled. Some
participants thus regarded claiming disability benefits as an additional advantage of a
mental health status rather than as an essential entitlement, as the following comments
exemplify:
M: "Yeah I'm on income support. I get the standard money but with an extra
amount because it says on the sheet 'you get an extra amount because you are
disabled, , which I think is quite funny. I suppose it's just the terminology they use
but you get extra money because you are disabled. I always think it's quite
funny. "
DJ: "I've just had my medical this week actually, for them to decide if I'm still
entitled to it because you have to be reviewed every year. But the DSS say I'm
eighty per cent disabled. It's ridiculous ...Yeah because they say I need constant
monitoring. But if they want to give me an extra twenty quid a weekfor it, then let
them. I'm not doing anything else so let them. "
A further example of vulnerability to scrutiny and also vulnerability in the
administration of benefits involved access to housing benefit. Delays in the payment of
housing benefit emerged as a particular source of complaint. One participant reported
that she had lost her home because the local council failed to pay housing benefit for her
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tenants whereby her house was repossessed whilst she was detained in a psychiatric
inpatient unit. Two participants described anti-fraud measures adopted by the local
council in relation to housing benefit entitlement that exemplify the undermining of
basic human and citizenship rights by the benefits system.
P2: "...a man camefrom the housing benefit office and just knocked on the door.
And you answered it didn't you? And he said 'oh I'm from the housing benefit, ,
and you got into a panic and let him in. My social worker was here at the time
and she introduced herself, said who she was and he said he was here to make
sure that who we'd said was living here was living here. And he asked [partner]
to identify herself You know, and it's like well this is who I am, here's my social
worker, she'll tell you who we are, look at this great big file, this is who we are.
No. No. He needed a driving license or a passport ... Yeah, so [partner] went and
got her passport and showed it to him. He made [partner] sign a form which she
did without thinking about it and we were reading it and then he went off. And I
passed that information to the Disability Association and they took it up with them
and they're perfectly entitled to do that. And you know, it has quite afunny effect
on you, being asked to identify yourself in your own home where you've been
livingfor three years and claiming housing benefit, you have no rights. "
The question that arises from the above comments is whether the intrusion on the
couple's family life was due to the fact of one of the couple being linked to mental
health services or whether this is a situation that arises in relation to all housing benefit
claimants. Nevertheless, the fact that none of the participants were employed at the time
of the study and were therefore claiming benefits means that they are disproportionately
more likely to be subject to such intrusions of privacy than the general population.
Summa.,.
One participant defined poverty specifically in relative terms and several participants
referred to the benefits trap. These participants did not feel that relinquishing welfare
benefits in favour of income from employment was a realistic prospect due to low pay
and employment discrimination. The loss of disability benefits was regarded as a
serious threat to social inclusion and some participants felt vulnerable to the removal of
disability benefits due to stringent procedures for the review of benefits. The application
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and review process for disability benefits was experienced as dehumanising and as not
targeted appropriately at people with mental health problems.
Complaints were made about delays in the payment of housing benefit whereby the
experience of one participant demonstrated the potential result of such delays as being
homelessness. Finally, two participants expressed horror at the infringement of privacy
caused by anti-fraud procedures adopted by the local housing benefit department.
165
Housing
Three main issues in relation to housing emerged from interviews with participants:
• Visibility within the neighbourhood as a person with a mental health problem
• The experience of homelessness
• The experience or perception of supported accommodation
A number of participants referred to a concern about their visibility within their local
neighbourhood as a person with a mental health problem. Participants linked such
visibility to the arrival of emergency services during detentions under the Mental Health
Act 1983. The following comments refer to a number of factors associated with such
visibility.
S: "Yeah and it makes you feel different as well. I mean, even now, I feel like I
have some sort of sticker on my back or something when I walk through the town
or like when I get in my car. Because when I get in my car, especially because of
the neighbours. I mean, I talk to my neighbours but when I think of how many
times the ambulance must have pulled up outside and all the noise, you know, And
me being marched off out the door and all the psychiatrists, because they used to
come to my house and I'd have social workers here and people, you know. They
must have thought 'what the hell is going on in that house?' you know. So even
now I do think I have some sort of sticker on me saying 'oh by the way, I'm
mentally ill, 'you know, or 'I'm a right raving loony' sort of thing, 'stay away '. "
The participant relates a perception of difference in relation to other members of the
community, she also refers to the stigma of the mental illness label and she indicates
implicitly that her home was not a place of refuge and that she experienced lack of
privacy or protection from invasion by professionals. Concern with visibility in the
neighbourhood suggests a perception of tenuousness of community membership.
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A second experience that related to visibility in the neighbourhood involved being the
victim of crime. This experience also relates to the common reference to the 'known
address' in which participants' accommodation is singled out due to being an address
known to house people with mental health problems. Being a victim of crime is one
example of the harassment that Read and Baker (1996) found to be an important aspect
of discrimination and Berzins, Petch and Atkinson (2003) found 'violent victimisation'
in the neighbourhood is a common experience for mental health service users. One
participant had been a victim of crime but this had been directed specifically at his
personal property and thus was experienced as particularly distressing.
R2: "Oh yeah, my car was messed about with on the driveway several times.
Petrol stolen. Tools stolen out of the boot. Stones thrown, smashed the
windscreen. No split the windscreen should / say, not smashed. Tyres let down.
One chap threw a brick at my window. Luckily it was double glazed, hit the glass,
it didn't smash, while I was in bed "
On further probing on the reasons for the damage to his property, it became clear that
mental health status played a significant role, illustrated as follows:
R2: "Because they knew it was basically a house full of mentally ill people ... it
was deliberate. Oh yeah, it was targeted because we'd have fire engines and
police and ambulances outside, regularly ...People knew what was going on.
People weren't getting on right in there. And my car was targeted. I got to a stage
of xxx paranoia orjust frightened I couldn't walk up the road to the shop to get a
newspaper or anything because I thought people know I'm from that house. I still
feel strange about going over there in the daytime to see myfriend because I feel
it's a worry walking in the door. It's a known house in [town). "
The second issue to arise in the interviews in relation to housing is the experience of
homelessness. At least three of the participants had spent significant periods of time as
homeless, including one (0) whose discharge from an inpatient unit was delayed due to
having no home to be discharged to. One participant (A) had slept rough and
emphasised the risk of becoming the victim of violence for rough sleepers, although he
made no suggestion that he had been the victim of violence whilst homeless. A number
of participants indicated vulnerability of people with mental health problems to
homelessness caused by delays in processing housing benefit claims. Although this
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problem is not confined to people with mental health problems, greater vulnerability to
unemployment and therefore receipt of welfare benefits suggests that mental health
service users may be more vulnerable to housing benefit delays than others. Indeed, one
participant (D 1) lost her property because the housing benefit claim made by her tenants
was so delayed that her house was repossessed. She then became homeless due to losing
her rented property whilst in a psychiatric hospital. This was the second way in which
service users might be more vulnerable to homelessness than others. The participant
D1, spent time living in bed and breakfast accommodation and a hostel during an
extended period of homelessness. She described her experiences in some detail whereby
her descriptions provide a graphic illustration of the poverty and squalor involved in
living in such accommodation. It is also interesting to note that this period of
homelessness followed a period of hospitalisation and that the house she had owned had
been repossessed during this period of inpatient psychiatric treatment.
D1: "Well I was sleeping rough on friends' sofas and floors. Went up to London
and didn't sleep at all for a couple of days. Then I stayed with a friend up there
and then he sent me back to get it sorted out. So I went to the council and they
said they would put me in a bed and breakfast while they investigated my
homelessness. So they put me in [hotel}. That was costing about ninety-five
pounds a week bed and breakfast ...and the council only pay about sixty pounds
for rent so I had tojind the rest out of my giro so I was paying them thirty pounds
a week out of my giro, which was leaving me a tenner a weekfor everything else.
And that wasjust bed and breakfast, that was no meals or anything. And the room
was about jive feet wide and tenfeet long. It wasjust like a little broom cupboard.
The broom cupboard was bigger than the room. And it was at the back of the
hotel and it was crapfor the money ...So yeah, I didn't want to stay in the [hotel]
because I couldn't afford it anymore so they moved me into bed and breakfast in
[road], which was a total nightmare. That's the road behind the shopping centre.
And it was a really ghastly old building and the kitchen was open for an hour in
the morning between seven and eight 0 'clock...and the room, I wouldn't keep a
dog in it. It was horrible, really disgusting ... "
The last comment indicates the unsuitability of the accommodation not only for the
individual participant but also for anyone with a mental health problem. Such conditions
following discharge from a psychiatric hospital would never be conducive to recovery
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and cast doubt over the adequacy of the discharge planning and provision for people
with mental health problems.
The relatively low rates of homelessness amongst the study participants might reflect
the fact that only two of the four study areas were large urban areas whereby
homelessness is highest in urban areas (Burrows. 1997).
The third issue to emerge from the interviews was the experience or perceptions of
supported housing. None of the participants were resident in care homes but at least two
were living in supported accommodation at the time of the interviews. At least two
participants owned their own homes. One participant (A) commented that people who
live in residential care homes are particularly disadvantaged due to a low income. He
had previously lived in such establishments. However. a more frequently discussed
aspect of supported accommodation was a perception of dependency on professionals in
such housing. Observations were made about the general problem of being reliant on
professionals' assessments of suitability for independent living and a reliance on their
recommendations to housing agencies:
G: .....the only trouble is with public sector housing either provided by the local
authority or a housing association, you have to have a recommendation of a
health professional. Theyjust don't give it to you because they want to know that
you're stable enough to take on the tenancy. They don't want to put somebody in
theproperty and then the tenancy collapses. You're gonna look after the property
et cetera. The housing authorities work hand in glove with the health authority so
there's some kind of conspiracy. So if a social worker says you can't have aflat
G' or the housing authority won't offer you a flat. So you're being dictated to all
the time...When I tried to move from Tower Hamlets, which is in east London, to
[town], they turned round and told me basically 'see how you are in three years'
time, you can't move now' ...They wanted me to go through their system. But as
soon as I tell them I wanted to go to [county], I felt my rights were being taken
away. They turned round and said you can't do that, you've got to get better
first'. "
The problem of "being dictated to all the time" reflects another participant's (T)
complaint about staff in supported housing demanding compliance with medication.
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This complaint indicates vulnerability to scrutiny and authoritarianism in housing
services. Another participant reiterated the problem of dependency on professionals in
supported housing:
J: "I've been offered some supported housing and, quite frankly, I felt! would feel
even more of a user in a supported house with nurses coming in there to visit
people in the house who might be worse than! am at times, you know. And! felt it
was ghettoising my life and everybody told me! should have taken that ...I thought
I'd feel more dependent and more of a user, you know. "
However, another participant (E), who was resident in a supported accommodation
project at the time of the interview, had divergent views and felt that it was beneficial
for him and beneficial generally due to rapid access to professional support in times of
crisis. Another observation on supported housing was the lack of privacy due to sharing
communal living areas and that personal business did not remain private.
Finally, because people who use mental health services may be less likely to be able to
buy their own property, they are likely to rent property in the private sector at some
point in time. One participant (D1) commented that, following the Housing Act 1988,
tenants enjoy much less protection in the private rented sector and are particularly likely
to be subject to insecure shorthold tenancies.
Summary
It is clear that participants had experienced housing conditions that ordinary citizens
should not be expected to endure. Participants experienced lack of privacy and high
visibility in their neighbourhood due either to the appearance of the emergency services
outside their homes or due to the behaviour of other tenants. This means that people
who use mental health services may experience difficulty in maintaining their dignity
and privacy within the neighbourhood. Secondly, one participant's experience of
homelessness conveys the squalid conditions of the bed and breakfast establishments
that homeless people are expected to inhabit and the sheer expense involved in staying
in such accommodation. There was an indication that poor discharge planning allowed
the participant to live in such poor conditions. Therefore, adequate discharge planning
could have prevented homelessness. Thirdly, participants' experiences and perceptions
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of supported accommodation were of dependency on professionals and a lack of privacy
that most people would prefer not to experience.
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Education
Dunn (1999) identified exclusion from education as an aspect of the social exclusion of
people with mental health problems, citing both practical problems and low expectation
of mental health service users as significant barriers.
At least six participants had attained advanced qualifications, including university
degrees and at least one participant held a postgraduate degree. However, being
qualified to degree level seems to become redundant in the context of mental health
status whereby mental health stigma means that individuals are likely to be excluded
from employment, regardless of their educational attainment.
One participant (D2) discussed difficulties she had experienced in attending a college
course whereby the college environment had been competitive and learning proved
problematic due to the cognitive deficits caused by her medication and her illness. In
addition, the participant had previously studied for a professional qualification at
college and had experienced ejection from the course following a period of absence.
The interesting point to be made about rejection from that particular course is that the
profession was one in which members are likely to work with people with mental health
problems and thus the rejection of the participant from that course raises questions
about professional attitudes towards mental health problems.
There was a minority view that support was available for students with mental health
problems. The more common view, however, was that discrimination against people
with mental health problems in the education system is widespread.
One participant had experienced explicit discrimination at his local further education
college. He had been elected as president of the students' union but the college
authorities had requested his resignation following disclosure of his mental health and
forensic history. The participant stated that he felt terribly discriminated against and that
the college was clearly contravening its own equal opportunities policy. I will relate the
participant's experiences in some detail because his experience is a recent example of
how discrimination against people with mental health problems not only exists but also
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is sometimes blatant. It is of note that, although the participant related his experiences in
relation to education, the following case study highlights the persistence of explicit
discrimination against people with mental health problems.
Case Study: M
M: "...1was the sports secretary for the students' union. And then just before
Christmas of the same year, the president left the college, so 1took over as acting
president. And then 1went to - because the president at [college] sits on the
Board of Governors, so 1became a student governor. 1attended their meetings,
went to a residential weekend with all the governors to become a better governor.
And then in May there was an election, an election proper for the next year and I
got elected as the president. And everything was going fine. The last term before
the term broke up in July, I gave a presentation about better funding for the
student union. All the governors were quite happy, then out of the blue in July, 1
was sent a letter from the college saying 'could you come in urgently to see the
vice principal, in charge of personnel and planning. ' So I went into the college, 1
didn't exactly know why and then I went up to his office and sitting in his office
was the chairman of the governors, a local magistrate and another governor
who's a solicitor. And they said 'we've found out quite a few things about you. '
And I said 'really? What sort of things? ' They said 'well, we've found out that you
are actually a care in the community patient with a criminal record and we think'
- And they said 'we've found out that you've been in trouble with the law and
looking down at the' - the chairman, he had a list of things I'd been up to and
how long I'd spent in hospital, what medication I was on, everything. They even
had more detail than I knew. The police officers involved in [city] in the case and
I was just blown away by it. And they said 'what we'd like you to do if you could,
is write a letter now resigning as president and therefore you don't sit on the
Board of Governors. And then at the bottom you could write you'll never standfor
electionfor anything at the college, even of that meant just on a course. ' Because
each course has a course rep. 'Don't stand for those sorts of things if that's your
right. ' And they said 'look at it from my point of view, imagine - I don't know,
some prospective parents send their sixteen year-old to the college to do A ' levels
and theyfind that theperson that represents their son or daughter is you. Doesn't
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that look bad for the college?' And I thought 'er '. Iwas quite shell shocked by it
all. SoI resigned but then I went back to the student union offices, I thought about
this and I thought 'this isn't right. ' You can't just - Iwas democratically elected
and why - they can't do this. So I phoned up the NUS, which has got a legal
department, and they said 'well as long as he hasn't got bankruptcy or fraud or
something like that, you're all right. ' And they said 'this other thing about health
needs, that's just ridiculous. You can't start telling people they can't do a job
because they've got an illness or something or they don't fit in with what would
look good to parents. ' So I said 'put like that, yeah, you're right. 'So I phoned up
the vice principal and withdrew my resignation and then after that it was very
difficult ... "
The authorities of the college eventually found a loophole inwhich a small gap between
courses meant that the individual was technically not a student and was not, therefore,
eligible to represent other students. The participant therefore had no choice but to tender
his resignation on the basis of a technicality.
M: "Ijust want to point out that for a college that prides itself on its inclusive
policy and non-discrimination and things like that, equal opportunities, it's ajoke.
And so Ijust wanted to point that out to people ...1don't want revenge, Ijust want
someone at the college to acknowledge that, all right they might have seen me as
some sort of criminal who looked badfor them, but I see it as someone that - well
I see it as discrimination against someone that's disabled. I mean, you can't -
supposedly discrimination covers even people that have offended. I was reading a
definition of discrimination, according to - this is an equal opportunities -
'prejudice and discrimination are unjust, disagreeable and unlawful. They may
impact on women, minority ethnic groups, people with disabilities and those who
have been in prison. Groups who make up the majority of the adult population in
Britain. To exclude or neglect their contribution to the economy and society is to
deny them the chance tofully realise their skills and talents. It makes uspoorer by
reducing productivity and profitability. The Director General of Employment and
Training agency. ' And that's exactly what the college did and I've looked through
as many - I got hold of the college equal opportunities policy statement and it
actually says 'the college will not discriminate against people with disabilities. '
But they have and no one seems to have realised that at the college. "
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Therefore, the participant identified his experience as an example of mental health
prejudice and discrimination. I was interested to learn how the governors had managed
to obtain the information about the participant's health and criminal records. It seemed
to me that there had been some sort of breach of confidentiality.
M· "This is the exact words, 'we've been talking tofriends of ours, 'Le. people in
the legal profession. Because one's a magistrate and one's a solicitor. And I was
thinking, when you sign up to a current governor, you have tojill in aform, have
your declaration, and everything date marked, your business interests. Mine was
very blank but it did have a section that says 'have you ever been sentenced or
served more than three months in prison?' And 1 haven't. I've never been
sentenced to a prison sentence and 1've never served more than three months so 1
said 'no '. But then, what gets me, 1 cannot work out how they've just found this
out. Why? Because a couple of weeks before, 1 was giving a presentation to the
corporation and that was jine. Everyone thought that it was great. And then a
couple of weeks down the line, I'm - God if they saw me they'd cross the road. So
1still can't work out what happened that theyfound first of all tojind those things
out and then the way they went about jinding out, which was basically through
people they know in the legal profession. "
Therefore, the participant clearly explained that his forced resignation was not due to his
behaviour whilst serving as the president of the student union but due solely to his
mental health and forensic history. Finally, I wanted to hear from the participant how
the college could accommodate students with mental health problems.
M: "Wellfirst of all, not discriminate against (them) 1would say and then assess
their needs. And 1 would just give them support. Well, it depends on how much
support because there's - 1 was actually involved in a - I sat on a tribunal for a
student that had assaulted another student and he was - yeah, he had mental
health problems and his CPN came to the tribunal which I was sitting on with the
vice principal, (other staff), like a panel. And what had happened is he had
attacked another student but he said he did it in self-defence, that he was
provoked And the CPN came along with reports from the psychiatrist because
he'd not been taking his medicine. No, yeah he'd not been taking his medication
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and the college expelled him but they said they didn't have the level of support
that he could stay at the college ...
Therefore, the discrimination the college subjected the participant to was not an isolated
case of discrimination and, furthermore, the college had, according to the participant,
admitted that they were not able to provide support for students with mental health
problems.
Summary
Participants held a varied range of views on the accessibility and suitability of post-
compulsory education for students with mental health problems. One participant
reported professional support and encouragement to advance his education and another
participant had received support from a college once she had informed them of her
mental health problem. One participant reported expulsion from a professional training
course and another participant reported experiencing the most explicit and humiliating
discrimination that one could imagine within the education system. He also reported




I wanted to examine the opportunities participants experienced to develop social
contacts and whether participants encountered barriers to forming social networks.
Qualitative research into the nature of social networks is required (Green et al., 2002) in
order to examine qualitative aspects of networks rather than merely focusing on size of
network as an indicator of the adequacy of social relationships (Hall and Nelson, 1996;
Albert et al., 1998).
Many participants discussed disclosure in relation to social networks and I was
interested to consider this relationship. Finally, participants discussed their attitudes
towards the formation of relationships with partners and their experiences of family
reactions to mental illness.
The literature on the social networks of people with mental health problems assumes the
importance and beneficial nature of social networks (Green et al., 2002). However, I
wanted to examine whether participants defined friendship as important in order to be
able to evaluate the impact of opportunities and barriers to the formation of social
networks. I defmed social networks as including friends, family members and people
encountered during contacts involving a special interest. Most participants regarded
friendships as important yet identified numerous barriers to developing and maintaining
friendships.
Barriers
By far the most frequently discussed aspect of social networks was the barriers or
impediments to developing friendships. A number of common impediments were
identified and included fear of rejection or reference to previous experiences of
rejection, fear of mental illness among the public, poor social skills associated with
mental illness, stigma and lack of opportunities to develop social networks. There was
agreement that stereotypical attitudes about mental illness influenced the potential
development and maintenance of friendships, as is illustrated by the following
comment:
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PJ: " ...And I told some friends of ours who refused to talk about it and who I
have since lost contact with very strangely. So I think it's very frightening for
people, it seems to me, because they don't mind depression because everybody
gets depressed but manic for people means mad. I don't think they can accept
that. "
Green et al (2002) found that participants described friends drifting away rather than
explicit rejection but the above comments suggest that loss of friends is due to negative
evaluations of ill health by friends. Participants seemed to be aware of the impact of
negative public attitudes on their ability to maintain friendships, but also attributed
rejection by friends to their behaviour while unwell. For example, one participant (M)
described how his illness had affected his friendships in that friends noticed a change in
his behaviour and personality following the onset of illness but that they had remained
friends and would actually prove useful in indicating the onset of illness, should it recur.
He felt that he had not lost any existing friends due to his illness, despite their
reluctance to socialise with him when his mood was excessively elevated. Indeed, he
commented, "They're all the same people I used to go round with before I came into
contact with the mental health services and they're still the same people I go round with
"now.
Another issue raised was the difficulty of forging new friendships following the onset
of mental health problems.
K: "And the stigma - myoid friends know me and they still talk about how well I
did academically and that's very patriotic {sic] of them but I don't make new
friends. I belong to an African-Caribbean women's group in the east end, or
{area], that's north-east London. I don't take any activities, whereas before, I
used to teach and help with children. I have no children myself but I was quite
active. But now the thought of meeting people, and them telling their children 'oh
she's not normal' or 'we don't want her in your class, ' I don't bother with it now.
I belong to the Labour Party and they invited me to become a school governor
and I thought 'no I don't want to' ...No, because when people find out your past,
why you have time to devote to this type of work, then you're open to ridicule,
stigma. "
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Participants commonly mentioned the impact of mental health problems as a major
impediment to forming and maintaining friendships. Participants particularly mentioned
lack of reliability, which renders regular contact with friends somewhat problematic.
D2: "...I'm unreliable and inconsistent. I might be well for a while and then not
so well so that anything like meeting and going to people's houses or meeting up
and doing things, I might not actually be able tofulfil. And when I'm feeling more
well I actually can be outgoing and I would perhaps want to do a lot of things and
then suddenly wouldn't be able to, so my experience is that people would be a bit
corifused by that, you know. One minute I would like to meet them and the next,
retreat backwards and withdraw from everything...and I find it extremely hard
phoning people up and talking to them. I find it very difficult using the phone and
I alsofind it difficult to say to people 'oh would you like to come round?' But also
I think I hold off because my past experience is that, you know, if you do trust
somebody and you do allow them to get close and become afriend, they're going
to reject you in the end anyway. So I actually probably withdraw for self-
preservation. "
Therefore, the participant described a fear of rejection as a significant barrier rather than
solely lack of confidence or poor social skills associated with illness. Nevertheless, she
and other participants associated poor social skills with illness.
D2: "It's a thing I've become aware of recently that - I'm not saying for
everybody but, well. certain people with schizophrenia who I know have a
reduced ability to communicate and tend to be much more withdrawn, tend not to
say very much and it's actually very hard to get a conversation going with them.
People, when they're manic, can be the complete opposite. They don't stop talking
and are oblivious to anybody else's need to talk as well and that's a definite no-no
in social skills, you know. You're certainly not supposed to do that. But it appears
to me that when people are in their state of illness, you're unaware or maybe if
you are aware, you don't care anyway, so no. And I know that happens with me as
well. There's periods you can either say too much or not say anything at all. Also,
things like eye contact can be very, very difficult with people with mental illness. I
always find that very difficult myself but I didn't know until recently that that
seemed to be quite a commonfactor. And sort of like not having any awareness of
the rules of conversational communication or friendship even, intimacy. It seems
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strange sometimes that I know I went through a phase when I was totally
oblivious to everything and whether I lost them because I was ill or whether I
never really had them, I don't know but I know I actually bought a book on it and
actually had to read up on several things because there was this hole in my ability
to function and I knew that if I wanted to try and function in a group, social
groups and things, I had to sort of learn the rules I suppose. "
Another participant attributed poor social skills to depression that reduces her
motivation to meet with other people. However, she also indicated the importance of
social as well as illness factors as presenting impediments to maintaining friendships:
PI: "Yeah and the depression is just as physical because if I'm very depressed,
then I won't want to be around people and if I am then I won't have any real
social skills, so that's very difficult for people as well and I think there's a very
able-bodied society where you are physically fit, mentallyfit and you hold down a
job and you have two point four children and are all heterosexuals and everything
else and if you belong to that society, you're okay but once you step out of that,
it's very hard to have relationships withpeople in that society, I think. "
The distinction made by the participant of insiders and outsiders in an 'able-bodied
society' indicates exclusion. The question that arises from participants' descriptions of
poor social skills associated with mental illness is whether the paucity of such skills is
due to lack of practice of such skills or due to lack of confidence or due to expectations
of rejection that might undermine confidence. It may be the case that a number of
factors interact to produce a network of impediments to forming friendships. For
instance, lack of practice of social skills might be due to lack of opportunities to engage
in social interaction and such paucity of opportunity may be due to the stigma
surrounding mental illness. Furthermore, participants may lack opportunities to interact
socially due to confidence that has been undermined by previous experience of social
rejection. On the other hand, poor social skills may derive from impaired functioning
directly associated with mental health problems (social withdrawal) or with medication
(e.g. sedative effects might reduce one's ability to socialise). Barriers to the
development of social networks are complex in that several factors were said to interact
to inhibit the development of social networks. In addition to poor social skills and the
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stigma of mental illness, one participant identified the barrier of different resources
available to users and non-users that makes socialising with non-users problematic:
K: "No I don't have a choice about havingfriends that are non-users. lfyou knew
somebody - for example, some users are married ...and they have children and
they continue to have the same family friendships, friends of the family, and their
partner and their children and the children have the same friends despite their
illness. They can move in and out ...But ifyou didn't know many people before you
were ill and then you become ill, it's very hard to move into non-user, ordinary
everyday people because you've got the time during the day, they haven't. You
don't have their money. Time and money is it. "
Thus, lack of resources means lack of choice in the composition of social networks. The
participant makes a very interesting but enigmatic comment that people with friendships
prior to illness can 'move in and out' whereas people with few friends prior to illness do
not have that mobility to socialise with people who are not mental health service users.
The barriers identified by participants led to the consensus that friends were drawn from
the mental health community but there were different appraisals of the desirability of
this finding. It was reported that the stigma of mental illness caused participants to
socialise with other mental health service users.
A: "But I've found in my ten years in {town] that personal relationships and
friendships that I've had, and that other people I know with mental health
problems have had, those friendships don't last if they're outside the mental
health sphere and people tend to makefriendships within the mental health group
and I suppose I've got to conclude from that there is still a lot of prejudice and
bias, a lot of stigma against people with mental health problems and that it
doesn't really matter what you do, you will always be left in that group. "
Once again, this comment implies a distinction between insiders and people with mental
health problems as outsiders or between the socially included and people with mental
health problems as part of a socially excluded group.
Disclosure
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I was interested to examine participants' attitudes towards disclosing their mental health
problems to social contacts because attitudes to disclosure possibly reveal whether
participants expected rejection on the basis of their mental health status. The
overwhelming response was that disclosure was difficult because it could lead to
rejection and therefore would be avoided or would be considered very carefully before
disclosing. However, two participants described incidents in which they disclosed in
order to test the reaction of the recipient of the disclosure. The reactions to such
disclosure demonstrated the stigma attached to mental health problems.
R2: "It depends on who I'm talking to. I went into afish and chip shop, I've been
going there for several weeks and there's a lady there about fifty and she was
looking at me saying - well she started talking to my friend who was saying 'I
work, I do this, I do that. ' And she came to me and she said 'oh have you got a
job?' I said 'no, I haven't workedfor eleven years. ' She goes 'why?' I said 'I'm a
manic depressive, ' And it just blew her away. She just stood there and she didn't
know what to say. She was embarrassed. It just took her so quickly from her fish
and chip shop. She was just so absolutely blown away by this statement. She
couldn't understand it.
MF: Why did you tell her?
R2: I just felt like telling. For once in my life I felt like telling a total stranger and
the reaction I got, she didn't know what to say. She couldn't get them fish and
chips put in a bag and paid, we'd gone as quickly as possible basically. "
However, the participant qualified this description by explaining that he did not usually
disclose his mental health status and that his disclosure was due to loss of inhibition due
to alcohol consumption prior to the incident. Nevertheless, the comment, "For once in
my life I felt like telling a total stranger ... " indicates the frustration experienced in
response to constant avoidance of disclosure. The following participant was much less
reticent in relation to disclosure:
M: "So I like the idea of saying to people - I've actually set people up and then
stopped myself. 'Oh see that, God, he's a schizophrenic. Another care in the
community patient gone and done something. ' And the person's 'oh yeah, God,
they should never be let out, blah, blah, blah. ' And then I'll go 'yeah,funny that
because I'm actually the same. ' And they go 'oh, erm, urm, uh' and theyjust feel
stupid. 'Oh er I didn't know. Well you can't tell can you?' Oh yeah, exactly, so
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why say 'oh .ruing nutters?' ] hate that. It really winds me up ...So that sort of
thing, ] go out of my way to just try and get people to change their view of
things. "
The latter participant was clear that his rationale for disclosing his mental health
problem was to challenge the ignorance he identified amongst members of the public.
However, other participants were more cautious about disclosing or had experienced
rejection following disclosure.
E: "I tend to be really discrete about that. I'm all right with other people who
have had insight, have suffered or are working in the profession, in the mental
health field ...But ] think the reason I'm reluctant to come out in a general sense
about my mental health is because of the stigma ... I don't think ] would gain
anything other than being looked at as a 100ny ...Because schizophrenia has such
a negative connotation to it, that's why] tend to be careful who I speak to. "
The comment, "I'm all right with other people who have had insight, have suffered or
are working in the profession ... " indicates expectation of greater acceptance by people
who have direct contact with people with mental health problems, as suggested in
numerous surveys on public attitudes in relation to mental illhealth (eg. Brockington et
al., 1993).
The following participant reiterated the problems of explaining lack of employment to
strangers or acquaintances and the rejection that follows disclosure.
A: "And I make no secret of the fact that I have got mental health problems. And
maybe as soon as they hear what you do for a living, 'oh well I'm on the sick, sort
of thing, and I've got mental health problems, , well mental health problems
means something really dire to a lot of people ...] think it all adds up to some kind
of stigma and - which is a real barrier to people getting out and forming
relationships outside the mental health sphere. "
The latter participant disclosed his mental health problem as a way of explaining why
he does not work and because he believes that people would eventually discover the
truth anyway. The participant who disclosed his mental health problem in order to
challenge ignorance (M) had no problem with disclosing his mental health problem
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because he did not perceive his history of mental health service use as problematic.
However, frequent reference to the stigma of mental ill health suggests that participants
avoided disclosure in order to manage a stigmatised identity, referred to as 'passing' by
Goffman (1963).
Service User Friends
The overall finding about social networks was that participants tended to express a
preference for socialising with other people with mental health problems. The reasons
provided for this encompassed greater acceptance from fellow users, greater trust that
they would not reject the participant, a sense of safety and support and commonality of
experience. However, participants also identified potential sources of stress associated
with having friends that use mental health services. Such stress was associated with
feelings of helplessness when a friend becomes ill, emotional demands made by such
friends and the trauma of witnessing a friend experiencing deterioration in their mental
health. However, a frequent comment made was that user friends understand illness and
thus are less judgemental.
R2: "They [users] are more on my side if you know what I mean, because they
understand it. They don't look at it funny do they? They look at me like it's a big
friendship isn't it? They say to themselves 'oh he's the same as me, ' you know.
The normal people I feel I want to shut myself away from them, keep away from
them, yeah ...people with some sort of mental illness, I can bond with them
straight away because we're all in the same boat basically...My friends who I've
met through mental health services are better friends than my normal friends
because they understand I can be completely open. We're all in the same boat ... "
The comment, "I want to shut myself awayfrom them" suggests an avoidance of people
who do not have mental health problems, referred to as 'outside normals' by Estroff
(1981) and the comment, HI can be completely open" in relation to 'insider crazies'
(Estroff, 1981) indicates the relative ease the participant experienced in disclosing to
other mental health service users. It also confirms Goffinan's (1963) hypothesis that
stigmatised people tend to seek out other marginalised individuals due to common
identity and provision of moral support. The participant's comments can be interpreted
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as reiterating the insider-outsider dichotomy but with service users as insiders and non-
users as outsiders.
D2: "Well, for me, the first thing is that people understand some of your
experiences and pain and difficulties. It's a great leveller, the fact that people
have all been through a rough time. To me, I don't feel threatened because I don't
feel that they're going to hurt me. I mean, that's a big thing for me. I feel quite
safe. It's very supportive and quite empathic a lot of the time as well. You get the
odd people who aren't but probably it's their problems. A supportive and
empathic feeling really. And it's very much an element of safety. And you can
quite often trustpeople. "
However, not all participants agreed that confining oneself to friendships in the mental
health community is particularly desirable whereby one participant used the metaphor
of illness to describe his views of this yet he proceeded to suggest that he gains
acceptance from those friendships.
G: HI do not have any normalfriends. All of myfriends are mental health service
users, which is a bit unhealthy.
MF: In terms of - you say that all of your friends use mental health services, what
do you get out of thosefriendships ?
G: Support that the health service doesn't provide. Like an internal support
system ...you can be as zany as you like as long as you don't do it to the extreme.
You can be zany in front of your friends, have peculiar quirkisms, peculiar
behaviour and it's acceptable. We're just accepted because we know we've all
been unwell and you're not really gonna change anybody's personalities ... "
Therefore, participants identified support and safety within social networks comprised
of fellow service users, referred to as mutual aid by Chamberlin (1978). Participants
also identified commonality of experience and resources as a key factor in feeling most
comfortable with user friends. However, it is interesting that one participant commented
that a social network comprised exclusively of user friends is 'unhealthy'. Nevertheless,
there was no evidence to support the finding by Green et al. (2002) that service user
friends are regarded as poor substitutes for lost friendships with non-service users.
However, the following participant concurred that restricting oneself to user friends
involves self-imposed exclusion.
185
J: ... You see, people get to go out with other users but we're isolating ourselves.
We're saying we're not as good as the rest of society and I think we should belong
to things. I know it's difficult for clubs and clothes and everything like that but
I've belonged to an organisation for about twenty one years, nothing to do with
mental health, but the two people I've come closest to there, over the years, I've
found out they have been users of mental health services ...
It is interesting that the above participant had made friends with two people in particular
at a non-mental health group that appear to coincidentally have had mental health
problems. She stated that she did not know they had mental health problems but
commented, " ...you do gravitate together. "
In addition, several sources of stress were associated with such friendships. Mostly,
such stress was associated with friends becoming ill and becoming users of what were
perceived as inadequate services, as the following comments demonstrate:
P1: "...But I also think there's that stress of not knowing what to do to help. You
know, you don't know what to do. You don't know how to help and haven't really
got the resources to help anyway. "
P2: "I was thinking about the stress also of knowing that they're going to go back
into the mental health service and having an inadequate service. And if you knew
that when somebody becomes unwell there was a service to meet their need, you
know, they've fallen but then there's a net to catch them, then I think the stress
and responsibility is taken away from you. But then there isn't that safety net to
catch them so you know if they start going into free-fall there's nothing that's
going to happen that's going to help at all. "
Therefore, for this participant, it wasn't illness per se that was stressful but her
perceptions of the inadequate service that her friend was receiving. Furthermore, the
responsibility felt towards friends' illness was not removed by use of services.
However, another participant located the source of stress in his friend's illness:
R2: "...I've got one friend who's a manic depressive like myself, who is very
unstable. He's always drinking on his tablets so his tablets don't work and he's a
bit of a strain because he'll phone me at different times of the day. He's constantly
high or he's low. He won't get out of bed 'till three in the afternoon. And it is a
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pressure. I don't want to lose him as a friend because I've known him twelve
years. He's quite a worry that he could do something wrong. I've had to get
services to get him in hospital before ... It's a worry I could do without. But then
he's seen me really ill and he's stayed by me. He's seen me saying stupid things,
being as high as a kite, like he goes. And it's put him under stress. But then it's
still a rewarding friendship. We've both got the same illness after all. So we help
each other. "
It is clear from the participant's account that social networks comprised of fellow users
might include stress associated with others' illness but also involve reciprocal or
symmetrical relationships in receiving support as well as providing support through
illness.
Partners
Three participants stated that they had experienced rejection from partners and other
participants expressed the view that they would feel more comfortable having a
relationship with a service user than a non-user. They expressed the belief that they
would not be accepted by a partner who did not have a mental health problem.
S]: .....1don't think I'd like to go out with a guy now unless he was a user. Ifeel
that they understand me better. "
Despite the following participant experiencing acceptance from pre-illness friends, such
acceptance was not received from partners.
J: " ...I've managed to maintain friendships with people I knew in the sixties and
seventies, before Iwas taken ill, and they always treated me the same, you know.
They don't sort of turn against me when I have another breakdown or something
but boyfriends have turned against me. They're all right when I'm well but if I'm
taken ill they get almost cruel and violent you know. It's very difficult ... "
The following participant expressed the view that people with mental health problems
expect rejection from potential partners that do not have a mental health problem and
therefore that there is an active choice made to develop partnerships with other mental
health service users or people with another disability.
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G: "The same sort of thing happens in relationships, you know, relationships with
the opposite sex, you know. Most of the fellas that I know don't even consider
trying to build up a relationship with somebody who hasn't had a problem
because they'll be rejected. Just look at me, I'm thirty seven, single, I've got no
kids, I haven't been able to hold down a steady relationship ...I'd like to have a
relationship, yes. But it's got 10 be basically a partner with some sort of
understanding. Yeah, I wouldn't just sort of go out with somebody and in six
months' time get married, you know, because I'd really have to get to know them,
you know. Maybe in my personal situation I might have 10 consider marrying
somebody with a different sort of disability ...AII I'm saying is it's very difficult to
find somebody who would understand. Fair enough, it's not likely to happen
because it would be a stigma against that person but you might find say a social
worker or even a nurse who was interested. But you just don't know because
that's stigma towards them thaI their husband or boyfriend has been in a mental
health hospital. It's a stigmatisation around somebody else. Well that's how I see
it anyway. That may be a narrow view but that's just from past experience. That's
what happens. Yeah I know it happens. "
The participant summarised the general view held by participants that they wanted
understanding and acceptance in interpersonal relationships. He also indicates the
contamination of partners with the stigma that is attached to the person with a mental
health problem. This provides an added dimension to the analysis of stigma in that
rejection may result from a fear of stigma being attached to the partner or friend as well
as a negative reaction to people with mental health problems per se. However, another
participant indicated lack of choice in partners and friends, encapsulated in the
comment, "It's a very small world":
K: "The stigmatisation, you know, like I'd like to meet afella, a male partner, and
although in theory you have this whole world open to you, all you really have is




Some of the participants commented that they had experienced negative reactions from
family members once their mental health problem became known within the family
environment. Participants described mental illness as a taboo subject within the family
whereby the participant's illness was either not discussed or the participant was
excluded from family gatherings. One participant (S 1) described the embarrassment that
her daughter experiences when the participant's moods are either high or low,
apparently due to awareness of the social visibility of her mother's behaviour. However,
one participant (M) described his family as supportive throughout his illness but it is
interesting to note that his mother had suffered from a mental health problem and thus
the support he received from his family may have been due to their familiarity with, and
acceptance of, mental health problems. This factor may have increased the level of
comprehension or empathy for the participant throughout his illness. Nevertheless,
participants described exclusion from family gatherings following psychiatric diagnosis,
indicating variability in experiences of acceptance or rejection within families.
Summary
Participants generally expressed a desire to develop social networks but found several
barriers impeded their access to a broad range of social contacts. Such impediments
were related to rejection and stigma against people with mental health problems.
Disclosure was generally avoided or expected to lead to rejection, although one
participant utilised disclosure to challenge public ignorance of mental health problems.
Most participants preferred to socialise with other service users and experienced such
friendships as supportive. Commonality of experience appeared to be the key factor in
determining preference for service users as friends. However, such friendships were
also associated with stress from various sources. Partnerships with other service users
were regarded as either inevitable due to rejection from non-users or preferable due to
greater commonality and understanding from fellow users.
Some participants experienced mental illness as a taboo within their families but the one
exception noted was in relation to a participant whose mother had also experienced
mental health problems.
The position of participants within society was summarised in the following statement:
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A: "...but it makes no difference whether you're like that or whether you're
totally incompetent and totally overwhelmed by your mental illness. It doesn't
matter whether you're anywhere between those two extremes. It seems that you
won't be taken in by the community, you won't be integrated into the community
except to meet other members of the mental health circuit who you might meet. "
Nevertheless, participants were not passive victims of rejection by non-users because
they demonstrated an active choice to develop friendships with other mental health
service users. However, participants also discussed structural impediments to socialising
due to low income.
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Public Attitudes
A number of questions occurred to me in relation to public attitudes towards people
with mental health problems. I wanted to examine how participants perceived public
attitudes in relation to people with mental health problems. I also wanted to investigate
the factors that are likely to influence public attitudes and the impact of public attitudes
on community integration. Finally, I was interested to hear participants' views on what
can be done to improve public attitudes towards this population.
Are public attitudes predominantly positive or negative?
The majority of participants regarded public attitudes towards people with mental health
problems as primarily negative. However, three participants felt that public attitudes are
not necessarily negative. One participant regarded the attitudes of professionals to
mental illness as more likely to be negative than the attitudes held by the general public.
T: HI actually think that a lot of ordinary people are actually more open minded
than a lot of mental health professionals and other people in positions of
authority, you know, like employers, landlords and what have you. Journalists are
very prejudiced against people with mental health problems but I think a lot of
ordinary people, people without influence or whatever you want to call them, a lot
of ordinary people realise that mental patients are basically ordinary themselves.
When you hear the psychiatric profession going on about trying to fight the
stigma attached to mental illness and yet it's the psychiatric profession that
creates the stigma in the first place. I mean, they - it's like butchers promoting
vegetarianism. Yeah, because they have this concept of mental illness, they have
this concept of insanity and yet there's no agreed definition of mental illness. "
The participant makes the distinction between the attitudes of ordinary members of the
public and the attitudes of people who play a significant role in determining the
inclusion of people with mental health problems into society. For instance, the attitudes
of employers and landlords would be expected to exert a critical influence on social
participation. This view appears to refute the notion that increased contact with people
with a psychiatric diagnosis produces increased tolerance of this group, as propounded
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by Brockington et al. (1993). The participant also blames the biomedical model of
psychiatry in producing stigma (" ...it's the psychiatric profession that creates the
stigma in thefirst place '').
One participant (M) indicated that public attitudes may be improving but also indicated
a lack of comprehension of mental health problems by both the public and by medical
professionals. Another participant commented:
S1: "Well I had that so much. Up until a few years ago, people would say 'you
haven't got a housing problem, you haven't got this, you haven't got a money
problem, you do this, you do that. ' And that's just so ridiculous to say that. It
means that everybody who's poor should be ill then, you know. And that's not the
way life is. You shouldn't be ill, you shouldn't do this, you shouldn't be depressed
and you've got nothing to make you. You've got a child, you've got a mother,
you've got a daughter, you've got - and I did. I had all those things but I still
didn't waste twelve years of my life to have a little bit of whatsername. You
wouldn't waste all those years would you? Losing a flat, losing everything. No
one's gonna go thatfar. "
The participant refers to the view that people can somehow snap out of their illness or
shouldn't be ill because they should be grateful for what they've got. Johnstone (2000)
referred to as this the 'pull yourself together approach'. The participant's comments
demonstrate the public's lack of comprehension of mental health problems. The
following participant describes the fear with which the public view people with mental
illness and the isolation that this produces:
D2: "...1think an awful lot of them, because of ignorance andfear and prejudice
and stigma view it like the first one you said, as something to be feared. And I
think thatfor the majority of people of thepublic, that's how they view it. Which is
very sad because that's what, to me, creates worse problems because the more
society views mental illness as that, the more it will be kept under covers and the
more it will get worse and the more isolated people will be and the whole spiral
continues, you know. It's like locking the skeletons in the cupboard, it will come
out one day. "
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This concurs with the view that fear is the most likely reaction to people with mental
health problems (Penn and Martin, 1998). Fear is likely to be generated by perceived
characteristics of people with mental health problems. There was a consensus amongst
participants that the predominant public stereotype of mental illness, and schizophrenia
in particular, involves the indication of an association between mental illness and
dangerousness to others. The following participant identifies a distinction in the minds
of the public between mental illness involving psychosis and depression in that the latter
is regarded as much less taboo. A number of participants made a distinction between
different types of mental health problems in order to demonstrate the greater
acceptability of depression over illnesses such as schizophrenia and mania. As one
participant commented 'mania means mad, you see' (P 1).
M: "If anything, it's [public attitudes] got worse, like people with personality
defects. Dangerous schizophrenics wandering around at any minute liable to kill
someone ...So if something's going to be an epidemic and at the moment mental
illness, oh God not one of those nasty - schizophrenics come in for such a raw
deal. Schizophrenics you're gonna turn into someone else with an axe or
something or - I just hate that stereotype of someone walking round in a world of
their own sort of talking to themselves and - I don't know, doing bizarre things.
Oh yeah I've seen that sort of thing but the majority of people it's just depression.
It's out and out depression. My mum's had it, my younger brother gets it, I've had
friends - just so many people have it yet there's the stereotype. That's a mental
illness, ooh no, that's depression, that's not a mental iIIness...Oh yeah,
depression is being embraced at the moment. People like 'oh a bit down,'
everybody's talking about it. It's not like it used to be like 'oh cheer up, why are
you depressed?' It's become much more acceptable now but I don't think mental
illness is though. "
Therefore, the participant argued that even though depression is very common, the
predominant public stereotype of mental illness involves psychotic phenomena and an
attitude of differentiation towards the person. It also involves the image of the
dangerous psychotic roaming in the community ready to commit random acts of
violence on strangers. He also reiterated the distinction between depression, which is
'embraced', and psychotic illness, which elicits rejection. Other researchers have found
that participants describe a hierarchy of diagnoses whereby some diagnoses are
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considered to be more stigmatising than others, especially schizophrenia and borderline
personality disorder (MHF, 2000). Another participant (A) argued that such a stereotype
ignores the statistics that demonstrate that someone with a mental health problem is far
more likely to harm him or herself than to harm others. Meanwhile, M argued that
people with schizophrenia are far more likely to be afraid of other people and to
withdraw from social contact as a result. However, the hierarchy of stigmatised
diagnoses appears to negate negative responses to depression, such as the 'pull yourself
together' approach described by SI earlier.
Participants also asserted that negative public attitudes towards mental illness are
conveyed in the derogatory language used to describe people with mental health
problems. Participants referred to terms such as 'loony', 'nutter' and 'schizo'.
D2: "I think people who have come into contact in any way, whether it's
professionally or through families or personal experience, being educated,
through the media or whatever, I think their views have definitely changed and
they've had to have a better, realistic view. But there are some people who are
very prejudiced still, whose automatic response to somebody with a problem like
that is that they are dangerous, they are going to hurt them or are bad people,
they should be locked up. And you just experience it in everyday language, in
every word used. In slang, insulting words. One of the worst ones I've heard was
'rabbit boiler' and I had to get someone to explain it to me. I couldn't understand
what that was. "
The term 'rabbit boiler' appears to have derived from the film 'Fatal Attraction' in
which a rejected lover seeks her revenge by placing a former lover's family rabbit in a
pan of boiling water. The rejected lover is portrayed as mentally unstable in the film.
Nevertheless, the participant argued that contact and familiarity with people with mental
health problems is likely to reduce negative attitudes but that negative attitudes persist
among people with little knowledge of mental health issues. In addition, one participant
compared derogatory language to racial abuse, arguing that the offensive language is
more often tolerated inrelation to mental illness than it is to ethnicity.
M: "Yeah I suppose it would be like racial abuse, everyone's hot on that all the
time ...one's seen as highly offensive even though the other one is offensive to
someone who's been 'look,you're a nutter, you're a bloody schizo, , or whatever.
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That's offensive to that person but I think it is generally seen by society that well
for the majority of people it's not really offensive is it?"
The lack of objections to such language also indicates the outsider status of people with
mental health problems because tolerance of derogatory language indicates lack of
acknowledgement of psychiatric discrimination as equivalent to, for example, racial
discrimination. The participant's comments also reiterate the comparison between
people with mental health problems and other marginalised groups, with the suggestion
being that former occupy even lower status than other social groups. This is known as
the 'hierarchy of oppression' (Keating, 1997) and is critiqued in the discussion
following this chapter.
The Impact of Public Attitudes on Community Integration
One participant (D2) has already referred to the impact of negative public attitudes as
producing isolation of people with mental health problems. She also suggested that the
emphasis of public attitudes is on containing people commonly regarded as 'mad axe
murderers'. She also referred to the impact of negative attitudes on the willingness of
people with mental health problems to seek help. Importantly. she reiterated the view
that people with mental health problems are less socially integrated than other
marginalised groups.
D2: HI used to do a lot of work with Mencap and the physically handicapped.
Twenty years ago Mencap had this very good structured programme where they
would try to change things and get people more integrated into the community.
But in those days, years ago, was not really seen, you didn't see people out in the
community. You didn't see them. Certainly didn't give them jobs and people had
an attitude that they might catch it almost. And a lot of work was done, publicly,
definitely. I think the stigma of mental handicap has changed considerably. And
it's more acceptable to have a mental handicap than to have a mental illness. So
they managed to achieve it and I just don't see why that mental illness be xxx as
well. And I think one of the things is the Government could help through anti-
discrimination. "
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Perhaps mental health service users may be less accepted in the community than people
with learning disabilities due to an expectation of violence and dangerousness of the
former but not the latter. Alternatively, perhaps an assumed irrationality of people with
mental health problems renders them less readily understood than people with learning
disabilities. However, it is questionable whether people with learning disabilities are
fully accepted as members of the community.
The threat of containment was reiterated by another participant who expressed concern
that negative public attitudes and, specifically, biased news reporting. would lead to
infringements of individuals' civil liberties.
M: "Yeah. Do you remember [murder case]? They picked up someone that had
been loitering around there. He had mental health problems and he was sectioned
and held for weeks and weeks to see if it was him. And he was the person
mentioned in all the papers because at the time when they found him, he was ill
and so they sectioned him and interviewed him and he was the first suspect. He
was the most likely suspect. All thepapers had it down as him... "
Therefore, the equation of mental illhealth with violence and dangerousness could have
dire implications for the civil liberties of people with mental health problems. The
participant discussed the Michael Stone case that preceded the introduction of the
'Dangerous Personality Disorder Order' (Laurance, 2003; Moncrieff, 2003). The section
examining New Labour mental health policy will examine in greater detail the influence
of public attitudes towards the mentally illon national mental health policy.
Factors that Influence Public Attitudes
By far the most frequently cited factor influencing public attitudes was media portrayals
of people with mental health problems. This included portrayals of mental illness in
films, on television and in tabloid newspapers. The participant who mentioned the
derogatory term of 'rabbit boiler' proceeded to examine the content of media
representations of mental illness.
D2: " ...and I think what society doesn't realise is probably the media, I think
especially films and newspapers, they depict a dramatic angle on mental illness,
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usually violent, usually dangerous to other people. And they blow it all out of
proportion and that is what the public actually think of mental illness ... "
M: "I think out of everyone, of all the illnesses, schizophrenics get an absolutely
raw deal. No one understands the illness at all and it's - I don't know. A lot of
films, you have schizophrenics in films. You won't have 'oh there's that mad
manic depressive that's likely to swap into a different person. ' Schizophrenics,
they're open to literally open season. There's always a film, some sort of slasher
film with some sort of mentally deranged person. It's usually schizophrenia ...God,
all people ever get to see about it from the news and it's always in a bad way. It
will be - I don't know, 'care in the community patient butchers nanny' or
something. It's never seen in a positive light ever. Say you had something like the
Para-Olympics, everyone says 'that's brilliant. People have got through adversity
to do that sort of thing. ' I've never ever seen anything to do with mental illnesses
put in a positive light. No one's ever gone and said 'look, oh this person's really
depressed but now look what they've done. ' You never see that ever. "
Therefore, the two participants concur that media representations contain sensationalist
and dramatic depictions of mental illness. The second participant suggests that physical
disability is more acceptable to the public than mental illness. However, one could
argue that coverage of events such as the Para-Olympics is marginalised and possibly
patronising towards disabled people, in accordance with the 'personal tragedy' model of
disability (priestley, 1999). Nevertheless, the two participants above were clear in their
view that the general public is influenced by media representations of mental illness and
internalise the negative stereotypes depicted in films, television programmes and in the
printed media The following participant expressed concerns about tabloid reporting of a
notorious offender with a diagnosed personality disorder.
M' "I can't really imagine looking at The Sun or The Daily Mail, right-wing
newspaper. I bet they mention that. I'm certain that they'll say about this appeal.
That will be brought up ...It's certain things although they should be offensive,
aren't and that - just like that. In papers like The Sun, they probably describe
Michael Stone as 'mater '. That they would have no problem using that sort of
language and it's - I doubt if anyone's going to write in and complain, 'I find
your description of Michael Stone as a mater offensive. ' It just wouldn't happen. "
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The participant's views of the use of derogatory language in tabloid newspapers was
realised in relation to The Sun's depiction of Frank Bruno's compulsory admission to
psychiatric hospital. The Sun's early headline of 'Bonkers Bruno Locked Up' was
modified to more moderate language. However, Richardson (2003) claims that such
headlines would elicit objections due to Frank Bruno being a well-liked celebrity and
perceived as being unlike other mental health service users. Therefore, the Sun's change
of headline does not appear to have been a response to improving public attitudes
towards people who use mental health services. Moreover, the public's lack of objection
to such derogatory language suggested by the participant further indicates the low status
of mental health service users in contemporary British society.
Finally, two participants indicated the possible influence of internalised socialisation on
their own attitudes towards mental illness, thus indicating the importance of
socialisation in the development of public attitudes. One participant described her
family as prejudiced against mental illness:
PJ: "But I carry those stereotypes and those things inside me and I notice them
coming up and feel horrified by them, but I have to check that maybe that isn't
what I believe and do I think that? You know, inside me is a deep-seated fear of
people who are out of control. "
Another participant (G) stated that he referred to psychiatric hospitals as 'the funny
farm' during his childhood and that had caused him confusion when he realised that he
was affected by mental illness, thus suggesting that negative public attitudes are likely
to influence self-concept or personal identity of people with mental health problems and
suggesting that negative public attitudes are likely to influence internalised identities of
those with mental health problems.
Improving Public Attitudes
A number of participants commented that people with previous contact with people
with mental illness might hold more positive attitudes than people with less contact. Of
those participants who spoke about improving public attitudes towards mental illness,
the consensus was to advocate proactive anti-stigma education to combat prejudice and
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to challenge the stereotypes that have already been identified by participants. One
participant had been directly involved in the delivery of anti-stigma education to school
children. journalists and nurses and uses her personal experience of providing public
education to provide an interesting insight into the delivery of such programmes.
D2: "...Basically, it's about informing people about mental illness to reduce the
stigma. So there's bits about famous people with mental health problems, tallcing
about whether they themselves know people in their family, et cetera, talking
about the stigma against it, the nicknames and all this, derogatory, how it makes
you feel, giving them sessions where they have a tape of voices saying really
horrid things, they're trying to make a conversation. I give them a session on my
experience of mental illness and the impact. We also discuss other symptoms and
other illnesses and I think there's a question and answer session after mine, which
usually takes ages because they have loads of questions to ask ...I've got mental
health problems so !hope I say to them 'actuallyyou can still function. ' So all the
feedback we've had and all the questionnaires that we've had written out have all
supported the session ! do as being the best impact on them of what it's like to
have that sort of an illness. And the last bit they always find quite difficult to do
but we do adults as well. "
However, the participant described the difficulties involved in public education training:
D2: "We've done media groups, journalists. They were awful. Well no, they
weren't awful because it was my first one and I was terrified because they were
quite antagonistic because! was really making themface up to thefact that a lot
of what they do is actually causing the stigma and we know that they are out to
get headline catchers and sell papers but what they do to people's lives, you
know. So they didn't really like that but it did have them go away and think ...! do
talks at the university as well and trainee nursing students or mental health
students and sometimes when we talk about the negative parts, they get really
upset and say you're being very negative' and !say 'well that's what it's like, go
out there and change it '."
The message from the participant appears to be that education programmes are more
likely to be successful if they are targeted at children and adolescents in order to prevent
negative views of mental illness becoming entrenched in the individual at an early age
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and thus more difficult to challenge later in life. However, it is interesting to note that
none of the participants specifically discussed challenging stigma by campaigning
against negative or stereotypical media representations, despite a broad consensus that
such representations significantly influence public attitudes towards people with mental
illness.
Summary
There was a lack of an absolute consensus but participants described public attitudes as
predominantly negative, involving lack of comprehension of the nature of mental health
problems and as characterised by ignorance and fear. The fear of the public of people
with mental health problems was associated with a public perception of the
dangerousness of the mentally ill. Participants described how the nature of public
attitudes towards mental illness is indicated in the derogatory discourse surrounding
mental illness. The status of people who use mental health services is indicated in the
assumed acceptability of such language appearing in the tabloid media
The impact of negative public attitudes was thought to cause people to avoid services, to
avoid disclosure, to threaten civil liberties and to influence national mental health
policy.
Participants overwhelmingly blamed biased media portrayals of mental illness for the
negativity of public attitudes. There was a consensus that the media portray the mentally
ill as violent to others, particularly in relation to schizophrenia. Two participants also
indicated the impact of socialisation on the development of negative attitudes towards
mental health service users.
The consensus amongst participants who expressed an opinion on the matter was that
public education programmes are the most effective way of changing public attitudes.
Interestingly, none of the participants suggested directly challenging media coverage of
mental health issues, although one participant was involved in the education of
journalists, in addition to mental health professionals.
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Mental Health Services
This section refers to community mental health services. Participants' Views on
inpatient psychiatric services will be presented in a later section. It was interesting to
note that participants engaged in extensive discussions of their perceptions and
experiences of mental health services. This may have been due to the recruitment of
some participants from a user group involved in action to improve local services. It was
clear from participants' responses that experience of community services and
psychiatric hospitalisation impacted negatively on community participation and social
inclusion.
Firstly, participants made comments that were categorised as an evaluation of
community care. Secondly, I examined participants' ideas on the components of
effective mental health care. Thirdly, I compared participants' views on what they
wanted from mental health services with actual mental health care provision. I also
examined the nature of professional power in the mental health system and the use of
medical hegemony to maintain such power.
Community Care
Participants made comments about the overall organisation of mental health services
and indicated numerous failings of community care. Key issues raised were problems in
accessing appropriate mental health services, due to being offered services that did not
meet their needs, bed shortages, high case loads and overall lack of funding. More
specifically, there was a general view of an over-emphasis placed on crisis intervention
at the expense of preventative approaches, as the following participants describe:
PI: "But there seems to be very little resources on preventative care that either
you're well enough or you need to be in hospital. "
P2: "My aim would always be to have a preventative medicine other than crisis
because it's just so damaging, you know. The damage on that person and within the
family unit can be unbearable. But they won't respond until somebody has either
made an attempt on their life or made an attempt on someone else's life. Then they'll
respond. That can't be right. "
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Similarly, Rose (2001) found a lack of alternatives to inpatient admission during a
mental health crisis. Another participant (0), located in a different part of the country,
complained that services are difficult to access out-of-hours even in a crisis situation.
He stated that crises are often left for the police to deal with and commented that the
police are not always the best personnel to deal with mental health crises due to lack of
sensitivity (cf. Rose, 2001) Another participant (R2) cited the case of his friend who
committed suicide as a result of delays in accessing services.
Lack of support was also described following discharge from hospital. The following
participant described lack of support at a time when she appears to have presented a
significant degree of risk to herself:
SI: " ...Because I used to be sent home andjust go and lay on my floor for months
and never go anywhere. I never had any support. Nothing at all. That is important,
support and all that I think Even if you turn around and say I don't want it, which I
probably did, I don't know. I can't believe they went nine years and didn't offer me
anything ...I mean, twice I went to the Tube and tried to throw myself under the Tube
after leaving the {hospital] after three months. "
However, one participant did identify the availability of support as necessary and useful
in terms that appear to support the biomedical view of mental health problems:
G: "Well the good thing I suppose is the fact that they're there. People have got to
accept the fact that there's a natural ailment, mental disturbance, which has to be
treated in some way because there are people that need help and I'm not saying that
medication is always the answer ... "
The longer-term consequences of negation of a preventative approach were identified
by one participant in terms of lack of recovery. She referred to specific preventative
strategies that are identified as missing from current mental health services.
Interestingly, she identified information on preventative coping strategies as deriving
from self-help books and groups and not from statutory mental health services:
D2: "You know, they've been through the system, this happened to me and where
does it take you in the end if you're never gonna get better and you're gonna keep
coming back? Do you want to continue that lifo? And it took mejifteenyears of being
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in the system to get some help on looking at preventative measures and an
alternative life. Mainly through myself actually going and looking up self-help books
or joining groups. But I really believe that there needs to be much more work on
strategies for living and living skills and coping strategies and work towards
prevention of situations that can cause mental illness. Otherwise, I just think it's
going to blow up into an epidemic in this country all over. "
This view concurs with the recommendation of the Mental Health Foundation that
mental health services should adopt a holistic approach to mental health in which
emotional, physical and spiritual needs are addressed and provide a broader range of
services in accordance with such needs (MHF, 1997, 2000). In additional, the Mental
Health Foundation reported similar lack of choice in services and lack of alternatives to
conventional treatments, such as medication.
I would describe general problems of access to services as the 'paradox of availability'
in which people who may not want a service may be coerced into accepting a service
and others that do want a service experience difficulty accessing services. The following
participant describes the paradox of availability:
PI: " ...Again, from the manic depression group, there are two categories of people.
Those who've been admitted to the acute unit and those who haven't. And those who
haven't always struggle to get the service they need. They're always struggling to get
the right medication or to see their psychiatrist or to see their CPN or you know or
whatever. And those who have been admitted to an acute unit are always struggling
to get away from that. They're struggling to get the psychiatrist to lower their
medication. "
Therefore, participants complained of significant gaps in services in the sense that either
services are difficult to access or they adopt an approach that is not conducive to long-
term recovery. I was interested to hear from participants the possible reasons for the
inadequacies in services that they identified. A number of reasons for the failings of
mental health services were postulated, including lack of talking treatments, an
emphasis on medication, high caseloads, bed shortages and inadequate funding. In the
following section, I will report that many participants expressed a desire to receive
talking treatments. However, this was identified as a significant omission from services.
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Talking therapies were regarded as being either inappropriate or not sufficiently
available by many participants. Many participants complained of the emphasis placed
on medication at the expense of other treatments and one participant commented" ... But
they don't offer you any support for emotional issues at all. " (P1)
One participant (R2) identified poor levels of support as being due to high caseloads of
professionals, citing that his CPN had fifty-five people on his caseload. The participant
described mental health workers as 'overwhelmed'. Another participant (E) identified
inadequate funding and bed shortages as problematic in the organisation of community
care, although he did refer to the introduction of a home treatment service in his area as
a progressive step. On a more specific issue, two participants expressed concern about
the role of drug companies in the provision of community care. Both participants cited
the priorities of drug companies as promoting their products to GPs and psychiatrists by
offering incentives to attend conferences and meetings that involve the promotion of the
product.
In summary, participants generally felt that the range of services available to them was
limited and that there was too much emphasis on medication and on crisis intervention
at the expense of talking treatments and preventative intervention. The following section
will examine participants' preferences for the services offered to people with mental
health problems.
Treatments
I asked participants to describe the mental health services they thought would be most
useful in order to compare their proposals with the actual mental health services they
described. Most participants described talking treatments or simply having someone
sympathetic to talk to as assuming a prominent role in an improved mental health
system (cf MHF, 1997). However, many also complained that counselling,
psychotherapy and psychological interventions fell below their expectations due to long
waiting lists and the limited number of sessions offered. Furthermore, four participants
described how they had been denied access to counselling or psychotherapy on the
grounds that it would be "dangerous" (8) for them. A number of participants alluded to
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more holistic approaches to mental health as being helpful, as the following participant
explains:
D2: "But to me, an ideal situation would be to see somebody who could prescribe
you medication but can also give you therapy, talking therapies, et cetera and see
you as very much a person in the community, your social environment, your - you
know, everything about you, your lifestyle, and help look at that, the stress levels,
your job, everything. It's not just your illness, it's what's led up to it, what's the
future going to hold? And they don't address that. "
A number of participants were critical of the biomedical approach and one participant
advocated a complete abandonment of this approach in an improved mental health
system, with greater credence awarded to users' accounts of their experiences:
T: "There would have to be an absolute sea change in attitudes towards people
labelled mentally ill. I mean, they would be listened to and if they came out with
stories of their being abused in whatever way, as children, sexually or physically
abused or the mental abuse going on into the adulthood of the child, the authorities,
they would take people seriously. They would embrace the theories put forward by
R.D.Laing and they would reject this biopsychiatry approach, this emphasis on
medication, on drugs. The whole targeting of the patient, you know. The way it is, a
patient can't break wind without it being noted by a nurse as being evidence of
mental ill health. "
Participants commonly expressed the view that service users are not listened to by
mental health workers in relation to explanations of illness, backgrounds or views on
treatment. One participant (PI) described her impression that mental health workers
believe that service users should not challenge their specialist knowledge. A further
participant wanted services to provide users with more information on illness and
treatments in order to encourage greater autonomy and self-determination inmanaging
their mental health problem:
M: "Yeah I think tell people they have a problem. Not sort of speak down to them.
Explain to someone. I wish someone had explained to me sort offour years ago. Said
'look we think you've got something, it's not a problem but it's something you can
deal with. This is what you've got. This is how you can help yourself. Now with a
little bit of knowledge, you'll befine. You'll be able to - people wouldn't even know
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sort of thing'. But no, it's - they have to approach it from a different angle rather
than say 'look you're a mentally disordered criminal, , whatever it is. Thanks I feel
really good now. People should be - the doctors should give the patients more trust
to help themselves ... "
It is interesting that the participant refers to the negative effects of labelling, for
example, labelling someone as a mentally disordered offender. The participant also
appears to refer to a need for greater emphasis on preventative approaches and greater
emphasis placed on service users' potential for recovery. A commonly held view was
that mental health professionals viewed users as essentially different whereby many
participants referred to a 'them-and-us' attitude held by professionals, implying
workers' attitudes of the inferiority of service users in relation to professionals. This is
an example of 'dividing practices' in which the 'mad' are fundamentally differentiated
from the 'sane' as a form of subjugation by one group (professionals) over another
(patients) (Foucault, 2002). Finally, one participant (G) argued that mental health
services should provide greater assistance to users wanting to return to employment (cf.
MHF, 2000). This argument corresponds with the earlier assertion that mental health
services should adopt a more holistic view of the person and their environment in order
to treat mental health problems in an ecologically valid, broad context.
Psychiatrists
I have already described participants as expressing concern that mental health services
over-emphasise medication as the predominant form of treatment. This is exemplified in
the operation of outpatient appointments with psychiatrists. Outpatient appointments
were a common source of concern whereby the majority of participants to discuss this
issue stated dissatisfaction with the standard of care they received at such appointments.
The most common causes of dissatisfaction were the lack of time at appointments; lack
of relationship with the psychiatrist; lack of consistency in terms of frequent changes of
staff; the lack of accountability in decision-making by the psychiatrist; and explicit
emphasis on medication as a method of risk management. In fact, psychiatrists were
particularly unpopular amongst participants whereby three participants referred to
psychiatrists as 'playing God', promulgating a sense of omnipotence and arrogance. In
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relation to outpatient appointments, the following participant exemplifies the views
expressed by many participants:
P2: "No all there seems to be is the time pressure. Everything's rattled out so
quickly that it's not like a relationship where someone's enquiring about how you
are so they can assess the most appropriate treatment. It's like he's got five minutes
to give you a prescription and in that five minutes you've somehow got to convince
him of how you are so that you hopefully get some appropriate medication. But
there's no comeback if you don't. Sometimes - I mean, in the beginning, when you
were going on your own that it was like 'well what's he done that for? '...And also
it's not actually our experience but most people, they'll see one psychiatrist thenfor
their next appointment they '/I see another one so they don't build up any relationship
with them. So they have no confidence in these people and so what happens is then
that people begin to try to medicate themselves, to keep themselves well. So they
learn about the medicines ... "
The participant was describing her experience as a carer of her partner so that her
experience was as an onlooker in outpatient appointments. She even described an
incident in which the psychiatrist spoke to her for a significant portion of an outpatient
appointment, having mistaken her as his patient. The participant used this as an explicit
example of how psychiatrists lack knowledge of their patients and relate to their patients
so poorly that they may not even clarify the identity of their patient when an outpatient
appointment is attended with a carer or friend. The participant's description of
outpatient appointments underlines the emphasis placed on medication in these
appointments and also indicates the lack of accountability of psychiatrists for their
decisions. This'was a frequent concern in relation to psychiatrists that will be explored
in the following section. The following participant describes not lack of knowledge of
the patient but lack of knowledge of a service. This might suggest that the psychiatrist
lacked local knowledge, possibly indicating the problem of using locum staff. Two
participants complained that psychiatrists appear to lack interest in their patients and
this is described along with the function of risk management in prescribing treatment
using psychiatric drugs:
R2: "I just recently saw a psychiatrist on Thursday. The man was useless. Useless
man. He knew nothing about the service I was talking about. Hejust - basically '1'/1
see you in three months, keep taking the tablets. ' I thought you just wasted my time
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coming to see you. ' There was no proper interview...They don't listen properly. All
the time you're taking them tablets and you're not causing any trouble in the outside,
they'll leave you alone. Once every three months, come and see me. Yeah. They send
you a letter to go and see them. "
However, the same participant described a positive experience of an outpatient
appointment whereby he discussed the elements that comprise useful contacts with
psychiatrists. He explained that the helpful outpatient appointment involved visiting a
psychiatrist who possessed knowledge of his patient by reading the medical notes, by
showing a genuine interest in the patient, by spending time with the patient and by
adjusting medication to suit the needs of the patient.
Accountability
Three participants described psychiatrists as 'playing God'. This appeared to be a
reference to the power of psychiatrists to make far-reaching decisions that affect many
areas of patients' lives. It also appeared to refer to lack of accountability in decision-
making and the power of psychiatrists to make decisions purportedly in the best
interests of the patient. The following participant directed severe criticism at a particular
psychiatrist who she accused of 'playing God':
S: "Well I said to him [psychiatrist] because basically with my life, he was playing
God in a sense because he's not answerable to anybody. What he says goes. I was
aware that each time he wrote a report on me and it went to case conferences or
whatever to do with {son], it was down to him, down to him. He had the last say. He
said whether or not it would be wise. And I was waiting, waiting for the day when
he'd say it was okay and he eventually did ...But to me, that is playing God. I mean,
who is he to decide? ..and the bit about medication. I mean, if you go to your GP,
normally you should take what they give you because they know what is best for you.
You think they do, well not all the time, but you think they know what's bestfor you
because they've trained to know what's bestfor you. They've been to medical school.
And so have psychiatrists, meant to have been, but really I think the only people that
know what's bestfor you is you. Me ...but yeah, he was playing God, telling me to go
on this medication, telling me to do that, telling me I had to stay in hospital, telling
me I wasn't allowed to see my son. He didn't actually tell me that but because of
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what he wrote that's what happened. Yeah he was. That's why J say he was trying to
pay God."
Many participants were troubled by the apparent lack of accountability of psychiatrists
in their decision-making, particularly in relation to alleged malpractice. A number of
participants expressed frustration at the lack of justice for victims of psychiatric
malpractice. One participant (E) discussed malpractice in relation to the severe adverse
side effects he experienced as a result of being prescribed Largactil. He described
himself as a 'victim' of psychiatry and expressed concern about the psychiatric
treatment of elderly patients and the potentially higher rates of iatrogenic death in this
population. He espoused the strategy of adverse media publicity of cases like his own
but cited collusion between psychiatric professionals as preventing justice being
achieved in such cases:
E: "...J think it's a situation that there is quite often a great collusion within their
own profession to help one another and to protect one another if malpractice has
happened. "
Lack of accountability was also thought to be related to the treatment of complaints by
service users in which complaints of malpractice or poor treatment are regarded as
lacking credence and thus users themselves are regarded as lacking credibility. When
participants discussed making complaints against poor practice they expressed
dissatisfaction that complaints are often attributed to illness or they expressed a fear of
disbelief or a fear of withdrawal of services.
D2: " ... There are many frustrations and I do jind sometimes at meetings I get very
frustrated because there are still some people who think that a user should be seen
and not heard. And when you do say your views, you're questioned and even made
out to look as if perhaps you're ill because of what you're saying. But when I came
out [of hospital], J was very traumatised and I wanted to complain and I just felt that
nobody would believe me. It would be my word against theirs ... "
Another participant (E) explained the dilemma that some patients might experience in
that he related an incident in which a service user wanted to complain about treatment
but she was discouraged by fear that her services might be withdrawn. Indeed, another
participant describes the actual withdrawal of a service following a complaint:
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T: "He stuck me offhis list because I wrote a letter to his senior partner complaining
about him, complaining about his performance as my GP ... "
Such action exemplifies the power imbalance between the patient and the medical
practitioner. The issue of accountability was also examined in terms of a comparison
with general medical services whereby lack of accountability was attributed to the
subjectivity of psychiatric discourse as a medical science, as described by the following
participant:
S: "I suppose it's their insurance and their way of talking, their way of saying things.
I mean, obviously if you were in the [general hospital] for instance, with a physical
problem and they did something to your body that didn't really need to be done, then
it's obvious isn't it? They can't dispute it because they weren't standing there saying
'in my opinion you need to have your breast off' or something. They'll say 'you need
to have your breast off because you've got cancer' whatever. But with a psychiatrist,
it's so complex anyway. But they can't - I mean, they're allowed to say whatever
they like basically, aren't they? They are ...But basically no doctor should be above
the law but I would say psychiatrists are above the law because they are allowed to
say whatever they like about a person and their opinions. Even though their opinions
could change a person's life forever or maybe even kill them. They're allowed to do
that but the doctors at the [general hospital] aren't allowed to do that. They aren't
above the law. They are answerable. But who are psychiatrists answerable to? No
one. I mean, I know there must be a governing body or something. "
The subjectivity of psychiatry has been indicated by a number of critics (e.g. Johnstone,
2000; Kutchins and Kirk, 1997), especially in relation to diagnosis (Parker et al., 1995).
Foucault (2002) indicated the power inherent in a discipline parading as a scientific
venture, thus enabling psychiatric service users to be subject to the control and
subordination of those claiming to practice a scientific discipline. The participant's
comments also describe the fundamental distinction between general medical patients
and users of mental health services and particularly the subjectivity of psychiatry in the
absence of somatic indicators of dysfunction. Indeed, Johnstone (2000) argues that
psychiatry is unique in administering physical treatments in the absence of obvious
physical pathology and in treating people against their will.
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Professional Power
Participants discussed power imbalances in relation to professionals with regard to
issues of compliance, a statutory monopoly of services, dependency, the intrusiveness
of home visits and difficulties participants experienced in extricating themselves from
the mental health system. Three participants spoke directly about dependency deriving
from mental health service use; the following was a fairly typical view:
D2: " ...And to a certain extent, I sadly think that an awful lot of the mental health
professionals encourage that [dependency]. There's almost this - what's it called?
Co-relationship? Co-dependency, whereby a mental health professional needs to be
needed and the person who's ill, the patient, needs that and they fit their role so
nicely that they get locked into it and neither one leaves so that this one never gets
better and this one never really moves on. And that happens all the time and you can
actually see it happening. So to a certain extent sometimes the system encourages
that to happen, which is difficult. "
The sick role is a frequently cited consequence of mental health service use (Goffinan,
1963; Johnstone, 2000). The following participant identified her community worker as
helpful but regrets the dependency she experiences in relation to calling on a
professional for assistance:
J: HIfind it paternalistic. I do. I'm sort of fighting all the time to maintain my
individuality and my independence. And I feel I could just be taken over and changed
into a sort of cabbage or something who, you know, just a vegetable. I really do and
it does scare me ...I'd like to get to the stage where I'm independent of support. I've
asked you see, I've asked for a CPN for the last bout when I was having terrible
problems and wanted to move and I was given a CPN for that situation. He did help
me greatly ...But at the same time, every time he comes round, I'm diminished as a
person. He's a nice person. He's a helpful person but he's so nice and helpful I feel
sort of as though I shouldn't - I'm a woman that's coming up to fifty-five, I ought to
be able to handle these problems myself. "
There is an important question, therefore, concerning how mental health services
propagate such dependency. One way might be to impede users' independence by
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controlling the type of information users receive and the type of services that are
available.
P2: "I think you could easily become quite paranoid about this because you know,
it's like they want the control of the information and I can feel myself thinking, you
know, they really want the monopoly on all the services and all the information and
all the medication and al/ that sort of thing but you know, from a support group of
users I think that's true. Most of the good stuff comes from there. All the true
information about how people experience manic depression and their episodes really
does come from that place ... "
The way in which fellow users provide most useful information adds a further
dimension to the reciprocity of relationships between fellow service users. This finding
also concurs with the finding that most support is derived from outside of statutory
mental health services (Rogers, Pilgrim and Lacey, 1993). An issue that is closely
related to dependency is the difficulty numerous participants reported in managing to
extricate themselves from the mental health system whereby the following participant
describes how this is even acknowledged by mental health professionals:
PI: "The CPN said to me some time ago - the one that we got rid of, she said to me
once that you can -' there'1/ be a time when you won't need to see me at all and I'll
just be at the end of a phone for you but you won't get rid of having to see the
psychiatrist. ' It's like you have to see the psychiatrist for the rest of your life. "
Such comments from professionals indicate expectations of chronicity of illness, poor
prognosis and lack of recovery. Indeed, the interviews revealed a common desire to be
extricated from mental health services or participants commented that it is very difficult
to achieve such extrication. Two participants who did manage to extricate themselves
described their joy at being free from mental health services. Nevertheless, the difficulty
in extricating oneself demonstrates the power of mental health professionals to demand
compliance with a stated need for mental health services. The power of mental health
professionals is also inherent in the system of visiting clients in their homes. One
participant described such visits as intrusive and as an unwelcome infringement of
personal privacy:
J: " ...But no, professionals visiting you, I mean, there are CPNs and people that do
go round and it's rather intrusive. And it also advertises to everybody that you're a
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mental patient if they're seen there often enough. It's either a social worker or a
CPN"
Therefore, participants complained of observing or of experiencing feelings of
dependency as users of mental health services. Professionals were accused of wanting to
control information and of seeking to monopolise service provision. This is evident in
the section concerning user involvement in which participants complain that user groups
and support groups are not promoted by professionals. The difficulty participants
experienced in extricating themselves from the mental health system demonstrates the
power of professionals to maintain some degree of control over service users' lives.
Medical Hegemony
I employ the term 'medical hegemony' to refer to the power psychiatry derives from its
construction of mental illness as a biological entity. Therefore, psychiatric
professionals' power is derived from the medical model of mental illness and the
language used to describe mental illness. A number of participants contested the
medical model whereby the medical model was thought to be problematic in relation to
the process of diagnosis; the notion of best interests; the concepts of insight and
delusional thought processes and the discourse adopted by mental health professionals
to describe mental illness. The following view was typical of the disapproval of the
medical model:
D2: "...1 think one big flaw for me is that they see it purely as a medical model and I
really believe that the whole system needs to change in this country and they need to
look at you as a whole person and come at different angles, not just the medical
model but the social model and the whole mix up of the person, what makes you who
you are because you're not just a person who takes medication. You know, you need
treatment in otherforms. "
The participant makes two important points. Firstly, that the medical model dominates
and construes the individual in a restricted way. The alternative social model is thought
to construe the individual in a more holistic way. The social model is important to
citizenship because it attributes disability to disabling environments that permit
institutional discrimination, segregated services and exclusion from valued activities
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(Oliver, 1996). Secondly, the dominance of the medical model restricts the availability
of treatments to medication and neglects alternative forms of treatment. The concepts
of insight and delusional thought processes undermine the credibility and competence of
the patient. These concepts afford psychiatric professionals the power to define
abnormal thought processes and to indicate that a patient is unaware of their illness. The
following participant cites the notion of 'lack of insight' as a discourse adopted by
professionals to question the credibility of users' accounts of their experiences:
T: "But this lack of insight thing has been thrown at me for years. You know, 'he is
deluded, he lacks insight' and it's all complete bollocks ...The more you argue the
madder they think you are or the more potentially aggressive or dangerous or
sinister they think you are ...And it was written down that I was diagnosed as a
paranoid schizophrenic as if that proves something in itself, as if that explains quotes
'everything'. Youjust have to write down that phrase and that's supposed to cut off
any kind of debate or investigation, you see. "
In relation to diagnosis, a number of participants complained of lack of information
about their diagnosis, commonly citing ignorance of their formal diagnosis. The state of
knowledge of diagnosis confirms the previously cited complaint of lack of information
provided by mental health professionals. Three participants disputed the validity of any
diagnosis on the grounds that they have never experienced formal mental illness. One
participant complained of having received a number of conflicting diagnoses, thus
questioning the validity of the diagnostic system. I asked her if she had been given
information on a diagnosis:
S: "Well I wouldn't say they explained anything to me but there was a number of
diagnoses over a period of time, erm. My psychiatrist said I was psychotic. One
particular psychiatrist said I was schizophrenic and then I went to the Maudsley to
see a top woman who said she's neither of the two, you know. Just a bit - reacted
badly to [a tragic event] and then I've had 'she's got personality disorder,' 'she's
got a behavioural disorder,' erm...Well they gave me several diagnoses. And I've
still never had one proper diagnosis. And you know why that is don't you? Because
there wasn't anything actually wrong with me. So it's a big bloody farce and it's a
bigjoke ... "
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Although Bentall (2003) argues that diagnoses that change over time do not indicate a
lack of diagnostic validity because symptoms change over time, many others question
the validity of psychiatric diagnosis (e.g. Kutchins and Kirk, 1997; Parker et al., 1995;
Boyle, 2002). However, it could be argued that information on diagnosis is relatively
meaningless because of the subjectivity of such information whereby awarding
importance to information provided by professionals implies that such information is
reliable and valid. However, lack of information on diagnosis suggests a professional
view that users of mental health services have no need for information on treatment,
thus indicating the fundamental power imbalance between practitioners and users of
psychiatric services.
The concept of best interests is, arguably, inherently paternalistic in that it awards
professionals the power to determine a patient's best interests and thus possibly negate
the patient's wishes. Two participants argued that psychiatrists are not necessarily aware
of the patient's best interests, indeed one participant (T) argued that psychiatrists act in
the best interests of those who wish to oppress the patient and certainly not in the
patient's best interests. Lukes (1974) argued that one form of power is through the
determination of people's interests, although he also stated that someone who agrees
that another individual or group acts in their best interests cannot be said to have power
exerted over himlher. The majority of comments relating to best interests refuted the
notion that psychiatrists act in patients' best interests, although one participant
disagreed, stating:
D2: .....you can't always be the best judge of how you are. You're not always that
aware of howyou are. "
In summary, the hegemonic nature of psychiatry can be detected in the medical model
that participants identified as dominating mental health services. Participants regarded
the medical model as espousing a narrow view of mental health problems, thus negating
a holistic approach that acknowledges the impact of social factors on mental health. The
dominance of the medical model was regarded as leading to an over-emphasis on the
administration of medication in mental health services. Furthermore, psychiatric
diagnosis was described as being unreliable, stigmatising and as lacking personal
relevance. The notion of lack of insight was regarded as derogatory and as a way of
negating users' views of their experiences. The notion of best interests was regarded as
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inherently paternalistic and one participant questioned whether psychiatric services
were really provided in users' best interests, citing the interests of carers as more
influential.
Summary
Participants expressed a consensus view that mental health services should place greater
emphasis on providing support through talking, either with talking therapies or simply
by staff being available to talk with users about their lives. Participants complained of
an over-emphasis on treatment using medication and some participants identified the
medical model as propagating a narrow view of mental health problems. Participants
demanded a more holistic view of mental health problems and greater emphasis on
preventative intervention and coping strategies.
Participants were generally dissatisfied with the intervention of psychiatrists, citing
numerous concerns in relation to outpatient appointments. Participants regarded
psychiatrists as lacking in accountability in relation to their practice, particularly in
relation to malpractice. Some participants felt that psychiatrists exerted excessive power
over their lives and this was encapsulated in the accusation that psychiatrists 'play
God'. However, at least two participants were grateful for psychiatric intervention
during a crisis yet both also expressed concerns in relation to the nature of intervention.
The issues of dependency and negation of users' complaints indicate the power of
professionals relative to users of mental health services.
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Inpatient Services
This section examines participants' experiences of psychiatric hospitalisation. All of the
participants who related experiences of inpatient psychiatric treatment described
treatment received in the last five years. None of the participants referred to old-style,
large-scale institutions when describing experiences of hospitalisation. However, one of
the geographical areas in the study was of particular interest because a new unit attached
to a district general hospital had been opened two years prior to the study and enabled a
comparison between an older-style small-scale institution and the new inpatient unit.
Many participants discussed the older-style institution, which is referred to as KG in the
findings, but expressed the view that, although the new unit represented a more pleasant
environment and greater privacy, the standard of care and lack of meaningful activity
remained comparable with the old psychiatric hospital.
Participants discussed citizenship in terms of a comparison between the access to rights
and opportunities afforded to general medical patients and psychiatric inpatients. If such
rights and opportunities are not equivalent, then psychiatric patients may be considered
to lack the status of citizens. In addition, the findings refute Marshall's (1992) claim
that state welfare services facilitate the attainment of social citizenship.
I wanted to examine the rationale for hospitalisation and what this rationale indicates
about the civil rights and community membership of psychiatric inpatients. Most
participants engaged in extensive discussions of inpatient care, mostly as a result of
having been admitted to psychiatric inpatient units. Two participants had not
experienced such hospitalisation directly but had visited friends in hospital and made
comments about their responses to such visits. The main themes to emerge from the
interview data were as follows:
• Ward environment: This section will include a discussion of levels of activity
on the ward, availability of staff, violence, safety and risk management on
wards. The discussions of such issues are summarised in an analysis of whether
psychiatric hospitals provide environments that are conducive to recovery.
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• Power: Examined under this heading are discussions relating to the exercise of
power over people with mental health problems in the processes of admission to
psychiatric hospital and subsequent detention, including sectioning and the
status of informal detention. The practice of seclusion and control and restraint
and the rights available to patients whilst in hospital are also examined.
Ward Environment
a) Staffing
The availability and quality of care provided by staff will be examined in this section.
An almost unanimous complaint made by participants was the lack of availability of
nurses on wards. Staff were described as lacking interest in the patients and to be more
concerned with completing paperwork than with interacting with patients.
DJ: "It was horrible though. People there left on their ownfor hours anyway,just
smoking or sitting doing nothing and then when they pluck up the courage to go
and ask someone for help and they're told to go away. I don't expect that in
hospital at all. Especially if the staff aren't doing anything else. If they're just -
they need to congregate in the offices all the time. Sitting there and smoking and
eating and talking. I'm sure they got some work done but they were obviously
badly organised if they couldn't take time out to sit with a patient. Because you
have a primary nurse. I never saw my primary nurse. I saw my primary nurse
both times when I first went in, when they did the care plan and that was it. I was
there for three months both times and never had a conversation with my primary
nurse after that. "
Another participant complained:
S: "...If the nurses do actually come and sit in the lounge, they pick up a
newspaper and start reading or watch the telly. "
In other words, when the nurses do move into the proximity of the patients, they
continue to avoid interaction with patients. The avoidance of contact with patients
appeared to persist even when a patient made a direct request to talk to a nurse. One
participant (01) described how nurses would typically deny such a request by stating
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that they were too busy with their paperwork. One participant (P) described how she
had been admitted with substantial wounds caused by self-harm and that such wounds
remained undetected and untreated due to lack of attention from staff.
Ward rounds were a particular source of complaint whereby participants cited lack of
time available for the ward round, lack of discussion with patients and the numbers of
professionals attending as particular sources of dissatisfaction. The following
participant summarises the attitudes of participants to ward rounds.
E: "Because it can be a bit daunting sometimes when you've got say, ten, fifteen
people sitting around, all professionals, nurses and social workers,junior doctors
and other nursing staff and they're all debating about what's the next stage or
about release and so on. So itjust depends on the individual but I know in mypast
I've sat in quite a big room, there must have been about twenty people there.
Fortunately for me, I wasn't frightened. But I can imagine somebody who would
jind that very intimidating. "
Another participant (81) complained that the large number of professionals attending
ward rounds represented an infringement of the patient's privacy. The discussion of
ward rounds suggested that patients fmd them intrusive and possibly intimidating and
the lack of time meant that there is a lack of opportunity for patients to represent their
viewpoint on care and discharge. Participants' responses also suggested that ward
rounds are organised to meet the needs of professionals rather than to benefit patients.
b) Activity and Treatment
Participants frequently reported a lack of treatment and activity in psychiatric inpatient
units whereby this led many participants to question the rationale for psychiatric
hospitalisation. The following participant summarised participants' dissatisfaction with
this aspect of hospitalisation.
D1: "You don't get any treatment, right. You get given tablets if the doctor says
you've got to have them. You get a ward round which is jive minutes a week.
There's occupational therapy for two hours in the morning if you like doing
colouring in. And other than that, you're left to get on with it. No counselling,
which I thought you would get. You know, if you're in hospital you'd assume
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you'd get some therapy of some sort. There's nothing. You just sit in the smoking
room mucking about with the other patients. "
Despite the general criticism of over-reliance on medication on psychiatric wards, one
participant (D1) indicated that the lack of treatment extended to lack of medication.
Such lack of treatment caused the participant to compare her stay in psychiatric hospital
to a hotel in that she spent most of her time away from the ward. This caused her to
question not only the rationale of hospitalisation but also the effectiveness of psychiatric
inpatient treatment.
D1: "...So what psychiatric treatment there was in that I don't know, but that's
exactly how it was ... if I'd have been really ill, if I'd been suicidal or really
depressed or something. I don't know what I would have done. I would have
probably topped myself because there was no help in there. So it's a good job I
wasn't ill really. "
Her comments indicate a perception of neglect in inpatient units. Moreover, a number of
participants cited lack of activity and attributed this to the poor facilities in hospital
whereby lack of activity meant that daily routines punctured the day and became the
main sources of occupation.
D1: "We made our own amusement because there was no structure to anything.
Mealtimes was the highlight of the day because it was something different to
do ...most days there was a blackboard, they would prop it up against the pool
table, the pool table didn't have any cues so you couldn't use it. And there was a
piano which half the keys were missing from so you couldn't use that either and
there would be a blackboard this big propped up against the pool table with the
grid of a word search on it. And that was the occupational therapy. That was what
was left to entertain you with. All the jigsaws - I think I tried to do all the jigsaws,
all of them had pieces missing and the books were like really old, old shifty,
uninteresting novels that were, I don't know, Jim Goes to Sea and stuff like that,
you know."
The participant's previous reference to occupational therapy involving colouring in and
her references to jigsaws and word searches suggest an infantilisation of psychiatric
patients and a negation of therapeutic interventions aimed at facilitating recovery. The
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message conveyed by participants was that there were no beneficial therapeutic
interventions in NHS psychiatric units.
c) The Non-Therapeutic Environment
Participants mentioned a number of features of the ward environment that they
considered to be detrimental and not conducive to recovery. Frequently cited features
were the behaviour of other patients, weight gain, control and restraint, violence and
deaths of other patients. The main complaints concerned the distress exhibited by other
patients and the general air of disruption on the ward.
S: ..Well as I said to you before, I said erm somebody could be really depressed
like myself and it's an awful way to say it but I'm going to say it again anyway,
you've got someone on the left hand side slashing up their arms or whatever,
sticking cigarettes in their hands erm and then you've got someone on the right
hand side screaming or whatever, trying to smash the windows and get out and
then you go upstairs and have your friend hanging from the pipe. I mean, I don't
really call that therapeutic myself. And that's basically it. That's every day, every
night. Even during the night you couldn't get a good night's sleep. I wouldn't
anyway, but you couldn't because there was too much going on. You'd get
someone that was so distressed the bloody alarms would go off and that meant
crashing of feet, like loads of people and like decking that person, you know,
because that's what they thought you had to do, you see. "
Another participant (M) found his time in an inpatient unit to be non-therapeutic due to
the weight gain he experienced. The participant attributed the weight gain to the lack of
opportunity to exercise by incarceration and the poor sporting facilities available. He
also commented that the weight gain adversely affected his self-esteem and this is
noteworthy because it associates poor facilities with a directly adverse impact on
patients' mental health. Interestingly, he contrasted the poor facilities available in NHS
units with the impressive facilities he had experienced whilst receiving treatment in a
private psychiatric unit. A number of participants commented on the superior facilities
and activities offered at private psychiatric inpatient facilities in comparison with NHS
units. However, private hospitals were also described as administering excessive
medication even within the context of concerns raised about over-medication in NHS
psychiatric hospitals.
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An additional way that psychiatric hospital admission was found to be counter-
productive was that it removed the person from their family and home life. One
participant (Dl) was not only highly distressed by being separated from her four
children but she also described how she lost her home whilst she was an inpatient due to
eviction by her landlord.
The view of hospitalisation held by many participants contradicts the notion of the
asylum purpose of hospitalisation in which the patient is allowed relief from their
problems in order to recover their mental health. It is clear that stressful aspects of the
ward environment and aspects of psychiatric inpatient care led participants to question
the rationale for psychiatric hospital admission. This view was summarised by the
following participant:
S: "You know, it's very damaging. I'm sorry but like I say I've yet to meet a
person that actually says yes being in KG or being in (new unit] has really
helped me '...And I know loads of people from KG either they're still going there
as nutty as ever or they're even nuttier, like I was ..
d) Safety, Violence and Risk Management
One of the non-therapeutic aspects of the ward environment has been identified as the
behaviour of other patients. A more extreme example of this is found in incidents of
violence perpetrated by patients on other patients. Two participants reported having
been assaulted by other patients.
R2: "One bloke belted me in theface for no reason. A woman slapped me so hard
around theface, nearly knocked me out, for no reason. It was horrendous. I think
it's worse than prison myself. I'd rather go to prison than have all those drugs
and being kept in like they did in those days. "
The second way in which patients were the victims of violence was at the hands of staff
using a technique known as control and restraint. One of the main complaints about
control and restraint was simply that it involved the infliction of pain. One participant
referred to the use of control and restraint as 'physical abuse' and the staff who
perpetrated such abuse as sadistic.
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D2: "But I think the worst memories for me are really the physical abuse that
actually went on by some of the staff, being hurt. I was controlled and restrained
many times and injected and my memories of this are that the people who did it,
you can sense, I think everybody can sense, I know I certainly did when it would
happen to me, that they enjoyed what they were doing and they were doing it very
firmly so that it hurt me. They were actually hurting me. They weren't trying to
keep me safe. They were trying to hurt me and I actually had my wrist almost
broken. It was the ligaments were torn by one man who controlled me to the
extent that that's how far it went and wouldn't stop when I kept pleading. And I
saw it done on other people as well. It wasn't just me, it was done on others as
well ...And the whole atmosphere was one of aggression and well there was a
malevolent atmosphere. It was a very aggressive place. "
The appropriateness of control and restraint as a technique for controlling 'challenging'
or 'difficult' behaviour is questionable when examined in relation to the environmental
triggers for the behaviour that attracted the use of control and restraint. Participants
described control and restraint being used following escape attempts or from throwing
items such as furniture around the ward. Participants attributed such behaviour to anger
and frustration at being incarcerated and by the behaviour of staff on the ward. One
participant (D2) referred to the claustrophobia of being incarcerated, the lack of fresh air
available to patients, frustration at lack of self-determination and of not being listened to
when complaining about medication. The following participant described her response
to frustration caused by incarceration:
S: "Well if like I got erm really stressed out ...upset or angry or anything or the
way I was being treated - like once I picked up a table and lobbed it across the
room and erm the alarms went off and they all came running from God knows
where. Theyjust seemed to come out of the woodwork and they drag you upstairs,
arms bent behind your back like a policeman does, head down ...and erm you're
sort of slung onyour bed and injected basically, so you go to sleep. "
There are at least two elements of control exerted over the patient in the preceding
description. Firstly, the participant describes being handled in the same way a police
officer would handle someone who is being arrested and secondly, the use of
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medication to manage 'disruptive' behaviour. The latter will be discussed in the section
examining the use of power in psychiatric units.
Another form of ward violence that was described by participants was the witnessing of
suicide attempts by other patients.
T: ".; actually I witnessed someone trying to hang themselves from a curtain
rail ...I was actually lying on my bed and this guy didn't say anything and then I
heard this sound and it was the sound of the rail being pulled out of the wall and I
saw this guy with whatever he had round his neck, tied up to the rail. "
A number of participants referred to friends who had committed suicide whilst in
psychiatric hospital. This caused one participant to question the effectiveness of
hospitalisation:
S: "i : So the bottom line is really how on earth did it help them? It helped them to
die basically, leaving children behind who may grow up resenting their mother,
father, whatever because they've killed themselves. They may become ill
themselves ...A mass of people all dying. It's like a war and it's not a war. "
The incidence of suicide and parasuicide on psychiatric wards led some participants to
question the adequacy of supervision on psychiatric wards. A number of participants
attributed high suicide rates in hospital to the side effects of treatment (e.g. R2) and the
hopelessness caused by lack of recovery due to a narrow emphasis on medication at the
expense of more holistic approaches to treatment (D2). However, one participant who
had been involved in the consultation with users on the design of a new psychiatric unit
criticised the unit as resembling a secure unit due to the emphasis on risk management
at the expense of patient comfort and choice. The Health Trust was criticised for not
listening to users at the consultation stage and decided to provide patients with plastic
quilts and showers that ran for approximately seven seconds. I asked the participant
why the Trust had taken such decisions.
D2: "One was the fact that they wanted everybody to have plastic quilts and I
said they'd sweat too much and they'd be awful ... that was ignored and it's now
been proved that I was right and they've had to spend a lot of money which was
wasted ...And the other issue was about the showers. And I was horrified to see
that they were like sports centre showers, seven seconds, and I said this at the
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time, I said 'I think that's disgusting, ' I said 'I wouldn't like that and I don't think
you would. Would you have that in your home?' I said to the people on the panel.
And I was told it was a safety issue ...I think it's because of safety issues that they
have to protect themselves and it's now very much a minimum risk environment.
They can't afford to be sued so they have to make sure it's safe, as safe as you can
make it, at all expense and at all costs to anybody else. I mean, even the freedom
to choose whether you have a hot or cold shower. And I disagreed with this and to
me what they were doing was turning it into a secure unit but not calling it that.
So there were big frustrations for me at the time, and still are. Issues over the
garden. You know, okay you have to have a fence so they can go out. And now it
turns out that people can still get over the fence so they can't go out. "
Power
a) Admission and Detention
This section includes an examination of participants' experiences of admission to
hospital and their rights whilst in hospital. A common theme in discussions of
psychiatric hospital admissions was the use of police, ambulances and handcuffs, which
some participants stated made them feel like a criminal. It struck me that some
participants had been treated in a rather heavy-handed way during the process of
sectioning. One participant described how the police had battered down her door in
order to gain access while she was at home with her children:
D1: ";..They only had to press the doorbell. They just booted the door in, came
running up the stairs, because I heard all this commotion. I wonder what's going
on? As I went out there, there was bloody loads of them everywhere. There was
only me."
The way inwhich the participant felt overpowered in the situation is encapsulated in the
comment "there was only me".
A number of participants commented that even when patients agree to enter hospital
voluntarily, they are often coerced into remaining and accepting treatment, even as
informal patients. One participant commented that voluntary admission is a misnomer. I
asked her why she thought this.
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D2: "Well the door's lockedfor a start. You know, how can you be a voluntary
patient if the door's locked? And if you do decide to go, you'll be more often than
not the nurse will say 'can you just wait to see the doctor?' You can't just walk
out the door. And then maybe they'l/ say 'well can you just wait until tomorrow to
see the consultant? ' And it isn't a question of just going when you want because
sometimes they will be quite persistent about making you stay and I know a lot of
people whereby if you leave the building you will be sectioned. Or if you don't
take the medication you will be sectioned. I mean, that's another one. So you
might be voluntary but you have to take the medication or you will be sectioned.
So you're not reallyfree. "
The information from participants was that voluntary patients are actively prevented
from leaving the ward or are threatened with compulsory detention if they are not
compliant with the wishes of the staff.
b) Seclusion
I was interested to learn whether participants had been the subject of seclusion and the
possible rationale for the use of seclusion on psychiatric wards. Two participants spoke
of their experience of seclusion. At the old psychiatric hospital referred to as KG,
participants described the practice of placing patients on the 'landing' as a form of
seclusion.
S: "...At onepoint, when I was on the landing because I'd been 'difficult'>
MF: You were on the landing? Whatdoes that mean?
S: Well you're confined upstairs. Because - probably you've chucked a chair or
shouted at someone or tried to smash a window. I did smash a few windows up
there actually, I must admit. Once I was just standing in this room, pacing
backwards and forwards because I was getting really, really angry, and the staff
were there watching me and I just went like that, shoved my foot through this
window and the alarm bells go off and you're confined upstairs. We were both
actually confined upstairs at that particular time. She was in her bedroom and
you were allowed to smoke up there ...But she must have somehow got a lighter
and erm she was sitting there, all of a sudden I saw theseflames. I thought 'oh my
God' and that was her ...What I was trying to get at was she was punished for
that. She wasn't like 'oh my God, are you all right? Oh come and talk to me, ' and
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you know. Oh no. She was ostracised She was made tofeel totally, totally - well
that she had done something really wrong by trying to take her own life. "
The incident refers to the response to a suicide attempt by the staff in a punitive way by
placing the individual on the 'landing'. The two participants who referred to seclusion
both stated that it was used in a punitive way, usually in response to behaviour that was
perceived as being disruptive or uncooperative.
c) Staff Attitudes
An examination of staff attitudes might facilitate an understanding of why nursing staff
appear reluctant to interact with patients. It may also help to explain why there is a
paucity of activities available to patients. Negative staff attitudes may also be associated
with the use of control and restraint and seclusion. All of the participants who discussed
staff attitudes perceived them as being negative towards patients. Staff were even
compared to prison warders or traffic wardens. Psychiatric ward staff were described as
having an attitude of differentiation in that patients were regarded as inferior and
different from staff. Staff were also described as punitive ("punished for being ill",
"made me feel like a criminal"), as the following participant explains:
D2: "... Yeah, it's the attitudes of the staff around It's how they deal with
you ...But quite often it's - what I experience is a very punishing atmosphere.
You're beingpunished for being ill, that's it. That's exactly what itfeels like. Most
of my experiences - I think I've been in eight or nine times and very long stays,
most of these experiences have made mefeel punished for being i/l, made mefeel
like a criminal, made me feel bad about myself, made mefeel that I shouldn't be
mixing with society. They made me feel like that by their attitudes, by their silly
laws and rules, which are totally ridiculous half the time... And somebody's got
their big hobnailed boot and they're treading on you and an awful lot of staff in
those sorts of places, I won't say all, but some of them, have gone into that
profession because they want to dominate people. They want to disempower
people. They want the power. They want to crush people. They have an attitude
that they obviously have an inferiority complex which is then made better by
working with people who are less lucky than them. And you can see it in their
eyes, the way they have such glee in their power and I'm talking about one
particular person at the moment I know and it's awful because to me they are the
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type who would make prison officers or Gestapo or traffic wardens. What the hell
are they doing in the mental health profession? To me, it's certainly not the type
of person you should be employing. As I say, things are improving, but in the old
days the places were full of people like that, looking after us. I won't say looking
after us, controlling us. And (they got a kick out of it) and they were so
disempowering ...and then a lot of people came out of places like that totally
disempowered and crushed It took me years to recover. Years and years of
trauma and therapy to get back any power in myself or belief in myself "
A further attitude described by participants I refer to as 'behavioural attributions'. This
category of attitudes relates to how patients' behaviour is attributed to illness and not to
environmental factors or to reactions to being incarcerated. I examined descriptions of
'property damage' on the ward in order to establish participants' own interpretations of
their behaviour. 'Property damage' was a term used by one of the participants (A) to
describe damage to property on the ward. I have used this term to explore how patients
vented their emotions whilst on the ward and to explore explanations of their actions.
Property damage was attributed to frustration or distress caused by poor quality care,
incarceration or over-medication on the ward. According to participants' views on the
behavioural attributions made by staff, such property damage is either attributed to
mental illness or to deviancy, without regard for the aspects of the ward regime that
might trigger such behaviour.
The explanations adopted by ward staff differed from participants' explanations in that
participants felt that ward staff were likely to attribute behaviour to mental illness rather
than to environmental factors.
S: "Because it goes back to what I was saying, if you show emotion, you know,
you are given more drugs. If you sit there and cry, that means you're severely
depressed and you're going to kill yourself in their eyes. If you sit there or stand
up and start shouting or throwing things around, that means you're a danger to
yourself and everybody else. It doesn't. It just means that you're stressed out or
whatever, you know, because you're there. But you just get more and more drugs
and as I just said, I was a zombie ...I'm sorry but you couldn't do anything. You
couldn't breathe without it being scrutinised and turned around ...any emotion you
had while you were in hospital would be used against you. It's like when you're
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arrested and they say 'anything you say will be taken in evidence and used
against you, ' that's exactly what it's like in hospital. Anything. If you sit on the
floor instead of on a chair, that's a sign that you're ill. "
d) Medication
The most common concerns about the use of medication on psychiatric wards
concerned the emphasis on medication as the sole treatment available and the use of
medication to control patients. Participants commonly referred to the use of
'acuphasing' following an incident of disruptive behaviour on the ward. Participants
also complained of the administration of high doses of medication that produced
sedation. The rationale for the use of medication was asserted to be the management of
patients, as described by the following participant:
M: "Most medication in places like KG and [forensic unit] is just tranquillisers.
All the tranquillisers do is slow people down and put them half to sleep. They are
a lot easier to deal with when they're half asleep...As I say, it's a bit like when
you're outside and you've got a problem, what do you do? You talk to
someone ...and then you both discuss it and look into things and come up with
solutions and thatjust seems a lot better way to me than here's your tablet,just sit
down there and fall half asleep. Because how does that benefit anyone? All right,
if someone's very manic and they're running round like Speedy Gonzales then
yeah, it's a good thing. But they were literally just dishing them out lilcekids in a
sweet shop. "
Participants used the term 'zombie' in relation to medication so frequently that I
introduced the term 'zombification' to describe the effects of tranquillisers on
psychiatric patients. The following participant represents the majority view on the
function of tranquillisers on psychiatric wards.
R2: "If you tried to commit suicide, you'd have that much medicine. You could
sleep for three solid days after that. There's no way - you wouldn't do anything
wrongfor three days. The nurses could relax. "
e) Regimentation
Power differentials between patients and staff were epitomised in comments alluding to
'them and us' when discussing staff attitudes. Rules and regimentation represented
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ways of enabling the staff to exert power over patients, as described by the following
participant:
D2: "Oh dreadful. Well okay, you have tea at certain hours of the day, you can
have tea at ten or coffee at three, you know, that's it. And we need to have almost
fights because of that. Because people would like to have a cup of tea or coffee
when they want it, not you're told to have it then and if you come later it's cold
and you don't even get it. I mean, il used to be horrific. So that's not very good.
You can't makeyour own tea or coffee. You know, not being able to smoke here or
there. Not being able - you know, having to go to bed when you're told to. 'You
can't do this. ' It's like a concentration camp the whole time ... "
f) Comparisons with Prison
A theme that runs through the entire discussion of psychiatric inpatient units is that they
resemble prisons and staff members are comparable to prison officers in that patients
feel that they are being punished. The comparison is not a simple one however, because
some participants felt that prison is actually more legitimate and has better facilities and
that the staff are actually friendlier in prisons in comparison with psychiatric nursing
staff. One participant (A) described a 'prisoner mentality' in which the patient puts their
head down. serves their time and endeavours to achieve an early discharge. The
following participant exemplifies the 'prisoner mentality':
Dl: "Well the first time I was very resentful because I felt I was being held
prisoner and I didn't know what to expectfrom day to day so it was all a learning
curve...But the second time, I knew what the routine was and I mew that if you
kept your mouth shut and cooperate, you get off your section quicker than if you
argue. So you just learn to go along with it. It's like being in prison really. They
say you keep your head down and just do your time and shut up and you'll get out
quicker and that's what I did. I mow people who have been there for eighteen
months because they argue too muck You say to them 'shut up. Don't answer
them back. Just do as you're told and you'll get out of here'. "
This view strongly implies that an inpatient is serving a sentence rather than being
admitted to hospital to receive treatment. The lack of freedom of movement and the
regimentation of the hospital routine also contributes to the notion of incarceration.
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The following participant contrasted prison and psychiatric units on the basis of the
latter's lack oflegitimacy.
T: "It's dreadful. It's worse than being remanded in prison custody, you know. At
least if you're remanded in prison you know it's because you've done something.
There's a reason for it.i.And I thought prison was really unpleasant because I
was physically unwell and the standard of medical care was very poor. But I
thought at least this place has legitimacy, you know. But I don't feel that about
psychiatric facilities. I feel, you know, this isn't right. The whole set up isn't right,
you know, people being sent to institutions that are called hospitals and they're
called patients whereas they're really prisoners or detainees and they're forced to
take medication. They are forced to have injections. "
Summary
It is important to attempt to understand why psychiatric hospitals were experienced as
punitive and as instilling a prisoner mentality rather than being perceived as places to
receive treatment and achieve recovery. Participants described psychiatric hospital as
failing to provide adequate treatment in the over-emphasis on medication and lack of
alternatives. They also described lack of activity, poor facilities and lack of contact with
staff. The limited treatment and lack of activity caused some participants to question the
rationale of psychiatric hospitalisation. Psychiatric hospitals were also described as
providing a non-therapeutic environment whereby the behaviour of other patients was
disturbing, as was the witnessing of suicide attempts and violence directed towards
patients either by staff in the form of control and restraint or by other patients.
Separation from family and lack of exercise and fresh air were also discussed as
indicative of the non-therapeutic environment of the psychiatric hospital.
The use of power by staff over patients was indicated by participants' discussions of the
use of physical force in involuntary admission and the use of coercion in 'voluntary'
informal admission. Seclusion and the use of medication were also indicative of
attempts by staff to control and punish patients. Rules concerning access to ordinary
opportunities on the ward (e.g. making tea, when to eat, when to retire to bed) also
indicated the exertion of power over patients.
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The fact that the 'prisoner mentality' was discussed by a number of participants and an
even greater number compared psychiatric hospital with prison would strongly suggest
that participants regarded hospitals as non-therapeutic.
In relation to Marshall's (1992) claim that state welfare enables the achievement of
social citizenship, participants' experiences of NHS psychiatric inpatient treatment
indicate that social citizenship was undermined through the provision of poor quality
care and by differentiating not only patients from staff but also patients from the public,
the latter not being subject to enforced incarceration.
One participant (02) summarised the features of improved inpatient care as offering a
place of safety with sensitive and understanding staff who are willing to spend time
with patients, listening to their difficulties, minimum short-term medication, meaningful
activities that are voluntarily engaged in and as encompassing a broad range of
therapeutic and leisure activities and transitional support on discharge. The participant
described such features as being present in a private inpatient unit she had attended.
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Medication
Medication is linked to citizenship because participants identified numerous ways in
which medication impedes engagement in ordinary activities. For instance, participants
described impediments to their ability to work, to parent and to engage in inter-personal
relationships caused by medication. Therefore, medication was found to impede roles
essential to the status of citizenship. Moreover, the role of medication in participants'
lives indicates the way in which mental health problems are conceptualised in mental
health services and how this suggests causality and directs treatment of mental health
problems.
I wanted to explore the following questions in relation to psychiatric medication:
• What is the role of medication inpsychiatric treatment?
• Had participants experienced side effects as a result of taking medication?
• What are the reasons for compliance and non-compliance with prescribed
medication?
In addition to the questions above, participants raised concerns about issues relating to
dependency and withdrawal. They also discussed the power of the user in relation to
professionals in describing their attempts to negotiate on medication. Participants also
referred to the use of coercion to enforce compliance with prescribed medication. Given
that participants considered the psychiatric system to be dominated by medication, I
wanted to discover whether participants perceived medication as useful. A number of
participants reported that their medication was effective in stabilising their illness.
Indeed, one participant indicated that her medication assists her to function in a healthy
way.
P: "I've been a voluntary patient but I've also been an involuntary patient. ljust
thought that - I'd got it into my head that I could control my condition myself
without medication, everything. And I fast learned that I couldn't ...And I realised
- and now I have no problems taking my medication because the medication's
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actually been done to suit me. I don't feel groggy. I can get on with different
things. I can do my writing and it enables me to live. It doesn't seem to have any
side effects that I can't deal with. And that's the big difference because some of
these drugs are really potent but it's been done with avery jine balance. "
A second participant referred to his medication preventing him from becoming ill and
reported no side effects:
M: " ...If it does something through chemicals or it does something because I
believe it does something, I don't know. I really don't care. As long as I take it
every day at nine and stay all right and it's got no side effects so I don't feel any
different from before I became ill. Although supposedly - because when I went
through my what's wrong with me phase, I went as far as to find out about the
drugs. These are the side effects and I haven't had one side effect from it. "
However, the majority of participants who discussed medication complained of
unpleasant side effects. The most commonly cited side effects were extreme thirst,
weight gain, involuntary muscular movements (tremors) and emotional blunting.
However, the most commonly cited side effect of all was sedation. A number of
participants also discussed tardive dyskinesia and the embarrassment caused by
involuntary movements such as uncontrollable facial movements.
E: "One of the side effects was - severe side effects- was muscle cramps in the
neck and in the tongue which made me feel like I'd swallowed my tongue. That's a
really severe one. But also like the shaking leg. You know, that's quite common
for a lot of people, But in certain high doses, which they tend to put you on when
you go into hospital, that's one of the side effects that I was a bit concerned
about ... "
Such comments prompt the question of the impact of medication on social networks
through motivating social withdrawal due to the social embarrassment caused by
medication-induced movement disorders (Estroff, 1981). One participant (M) referred
to the psychological impact of weight gain as depressing and another participant's
discussion of weight gain provides an interesting insight into the behavioural
attributions of professionals in response to patients' complaints of side effects:
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G: "Well especially weight gain initially. I used to be a thirty-four waist, now I'm
a forty-four. I used to be a forty-inch chest and now I'm a fifty-inch chest. So
weight is the problem. The doctors are always accusing your diet, not enough
exercise.
The latter comment indicates the participant's perception that medical professionals fail
to acknowledge the impact of side effects and instead blame the patient for not heeding
their physical health needs. Such assumptions allude to the lack of credibility attributed
to mental health service users who complain of physical health problems. Similarly,
another criticism cited by participants was that mental health workers fail to recognise
the impact of medication on daily functioning. The side effects of medication were
reported to interfere with employment, parenting, emotional relationships and with
cognitive functioning. The following participant exemplifies comments that were made
in relation to the iatrogenic impact of medication on employment in impeding her usual
occupation as a secretary:
J: "Ifyou're actually typing and your hands shake - I said the other week, I was
shaking. I was sitting here shaking ... Yeah, it's the side effects of lithium, plus an
anti-depressant I took. Sitting down in front of a typewriter xxx letter at home, I
couldn't hit the right keys. I've been typing all my life practically, you know. Had
a good speed And it's all completely gone because of the medication. What am I
supposed to do? Give up the medication? You know, I mean, it's catch twenty-
two. "
The participant's experiences illustrate the impact of medication on the ability to work
and thus suggest a detrimental effect on citizenship. Furthermore, the sedative effect of
medication was reported by two participants to reduce their ability to provide effective
parenting and one participant regarded the demand for compliance with mental health
services by the children and families social services department as somewhat ironic,
given the impact of medication on her ability to parent:
D1: "I can't look after my kids properly because I'm asleep all the time. I take the
girls to school and, like today, because I'm up in the morning I'll have a sleep
after you go but I'm not too bad today because my injection's tomorrow ...Next
week I can guarantee it, I'll take the girls to school, come home and sleep 'till
three 0 'clock and then go and pick them up and then go and lay on the sofa. I
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won't be able to move ...Yeah, I've got to take this for the rest of my life and I
can't have a life. It gets the kids down... "
Personal relationships were reported to be affected by the emotional blunting attributed
to medication. This meant that participants did not experience emotions so keenly and
thus medication was reported to interfere with intimate emotional relationships.
I was interested to learn whether the side effects of medication were a motivation for
non-compliance with a medication regime and, more generally, the reasons for
complying or not complying with prescribed psychiatric medications. Participants
produced more reasons for complying with medication than for not complying.
However, the two main reasons cited for not complying with medication were rejection
of illness and thus a belief that medication was not necessary and the unpleasant side
effects of medications. The most frequently cited reasons for complying with prescribed
medications encompassed the unpleasant effects of withdrawal from medication,
physical and psychological dependency on medication, lack of information on side
effects and coercion by professionals. Participants also discussed compliance as being
due to fear of hospitalisation, fear of relapse in illness and the social unacceptability of
illness. Therefore, compliance was not necessarily equated with positive appraisals of
medication.
Participants described compliance with medication as being due to coercion by mental
health professionals. A number of participants referred to the use of depot medications
(intra-muscular injections) as a way of enforcing compliance with a medication regime.
P: "I kept saying 'I want to come off it. ' I kept saying 'no, , and they gave me it by
injection because I refused to take it. And if I didn't turn up for the injection,
they'd come to my home andfind me, wherever I was and they made me take it. I
lost seven years of my life through that. "
These comments suggest lack of autonomy to refuse treatment in the community, thus
casting doubt on the voluntariness of compliance. The participant (0) whose
psychiatrist denied the possible side effect of weight gain indicated a possible reluctance
by professionals to acknowledge the side effects of medication. Another participant
described the attitude of professionals towards non-compliance:
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SI: "Oh I think they're all for taking the medication and if you don't take it, it's
irrational. I mean, I've had them come to my house and section me at my house.
The actual consultant visited me in my house. J as well I think, because I didn't
take my medication and I was very unwell. "
The latter comment implies that refusal to take medication caused the participant to
become unwell. However, mental health professionals' attitudes towards compliance
with medication indicate a commitment to the biomedical approach to mental health
problems. Two participants described a sense of regret that they had not complied with
their medication, attributing their ill health to absence of medication, although a number
of participants attributed illness to withdrawal from medication. Therefore, it may be
difficult to determine whether absence of medication causes a recurrence of illness or
whether ill health is due to the adverse effects of withdrawal of medication. The
following participant summarises the common attributions made by participants of non-
compliance with prescribed medication:
D2: "Yeah, many times I stopped taking my medication. A number of reasons.
Sometimes because I felt I didn't need it. Sometimes I felt half my personality was
lost with it and that was robbing me of that side of me. I felt very numb at times.
Sometimes it was because I really didn't believe I actually needed medication
because I was actually ill and I didn't think - I couldn't rationalise it at all. Other
times, in the early days, I actually felt I should cure myself without medication
and other times it was because I was trying to get pregnant and one of the worst
things was I was put on medication that was actually making me infertile for many
years and I didn't know it and it was only a blood test that showed it. And that
happened three times because each time I went on a different medication, the
same thing would happen. So that I was furious about, that I was being made
infertile by the stuff they were giving me even though they knew I was trying to get
pregnant. And they didn't tell me. They say now they didn't know but I think they
should have known it's a side effect. But every time I stopped the medication, I
became ill and ended up being sectioned and back in and then having to start all
over again. It was a rough ride really. It was like a roller coaster for the last ten
years. My view now on medication is that yes, it helps me. I don't try to let it
control my life. I like to make sure it's monitored so I'm not over-medicated ... "
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As stated previously, lack of information was cited as a possible reason for compliance
with medication. I was interested more generally in whether professionals were
forthcoming with information on specific medications and potential side effects. The
question is also related to the willingness of professionals to negotiate with users on
medication regimes. Generally, participants complained that professionals are reluctant
to provide information on medication unprompted and a number of participants reported
that they obtained information on medication from fellow service users. Two
participants argued that professionals are unwilling to volunteer information on
medication due to the expectation that such information would increase non-
compliance. Another participant related lack of information on medication to users'
decisions to self-medicate:
PJ: "Well you're not really given any information on medication, are you? ...We
do this to a certain extent, we gather information so that if,for example, if I start
to go high, then we can think well what we '/I do then is we '1/ increase the mood
stabiliser or something and decrease the anti-depressant. But we '/I do that
ourselves because it's so difficult to get that from the psychiatrist. By the time
you've spoken to the CPN who then speaks to thepsychiatrist, who then either has
to see you or not, by the time aI/ that's happened, your mood is out of control. So
people end up self-medicating and the psychiatrists, quite understandably, hate
that. They don't want their patients to self-medicate but they create that for
themselves. "
Nevertheless, three participants cited examples of successful negotiation with their
psychiatrists, although they attributed this to particular characteristics of individual
psychiatrists and one participant made the point that his current psychiatrist, who he
successfully negotiates with, may move on to a job elsewhere and be replaced by a less
amenable psychiatrist.
E: "But when you start to negotiate with them, it's like you're encroaching into
the psychiatrist's area because they know best. You're not supposed to have the
insight or knowledge, back then, to challenge or question what was being done. "
A further reason for compliance with medication was cited as a desire to avoid the
unpleasant effects of withdrawal from medication, as the following participant explains:
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R2: "...Also I think to myself I would stop taking these tablets but the withdrawal
is too bad. That's another reason why I have to keep taking them. I have
diazepam, Valium. You try and get off that easily. There's no way. Otherwise, I'd
stop taking them. "
One participant indicated the confusion some psychiatrists make between the effects of
withdrawal from medication and relapse in illness. She also introduces the issue of
physical dependency on medication.
J: "Well because the thing is if you come off anything like lithium, sometimes you
can have a breakdown through a rebound effect and I think that's probably what
has happened to me in the last three times. I've had a rebound breakdown. But the
psychiatrist takes it as a breakdown...Well stopping something like lithium and
when it comes out of your system, you're so dependent on it, you get a rebound
from that, so I've been told. And the Manic Depression Fellowship stand by this.
They say you get rebound breakdowns. But he took it as a relapse and you know,
they don't really care which it is, you're in hospital, you've got to have the
medication and now I'm afraid to come off it in case I start going round the house
and knocking onpeople's doors ... "
Finally, several participants expressed concern about the potentially adverse long-term
effects of medication, as one participant (R2) stated, "you don't know what they're
doing to your insides".
Summary
Some participants stated that their medication is useful in stabilising their illness.
However, participants complained of side effects, some of which severely impede
everyday functioning and fulfilment of important citizenship roles. Participants also
complained of lack of information on medication from professionals and reluctance of
professionals to negotiate with users. Side effects were cited as a major reason for
refusing prescribed medication. Participants also discussed dependency and the
problems of withdrawal in relation to medication. The power differentials between
service users and professionals were demonstrated by coercive responses to medication
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refusal and reluctance by some medical professionals to negotiate with users over
medication or to provide basic information on side effects.
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Parenting
At the time of the study, five of the participants were parents (including two in a same
sex partnership), with eight children between them. Three of the five parents had been
detained in hospital under the Mental Health Act 1983 and six of the children had been
subject to care proceedings by the local authority children and families department.
Given Sayce's (1999) assertion that parenting is a citizenship right, I wanted to learn
about participants' experiences of the impact ofa mental health problem on parenting. It
is important to examine parenting by people with mental health problems because
research literature on such parenting is almost wholly negative, prompting the question
of whether such a bias is reflected in professional practice. I also wanted to discover the
impact of mental health services on parenting and family life. Finally, I asked
participants about the type of intervention that would support parenting, if anything.
The impact of mental health problems on parenting
Participants identified specific difficulties they had experienced in relation to parenting
with a mental health problem. Participants discussed difficulties caused by mood
swings, sleep deprivation and self-neglect. I have already examined the impact of
medication on parenting in the chapter that discussed medication. Participants also
discussed the stigma of having a mental health problem and the impact of stigma on the
child, especially once the child attends school. Two participants were particularly
concerned by the prospect of teachers' knowledge of the parent's mental health problem
and the potential bullying of the child by classmates. However, of greater concern was
the stigma and suspicion caused by teachers' knowledge of at risk registration of
participants' children.
One participant (D2) identified the sleep deprivation associated with having a small
baby as being a potential trigger for poor mental health. She also identified mood
swings as possibly causing confusion in her child. Two participants identified the
problem of the child blaming themselves for the mother's poor mental health, as
described by the following participant:
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D2: "...1think 1suppose the difference for me would be the actual changes in the
person of me, the moods, that he might find difficult to live with or understand.
And children often blame themselves and that's what would worry me is that he
might end up thinking that it was because of him that 1was like that and 1hope
when he's older to actually make it clear to him that it's not. 1hope to explain
things so that he understands... "
Four of the parents expressed fear that stigma might be experienced by the child as a
result of having a parent with a mental health problem. One participant mused on how
she would explain their stay in a mother and baby unit to her child and commented:
D2: "...Ifind it strange that you have to think like this because, as I said, ifit was
physical, people wouldn't have this guilt or this monster behind them about what
do 1say? .. "
It is interesting that the participant reiterates the frequently cited distinction between
physical and mental ill health in her concern about how to explain her illness to her
child. This is another aspect of the differentiation of people who use mental health
services in that mental illness is experienced as stigmatising and as difficult to explain
to others, the implication being that this is not the case in relation to physical illness.
However, participants made a greater number of comments concerning the positive
impact of parenting on mental health. Participants discussed the motivation to recover
from an episode of illness, the structure and distraction provided by parenting and the
engagement of problem-solving abilities.
DI: "...when you've got kids, you've got something to pick yourself up for and
make an effort but without children, I would imagine it's much easier to give up
really. "
D2: "...It always puts morepressure on as well because it's very tiring but on the
one hand, it's actually something for me to live for and to lceepgoing for and
something else to think of all the time. "
Participants also regarded mental health problems as performing an educative role in
facilitating greater emotional awareness in their children:
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S: "...it can have a little bit of a positive effect because I think there's boys
especially, a big thing, men don't hardly show their emotions. It's all like 'I'm a
man, I don't do that sort of thing, that's woman's stuff. But I think in some sort of
way, it can have a positive effect by making them understand a bit more like if it's
not so threatening as it's taking the person you love awayfrom you. I think it can
help in the sense that life isn't rosy is it? Life isn't rosy...and I don't think we
should shut ourfeelings away in the closet. "
The impact of intervention on parenting
Three of the five parents in the study (the same three as had been detained under the
Mental Health Act 1983) had experienced the intervention of the Local Authority
Children and Families Department in care proceedings made in relation to their
children. Participants spoke of how they were expected by both statutory mental health
services and children and families departments to prove the adequacy of their parenting.
However, such participants were wholly critical of the conduct of social workers in
conducting investigations and performing their duties in relation to the children
involved. Participants spoke of the stress associated with the threat of removal of their
child(ren) and of the scrutiny involved in proving their ability to provide adequate
parenting. Social services' intervention was perceived as aggressive and threatening and
thus was experienced very negatively. Personal emotional responses were described as
encompassing anger, fear, depression and thoughts of escape from the process:
D2: "Theyjust assumed that because I had manic depression that I couldn't cope
being a mother ...The heavy-handedness of being on an at-risk register is like
making me into a criminal ... "
One participant (D1) described how her children were removed from school, without
warning, during a child protection investigation and another participant (S) described
how children and families social workers coerced her husband into divorcing her
following an assessment that she might have posed a threat to her child. A third parent
(D2), who had no other children, experienced her child being placed on the child
protection register before he was even born, suggesting that such decisions may be
made without tangible evidence of harm. Moreover, the children and families social
services department suggested that the participant's husband relinquish his employment
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in order to demonstrate his commitment to parenting, indicating unrealistic expectations
held by professionals. As just mentioned, the husband of another participant was
reportedly persuaded to divorce his wife in order to distance himself from her.
Therefore, fathers were also disadvantaged by social services involvement. The parents
in the study emphasised the lack of evidence to suggest that they would harm their
children and described these instances to convey the overwhelming power exerted over
families by social service departments.
Furthermore, the participants who had come to the attention of the social services
department complained that assessments of parenting were conducted out of context and
were pre-judged on the basis of assumptions that parents with a mental health problem
are incapable of providing adequate parenting to their children. Participants felt that
judgements were made in the absence of tangible evidence of parenting and that there
was a lack of a balanced view of the abilities of people with mental health problems to
parent, as exemplified in the following comments:
D2: " ...So there is a very negative view of it [mental ill health] and it's very much
looking at the bad things and what they failed I felt to do was look at the amount
of people out there with mental illness who do succeed in bringing up babies and
children and do a fair job. And you can do a bad job even without suffering
mental illness, you know, and that's what's shocking is that, you know, it used to
make me quite angry because I knew that if I had MS or diabetes or cancer, I'd be
given all the support social services could give and you know, it would all be very
understanding. But because it's a mental illness, it's 'Doh, the damage you're
going to do '... "
The participant illustrates two sources of concern expressed by parents in the study;
firstly the view that parents with mental health problems attract a disproportionate
amount of attention, especially in relation to people who pose a threat to their children
or harm their children without action being taken to protect those children. The case of
Victoria Climbie was frequently cited. This observation strongly suggests that childcare
professionals discriminate against parents with mental health problems by demanding
higher standards of care than those applied to parents without mental health problems
(cf. Sayee, 1999). Secondly, the comments represent a commonly held view that mental
health discrimination is evident when comparisons with physical illness are made.
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A further source of dissatisfaction expressed by the parents in the study involved the
impact of mental health services in causing separation of the parent from their children.
Two participants explained how crisis intervention involved removing the parent with
the mental health problem from the home and that this would have increased the stress
of the situation and would have elicited feelings of failure in the parent in response to
possible perceptions that the parent could not cope at home, thus suggesting the
negation of the needs of parents in mental health services (Parker, 1999). For another
participant, the impact of hospitalisation meant significant periods of time separated
from her child and husband. It meant that she missed several of her child's formative
years.
S: HI can't figure it out at all. Sometimes now I think I can't handle it because my
son was six years old when I went away. All right, I saw him practically every
day, I mean, you can't call a twenty minute visit and I'm sat there like a zombie
but - so basically Imight as well not seen him at all, because it didn't really sink
in. But he was six and when he came back, he'd been here a year and a couple of
months, so it's not very long, and he was eleven when he came back. That's five
years later and I've changed, he's definitely changed. Imean, he was a six year-
old boy. Totally different. I don't dislike him being twelve as he is now, but he was
my little boy. And I've missed five years of that and he's missed five years of
me...
The participant's comments indicate a fundamental impact of mental health service
intervention in that it denies the individual the role of parent. Numerous participants
who cited access to family life as a primary defining characteristic of citizenship,
including the opportunity to parent, indicated the importance of the parenting role. The
expectations of mental health professionals exerted a significant impact on parenting
because attitudes determine the type of intervention offered to parents. One participant
was hospitalised in a mother and baby unit and encountered both pessimistic and
deterministic attitudes from unit staff:
D2: "Even at the mother and baby unit, the majority of staff came from that line,
that most of us suffering from long-term mental health problems would never be
able to cope and even at the end of it, because they said when I left there that they
were concerned about my ability to cope long-term. Even though I was better and
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happy coping, they still had to put that in at the end They didn't think I could
cope. And there were certain ones like the mothers with schizophrenia that would
definitely not be allowed to take their child home unless they had a partner. And
there were other people who were assessed, passed the assessment and still not
allowed to take the child home because they'd had a bad upbringing and they did
say because of my upbringing I wouldn't be a suitable mother. "
The picture that emerged from this participant was that single mothers ran a high risk of
losing their babies altogether. However. the participant acknowledged that being a
single parent is objectively more difficult if the parent has a mental health problem and
therefore that such attitudes may not simply reflect negative attitudes towards single
parents. Nevertheless. one participant (Dl) indicated that children and families social
workers were judgemental about the fact that different men had fathered her children.
The participant (D2) who experienced a mother and baby unit also described an incident
of control and restraint being used against her and also being so heavily medicated that
she was even unable to carry her baby. Mental health services also exerted a negative
impact on her parenting ability by prescribing medication that prevented conception.
The participant also described professionals' attitudes towards her attempting to
conceive:
D2: "Oh well, my CPN at the time was not supportive and said ' why don't you
get a dog instead? ' And after that 1didn't want to work with him. Yes, he was not
understanding. And in fact, I think a lot of them didn't dare voice their
opinion ...Because I think they would admit that that's not their right to say I can
and can't have a child But I think they would have felt that because of the
difficulties involved that it would actually not be advisable. "
Such attitudes indicate the importance of considering whether parenting is a citizenship
right that should be upheld with other fundamental rights. Other participants
complained of professionals' attitudes to parenting that reflect attitudes of the broader
population. A same sex couple experienced homophobic attitudes from professionals
that were manifested by the lack of recognition of them as parents in a legitimate family
unit.
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P2: "And they're not interested I mean, I'm sure you know different families do
things in different ways and they're not in the least bit interested in finding out
what - how you manage your family life because they will not see us as a family.
So they needn't find out whether [partnerJ has equal parenting rights as I do or
whether the children want her to parent them. Because actually that was their
choice. So - but nobody's ever asked those questions or found that out so they
never have to look at that. "
The participants explained that such attitudes are driven by the way in which
professional practice is informed by social norms, such as assumptions concerning
legitimate family structures, and rejection of alternative family structures. The
participants felt that professionals pathologised their lesbian relationship by attributing
it as a cause of one partner's mental health problems. Mental health professionals also
failed to recognise the legitimacy of the participants' relationship by failing to disclose
information to the patient's partner; the participants found that heterosexual couples did
not share this experience, as verified by speaking to heterosexual service users. In
addition, mental health workers subjected the participants to intrusive questioning about
their sexuality; again, heterosexual couples did not share this experience. Homophobic
professional attitudes illustrate the importance of the broader issue of whether
citizenship should be a universalistic or particularistic concept, the latter involving
rights that uphold the citizenship status of marginalised groups (Young, 1995).
In summary, participants described professionals' attitudes that clearly demonstrate a
reluctance to acknowledge that people with mental health problems might have a right
to parent and are able to fulfil the parental role very successfully. Participants reported
pessimistic and deterministic attitudes towards parenting with a mental health problem.
In addition, professionals were reported to express negative attitudes that were possibly
influenced by homophobic prejudice and judgemental attitudes towards single parents.
Moreover, services that separate the parent from their child may be counterproductive
and certainly all of the parents in the study stated that separation from their families was
or would have been extremely damaging.
Participants' experiences of parenting were characterised as involving loss (cf. Phillips
and Hugman, 1990). For instance, one participant (8) described her loss of authority as
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a parent whilst her child was subject to substitute care. She also described loss due to
separation from her child during psychiatric hospitalisation. Loss was also described in
terms of impediments to parenting caused by medication-induced sedation (e.g. 01).
What kind of inten'ention would facilitate parenting?
I asked participants what kind of support would have helped them parent during their
mental health difficulties. The consensus view was that practical support at home would
have been the most useful form of intervention whereby participants' main
dissatisfaction in this respect was that services do not endeavour to support people
within the family unit. In addition, one participant stated that the recognition of the
impact of social circumstances on mental health would have facilitated a more useful
view of the parent's difficulties. The participant (01) argued that help in preventing the
loss of her home and the provision of day care for her children so she could concentrate
on her social circumstances would have been particularly helpful. However, the
participant was hospitalised and lost both her home and residence of her children in part
as a result of mental health service intervention. Another participant (02) reiterated the
usefulness of practical help such as brief respite from her parenting responsibilities
during the day in order to enable her to rest. She also emphasised the need for assistance
to be non-coercive. Participants experienced the intervention of the children and
families department to be coercive and as undermining parents' ability to parent.
Participants also argued that mental health intervention that focuses on preventing
mental illness would have been useful.
In summary, participants preferred intervention that enabled them to remain at home
and within the family unit and they valued strategies that emphasise the prevention of
the escalation of problems that can exert an adverse effect on mental health and ability
to parent.
Summary
The fmdings demonstrate that parents with mental health problems are confronted with
difficulties but this is quite distinct from claiming that poor mental health inevitably
undermines parenting, as suggested by much of the research literature on this subject.
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Part Two: Civil Citizenship
Civil citizenship, in Marshall's (1992) model, encompasses freedom of speech and
thought, ownership of property and the right to justice. The research findings examine
civil citizenship with specific reference to the right to justice following hospital
detention under the Mental Health Act 1983 through the operation of hospital
managers' hearings and mental health review tribunals. Under civil citizenship, the
individual is entitled to protection from arbitrary intervention by the state (Held. 1991).
Due process is particularly important in relation to people detained under the Mental
Health Act 1983 because detention is based arguably on subjective judgements of
mental dysfunction and dangerousness and thus such judgements may be erroneous or
subject to abuse (see racism in the mental health system: Keating,2004).
I examined participants' experiences of the Mental Health Act 1983 in relation to
knowledge of their rights under the Act whilst detained patients. Therefore. civil
citizenship is examined bearing the following questions in mind:
• Are mental health review tribunals an effective route to due process?"
• Did participants understand their rights under the Mental Health Act 1983?
The fundamental question in relation to the civil citizenship of people who use mental
health services is whether they enjoy equal access to legal systems and an equality of
representation in relation to legal institutions and processes.
Mental Health Review Tribunals
Although one participant stated that mental health review tribunals are an important
attempt to protect the civil rights of detained patients. a number of participants indicated
lack of confidence in the current tribunal system. Three participants regarded the
tribunal process as futile in that the panel appeared to have made their decision prior to
4 Due process refers to a fair bearing in a formal legal context.
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meeting the patient. I asked the following participant if she had ever appealed against
her hospital detentions:
Dl: HI did the first time. When I went in the first time, I appealed and I learned
that was a complete waste of time. I did the Managers' appeal and the hospital,
the Board, and they'd made their minds up anyway. They weren't going to back
down. So the second time I went in, I didn't bother ...The third time, I didn't
bother appealing because I know what to do. If I went back in there now I
wouldn't argue with them. I would just let them do what they've got to do and get
out of there again. "
Participants indicated the problem of low discharge rates (cf. Spencer, 1989) and their
consequent lack of confidence in the tribunal system. I asked the following participant
about the degree of knowledge a detained patient has about their rights:
D2: "Well in the past, I didn't. I didn't know anything and consequently I
remember once having a tribunal and thefirst time it happened I actually sort of
refused to go in at the last minute because I thought there was no point. I thought
they think I'm mad so I didn't go in. And another time I did have a tribunal and I
thought I presented a very good case but they still didn't agree with me. So what's
the point of these tribunals? In fact I've heard of only about two people ever get
off a tribunal but I certainly now know my rights much more and would call an
advocate just like that. Just because of having an advocate there means they have
to do it by the book and they have to make sure and it does change their attitudes
when they know you have an advocate in your ward round. It's like oh boy, no
messing with me. "
Participants described independent mental health advocacy in positive terms as enabling
service users to realise their rights by providing assistance in representing the user's
views to mental health professionals.
Participants identified a number of barriers to due process. One participant (02) felt that
discharge rates from tribunals may be low due to the emphasis on the risk the patient
might pose to themselves or others and the resultant desire of professionals to avoid
litigation. She also felt that the composition of panels discourages comprehension of the
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patient's situation whereby she felt that a user on tribunal panels would provide greater
balance in panel decision-making. On further probing, the participant commented:
D2: "Ooh I think without them [tribunals] would be worse. I think we definitely
need something like that. But what I would like to see is a user on them, on the
panel. I would like to see that. Somebody who sees it from their side because
you're talking to people who are a) they're all professionals, b) mainly retired, c)
law-abiding, et cetera. So they all come from that angle but nobody is there on
that tribunal seeing it from your side. You know, when you have a jury, at least
you have twelve people from different ... "
The participant's assumption is that the presence of people with mental health problems
on tribunal panels would introduce a greater balance in comparison with the relatively
homogenous composition of panels, as they are currently constituted. It is interesting
that the participant compares the mental health review tribunal with trial by jury, thus
indicating the importance of the concept of due process. Another participant (T)
expressed dissatisfaction with the influence of professionals' reports on decision-
making and the inability of the patient to respond to such reports because reports in his
case had not been made available to him. His comments indicated the power imbalance
between professionals and patients in the tribunal process and in the mental health
system in general. They also reiterate Peay's (1989) finding that tribunals endorse
mental health professionals' recommendations in a large majority of cases.
Another barrier to the realisation of due process in tribunals was the perceived
inadequacy of legal representation available to detained patients. Two participants
commented that they had never met their legal representatives prior to the hearing and
therefore the solicitors had minimal knowledge of their clients. Two additional
participants expressed concern about their suspicion that a particular legal firm held a
monopoly over legal representation at mental health review tribunals and the comments
made by a fifth participant appeared to suggest that detained patients are steered in the
direction of a specific legal firm. She also confirmed the complaint that legal
representatives are not always familiar with their clients' cases. I asked her if she had
legal representation at a hearing.
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Dl: "I did at the - whichever one they did in the hospital, I did It was the
solicitor that they recommend for all the patients in there. So I didn't know him
from Adam. "
Finally, practical obstacles to due process were cited in that the impact of illness and
medication impair the patient's ability to follow the procedures required for making an
appeal against one's detention and appearing in front of a tribunal.
R2: "It was hardfor me because I was so unwell really, actually to take it in. For
a start, I had to be helped to write a letter to them by a nurse because I was too
drugged up to write I think She wrote it and I signed it. And there they were
talking to me, it was sort of going over me. I wasn't sort of taking it in that
well ... "
The participant's comments confirm the finding that obstacles such as the impact of
medication and lack of access to writing materials impede appeals under Section 2 of
the Mental Health Act 1983 (Bradley, Marshall and Oath, 1995), although at least the
participant was assisted by staff in making an appeal, indicating recognition by staff of
the basic right to appeal against compulsory detention under the Act.
The Mental Health Act 1983
A number of participants commented that they lacked knowledge of their rights under
the Mental Health Act 1983 during their hospital detentions. The consensus view was
that patients are provided with cursory written details of the Mental Health Act 1983
and the implications of their detention are not explained. Therefore, it appeared that the
provision of such information was merely a paper exercise that held little meaning for
participants. The ability to comprehend the information provided may have been
impaired by illness or medication, as the following participant indicates.
S: "Well I didn't really understand it [being sectioned] at the time. I mean, I was
given a leaflet and it said you're being held against your will, ' whatever it said,
for a certain amount of time. 'Ifyou want to appeal, blah, blah, blah. ' So I didn't.
Where I was so drugged up I didn't really take too much notice of it. But then I
suppose, later on, when it became apparent that I wasn't actually getting out of
the place, because I'd been sectioned, that was awful. That I'd had everything
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taken awayfrom me, you know. Myfreedom, because when I was voluntary - that
makes me laugh as well because you're either voluntary or you're sectioned and
when you're voluntary, to me it says that you can ask to leave or whatever but
then they still stop you and then if you persist, they section you so you can't be
one or the other, you're practically both mixed together. "
Therefore, the participant reiterated the cynicism expressed towards informal status that
was explored in the section on hospital treatment. In addition, numerous participants
related very similar views on lack of information provided and the impact of
compulsory detention, thus reiterating the importance of due process as a fundamental
civil right.
Summary
Mental health review tribunals were generally regarded as a futile exercise. given the
low discharge rate. Such low levels of discharge were attributed to the composition of
tribunal panels, the influence of professionals' recommendations, poor legal
representation and conservative approaches to risk management. The low discharge
rates reported in the current research are confirmed by the Mental Health Act
Commission (2005) which found a discharge rate of only 10% in the period 2000-04,
although it was even lower in a study reported by Perkins (2003a), with only 5 out of 61
tribunals ordering a discharge.
In addition, two participants described practical obstacles to the appeal process,
specifically in relation to the effects of illness or medication. Participants were generally
dissatisfied with their legal representation, citing the monopoly of a legal firm and lack
of knowledge of the patient. Participants also commented on their lack of knowledge of
their rights under the Mental Health Act 1983 and did not find the patient literature
particularly helpful in reaching an appropriate level of understanding of their status as
detained patients. A number of participants indicated the usefulness of an independent
advocacy service in ensuring effective representation inmeetings and tribunal hearings.
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Finally, several participants indicated their opposition to the proposed changes to the
current Mental Health Act in the belief that such changes will further erode service
users' civil liberties. Such views will be examined in the following section.
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Part Three: Political Citizenship
Mental Health Policy
Political citizenship refers to political participation and influence over political decision-
making. Participation is not restricted to formal participation such as standing for public
office or voting because political citizenship has been examined in terms of user
involvement as an act of political citizenship (Lister, 1998). However, user involvement
is examined in the section that explores social citizenship because participants primarily
discussed user involvement in relation to service participation rather than political
participation. More specifically, political citizenship of mental health service users was
examined in relation to their influence on mental health policy.
A number of key questions arose in relation to mental health policy under the current
Labour government.
• How did participants respond to New Labour mental health policies?
• What are the factors that influence mental health policy?
• Do users of mental health services have the opportunity to wield political
power?
• What is the Labour government doing to tackle stigma and discrimination?
How did participants respond to New Labour mental health policies?
Three major New Labour initiatives are examined in this section, encompassing
community treatment orders (DoH, 1999b)5, assertive outreach (DoH, 1998) and the
control of 'dangerous' people with personality disorders (DoH, 1999b). I was interested
to examine whether participants welcomed such initiatives as a way of dealing with risk
in the community or whether they regarded the initiatives as unacceptable infringements
of individuals' liberties. Generally, participants possessed little knowledge of
5 The text refers to community treatment orders because this was the title of the proposals at the time of
the research; they were later re-titled mental health orders.
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community treatment orders. However, these were a new initiative at the time of the
study and it was obvious that information about them had not spread to all areas
involved in the study. In general, participants outside of the south east of England held
greater knowledge of mental health policies than participants located in the southeast.
Nevertheless, some participants had sufficient knowledge to express opinions on
community treatment orders. The consensus expressed by participants was that
community treatment orders represented an unacceptable threat to service users' civil
liberties and participants expressed strong disapproval of them. Only two participants
were willing to express positive appraisals of the policy, although they expressed
ambivalence rather than outright approval.
A: "So yeah, I mean, I think what people don't want and I think professionals and
users don't want the riot squad to be going round houses sort of pinning people
down and injecting them and then moving on to the next one, you know. But if the
community treatment order is going to mean that kind of thing then I don't think
anyone would expect it to work But if it's going to be something that might
possibly save someone from a worse history and it might bring them to their
senses, I think it's worth trying ... "
One participant discussed community treatment orders in relation to perceptions of, or
actual risk posed by mental health service users in the community.
PI: "Well I think that's a very difficult one really. You know, part of me thinks
everyone has a right to say whether they want to be treated or not. That should be
a basic human right. But then if you look at it from their effect on other people,
then that's something quite different isn't it? Because as we've said, for many
people the result of the withdrawal of their drugs is aggressive behaviour. And for
some, that's more aggressive than others. Some people could be quite a danger
without their treatment. So it's like in one way I don't agree with it but then if
there was a schizophrenic living next door to me and our two children and they
then refused to take their drugs and they became very violent and abusive, I
wouldn't want them living next door to me. "
The participant's comments prompt the question of whether aggressive behaviour is due
to illness or due to the effects of withdrawal from medication in the process of refusal to
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take medication. However, the participant's partner disagreed by emphasising the
coercive nature of the orders.
P2: "Ifeel terrified by the whole prospect. Ijust hate the idea of it. It's almost like
the mind police. You know, strolling the streets, looking for somebody
misbehaving and whipping them into a clinic, jabbing them full of stuff and then
sending them out again. It's terrible. "
Several participants objected to the emphasis on medication in the proposed community
treatment orders. The following participant made such an objection primarily on the
grounds of the ineffectiveness of medication:
T: "I think it's abominable, I really do, because I mean, this idea that drugs are
some kind of magic bullet, like some kind of panacea. I mean, if the Government
thinks that people will stop acting aggressively and disruptively if they are made
to have an injection. it's completely untrue because people will just get angry.
And you can be medicated and you can still be angry. You can still be disturbed. I
mean, if there's a reason for it - because social workers and professionals, they
try to say that I've been angry and disruptive because I haven't been taking my
medication regularly but the thing is, people can take their medication regularly
and they can still be disturbed and they can still be angry. And people are going
to be angry because if they think that they're in the community and they're going
to beforced by law to have an injection, it won't work. "
Moreover, one participant (E) argued that community treatment orders are based on a
belief in psychiatry that service users should take medication for the rest of their lives
and on the assumption that non-compliance with medication is irrational. This
demonstrates the influence of medical hegemony on Government policy (see also
Pilgrim and Waldron, 1998; Mulvany, 2000). On the contrary, E asserted that non-
compliance is rational due to some particularly unpleasant side effects and due to the
adverse impact of medication on everyday functioning.
Many participants expressed the view that community treatment orders would be
unworkable, cited as a less frequently discussed aspect of legislative reform (Beresford
and Croft, 2001). The main reasons postulated for the difficulty in enforcing the orders
were professional reluctance and insufficient numbers of professionals to enforce the
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orders. However, many participants also thought that the orders would cause people to
avoid services in order to avoid the coercion inherent in the orders. This is suggested to
be a likely response of users to new mental health legislation (Beresford and Croft,
2001). The following participant represents the views of many participants:
D2: "Where are they going to provide the stafffor this? That'll need a doctor, a
social worker and somebody else to do that. I mean, you would have to go
constantly out and do that...I think it's going to make matters worse and I think
it's unworkable, yeah. I think it is because sadly it can put people against the
health service when people try so hard and to work alongside instead of working
against. It's the total opposite of what people want who are in the service and it's
the total opposite to what I think a lot of professionals want. I don't think it will
work I think it's going to create a nightmare and headaches, I suppose if they
said if you don't take your medication we will section you and bring you in, that
may have a difference if that's what they intend But if theyjust intend to grab you
andjab you and throw you back at your home, I don't know. Who can tell? "
Another participant (M) expressed the view that community treatment orders would be
unworkable because of the sheer physical difficulty of medicating a person against their
will given that the orders would not be enforced in an environment as secure as a
psychiatric inpatient unit. Many participants objected to community treatment orders on
the grounds that they involve the removal of the right to refuse medication in the
community. This prospect was thought to be sufficiently dire by one participant that it
would drive service users to adopting a nomadic lifestyle in order to evade capture by
mental health services:
D2: "Yes, I thought they couldn't make me swallow the tablets because I'm
renowned for stopping them but they did put me on injectionsfor a long time and
you know, I thought you know, with compulsory orders I thought this would be
awful because again, it's a right that's taken away, your right to refuse it if you're
in the community. I don't see how they're going to be able to do it because do you
know what would happen? I can see this happening actually ((laughs)), it's not
funny, it's actually very serious. If they pursued people okay, say schizophrenics,
with injections in the community, what are they going to do? Run away. Leave.
They are not going to stay in one place. They'l/ up and off they go. They'l/ be
homeless. (Running) homeless people. Moving on, moving on, never receiving the
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right treatment and they'/I just get ill. So instead of having what a lot of people
around here I know are trying to do, is give continuity to people with
schizophrenia so they have continuous care bypeople they know in the community
and the right medication, constantly looked after in that sense and kept well, it
will drive people - I can't believe they haven't thought of that. I mean, how will
they stop that? How can they stop it? You can't. What will you do? Go and find
them, send all the police out? The police are going to be ever so busy in this
country. "
In summary, all but two of the participants who felt sufficiently confident to express an
opinion were cynical about the proposed community treatment orders. Many
participants felt that their introduction would be impeded by practical difficulties and
would cause users to avoid services. Some participants also objected to the implication
of the orders for users' civil liberties because they remove the right to refuse treatment
outside of inpatient settings.
Assertive outreach was a similarly contentious Government initiative and similar
objections were raised against it. Participants felt that assertive outreach services were
based on coercion and would similarly drive users to avoid services. One participant
(D2) questioned the relevance of assertive outreach to her area, stating that it may be
more appropriate for large urban areas such as London in which service users may live
more disrupted and disadvantaged lifestyles. The participant also indicated the difficulty
in enforcing engagement:
D2: "...So I don't know about this assertive outreach. Sadly, I think it's made up
by somebody who hasn't a bloody clue as to what goes on al/ around or what it's
like to be severely mentally ill. Either that, or they haven't listened because I think
the people I know who've been like that I don't think they'd respond in the way
they'd want them to. I think they're gonna make tracks and run away and be
obscure and go to different towns ...But if they are going to be threatened by
compulsory medication or treatment orders or whatever and they'1/ have assertive
outreach chasing after them, it's going to ruin everything that's been built up. It
really is. And itjust seems stupid to waste resources when what they really should
be doing is building stronger community services ...So I don't think assertive
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outreach is going to work. I'm certainly not sure about this community treatment.
I'm glad I'm not in the service. I wouldn't like to have to do it. "
In relation to the legislation introduced to deal with reputedly dangerous people with
personality disorder in the community, participants expressed concern over the civil
liberties implications of preventative detention. Objections were also similar to the
objections to community treatment orders and assertive outreach in that individuals
affected by the legislation were anticipated to avoid services and there would be
professional reluctance to enforce the legislation. The following participant summarises
this view but also indicated the influence of populism on the construction of mental
health policy and the civil liberties implications of the notion of treatability:
D2: "i : I mean, its [the Government] happy to keep the general public happy but
we'll just pay token to service users to keep them happy too. I mean, there has
been an outcry about all these secure units because they're going to have to lock
people up before they've even done anything. And do you know what that's going
to do? It's going to drive people underground. People aren't going to want help.
They wouldn't dare go for help in case they get branded as personality disorder.
If they get branded they'll probably be thrown in with the key thrown away. So
what is going to happen is no one will go to their GP, their psychiatrist, anyone,
for help ... "
The same participant raised objections to the civil liberties implications of the notion of
treatability in relation to personality disorder:
D2: .....Because ifyou 've not treated them and they're not treatable, how can you
ever release them because you can never say they're well again? Well yeah, I
mean, there's two things about that I think are really quite sad in a way is thefact
that he [Michael Stone] was turned away. Now I don't believe anything's not
treatable anyway. I don't believe that. I believe that you just perhaps treat people
with personality disorders in a different way. And maybe they don't respond to
drugs, maybe that's true ...I would suspect that quite a few professionals will be
wary of diagnosing them because once you've diagnosed them, that's it, they're
done for life ...I wouldn't lilceto be a professional because you can't win either
way because if you don't label them and get them loclced up and something
happens, you're sued and ifyou do, you could be committing somebody who's not
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- may never do anything, to a prison for the rest of their lives. It may be on your
consciencefor that. I don't know. "
A number of participants questioned the validity of the diagnosis 'personality disorder'.
One participant (D2) argued that it is an 'umbrella term' that captures a broad range of
impaired functioning (cf. Pilgrim, 2001). However, she did appear to regard the disorder
as existing in that she stated " ...an awfully high percentage of people have personality
disorders. Small bits of their personality might be disordered and it could be anything
from a dependency on alcohol or going upwards." However, other participants were
more cynical about the validity of the diagnosis:
M' " ...I still don't really understand what it's supposed to be. And just the title
'personality defect', does that mean that you're walking around in Wellingtons
with custard in the bottom? Is that a personality defect? I just don't really
understand the terminology, the symptoms, the by-product of the symptoms. I
really don't understand what it means. "
Factors that influence mental health policy
The majority of participants blamed concern with public safety and 'knee-jerk
reactions' to homicides perpetrated by mentally ill people as propelling mental health
policy. The following participant expressed concern that the actions of a small minority
of the mentally ill serve to stigmatise all mental health service users. She also indicated
the reluctance of professionals to enforce coercive policy proposals and represents the
view of many participants that homicides committed by the mentally ill are the main
driving force of current mental health policy:
J: "But no, I feel all the time I'm fighting to maintain my individuality. I don't
believe you should have to hide anything. People should accept us but every time
somebody goes out and stabs somebody, it puts a bad (picture) on the service user
or a schizophrenic or whatever the person might be. And that's causing more and
more stigma ...You know, it's going to mean more of a void between the world and
us, you know...Well it's because of the fuss that's been made about people
stabbing, being stabbed...there's a very low percentage of mental health users
that will kill and usually they've been misusing drugs as well as not taking their
medication. And it's happening more and more, people going stabbing people
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with swords and in a hospital and in a church and obviously it's mental illness but
we're not all going to start doing things like that. Most of usjust want to live our
lives and be part of the world, the community. And I think it's becoming an
increasing battle. Service users will need each other more and more and we'l/
have more ideas of being ghettoised and being a closed community within
ourselves. And I think that's veryfrightening really. "
A number of participants identified populism and public pressure for greater
containment as a factor underlying the construction of current mental health policy and
in the expenditure of funds. Lister (2001) describes populism as involving the 'wooing'
of the wider electorate that allows the tabloid media to set the parameters of political
debate and leads to exclusionary policies (see also Beresford and Croft, 2001) and is
part of the demonisation of mental health service users whereby Pilgrim (1999) states:
"Us and them, sane and insane, public and patients, most voters and few - so much for social
inclusion." (p.2)
Populist mental health policy appears to be an example of the 'dividing practices'
described by Foucault (2002) in which the powerful construct a dichotomy between the
'sane' and the 'insane'. Such populism is based the stereotypes of dangerousness
described by participants (see also Beresford and Croft, 2001).
The following participant refers to the type of facilities Frank Dobson's 'extra'
£700million is being spent on and the re-institutionalisation this involves:
D2: H ••• I've been trying to get the MP here to see if they'd put forwards
suggestions and questions in Parliament. So if somebody did, they'd be putting
their neck out because the majority of the population would just be quite happy if
they are locked up and that is why - do you know where a lot of this new money
has gone? Into secure units around the country. They've put masses of money into
secure units just to lock people away and that is it. And so sadly, do you know
what is so sad is that they closed the asylums and chucked everybody out. They
didn't give any community care. Things have backfired and now they've rebuilt
smaller asylums and they're going to lock them up and throwaway the key. And
that's the cycle. And that's happened infifteen years. "
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To what extent do mental health servi~e usen have the opportunity to wield
politi~alpower?
In relation to the construction of mental health policy. one participant (E) contrasted the
considerable power the professional lobby exert on the construction of policy with
service users' relative lack of power to influence policy. However. a second participant
spoke of a lack of formal political power due to the stigma of mental health problems:
D2: "...1mean, I've often thought about campaigning a bit more but I'm scared
because 1'm scared that someone will see my name or picture in the paper and
say send in a thing saying this person is a mad woman. So it doesn't really give
you much confidence to go out there and be political when you've got that little
skeleton in the cupboard Because 1was thinking, 1could never stand for
Pariiament ...I'm surprised we're allowed to vote ((laughs))...The last election 1
know because 1have actually missed elections because 1was sectioned or
whatever. Yes, if you 're sectioned, yeah. Prisoners can vote can't they?"
To what extent is the Government ta~kling stigma and dis~rimination against
mental health servi~eusen?
Standard One of the National Service Framework for mental health (DoH. 1999a) states
that the Government will introduce policies that tackle the stigma and discrimination
associated with mental health problems. I asked participants whether they thought the
Government was honouring its promise. A number of participants welcomed the
National Service Framework as facilitating greater user involvement and as giving users
'almost legal status' (D2) in having a right to be consulted in the provision of mental
health services. However. the following participant indicated the problem of
professional resistance to greater user involvement:
PI,' " ...1think they have to accept [user group] because of the National Service
Framework. So they have to accept [user group] and they have to listen to them
and some people in the service are very supportive of that and want to encourage
that but there are quite a lot who aren't and who don't have the same belief that
users should be involved in the development of mental health services. And that
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belief that we said 'we've trained several years for this so I know what I'm doing
andyou don't'. They sort of want to keep hold of it. "
Another obstacle to the realisation of the more emancipatory aims of mental health
policy is the lack of appropriate funding, as suggested by the following participant:
D2: ..... Yeah, I mean, I think if the NSF was really serious then it should have
been backed with the appropriatefunding for development of services but because
that hasn't really happened, it's just a laugh isn't it? But the general population
don't know that. I can't believe why people don't get out from the television and
the radio and say this to the country and say well this is what is really
happening... "
The lack of appropriate funding to realise the more emancipatory aims of the National
Service Framework can be contrasted with the participant's previous comments
explaining the funding of the more coercive elements of current mental health policy.
The contradictions between the progressiveness and authoritarianism inherent in New
Labour welfare policies (Lister, 2001) seems most explicit in the Government's
approach to mental health policy. In addition, the way in which most participants who
expressed a view objected to community treatment orders as coercive and
discriminatory indicates that the Government was not regarded as honouring its promise
to tackle stigma and discrimination against mental health service users. Indeed, many
participants indicated that current mental health policy serves to increase the stigma of
mental health service use.
Summary
Participants objected to all of the three New Labour mental health policy initiatives.
Community treatment orders in particular were regarded as unworkable, likely to cause
people to avoid services and as posing an unacceptable threat to service users' civil
liberties. The same objections were raised in relation the preventive detention of
'dangerous' people with 'severe personality disorder'. Assertive outreach had not been
implemented in at least one of the study areas and thus provoked less comment.
However, it was viewed as unworkable on the grounds that engagement cannot be
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coerced and would cause people to avoid services in order to avoid coercion and threats
to individual autonomy.
Participants who provided a view were unanimous in blaming high profile homicides
committed by persons with mental health problems as driving coercive mental health
policy. The Government's concern with populism was regarded as driving an emphasis
on public protection and as causing even greater stigmatisation of people with mental
health problems.
Stigma was identified as a barrier to political involvement and the relative power of the
professional lobby to direct mental health policy was seen as indicative of service users'
lack of political power. Therefore, participants appeared to suggest that mental health
service users lack political influence. The following section examines the influence of
users of mental health services on those services.
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User Involvement
Having questioned participants about their experiences of mental health services, I
wanted to examine the extent of user involvement in relation to statutory mental health
services. User involvement is an active form of political citizenship (Lister, 1998). User
involvement is also relevant to citizenship because citizenship is described as involving
participation in democratic decision-making, including in relation to welfare services
(Croft and Beresford, 1992; Beresford and Campbell, 1994). This is referred to as
participatory democracy (Beresford and Campbell, 1994) whereas participants
described user involvement that fell significantly short of such participation. A number
of questions were constructed to question participants about their experiences and views
of user involvement:
• How are users involved in statutory mental health services?
• How would participants like to be involved with services?
• Do users exert an influence over services?
• Are there specific barriers to user involvement?
• What is the response of mental health professionals to user involvement?
• What has been the personal impact of user involvement on participants?
How are users involved? How would users like to be involved?
The most commonly reported type of involvement was consultation in which
representatives from services sought users' views on the development of services. In
one of the study locations a new inpatient psychiatric unit was built and users were
consulted on the design of the new unit. However, one participant complained that
several of her own suggestions for the unit were ignored by the project co-ordinators.
The experience appeared to demonstrate that users exerted questionable influence over
the final decisions for the unit. The participant has already been reported as complaining
that the new unit was designed with greater emphasis placed on risk management than
on patient comfort (e.g. plastic bed sheets and showers that ran as sports centre
showers). This is her view of the consultation process:
D2: "... Again you know, if there's any ideas to change a service, they need to be
consulted, the users. And very much listened to. And if they [users] say no they
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don't want that changed, there must be a good reason to go against that decision.
Because what I don 't like is if users arejust asked and their views are not listened
to and they're not taken into account and then that's just not on. It's not
appropriate. To me, the success is when you are actually listened to and change is
because of what you've said. "
Participants referred to information sharing as an additional form of involvement. One
participant criticised the view that services pay lip service to users views in that he
found the information sharing aspect of involvement enlightening and as "a learning
process in itself' (E). He referred to the value of attending health trust meetings and
Community Health Council meetings in order to keep abreast of developments in his
local area.
Another type of involvement was the monitoring of services, referred to as 'voice' by
Peck, Gulliver and Towel (2002). One participant (D2) described monitoring as a way
of indicating to the local health trust the problems arising in relation to services and
described the local user group as a 'watchdog'. Users in one of the study areas were
involved in establishing a patients' council in a new inpatient unit. This was presented
as one way in which services could be monitored and as a way of modifying the balance
of power between psychiatric professionals and service users.
Networking was also seen as a further means of user involvement. A small number of
participants discussed attendance at conferences and other events in which they were
able to meet with other service users from across the country, as described by the
following participant:
E: "Well I'm certainly not academic in the sense that I can articulate a lot of
factual information and give you a big summary but what I feel for myself is that
by being involved with the various groups I am involved in, I get a better picture
of how other service users jind their involvement. Certainly with the National
VoicesForum andfor a while with Mindlink, when I was involved. You see people
from other parts of the country that otherwise you wouldn't see. And certainly for
the conference where I met you about your research, I think it's good networking.
It's important. The only thing I can say with those professionals who have their
ownprofessional network but are not service users, they have a vested interest not
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to promote service user involvement because it's too challenging for them
sometimes or they might not like to have to change the way they do things. "
It is interesting that the participant contrasted service user networks and professional
networks in a comment that identified two possible barriers to user involvement:
professional resistance due to being challenged or not wanting to change. The
participant's distinction between professional and service user networks might suggest
that professionals benefit from stronger networks whereas user networks may be less
well established and less powerful than professional networks. The implication appears
to be that professional networks may serve the purpose of maintaining the power
imbalances that exist between professionals and service users.
Participants also identified individual ways in which they could become involved in
changing services. A number of participants were involved in writing about their
experiences. One participant (E) submitted articles to a magazine distributed to service
users and another participant (A) had published his own research involving ex-patients'
views on the local psychiatric asylum and members of the discussion group had
participated in user-led research. Writing about individual experiences was explained as
an attempt to challenge the stigma of mental health service use. An additional method of
involvement was to respond to Government policy proposals, such as the Green Paper
on the reform of the Mental Health Act.
To what extent do users influence services?
There were distinctly mixed views on the extent that users influence statutory mental
health services, although many participants expressed frustration at the pace of progress.
One participant (D2) has already been described as being dissatisfied with her
experience of consultation on the design of a new psychiatric unit. However,
participants in the discussion group argued that the greater involvement of users in
services had changed the behaviour of professionals involved in their care. Other
participants argued that the presence of a user group did influence the organisation of
local services, as described by the following participant:
Pi: "I think that [user group] isfar more influential now than its ever been and
certainly, from what ] understand, things have come a long way in the last ten
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years but they're still a long, long way behind many other areas in terms of
involvement and recognition of the user group. I mean, some people go up to
conferences where different user groups are involved and when they do that, they
come back with stories of how these groups are and how the Trust supports the
user group in a very real way. Because you can sit at home and think we're
actually doing a really good job and this isn't too bad at all, but when you go out
and see what other areas are doing and they're doing that because they have the
full backing of the Trust that they're under. "
It became apparent when speaking to users in different parts of the country that the
participants in the Midlands and East Anglia were more likely to comment on user
involvement in relation to national mental health policy and were more likely to refer to
national user events such as conferences whereas the users in the south east of England
expressed opinions more relevant to local user involvement. This could have been an
effect of some of the participants located in the South East being recruited from the
local user group and thus the activities of the group became salient in the research.
Furthermore, the participants located outside of the south east of England were recruited
through a national conference and therefore might have been more likely to be involved
in national user involvement activities and therefore might have been more aware of
national policy. In addition, at least two members of the user group in the South East
cited social contact as the prime reason for attendance at group meetings, rather than
commitment to user involvement as a political activity.
Certainly, a large amount of interview material was generated as a result of participants'
discussions of the local user group located in the south east of England. Interview data
on the influence of user groups was also generated as a result of the local circumstances
in the southeastern area. For instance. a number of services had been threatened with
closure shortly preceding the study period and this presented an opportunity to discuss
participants' views on how influential the user group had been in persuading the
authorities to abandon the threatened closures. Participants held mixed views about the
influence of the user group on preventing the closure of some services. One participant,
who was not a member of the user group in the South East, expressed doubt over the
influence of user groups:
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M: "That's sounds a good idea but it goes back to how much say do these groups
actually get and how far they can influence policy and what goes on? I don't
know. I'm unsure as to how much they can actually get done or challenge really. "
Nevertheless, one participant reported having received positive feedback from a
representative of the local health trust following the user group's involvement in
campaigning on the threatened closure of local services:
D2: "...We had the mental health director wrote to us and said - not director, I
don't know the terms actually but one of the - I don't know who she is, she
actually wrote to us and said that it was really very influenced by our concerns
and reason as to why it needed to stay open and actually thanked us very much
and hoped we continued to support the services, like we have been doing
basically. I mean, as I said it's notjust because of [user group). "
Certainly there was doubt in relation to whether users influence central Government
policy. I asked the following participant if he thought the local user group (of which he
was a member) exerted influence:
T: "I'm not sure. I'm not in a position to say but all I know is that service users
don't have much impact on the Government with the Government bringing in
Cl'Os and detention, preventive detention for psychopaths, so I don't think service
users have that much impact on the Government. "
This comment is relevant to the question of whether service users are able to wield
political power. The answer according to this participant is that Government mental
health policy suggests that users lack political power. This is an important aspect of user
involvement and illustrates two levels at which user involvement operates: the local
level in relation to local services and at the national level in relation to national policies.
An additional level is individual involvement in care planning whereby participants'
reports of changes in behaviour of individual professionals as a result of user
involvement suggests greater satisfaction with individual involvement in comparison
with local or national user involvement.
However. one participant (E) was optimistic about the influence of users over services
in his area, the Midlands, but when he described consultation he described the sharing
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of information rather than influence over service development ("they'll probably tell us
when it will be implemented"). It is interesting that his account of the development of a
new psychiatric unit in the Midlands concurs with the account of the new unit built in
the south east of England:
E: "They haven't started locked wards yet but I think at the next patients' forum
meeting it will be - they'll probably tell us when it will be implemented. I think
they've noted the objections and the reasons why but because of patient safety I
think really you have to take that into account. And in a sense, I can see why, it's
whether they do a survey of the patients on the ward at the time, whether they
would be happy to have that. I think some would and some wouldn't. But because
the staff at [user group] are quite busy in other areas, they visit other day centres
relating to the Trust around the area, I think really it would be expecting them to
do too much and do quite an involved consultation on that. So we'll have to see
when it starts and basically monitor it if it goes ahead. "
The final comment might suggest a problem with user involvement occurs in
relation to the relatively small number of service users involved who are
confronted with the enormous task of changing the balance of power within
mental health services.
What is the response of professionals to user involvement?
Only two participants described professionals as holding positive views towards user
involvement and this was with reference to specific individuals rather than to
professionals in general. All other comments in relation to professionals' responses to
user involvement identified negative views held by professionals. Reasons for
professionals' resistance to user involvement encompassed perceptions of threats to
professional power, fear for their own jobs and not wanting to change. Another relevant
factor mentioned was the influence of the National Service Framework for mental
health on professionals' behaviour. The NSF was regarded by participants as coercing
professionals into accepting user involvement whereby professionals were thought to
recognise the demands of the NSF for greater user involvement but lack commitment to
involving users in their care or in the delivery of services. The following participant
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discusses the impact of the NSF but also highlights the need of users to be encouraged
to become involved in user initiatives:
PI.' "Well as I said, some consultants and CPNsjust sort of-they'll do it because
they have to but they don't really encourage it. If you're unwell, you're very
vulnerable and you need encouragement to be involved in those things. One CPN
actually brought someone to [user group]. They really encouraged them to come
along, brought them in and were with them. But people need that sort of
encouragement, to know that they might have something valuable to say and if the
CPNs aren't doing that, if the CPNs are very reticent about user involvement and
in some cases very discouraging, then people won't get involved. People won't
know that they can get involved or that they have any sort of validity. "
Nevertheless, one participant (D2) did report having been encouraged to attend her local
user group as part of a rehabilitation programme, thus suggesting that some
professionals might be supportive of user involvement. A number of participants
referred to professional reticence to accept user involvement as being due to perceived
threats to professional power and as not wanting to change. Therefore, overall,
professionals were described as being reluctant to accept user involvement although a
small number of individual professionals were found to be more encouraging of
involvement than others.
Barrien to user involvement
Participants identified a large number of barriers to user involvement. Professional
resistance was examined in the previous section. Other barriers included lack of
invitations to meetings and networking opportunities; lack of financial remuneration for
involvement; lack of commonality with other users; obstructive health trusts; lack of
funding; the complexity of policy documents; illness; reminders of patienthood; lack of
confidence; lack of influence and lack of credibility of users. Lack of financial
remuneration referred in part to inequities in the payment of travel expenses between
users and health trust staff, as discussed by the following participant:
PI.' ..Weget invited to some things. And then when you are invited to something,
you're not - they pay something like five or ten pence a mile, ten pence a mile
petrol. That's what the Trust pay, which is an insult really because these people,
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like myself, we're all on benefits. We can't afford to keep going to different
places. "
Lack of invites to meetings referred to the lack of invites from the local health trust. The
behaviour of health trust staff was also highlighted as indicating the lack of value placed
on user involvement by the health trust. The participant above described how
representatives from the health trust either cancelled scheduled meetings or arrived too
late to conduct a fully attended meeting. These incidents conveyed a lack of
commitment of health trust staff to user involvement. In addition to lack of financial
remuneration, one participant (G) argued that user involvement is not attractive to users
because of the voluntary nature of participation because participation does not attract
payment.
Other participants indicated that local user groups were funded by the health trust and
therefore that they were not totally independent of the health trust. One participant
indicated that user group workers were employed by the health trust, although they were
users of mental health services. Lack of influence over health trust policy was also cited
as a barrier to user involvement:
E: "...I don't think they can rock the boat if they wanted to, make objections if it's
a majority decisions but at the end of the day, if the Trust wants to do something
because it's important then they do it. Then there's not much that the user group
can do apart from object or at least once the change is implemented, monitor it
and report back to thepatients' forum. "
The participant's comments indicate a lack of participation in democratic decision-
making whereby decisions are made in the absence of service users, then related post
hoc.
Not all of the participants were members of a user group and one participant (M)
commented that he had not joined a user group due to a lack of commonality with other
users. Another participant (S) who was not an active member of the local user group
commented that she felt unable to participate fully in user initiatives because it
reminded her of her negative experiences of having contact with mental health services.
She described her unease at attending a patients' council meeting in the local psychiatric
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inpatient unit because it reminded her of her experiences as a psychiatric inpatient.
Therefore, there should be respect for non-involvement of users in an inherently
oppressive mental health system (Williamson, 2004). The participant also referred to the
use of jargon in inhibiting her involvement in a patients' council meeting. Therefore,
users themselves may be responsible for excluding participants by their use of jargon
that may not be familiar to new members of user initiatives. Finally, illness was
attributed as a barrier to user involvement:
DJ: "Well maybe perhaps it's the nature of the illness that people have, it breeds
apathy so it's hard to get people motivated. "
The penonal impact of user involvement for usen
Amongst participants who discussed the issue, there was a consensus that user
involvement exerts a positive personal effect whereby some participants described
increased self-esteem, greater access to information, greater motivation and the use of
experience to help others. One participant (K) referred to user involvement as providing
her with 'a meaningful life' and another participant (E) referred to greater access to
information on local services and as a way of remaining occupied and less isolated. The
following participant summarised the positive personal impact of user involvement:
D2: "There are times when it certainly feels tokenistic and I get very angry. But
on the whole, I'd say it's far more positive, so that's for me personally. To me,
apart from that, to me as a person, it's actually helped me get out and about,
integrate and have motivation and have some hope that things will improve. It's
given me a driving force and an aim in lifo to try and improve on the mental
health service. It's given me self-esteem, confidence. It's given me so much. You
know, I've written a paper about it and said how much it's given me. So that's
actually very important to me. "
She proceeded to describe the level of user involvement she would like to see develop:
that users should be involved in staff recruitment, professional training, management of
budgets, campaigning for increased resources for services and anti-stigma campaigns.
However, she also suggested that users require support and training to be effectively
involved in mental health services and policy.
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Summary
Participants appraised user involvement as being greatly beneficial both on an
individual level and as a collective group. Consultation was the most frequently cited
means of involvement but some participants expressed dissatisfaction with their
influence over service provision. Nevertheless, participants did express satisfaction with
greater opportunities to receive information about service developments and appreciated
the shift in power inherent in user involvement.
Members of the discussion group felt that professional practice had changed as a result
of their involvement in user initiatives. However, other participants were cynical of
professionals' motives and regarded them as resistant to change and as wanting to retain
their power in relation to service users. The overall view held by participants appeared
to be that user involvement represents a significant progression but that the balance of
power has not swung sufficiently towards service users.
Participants identified a broad range of barriers to user involvement. These included
personal factors but mostly involved barriers placed by health trusts. Similarly,
professionals were cited as demonstrating resistance to user involvement, although
individual exceptions were also mentioned.
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Feedback from Participants
Following completion of the analysis of the interview data, participants were
contacted by letter in order to establish whether they wished to receive a copy of the
findings chapter (see Appendix 7). Twelve of the eighteen participants were written to
whereby two of the letters were returned due to the participants no longer residing at
the address. Nine of the participants replied by requesting a copy of the findings but
one participant responded by stating that she would agree to provide feedback on the
findings "for a fee". It was not possible to pay a fee in return for feedback due to lack
of funds but it was agreed with the participant that she would receive the findings
without an obligation to provide feedback. Indeed, the letters sent to the participants
emphasised that there was no obligation to provide feedback.
Of the nine participants who received a copy of the findings, only three provided
feedback, two in face-to-face meetings and one by email. All three participants
commented that they had been struck by the similarity of others' experiences to their
own. It appeared that the research had been useful to the participants in that many had
explained the rationale of their participation as wanting to share their experiences with
others and publicise their experiences to a wider audience. Therefore, the usefulness
of this research depends on its dissemination both to influence policy and service
provision but also to share experiences with other service users.
The remaining participants might have been discouraged from providing feedback by
the sheer length of the findings chapter, amounting to approximately 50,000 words. In
retrospect, I should have offered a shorter summary of the findings in order to
facilitate reading and encourage feedback, especially given that Ward and Flynn
(1994) recommend avoidance of lengthy documents in the dissemination of research
findings. However, I offered the full version of the findings to enable participants to
read their own contributions in order to ensure accuracy of interpretation.
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Chapter Seven: Discussion
The concept of citizenship was introduced at the beginning of this thesis by reference
to Marshall's (1992) tripartite model that encompasses civil, political and social
citizenship. The primary aim of the research described in this thesis was to attempt to
answer the difficult question of whether people who use mental health services enjoy
the opportunities and rights associated with citizenship or whether, as a social group,
they occupy a disadvantaged position in society in relation to people who do not use
mental health services. I hope to argue convincingly that Marshall's (1992, 1981)
conceptualisations of citizenship were flawed due to the negation of the role of power
in defining non-citizens and excluding marginalised groups from participation in
society.
However, if people who use mental health services are socially excluded as a social
group, the problem emerges of whether exclusion is caused by mental health status or
by structural factors such as poverty or unemployment. In order to resolve this
problem, the findings must be examined to identify the particular aspects of mental
health status that increase vulnerability to social inequality.
Read and Baker (1996) conducted a quantitative survey of users' experiences of
discrimination. Their findings on employment and parenting were replicated in my
own study in that respondents reported harassment from work colleagues, dismissal,
rejection in job applications and concealment of psychiatric history in job applications
and at least two of the four parents in my study had their parenting unreasonably
questioned. However, Read and Baker admitted that they questioned users on a
narrow range of topics, acknowledging that they had failed to question users on their
experiences of housing, income, education and training. Therefore, my own research
covers a broader range of topics and examines topics in greater detail than is possible
in a quantitative survey.
Wahl (1999) argued that stigmatised individuals enter social relationships in an
inferior position and that 'mental illness' is a prime example of a stigmatised master
status (Becker, 1963), defined as encompassing all social roles and as undermining
alternative roles. The question arises of whether mental health service use is a master
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status to the exclusion of alternative social roles. Participants' discussions were
dominated by mental health service use, thus suggesting that they were particularly
dissatisfied with such services (the majority of comments were negative), but also
indicating the importance of mental health services in the lives of users of these
services. The question remains, however, of whether participants primarily identified
as someone with a mental health problem. The finding that many participants
indicated lack of full enjoyment of citizenship indicates the lack of alternative roles to
challenge the service user role. For instance, participants identified lack of
employment as involving denial of the valued social role of the economically active
citizen.
However, an examination of the advantages of mental health status identified by
participants raises important questions about the nature of inclusion. A number of
participants described the advantages of occupying the role of a mental health service
user. Mental health status was described as enabling the avoidance of coercion into
employment and the enjoyment of greater leisure time than the employed, although
poverty curtailed leisure activities unless the individual was able to enjoy the
concessionary prices offered to some users. The status also enables an escape from the
obligations of employment, including an obligation to attend regularly and to remain
well. Therefore, some aspects of exclusion from employment appeared to be
beneficial.
Moreover, employment has been described as detrimental to health due to lack of
exercise and lack of time spent with family and friends and on leisure activities
(Anon, 2003). Moreover, exclusion from paid employment often means exclusion
from low paid employment. The Government's rhetoric of inclusion through paid
employment ignores the prevalence of low paid work (Levitas, 1998) whereby the
Social Exclusion Unit report on mental health (SEU, 2004) is accused of ignoring the
impact of low benefit levels on social inclusion (O'Kelly. 2004). Instead of
demanding inclusion inpaid employment, economic inclusion (perkins, 2003b) might
involve an increase in benefit levels (O'Kelly, 2004) to enable choice of whether or
not to work and graduated benefits to reduce the role of the benefit trap in
discouraging participation in paid work. Flexibility in employment is also
recommended to address the kinds of fears participants expressed in relation to the
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stress of work exerting a negative impact on mental health (Perkins, 2003b; Sayee,
2003) and greater flexibility in the benefits system to enable people to claim benefits
easily during periods in which they cannot work (Perkins, 2003b). However, the latter
suggestion fails to address the increased likelihood of dismissal from work due to
sickness absence and the way in which the individual's lifestyle would be determined
by periods spent claiming welfare benefits while absent from work.
This raises the question of whether people with mental health problems want to be
included in society dominated by sane people. New Labour discourse that advocates
social inclusion through paid work is an example of the hegemonic nature of social
inclusion discourse (cf. Faulks, 1998). Pete Shaughnessy (2000) comments:
I am excluded. I am in the tribe who no one in their right mind would want to be part of it [sic]. I
don't want to be included. I don't want to be included in your narrow, moralistic,judgemental
world. You all aspire to be at the top, I'm content to be at the bottom.
A meaningful social identity is defined by the dominant voices in society whereby
marginalised groups are excluded from the norms of society determined by powerful
social groups (Young, 1989). Jenkins (1996) describes social identity as consistent
over time and as established through social relationships but also as organised through
similarity and difference.
Participants' comments on social networks, user groups and self-help groups
indicated a preference for contact with fellow service users, thus suggesting
identification of commonality according to mental health status. Participants also
distinguished themselves from non-users in their discussions of poverty (being poor in
relation to others), social relationships (preferring user friendships, avoiding
friendships and partnerships with non-users), employment (difficulty explaining
unemployment to non-users), visibility in the neighbourhood and in public attitudes
(identifying as the subject of negative public attitudes, implying differentiation
between users and the public). However, dominant norms are not necessarily the
most healthy to pursue and thus membership of a marginalised group can be appraised
as valuable for both the group members and wider society. For example, consumerism
and employment are valued by many but may undermine autonomy and creativity
(Illich, 1978). Moreover, consumerism is associated with environmental damage
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(Clayton, 2000). Nevertheless, participants did appear to desire inclusion in a society
dominated by such values because they expressed normative aspirations. For instance,
participants indicated not only that they felt disadvantaged in relation to other citizens
but also that they held similar cultural values in that they desired property ownership,
employment, sufficient income, family life and leisure opportunities. This appears to
confirm the view that socially excluded groups share the same values as the socially
included (Bauman, 1998).
Furthermore, inclusion was experienced in terms of group membership whereby
participants expressed acceptance and commonality in groups comprised of fellow
service users. The participants' explanations of their commonality with other mental
health service users appears to be an example of identity politics in which
marginalised groups find commonality through common experiences of disadvantage
and oppression (Young, 1989). It is interesting to note that one participant commented
on the disingenuous group membership of another individual who attended a user
group but had not received an official psychiatric diagnosis. indicating the operation
of a form of exclusion. The complexity of citizenship is exemplified in participants'
conceptualisations of commonality in that oppressed groups are not simply excluded
from the mainstream of society but construct their own inclusion through group
membership according to characteristics such as mental health status or use of mental
health services, although it is not the case that participants felt that inclusion in
mainstream society is neither realistic nor desirable because participants made
reference to 'normative aspirations' in demanding access to the same opportunities as
non-disabled people.
Group membership was conveyed by some participants' comments in relation to other
marginalised social groups. A number of participants compared users of mental health
services with other groups of disabled people whereby people with a learning
disability or physical disability were believed to experience less discrimination and
stigma. Moreover, prisoners were perceived as being less stigmatised than mental
health service users in that they were thought to be less likely to experience problems
obtaining employment and to receive better treatment in prison than a psychiatric
patient receives in hospital. One participant commented that conditions were better in
prison than a psychiatric hospital and that prison involves some degree of legitimacy
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in punishing criminals whereas psychiatric hospital was regarded as having no
legitimate purpose.
Such comments appear to demonstrate the 'hierarchy of oppression' (Keating, 1997)
whereby members of an oppressed group present their own oppression as more salient
than the oppression of other marginalised groups, thus minimising others' experiences
of oppression. Keating claims that the construction of a hierarchy of oppression
perpetuates oppression by failing to recognise commonality of oppression amongst
marginalised groups. It also fails to recognise multiple oppression whereby
oppression based on specific characteristics is often experienced simultaneously
(Keating, 1997). For example, a number of participants in the current study referred to
the cumulative impact of mental health status, gender, sexuality, physical disability
and age. Keating argues that commonalities between oppressed groups should be
recognised in order to increase collective resistance to oppression. This appears to be
the rationale underlying suggestions that the mental health user movement should
combine forces with the disability movement in order to build resistance to oppression
experienced by both groups (Beresford, 2000a).
Keating (1997) indicates the existence of three levels of oppression: socio-cultural in
which language and cultural communication constructs representations of
marginalised groups. This level is observed in the participants' concerns relating to
media representations of the mental health issues and the use of derogatory language
in public discourse. The second level, the socio-political level, is produced by social
institutions, such as psychiatric hospitals, the psychiatric system and the government.
The third level of oppression relates to the psychological impact of oppression,
specifically in relation to internalised oppression. This level can be observed in
participants' concerns surrounding stigma and difficulties surrounding self-disclosure.
It occurred to me that participants' lives were particularly vulnerable to scrutiny
whereby private life becomes scrutinised in the public domain. Participants expressed
concern over their visibility in their neighbourhood; their parenting was scrutinised by
professionals; their disability was scrutinised by benefit officials (cf O'Kelly, 2004);
behaviour was scrutinised by ward staff during psychiatric inpatient treatment;
professionals gained access to private information during the process of assessments
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under CPA and gained access to their private life through home visits. Despite
proposals by David Blunkett (and latterly Charles Clarke) to introduce national
identity cards, members of the public are not exposed to such a high level of scrutiny
as users of mental health services.
Participants referred to the stigma of having a psychiatric diagnosis and attributed
stigma to predominant stereotypes held by the public and propagated by the mass
media. Participants presented a hierarchy of diagnoses whereby schizophrenia and
mania were thought to elicit the most negative public responses due to fear of
unpredictable behaviour due to perceptions of an association with violence.
Participants in the study described avoidance of disclosure of mental health status
across a broad range of experiences: in relation to job applications, visibility in the
neighbourhood, within social networks and in relation to parenting. The fear of
disclosure appears to represent a strategy for managing information about identity
(see Goffinan, 1963), in this instance, mental health status. Goffinan (1963) defines
stigma as unwanted differentiation that leads to expectations of rejection, avoidance
of social interaction or behaviour being interpreted according to the individual's main
identity. Another aspect of managing identity involves social avoidance and seeking
contact with sympathetic others (Goffinan, 1963), which was clearly illustrated by
participants' preference for contact with other service users. This was predicated on
the grounds of commonality of identity and greater likelihood of acceptance.
However, the concept of stigma has received criticism due to its individual emphasis
and thus the negation of the role of structural factors in the discrimination and
exclusion of marginalised groups (Sayee, 1998). Therefore, an analysis of social
identity should incorporate the role of power in the formation of identity.
Participants associated social rejection with negative public attitudes based on
stereotypes of the unpredictability and dangerousness of mental health service users.
Pickering (2001) argues that stereotypes support power imbalances in society
whereby the powerful determine the nature and targets of stereotyping and the
stereotyped are powerless to resist such mechanisms of social categorisation.
Participants' comments on stereotypes suggest that people with mental health
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problems occupy the status of 'other' (cf. Foucault, 2002) because stereotypes serve
to define insiders and outsiders in society.
Participants were unequivocal in blaming the media for the propagation of damaging
stereotypes. Research appears to present a consensus view that the mass media
presents negative representations of mental health issues (Wahl, 1995; Philo, 1996b;
Philo, McGlaughlin and Henderson, 1996) and that such representations influence
public attitudes (Wahl, 1995). The problem confronting such research is how to
determine cause-and-effect in that the media and the derogatory language employed
by the media may exist within a context of pre-existing public attitudes whereby the
media merely satisfies the demand for such representations rather than the media
creating such attitudes. Henderson (1996) interviewed television producers who
informed her that their remit in producing programmes is to entertain rather than to
educate and that good stories are more important than the accurate presentation of
social issues, thus suggesting public demand for entertainment rather than a balanced
examination of social issues.
However, researchers have acknowledged the role of socialisation in the acquisition
of negative public attitudes (Philo, I 996b ). Moreover, comments from some of the
participants indicated their own socialisation into negative attitudes towards people
with mental health problems and the impact of such attitudes on their acceptance of
their own mental health status. This finding appears to support the notion of the
internalised negative identity that Becker (1963) and Goffinan (1963) considered
would confront the individual labelled with a deviant identity. It could, alternatively,
represent internalised oppression in which the stigma of mental ill health influences
individual self-identity (cf. Keating, 1997).
In addition, participants made an association between negative public attitudes, media
representations of mental health problems and the emergence of coercive mental
health policy. The suggestion that mental health policy has been driven by public
concerns over a postulated (but erroneous) association between mental ill health and
violence raises the question of whether the issue of homicides committed by people
with a mental health problem has become the subject of a moral panic (Muijen, 1995).
Cohen (2002) defines a moral panic as 'short term reactions to the immediate ... and
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long term reflections on the 'state-of-our-times'.' Therefore, moral panics contain
moral judgements (Thompson, 1998) and are transmitted primarily through the mass
media (Cohen, 2002). Moral panics exaggerate the threat posed by the targets of the
panic and serve to increase hostility to particular social groups (Cohen, 2002). Cohen
argues that, like stereotypes, moral panics reveal sources of power in society since
moral panics are targeted at those thought to pose a threat to the social order and
involve demands for the imposition of social control on those threatening the status
quo (Thompson, 1998). Moral panics are propelled by fear and perceptions of
increased risk to the moral and social order (Thompson, 1998) and create folk devils
in society (Cohen, 2002).
The suggestion of a moral panic involving homicides committed by people with
mental illhealth raises the question of whether users of mental health services are folk
devils in society. Cohen (2002) describes folk devils as visible reminders of social
roles to be avoided whereby such roles involve threat to social values and majority
interests. The role of the media in creating folk devils and moral panics is simply to
exaggerate the threat posed by the target group. This is achieved through the use of
tenns associated with derogation and violence, such as 'psycho', 'maniac' or 'sicko'
(Philo, McGlaughlin and Henderson, 1996). Tabloid newspapers have been found to
exaggerate the numbers involved in homicides associated with the mentally ill and
call for greater control of the mentally ill (Crepaz Keay, 1996). Moreover, media
representations do influence public attitudes (Philo, 1996a, 1996b) and serve to
increase nimbyism and reduce help-seeking behaviour (Seeker and Platt, 1996).
However, politicians also playa crucial role in the exaggeration of the risk posed by
people with mental health problems. Participants argued that mental health policy,
specifically the proposed compulsory community treatment and personality disorder
legislation, serves to increase the stigma of having a psychiatric diagnosis.
Participants also explained policy developments as a reaction to high profile
homicides involving people with mental health problems. Interestingly, a number of
participants adopted a 'community care has failed' discourse in attributing homicides
to problems the perpetrators experienced in accessing mental health services.
Therefore, the link participants made between homicides and policy suggests that
policy development either contributes to or is informed by moral panics. Participants
284
believed that the overall effect of a moral panic involving mental health service users
is to undermine the civil liberties and social participation of people with mental health
problems. Participants also regarded mental health policy as discouraging help-
seeking behaviour because use of mental health services was associated with stigma
and threats to civil liberties.
Research suggests that mental health policy responds to public pressure for
containment and colludes in predominant stereotypes of the dangerous mental health
service user (Laurance, 2003). It appears that users of mental health services lack the
power to influence public policy and that they are less influential than the public in
the development of mental health policy. However, Morrall (2000) argues that moral
panic theory has been misapplied to mental illness because, he asserts, notions of
moral panic ignore the real suffering of both the victims of homicides and of the
perpetrators of such homicides. Morrall argues that, although the number of
homicides perpetrated by the mentally ill is small, the violence is real and that mental
illness associated with violence is real. He argues that social constructionist analysis
of the issue denies the suffering involved in such violence and claims that the blaming
of the media represents a denial of responsibility by psychiatric professionals,
resulting in increased public anxiety over the perceived threats people with mental
illness pose to society. Morrall disputes research on media representations of mental
health issues by claiming that the media do not exaggerate the threat posed by the
mentally unwell.
Moreover, Pickering (2001) argues that moral panic theory is flawed because moral
condemnation is not transient. This point relates to the subjects of moral panic theory
in that Cohen's original research examined the media attention paid to the violence
between the Mods and the Rockers in the Sixties (Cohen, 1972) and Thompson
(1998) examined panics surrounding Ecstasy and the rave scene in the 1980s, high
profile murder cases and AIDS. Pickering's argument could be adopted to posit that
people with mental health problems have been the target of moral condemnation for a
considerable period of time. However, media attention surrounding high profile
homicides by people with mental health problems tends to blame community care for
an increase in violence by this group (Crepaz Keay, 1996) and suggestions of such an
increase are clearly erroneous due to an annual decrease of 3% in such homicides in
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recent years (Taylor and Gunn, 1999). Nevertheless, in accordance with Cohen's
definition of moral panics (Cohen, 2002), the identification of a moral panic in
relation to high profile homicide cases involving the mentally unwell depends on how
transience is defined. The era of community care spans almost twenty five years, thus
suggesting that concerns about community mental patients being 'Freed to Kill'
(Crepaz Keay, 1996) extends beyond a merely transient reaction. However, it could
be argued that each high profile homicide triggers a resurgence of a familiar moral
panic, with specific high profile cases leading to changes in government policy
(Muijen, 1995).
Gramsci's (1971) notion of hegemony may be relevant (see Morrall, 2000) in that
moral panics are hegemonic in obscuring social inequality by producing folk devils
onto which frustration can be targeted. Hegemony is defined as ideology that obscures
power relations in society (Desmoyers-Davis, 2003). Stereotyping and the creation of
folk devils have been attributed to the powerlessness of people with mental health
problems within society. I will argue that the powerless status of people who use
mental health services is derived from 'psychiatric hegemony' (Davidson, 2003) that
constructs mental health problems as rooted in biological dysfunction and prescribes
biological intervention as the panacea to mental distress. The powerlessness of mental
health service users derives from their subjugation to the psychiatric profession
whereby the power of the latter is derived from its power to define irrationality and
the power to privilege medical expertise over irrationality (Foucault, 1994). Foucault
argues that the location of psychiatric expertise is the psychiatric institution (see also
Shaughnessy,2000).
Participants' discussions of inpatient psychiatric hospitalisation bore remarkable
similarity to research on psychiatric inpatient care in that they described lack of
activity, lack of therapeutic intervention, lack of staff-patient interaction,
heterogeneous patient mix and poor physical environments (see SCMH, 1998;
Walton, 2000). Participants' descriptions of inpatient care also bore similarities to
Goffman's description of the 'total institution' (Goffman, 1961) in that participants
complained about the rules and rigid regimentation of ward life. Goffinan discussed
regimentation and 'tyranisation' as involving 'curtailment of self, referring to
suppression of individual autonomy. Goffman also referred to the 'mortifying'
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experiences of ward life as involving lack of privacy, communal living, restricted
movement and subordination to authority. Participants complained about all of these
features of ward life. Goffinan concluded that psychiatric hospitals have a custodial
function due to the systematic oppression of patients and SCMH (1998) concluded
that hospitals function merely to contain patients, given the lack of therapeutic
intervention offered to patients. Participants' discussions of psychiatric hospitalisation
confirmed the function of containment fulfilled by psychiatric hospitals in their
descriptions of responses to ward life as involving a 'prisoner mentality' in which
patients subordinate themselves to the authority of the psychiatric professions in order
to achieve earlier discharge or greater freedom. The existence of the prisoner
mentality strongly suggests that participants did not view psychiatric hospitalisation
as therapeutic. Indeed, many participants described hospitalisation as counter-
therapeutic in discussing lack of privacy, disruption caused by a heterogeneous mix of
patients and suicide attempts, lack of fresh air and exercise, lack of freedom of
movement and the stress associated with containment.
A number of participants referred to the high number of deaths amongst mental health
service users, particularly in relation to suicides of inpatients. Mortality of those
diagnosed with mental ill health is significantly higher than amongst the general
population (Brown, Inskip and Barraclough, 2000), although it is claimed that suicide
cannot explain high rates of excess mortality (Waddington, Youssef and Kinsella,
1998). However, other researchers have claimed that suicide is the largest cause of
excess mortality amongst people with mental ill health (Brown, 1997) and unnatural
deaths, including suicide and accidents, account for up to 50% of excess mortality
(Mortensen and Juel, 1993). Other researchers attribute excess mortality to the effects
of neuroleptic polypharmacy (Appleby, 2000; Waddington, Youssef and Kinsella,
1998) yet others indicate excessive rates of cardiovascular, circulatory and respiratory
diseases amongst people with mental health problems and attribute such diseases to a
combination of unhealthy lifestyles (such as cigarette smoking) and poor treatment of
physical illness (Brown, Inskip and Barraclough, 2000). Participants' complaints of
the negation of physical illness by both general medical and mental health
professionals should be viewed within the context of excess mortality and the
potentially fatal consequences of failing to investigate and treat physical illness in
people who use mental health services.
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The most striking example of the untherapeutic nature of psychiatric hospitalisation
was conveyed by participants' discussions of abuse that occurred at the hands of ward
staff. A number of participants commented on the prevalence of the use of 'control
and restraint' and the use of medication to sedate patients following resistance to the
ward regime. The former can be described as involving physical control and the latter
as involving chemical control. Abuse was also in evidence, although not discussed to
any great extent, in the use of seclusion following supposedly disruptive behaviour.
Power is thought to be central to abuse (Penhale, 1999) whereby abuse is defined as:
... use of power to serve self-interest (or group interest) when there are seriously damaging
consequences for a person (or group) that is less powerful (Williams and Keating, 1999: 131)
Copperman and McNamara (1999) explicitly relate the types of experiences described
by participants with abuse. For instance, they claim that abuse is inherent in seclusion,
forced compliance with medication, limited contact with staff and lack of autonomy
on the ward. Moreover, formal complaints of abuse are unlikely to be made (Alty,
1994) or to be addressed because the credibility of patients' accounts is undermined
(Williams and Keating, 1999; Copperman and McNamara, 1999) and reflects the
powerlessness of patients in relation to professionals (Penhale, 1999).
Lukes (1974) argued that institutions exert power through collective support that
derives from consensual political or social relations. It is argued that the legitimacy of
psychiatric hospitalisation derives from 'psychiatric hegemony' (Davidson, 2003) that
not only defines mental illness as involving biological mechanisms but also prescribes
professional dominance of intervention (Foucault, 1994). The power of psychiatric
hegemony is apparent in the way some participants had internalised the biomedical
perspective in describing their mental health problem as being due to a 'biochemical
imbalance', although many participants explicitly rejected the medical model by
attributing emotional distress to social problems.
Moreover, participants' experiences of psychiatric hospitalisation not only reveal
locations of power in society, but also reveal the sheer damage caused by psychiatric
intervention. Illich (1995) refers to iatrogenesis in describing the harm caused by
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medical intervention. Iatrogenic medicine is described as that in which the costs
outweigh the benefits, problems are individualised and recovery is undermined.
Clinical iatrogenesis is clearly witnessed in relation to participants' experiences of
medication in terms of unpleasant side effects and the restrictions placed by such
effects on the ability to function in everyday life. A small number of participants
described medication as stabilising their illness but a larger proportion of participants
described side effects that restricted the ability to function in relation to employment,
parenting and social relationships. The power of psychiatry was demonstrated in the
greater number of reasons produced by participants to comply with a medication
regime in comparison with reasons not to comply. For instance, participants attributed
compliance to fear of hospitalisation and coercion from professionals, fear of illness
and fear of withdrawal from medication. Professional power was demonstrated by
professional resistance to self-medication (cf. Illich, 1995) and control of information
on treatment (cf. Rose, 2001).
Illich (1995) also refers to social iatrogenesis in the way medicine removes individual
responsibility for health. Illich indicates the problem of the medicalisation of
everyday problems as contributing to social iatrogenesis. Similarly, Breggin and
Cohen (1999) argue that psychiatry has increasingly medicalised everyday emotional
responses. They argue this is inherently problematic because psychiatric medication is
similar to alcohol and illicit drugs in merely obscuring problems. They argue that an
increasing medicalisation of emotional problems reduces individuals' tolerance of
painful emotions and undermines ability to harness resources to cope with such
emotions. Social iatrogenesis appears to bear resemblance to the final category of
iatrogenesis, cultural iatrogenesis (Illich, 1995) in which healthy responses to
problems are paralysed by the over-intervention of medicine. Social and cultural
iatrogenesis relate to the dependency that was identified by participants as
problematic in relation to mental health services.
The problem of dependency in mental health services was referred to by numerous
participants and has been identified with the propagation of sick role behaviour in
mental health service users (see Johnstone, 2000). Johnstone argues that the medical
model in psychiatry removes responsibility from the patient for their recovery
whereby psychiatric professionals collude in the sick role by playing the 'rescue
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game' in which professionals place individuals in a dependent position. The sick role
bestows certain advantages in that illness implies lack of responsibility and lack of
rationality and thus enables escape from the demands of healthy functioning
(Goffinan, 1963).
Similarly, Coleman (1999) accuses the mental health system of colluding with
patients to undermine recovery, particularly in relation to the role of medication in
removing the individual's capacity to relinquish dependency on others. Dependency
in the mental health system is inherent in the notion of imputed needs (Illich, 1977) in
which professionals determine individual needs, such as in the care planning process
(Baldwin, 1998; Stainton, 1998). McKnight (1977) indicates how professional
intervention in the name of 'care' is disabling by locating deficiencies within the
individual, thus warranting individual intervention; it fragments the client into
discrete problems, therefore warranting inter-disciplinary intervention; and results in
professionals monopolising solutions to problems they have prescribed in the first
place. McKnight argues:
When the capacity to define a problem becomes a professional prerogative, citizens no longer exist.
The prerogative removes the citizen as problem-definer, much less the problem-solver. (McKnight,
1977:85)
Furthermore, Illich (1978) argues that modern life is dominated by professional
intervention and that the effect of this is to undermine individual autonomy in
developing creative solutions to problems.
User involvement is described as an active form of citizenship (Lister, 1997). The
findings suggest that user involvement was largely restricted to consultation and there
appeared to be regional variations in the nature of user involvement. A fundamental
question that arises in relation to user involvement in mainstream statutory and
voluntary services is whether users would want to be involved in a mental health
system that is fundamentally flawed (Williamson, 2004). Moreover, the dominance of
the medical model remains, despite the ascendancy of user involvement in mental
health services. The construction of mental distress as an illness is fundamentally
damaging due to the implication of dysfunction and abnonnality for perceptions of
people with mental health problems as inferior to the well majority, note one
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participant's comment concerning the difficulty in participating in an able-bodied
society. This is also noted in relation to the hegemonic nature of social inclusion
discourse (Faulks, 1998).
Moreover, the dominance of the medical model is rendered explicit in discourse
adopted by the current Labour government. Labour discourse equates mental and
physical illness in describing mental health problems as being as 'common as asthma'
(Dobson. 1998); in employing a professor of psychiatry as the mental health czar
(Louis Appleby) and, most explicitly, in demanding compliance with medication in its
proposals for compulsory community treatment (DoH, 1999b, 2004). Despite the
Government's attempt to emphasise normality of mental health problems in their
prevalence, Labour mental health policy serves to increase the stigma of mental health
service use and increases the oppressive aspects of mental health care. The
Government's approach to mental health lacks coherence, veering between claiming
to challenge prejudice in the National Framework for mental health (DoH, 1999a) and
simultaneously threatening the civil liberties of mental health service users in the draft
Mental Health Bill (DoH, 1999b, 2004).
The medical model assumes that mental distress deprives patients of insight into their
illness and impairs rationality, thus justifying doctors' decision-making in patients'
best interests (Cavadino, 1989). The paternalism inherent in parens patrea" constitutes
discrimination because it is only applied to people with mental health problems
(Bean. 1986) whereby non-discrimination would involve the detention of all members
of the public who engage in potentially self-injurious behaviour (Pols, 1989).
Participants made frequent references to the fundamental distinction between
psychiatric and general medical patients on the issue of the ability of general medical
patients to refuse treatment. It would appear that the civil liberties of people with
mental health problems are significantly more easily removed in the name of state
protection than for any other group in the community. This is particularly the case in
relation to removal to a place of safety by the police under Section 136 of the Mental
Health Act 1983 and the removal of individuals' freedom of movement under, for
instance, Sections 2 and 3 of the Mental Health Act 1983. The increased use of
6 Parens patriae is defined as the justification of compulsory detention in the patient's best interests
(Cavadino, 1989).
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Sections 2 and 3 of the Mental Health Act 1983 (Hotopft et al., 2000), the increased
Government expenditure on secure inpatient beds (DoH, 1998a) and proposals for
compulsory treatment and care plans (DoH, 1999b, 2004) indicates the creeping
onslaught on mental health service users' civil liberties. It would appear that such
developments might indicate an increasing tenuousness of community residence since
the advent of community care twenty-five years ago. Participants' descriptions of
their visibility in their community in the process of 'sectioning' and the relative ease
of removal from the community within the sectioning process suggested the
tenuousness of community membership.
An important question that arises from T.H.Marshall's conception of citizenship is
whether it is a neutral concept. Marshall failed to examine differences in citizenship
status in relation to gender, ethnicity or sexuality, primarily due to reflecting the
attitudes prevalent at the time of his writing. An updated analysis of citizenship
eschews the postulated neutrality of the concept by examining the citizenship status of
certain social groups. Citizenship is not a neutral concept because certain social
groups appear to be more vulnerable to social inequalities than other social groups.
The thesis of my research is that people with mental health problems are particularly
vulnerable to experiencing social inequality but this argument must be presented
within the context of an interaction between numerous structural factors to present a
complex picture of social exclusion.
In relation to gender, there was no significant difference between the importance of
employment for male and female participants. Employment appeared to be equally
important to both sexes, except that people who were carers either of children or
partners appeared less interested in securing employment. However, research on
employment and poverty suggests that women are disadvantaged in the labour market
due to the competing demands of caring or parenting and in the benefits system due to
the assumption of women's financial dependence on men; women are also more likely
to be poor, especially single parents (Flaherty, Veit-Wilson and Dornan, 2004). All
four of the parents in the study were women and only one male (M) discussed
parenting but in a hypothetical sense about future parenting. One participant (02)
discussed how single parents are more likely to lose residence of their children due to
the absence of the perceived stability provided by a male partner. Interestingly, two
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participants discussed the professional attitudes they had encountered in a rejection of
their same-sex parenting; they felt that their family was not regarded as valid by
professionals. The same participants described the impact of crisis mental health
services on removing the individual from the family unit as very unhelpful and female
participants exclusively referred to the impact of psychiatric inpatient treatment on
their family life in terms of separating the parent from their children. Women
exclusively described the negative impact of medication on parenting and personal
relationships, particularly in relation to sedation and emotional blunting.
One participant (T) made explicit reference to the interaction between mental health,
male gender and social inequality. He expressed concern that male mental health
service users are more likely to be deemed dangerous. He also made reference to the
prevalence in abuse in the histories of people who use mental health services and a
number of participants made reference to abuse in their own histories. However, the
research produced no data to suggest whether gender differences exist in the
prevalence of abuse in the backgrounds of people with mental health problems
because investigation of aetiology was not an aim of the research. Interestingly, there
did appear to be a gender difference in illness discourse adopted in that men were
more likely to adopt a biochemical explanation of their illness whereas women were
slightly more likely to explain their mental health problem in terms of social stressors
such as housing or income problems. The reasons for this are not apparent in the
findings. However, participants, regardless of gender, were more likely to attribute
mental health problems to social rather than biomedical factors: explanations
encompassed family dynamics, family dysfunction, abuse and an accumulation of
social stressors. Two participants (PI, D2) did refer to family disposition that might
suggest genetic factors in the causation of mental health problems. In addition, one
participant (8) suggested that males are disadvantaged in relation to mental health
issues due to gendered cultural beliefs surrounding emotional expression in that males
are expected to inhibit their emotions, although she did not discuss the finding from
research that this factor might cause men to be more likely to engage in substance
misuse and suicide as a way of dealing with emotions rather than expressing and
sharing negative emotions in a cathartic way (Johnstone, 2000). Furthermore,
participants expressed the belief that schizophrenia and mania are more likely to lead
to social rejection due to public perceptions of dangerousness and unpredictability.
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Such perceptions suggest that public attitudes are, perhaps unsurprisingly, more
concerned with threats to the public rather than threats to people with mental health
problems posed by social inequality, self-injurious behaviour or violent victimisation.
Read and Baker (1996) found that 50% of the respondents to their survey had
experienced harassment in the workplace and in the community. Participants in my
study also reported harassment at work and, to a lesser extent, in the community.
However, Berzins, Petch and Atkinson (2003) found that workplace harassment was
less common amongst people with mental health problems due to lower levels of
employment. Nevertheless, they found that 41% of respondents reported harassment
in the community in comparison with 15% of the general population. Verbal abuse,
particularly derogatory name-calling, was the most common form of harassment, yet
people with mental health problems were significantly less likely to report
victimisation to the police due to a fear of not being believed and mistrust of the
police due to their association with detentions under the Mental Health Act. A study
of urban violence directed at people with mental health problems found that 16%
reported having been a victim of violence in the previous year compared with 7.1% of
the general population living in urban areas and reported in the British Crime Survey
(Walsh et al., 2003).
The reported experiences of two participants (PI, P2) reiterated the findings of a small
body of research on the experiences of lesbian, gay and bisexual mental health service
users. The participants' comments reiterate the concept of multiple oppressions in
indicating the cumulative impact of discrimination based on mental health, sexuality
and physical disability. McFarlane (1998) argues that the primary form of
discrimination is ambiguous in cases of multiple oppression. Moreover, the
participants in my own study reported heterosexism of mental health workers.
Rankow (1996: cited in McFarlane, 1998) defmes heterosexism as:
The institutional and individual assumption that everyone is heterosexual and that heterosexuality is
inherently superior to, and preferable to, homosexuality or bisexuality.
Both McFarlane and the participants in the current study indicate that mental health
workers view homosexuality and lesbianism as pathological and caused by or is the
cause of mental ill health (cf. Golding, 1997). Voyeurism and inappropriate
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questioning was reported in McFarlane's study and my own findings. Similarly,
mental health workers failed to recognise same-sex partnerships by failing to provide
information on treatment and services to partners. Furthermore, Golding (1997)
indicates that homophobia from mental health workers and users add to the stigma of
same-sex sexuality but also isolate lesbian and gay mental health service users from
other users. Golding argues that rather than displaying homophobic behaviour, mental
health workers should affirm sexuality and challenge internalised oppression rather
than reproduce the homophobia and heterosexism of wider society.
In relation to class, two participants referred to a system of social stratification in
which people with mental health problems are located at the bottom of such a system.
One participant (T) described social drift whereby he failed to replicate the success of
his parents in employment and explained this in terms of the stigma of mental health
service use. It is interesting to note that many of the participants held advanced
qualifications and yet many complained of difficulty in obtaining or maintaining paid
and unpaid work due to the stigma and discrimination associated with mental health
status. Data was not collected on the class backgrounds of participants' families but
high levels of unemployment within the context of high levels of educational
attainment indicate disproportionate disadvantage experienced by participants.
As mentioned previously, a major omission from my research is an analysis of the
interaction between mental health, ethnicity and social inequality. Only one
participant (K) was a member of an ethnic 'minority' and made some comments about
her African-Caribbean background but did not extrapolate possibly because the ethnic
composition of the small group discussion (two white females and one African-
Caribbean female) precluded an in-depth discussion of ethnicity.
The criticism of neutrality aimed at T.H.Marshall's (1992) analysis of citizenship
raises the question of whether the concept of citizenship is a useful vehicle for the
analysis of social inequality in relation to people who use mental health services. The
usefulness of the citizenship framework is that it examines the status of people who
use mental health services beyond the status of service users because it demands
fulfilment of a broad range of social roles. The citizenship framework also offers an
alternative to the biomedical model that continues to dominate the analysis of the
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experiences of people with mental health problems. The citizenship framework also
enables an examination of normative social values in defining valued opportunities
available to citizens and the type of membership demanded by citizens and also an
examination of the power dynamics inherent in the question of who defines such
values.
The originality of the present study lies in the application of T .H.Marshall' s tripartite
model of citizenship to people who use mental health services. The tripartite model
provides a conceptual framework for the analysis of the social participation and
membership of people who use mental health services. This has not been achieved
before in a qualitative study. For instance, although Barham and Hayward (1995)
made explicit reference to employing a conceptual framework of citizenship, they
failed to examine the theoretical basis of their conceptual framework. Barham and
Hayward's sample comprised of twenty male and four female ex-patients with a
diagnosis of schizophrenia. The sample of participants in my study is broader in that it
included eight males and ten females and did not restrict inclusion in the research to
people diagnosed with schizophrenia. Barham and Hayward's participants heralded
from a northern town with high rates of social deprivation, as evidenced by high rates
of supplementary benefit recipience. The participants in the current study were mostly
recruited from a seaside town in the south of England that nevertheless also featured
high rates on measures of social deprivation such as unemployment, poor housing,
suicide rates and teenage pregnancies (ODPM, 1998).
However, my study is comparable with Barham and Hayward's study in omitting an
analysis of ethnicity due to an absence of non-white participants, although Barham
and Hayward's sample did not feature any non-white individuals whereas the current
study included one female from an African-Caribbean background. Nevertheless, the
Barham and Hayward study was seminal in linking the social exclusion of ex-mental
patients with membership inherent in definitions of citizenship and thus is highly
influential to my own research. However, the current research examined service
users' conceptions of citizenship in an analysis that enables a comparison to be made
between participants' descriptions of their own status and how they perceive
themselves in relation to others. The research also examined the impact of service use
on citizenship, arguing that mental health service use undermines the citizenship of
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people who use mental health services by distinguishing them from non-mental health
service users by presenting mental ill health as involving incapacity, irrationality and
dangerousness. Marshall (1981) propounded the concept of welfare capitalism to
suggest that state welfare mitigates the effects of capitalism on social inequality. The
findings suggest that state welfare in the form of the benefits system and mental
health services not only fails to mitigate the effects of social inequality but also serves
to institute social inequality. Nevertheless, citizenship is useful in that it is a broader
concept than social exclusion. However, like social exclusion, the concept can be
hegemonic in serving a variety of political agendas.
Dunn (1999) conducted an inquiry into the social exclusion of people who use mental
health services. However, although the data was qualitative, evidence was gleaned
from professionals as well as users and it is not clear how in-depth the discussions of
discrimination actually were. However, the inquiry encompassed a broad range of
topics, including a discussion of the tenuousness of community membership caused
by the use of the Mental Health Act 1983 in detaining individuals in psychiatric
inpatient units. The advantage of Dunn's study in comparison with my own is that it
examined the opinions of a broad range of 'stakeholders', including those of mental
health workers. My study might have benefited from obtaining the views of mental
health professionals on the findings of the research as an opportunity to respond to the
criticisms participants levelled at mental health services. However, the explicit aim of
the study was to examine the views and experiences of citizenship by mental health
service users, therefore the views of professionals were not sought.
In summary, power is central to an analysis of the citizenship status of people who use
mental health services. I contend that citizenship status is undermined by the power of
psychiatry to define the mentally unwell as irrational, incompetent in decision-making
and as deviant in relation to behavioural norms. Lack of political citizenship is
demonstrated in the lack of influence of mental health service users over public
policy, particularly in relation to the influence of psychiatric hegemony on current
mental health policy. The relative lack of power held by service users is also evident
in the way media representations are able to present the mentally unwell as outsiders
and deviants. In addition, stereotypical public attitudes surrounding people with
mental health problems demonstrate service users' powerlessness to resist negative
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stereotypes (see Pickering, 2001). However, participants cited user involvement as
enabling the development of a meaningful social identity in the absence of
conventional social roles, such as the economically active citizen. User involvement is
also depicted as an active form of citizenship (Lister, 1997) and appears to be engaged
in as a recognition of the failure of passive citizenship to guarantee equal rights and
opportunities to mental health service users and represents resistance to professional
dominance in users' lives that bestows the discredited status of patienthood (see
Barham and Hayward, 1995).
Social identity is also central to an understanding of citizenship in that participants
described differential citizenship in recognition of commonality with other users of
mental health services and lack of commonality with those outside of their social
group. Young (1989) argued that differential citizenship should lead to special rights
for marginalised groups. The nature of such rights will be examined in the following
chapter that examines the implications of the research for research, policy and
practice.
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Chapter Eight: Implications for Research, Policy and
Practice
Implications for Research
Participants' references to a hierarchy of oppression (see Keating, 1997) indicate the
relevance of an examination of other marginalised groups within a citizenship
framework in order to identify commonalities and differences between such groups
and the social group identified with mental health service use. Participants believed
that they were more oppressed than other groups of disabled people. This belief could
be examined by conducting in-depth interviews investigating the citizenship status of
members of other marginalised groups, namely people with physical or learning
disabilities, unemployed people, welfare benefit recipients, asylum seekers or ex-
prisoners. Such interviews might elucidate on the similarities oppressed groups share
and the experiences unique to mental health service users.
In addition, interviews might be conducted comparing the experiences of people who
use secondary mental health services and people with mental health problems who do
not become ensconced in the mental health system in order to test my intuition that
mental health service use serves to undermine the citizenship of people with mental
health problems rather than poor mental health per se. This would enable a direct test
of the labelling theory of mental illhealth.
Furthermore, the suggestion by one participant that people who live inmental health
residential care or long-stay hospitals are particularly socially excluded should be
investigated by qualitative research that examines their experiences of social
participation and community membership. In addition, the finding that homelessness
is more prevalent in urban areas (Burrows, 1997) raises the issue of the
representativeness of the current sample of participants. Therefore, further research
could compare the experiences of citizenship of mental health service users between
urban, rural and semi-urban areas. It may be the case that even greater disadvantage
would have been found if the participants were mostly recruited from large urban
areas in Britain.
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An analysis of citizenship could also be rendered more sophisticated by examining
citizenship status of mental health service users according to gender, ethnicity, age or
sexuality in order to examine in greater depth the impact of multiple oppression.
Finally, descriptions of citizenship are predicated on the notion that citizenship
involves rights and opportunities available to members of a community. However,
perhaps a more stringent examination of the citizenship status of mental health service
users would involve establishing a baseline of rights and opportunities available to
ordinary citizens by examining the citizenship of people who do not use mental health
services and comparing their experiences with those of mental health service users.
Nevertheless, the heterogeneity of experiences and circumstances of people who do
not use mental health services might render broad conclusions somewhat problematic,
although the experiences and circumstances of people who do use mental health
services are also heterogeneous but are still worthy of examination. Moreover,
qualitative research endeavours to capture the complexity of human experience.
The overall implication of the research is that mental health service users hold
credible views and are able to express those views in a clear and articulate way in
relation to the complex concept of citizenship. The sheer quality of the interview data
collected demonstrates the value of conducting qualitative research on issues that
affect users of mental health services.
Implications for Policy
The Government has emphasised inclusion through paid work (Levitas, 1998).
However, many participants expressed unwillingness to engage in paid work for a
variety of reasons. Therefore, the Government should re-evaluate its welfare-to-work
policy in relation to people who use mental health services. Given that all of the
participants were long-term unemployed and were, therefore, reliant on welfare
benefits for significant periods of time, the Government should review the levels of
welfare benefits for disabled people in acknowledgement of the way in which
inclusion through paid work is not always feasible or desirable. The feasibility of
engagement in paid work would presumably be increased by more realistic wages in
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the economy overall. The findings on participants' views of employment also indicate
the importance of avoiding the imposition of dominant social norms on political
analysis of social inclusion and citizenship.
Furthermore, participants expressed concerns about the complexity of the application
process in relation to disability benefits and their seeming greater applicability to
people with physical disabilities. Therefore, the findings suggest that the application
process for disability benefits should be simplified and made more relevant to people
with mental health problems.
Many participants expressed an expectation of rejection in employment applications
following disclosure of mental health status. Therefore, perhaps the Government
should direct employers to omit questions on health in job applications. However, one
participant (A) expressed doubts of the appropriateness of this suggestion due to
duties currently placed on employers to support employees with long-term health
problems. In addition, public education programmes should particularly target
employers and those in influential positions in relation to determining the social
participation of mental health service users in order to reduce discriminatory
behaviour of employers, landlords, ect.
An additional way in which the Government could contribute to the social inclusion
of mental health service users is to regulate the media more stringently in order to
reduce the amount of derogatory language used and sensationalistic reporting that
participants' attributed to the stigma of mental ill health. However, the Government
does address this in proposing a greater role for Ofcom in monitoring media
representation of mental health issues (SEU, 2004). Nevertheless, the Government
also needs to examine its own contribution to the stigma of mental health problems
due to the way in which it emphasises the threat posed by people with mental health
problems in the community. Government policy should also be more coherent; less
concerned with populism; place greater emphasis on social equality rather than
hegemonic rhetoric on social inclusion; abandon proposals for coercive mental health
legislation and abandon the psychiatric hegemony peddled by the psychiatric
establishment.
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Participants in the study expressed a consensus opposition to the Government's
proposed compulsory community treatment orders. The most obvious implication of
the research for policy is an abandonment of the notion of compulsory treatment or
care plans in the community on the grounds that citizens should be free to choose
whether or not to accept intervention from a mental health service. Nonetheless, two
participants indicated that they were, in retrospect, grateful for intervention in
recognition of the impact of their illness on their well-being. Therefore, it is realistic
to conclude that some people might require intervention against their wishes but
participants' experiences of inpatient treatment cast doubt on the adequacy of that
intervention. Moreover, participants complained that mental health services over-
emphasise crisis intervention at the expense of preventative and rehabilitative
intervention, the implication for policy being that there should be greater expenditure
on preventative services rather than the acute services described in Modernising
Mental Health Services (DoH, 1998a). Users of mental health services should also be
more influential in the formulation of mental health policy in order to redress the
imbalance participants identified between users, professionals and the public in the
formulation of mental health policy.
Young (1989) discussed differential citizenship as involving special rights for
marginalised groups. Such special rights possibly indicate the need for anti-
discrimination legislation specifically intended to assist people with mental health
problems. Criticism has been directed towards the Disability Discrimination Act 1995
for its greater relevance to people with physical and sensory disabilities (Sayee, 2000)
and thus anti-discrimination legislation should address the needs of mental health
service users more specifically and ensure proper implementation of such legislation.
Implications for Practice
The main implication of the citizenship paradigm for practice is the recognition of
service users as citizens beyond their service use and the acknowledgement of the
importance of meaningful roles beyond that of mental health service user.
One way of conceptualising individuals beyond the 'patienthood' role (see Barham
and Hayward, 1995) is to abandon the biomedical conceptualisation of mental distress
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in an abandonment of notions surrounding incapacity in decision-making, irrationality
and irresponsibility. Rather, people who use mental health services should be treated
as competent in decision-making and autonomy should be respected, exception in
only the most extreme of cases.
Mental health services should also recognise the disadvantages service users
experience in relation to a range of indicators of social exclusion and should seek to
address such disadvantage with proactive approaches to community participation.
Services should also recognise the ways in which services impede realisation of full
citizenship status. For example, services should acknowledge impediments caused by
the side effects of medication in relation to employment, social networks, education
and parenting, as outlined in the findings of the current research. In relation to
parenting, services should provide practical support for parents and listen to users'
experiences of parenting in an abandonment of the assumption that mental health
problems preclude good parenting.
Moreover, the 'reciprocity principle' (Eastman, 1994) should be invoked whereby
deprivation of liberty should be met with an obligation to provide adequate treatment.
Participants supported previous research (e.g. SCMH, 1998; Walton, 2000) which
indicated lack of rehabilitation, activity and staff-patient interaction on psychiatric
inpatient wards. Therefore, compulsory psychiatric inpatient treatment should be met
with rehabilitation and holistic treatment that extends beyond medication and
activities that infantilise patients. Moreover, the abusive nature of control and restraint
should be recognised by the abolition of this abusive, dehumanising and potentially
fatal intervention (see the Rocky Bennett case: Guardian, 6dt February 2004). The
greater civil citizenship of mental health service users would encompass greater
respect for rights under the Mental Health Act 1983, specifically in relation to the
right to leave hospital and refuse medication if categorised as an informal patient. It
also means access to independent advocacy and a user on tribunal panels to balance
professional decision-making.
User involvement in services should extend beyond mere consultation to encompass
involvement in genuine decision-making and the development of user-led services.
The development of self-help groups should be supported by mental health
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professionals in recognition of the commonality and mutual support reported between
members of such groups. User involvement should also extend to the provision of
training to staff by users, given the dichotomous, hierarchical attitudes that
participants attributed to mental health workers. This would enable staff to achieve
greater insight into the impact of good and poor mental health care on service users
and the difference that this can make to users' lives. A "sea change in attitudes" (T) is
demanded of mental health workers.
However, overall, user involvement should extend beyond service use into genuine
participation in society, as defined by people who use mental health services.
Given the high mortality rates of mental health service users and some participants'
concerns surrounding the poor treatment of physical health problems, mental health
services should take seriously users' physical complaints and liaise with primary care
services to provide testing, monitoring and advice on maintaining physical health.
Users' reports of physical ailments should be awarded greater credence in order to
ensure rapid and adequate treatment of physical health problems. Moreover,
participants' demands for greater emphasis on mental health promotion in mental
health services echo the recommendations made by MHF (1997, 2000). More
specifically, MHF (2005) recommended the acknowledgement of the beneficial
impact of physical exercise on mental health in the introduction of nation-wide
exercise on prescription, thus enabling subsidised access to leisure facilities,
especially given that participants identified low income as impeding access to such
facilities. There is also a requirement of the opportunities to be available to exercise
during inpatient treatment, given the inevitably adverse effect of lack of fresh air and
exercise on physical health. Smoking in inpatient units and other mental health
facilities should also be prohibited, given that psychiatric hospital is the only NHS
inpatient environment to allow smoking (Mehta, 2002).
The most important implication for research, policy and practice, however, is that
mental health service users' definitions of citizenship and social inclusion should
inform policy, practice and future research.
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Chapter Nine: Summary and Conclusions
The findings of the study revealed that the citizenship status of mental health service
users is undermined, as evidenced by disadvantage participants experienced in
relation to employment applications, harassment in the workplace and constructive
dismissal. None of the participants were engaged in paid employment at the time of
the interviews; this meant that most, if not all, were in receipt of welfare benefits.
Participants described the impact of low benefit levels on social participation and the
scrutiny and vulnerability to withdrawal of benefits associated with receipt of
disability benefits. Some participants referred to their own poverty in relation to a
notional average income that would be required to participate in material
consumption. Participants expressed aspirations towards such consumption and thus
adopted social norms in this respect but described poverty as denying them the
opportunity to participate in a property-owning, mortgage-earning society.
Housing was primarily discussed in terms of visibility in the neighbourhood caused
by the presence of emergency vehicles at Mental Health Act detentions. Participants
also referred to addresses known to house mental health service users as being targets
of vandalism. Three participants described their experiences of homelessness but this
was not a common experience possibly due to the fact that most participants lived in a
small town rather than a large urban centre where homelessness is more likely to be
experienced (Burrows, 1997).
Participants provided varying reports on the availability of acceptance and support for
people with mental health problems in further and higher education but one
participant described explicit discrimination in relation to his experience of further
education.
Some participants described themselves as socially isolated and identified barriers to
developing and maintaining social networks; these encompassed rejection, public fear
of mental health problems, stigma, poor social skills and lack of opportunities to
develop social networks. Expectations of rejection provoked avoidance of disclosure
of mental health status to members of the public. However, participants expressed a
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consensual preference for socialising with other mental health service users,
conveying a sense of commonality and social identity as a coherent social group
based on use of mental health services. Public attitudes were described as primarily
negative, driven by fear and ignorance of people with mental health problems and
informed by misrepresentations of such people in the media. The use of derogatory
descriptors of people with mental health problems conveyed their lack of power to
challenge such negative discourse.
Mental health service use dominated participants' discussions of citizenship,
indicating the importance of services in users' lives. Participants described
community mental health services as placing an over-emphasis on medication to the
exclusion of talking treatments and holistic approaches to recovery and as over-
emphasising crisis intervention at the expense of preventative intervention.
Medication was primarily described according to the adverse impact of unpleasant
side effects on everyday functioning, specifically in relation to impediments caused to
employment, social relationships and parenting.
Psychiatric inpatient treatment was presented as fulfilling a function of containment
due to lack of rehabilitation and activity on wards, poor facilities and lack of staff-
patient interaction. Inpatient treatment was also described as non-therapeutic due to
the distress of other patients and abuse inherent in over-medication and the use of
control and restraint. Inpatient services were considered to be punitive whereby
participants described a 'prisoner mentality' that conveyed their belief that they were
"punished for being ill" (02) rather than viewing psychiatric hospitals as places to
receive rehabilitation and achieve recovery.
Participants' descriptions of psychiatric treatment and services refute Marshall's
(1992) claim that welfare services mitigate the effects of social inequality. Rather,
mental health services appear to contribute to inequality by removing the individual
from their community in the form of compulsory detention, by attaching stigmatising
labels to individuals, by constructing the status of patienthood, by impeding everyday
functioning by the side effects of medication, through loss of housing, family
relationships and parenting through hospitalisation and through the construction of the
individual as irrational, incompetent and dangerous.
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Moreover, the lack of political citizenship of mental health service users is conveyed
by their lack of influence over mental health policy. Participants viewed current
mental health policy as coercive, stigmatising and as undermining users' civil
liberties. However, user involvement was interpreted as a form of active political
citizenship whereby participants expressed their satisfaction with advances in
involvement with mental health services but dissatisfaction with the rate of progress
of involvement. Moreover, participants were more likely to be satisfied with
individual involvement in care planning than with involvement in service planning,
delivery and central government policy.
Service users' civil citizenship was doubtful due to the apparent lack of due process
experienced in relation to detentions under the Mental Health Act 1983. Specifically,
mental health review tribunals were described as having low discharge rates, being
influenced by conservative approaches to risk management and as indicating the
power of mental health professionals to influence the judgements of tribunal panels.
It is concluded that users of mental health services experience significant
disadvantage in relation to aspects of social, political and civil citizenship and thus
can be described as lacking the opportunities for social participation and community
membership that may be available to less marginalised social groups. However,
participants in the study failed to indicate commonality with other marginalised
groups, preferring to invoke a 'hierarchy of oppression' (Keating, 1997) to describe
how people who use mental health services are located at the bottom of a hierarchy of
oppressed social groups. Nevertheless, participants constructed their own inclusion
through involvement in social relationships with other users, participation in self-help
groups and engagement in user involvement in mental health services. Participants
demonstrated resistance to the patienthood role by developing meaningful alternatives
to conventional social participation in the form of inclusion in formal and informal
networks with other mental health service users. Moreover, participants indicated
advantages associated with mental health status, namely exemption from obligations
to engage in paid work and to adhere to ordinary norms of behaviour. Therefore,
theories of citizenship must avoid assumptions determining the basis of inclusion and
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membership because such membership does not ascribe to the simplistic
conceptualisation of the included-excluded dichotomy.
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Appendix 1: Written introduction to the research
Citizenship of Mental Health Service Users in Political, Professional and
Personal Contexts
Overview:
My research concerns the citizenship status of mental health resource users. Citizenship, in
this research, is loosely defined as community membership and participation. The subject of
my research is the social location of people with psychiatric diagnoses whereby mass
deinstitutionalisation of psychiatric patients has led to the emergence of questions relating to
the social position of previously institutionalised individuals. Some, for instance SANE and
the Zito Trust have questioned whether certain groups of people with a mental disorder are
safe to be located in the community and others, for instance Barham and Hayward (1995) and
Liz Sayee (2000), have questioned whether people with mental health problems are truly
integrated into society, citing discrimination as a barrier to 'inclusion'.
My research hopes to elicit mental health service users' views on what constitutes meaningful
social participation and the extent to which such participation is experienced by respondents
in the research.
My research questions are:
1. Do mental health service users experience broad denial of citizenship rights?
2. What is the relationship between user involvement and citizenship?
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3. What are the indicators of social exclusion and can these be analysed as indicators of
citizenship status?
The basic propositions of my thesis are as follows:
• People who use mental health services are disproportionately more likely to be excluded
from opportunities for social participation than people without a psychiatric diagnosis
• That such exclusion is the direct result of institutionalised discrimination
• That current mental health policy is incongruent with New Labour's populist rhetoric on
citizenship and social inclusion
• That professional espousal of 'user involvement' is merely rhetorical with minimal
relinquishment of power by professionals and is questionable within the context of broad
social exclusion
In relation to the latter point, much mental health research is problematic in examining people
with mental health problems only in the context of their service use and not as individuals
with lives to pursue outside of the mental health system.
The first research question is to be examined by conducting one-to-one semi-structured
interviews with individuals who have used mental health services in order to examine how
service use impacts on community membership and participation.
The second research question will be examined by conducting focus groups with both user
groups and groups comprised of mental health professionals in order to compare their
accounts of user involvement.
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The third research question will be examined in the individual interviews by discussing
participants' experiences of community living, mental health services and encounters with
legal institutions. I have suggested in my literature review that social exclusion may relate to
housing, employment, income, social relationships, parental rights, and education and
training. Interviewees may suggest additional or alternative areas of exclusion and explain
how their use of services has impacted on areas identified.
Official mental health policy is contrasted with rhetorical discussions of citizenship and
social inclusion by conducting a textual analysis of key government documents. I have
already examined the Government's proposals for the reform of the Mental Health Act,
Modernising Mental Health Services and the National Service Framework for mental health,
alongside documents produced by the Social Exclusion Unit, speeches made by Tony Blair
and Peter Mandelson, and by examining texts produced by 'intellectuals' associated with
Labour rhetoric, such as Anthony Giddens, Michael Sandel and Alasdair MacIntyre.
In the description of my assumptions underlying the research, I stated that people with a
psychiatric diagnosis are one of the most socially excluded groups in British society. I would
like to discuss this assertion with other marginalised groups, such as disability groups, gay
and lesbian activists and unemployed or homeless persons in order to compare experiences
across groups.
I want to examine official accounts (i.e. by professionals and policy makers) of citizenship
and social inclusion critically because such terms, like 'user involvement', are buzz words
often used opportunistically with little comprehension of application and implications.
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Therefore, I want to compare such official accounts with accounts of community membership
provided by mental health service users.
I also wish to avoid the victimology of much mental health research by avoiding the
depiction of mental health service users as victims to be pitied and in need of professional
intervention.
I also want to eschew the tradition of orthodox research which depicts the researcher as the
expert and participants as passive in the research process. I want to avoid the exploitative
'hit-and-run' approach of much research by involving participants in research design,
interpretation and dissemination.
As a recognition of participants' expertise, I will pay participants at the rate of £5 per hour (or
part of an hour) cash-in-hand. Research procedures will be negotiated with participants (eg.
length and frequency of interviews and boundaries of self disclosure over which the
participant may not wish to step) and participants will be given the opportunity to provide
feedback on the experience of being a participant in the research. Moreover, participants will
be asked to sign a contract which will emphasise their freedom to withdraw from the research
at any time. Of course, all the material will be anonymised and remain confidential, although
it will be clearly explained that the intention of the research is to be published in the form of a




I am a final year PhD student at the Tizard Centre, University of Kent. I have a degree in
psychology, a diploma of social work and an MSc in psychiatric social work. I have worked
as a volunteer in a Mind day centre, been a telephone counsellor, a citizen advocate in a
mental health advocacy scheme, a support worker in a residential project for women with
mental health problems and a care manager in an old age psychiatry service. I have brief
personal experience of using mental health services and significant experience of mental
health problems but I do not regard myself as a survivor due to not having been subject to the
coercive side of mental health services. I am interested in individuals' rights and would like




Appendix 2: Poster Presentation
Citizenship of Mental Health Service Users
My name is Maya Float. I am conducting PhD research at the University of Kent into the
citizenship of people who use/have used mental health services. I would be very interested in
hearing from people who would like to discuss their experiences of community living. I am
interested in people's experiences and views of:
• mental health legislation
• current mental health policy







• education and training
Participants will be paid £5 per hour (or part of an hour) and travel expenses. If you would
like more information, please leave a message for me, Maya Float, on the notice board in the
Purbeck Foyer. I will also be standing by this poster at all lunch and refreshment breaks
throughout the conference, or contact:
(Student's contact details)
Appendix 3: Verbal presentation
Research Presentation
Biography
I am a final year PhD student at the Tizard Centre, the University of Kent. I have a degree in
psychology, a diploma of social work and an MSc in psychiatric social work. I have worked
as a volunteer in a Mind day centre, been a citizen advocate in a mental health advocacy
scheme, a support worker in a project for women with mental health problems and a care
manager in an old age psychiatry service. I have brief experience of mental health services
and significant experience of mental health problems but I do not consider myself a survivor
because I have never been subject to the coercive side of the mental health system. I am
interested in individuals' rights (although users of mental health services do not have many
rights) and I would like to work in advocacy or generalist advice work. I do not want to
remain in higher education following completion of the PhD.
Research
My research concerns the citizenship of people who use mental health services. Citizenship is
loosely defined by those offering a definition as involving community membership and
participation in society. To explain what I mean by citizenship, it might be helpful to describe
where the idea from my research came from. A few years ago I was working as a volunteer in
a mental health advocacy scheme in North Wales. After a while, I realised that many of the
people I was seeing in the advocacy service were experiencing problems with housing and
did not have jobs and were experiencing financial problems due to lack of employment. We
had an office in the local in-patient unit and I began to wonder whether it was hospitalisation
that was causing disruption to work, housing, friendships and family relationships. I now
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realise this was probably a simplistic explanation but I believe mental health service use has
a major disrupting effect on people's lives, from the disruption caused by repeated
hospitalisations to the destructive side effects of medication. I want to find out in this
research whether problems with housing, money, jobs, ect. are common amongst users of
mental health services and, if so, to ask why this might be the case. Much existing research
confirms my initial suspicions about disadvantages mental health service users experience.
However, no-one has looked at such problems within the context of citizenship.
Citizenship is a useful tool for research because it examines how people fit into society and
the opportunities they experience or are denied in relation to participating in society.
Citizenship covers a lot of ground and enables a broad picture to be built up of people's lives
within the community.
However, citizenship is an awkward concept because it is not obvious what it means. It is a
complex concept but it can be simplified. I have broken citizenship down into a number of
areas. If citizenship means membership and participation in society, I think a citizen is
someone who has access to:
• decent housing
• opportunities for full-time employment in the mainstream labour market
• a reasonable income
• opportunities to develop social relationships (e.g. friendships)
• political influence
• does not have restrictions placed on their civil liberties
• is treated fairly before the law
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Therefore, in my research, I would like to interview at least 20 people who use/ have used
mental health services in order to discuss their experiences and views of:
• public attitudes
• mental health legislation
• mental health services






• education and training
I don't expect every person being interviewed to discuss everything on this list but I hope to
build up a picture of community living by interviewing enough people to suggest some
common experiences. I also don't claim that this list is complete. There are probably a
number of areas I have not yet thought of.
So, there are two main aims of my research:
• To examine whether people who use mental health services are more likely to be
excluded from opportunities to participate in society
• To examine whether politicians' and mental health professionals' accounts of citizenship
are relevant to the experiences of community living by people using mental health
services
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The problem with all research on citizenship to date is that it ignores the views of people with
mental health problems and instead covers views of 'citizenship', 'social inclusion' and 'user
involvement' from the perspectives of policy makers and professionals. Terms such as
'citizenship' and 'social inclusion' are buzz words in that they are trendy and tend to attract
people using these concepts in a way that is beneficial only to themselves. Therefore, I want
to take a critical view of dominant notions of citizenship by changing the balance of power in
debates towards the perspectives of mental health service users.
The problem with much mental health research is that it fails to consider people with mental
health problems as anything but users of mental health services. My research looks at
people's experiences of mental health services but also their wider experiences as citizens: as
people living in the community. My research aims to obtain a broader view of what it is like
to live with a mental health problem in current society.
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Appendix 4: Topic Guide
Topic Guide: This is a rough guide to interview topics. I would like
participants to contribute whatever they feel they can contribute and not expect
to cover everything in the topic guide. This topic guide encompasses
experiences and opinions.
Civil Citizenship (Law):
Use of the Mental Health Act:
• Compulsory hospitalisation/treatment
• Mental Health Review Tribunals! Hospital Managers' Hearings: access? usefulness?
• Community care legislation: aftercare?
• Decision-making: consent, compliance, insight
• Reaction to proposed Community Treatment Orders
• Experience of compulsion in the community: supervised discharge. supervision registers?
• Public and professionals' attitudes towards dangerousness
• Experiences of assertive outreach
• Experiences of and attitudes towards advocacy
Political Citizenship (Political influence)
• Current mental health policy
• Involvement in user groups
• Public attitudes: stigma? discrimination?
• Nimbyism: harassment in the neighbourhood? opposition to psychiatric facilities?
• Media representations of people with mental health problems
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• Experience of residential accommodation
• Integration in the local community
• Location
• Nimbyism: public hostility to psychiatric facilities
• Independence in accommodation
• Privacy
• Professionals' expectations of independent living




• Participation in open labour market? Minimum wage? Rehabilitative earnings?
• Vocational schemes
• Unemployment
• Stress of work?
• Professionals' / employers' attitudes
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• Income from work
• Benefits
• Poverty trap
• Attitudes towards money
• Definitions of poverty
• Aspirations for fmances
Social networks:
• Size of network
• How has service use affected friendships?
• Choice of friends
• Support from family and friends
• Rejection from family and friends
• Opportunities to meet people
• Acceptance by others
• Stigma
• Disclosure of mental health problems to others
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Parenting (either as a parent or childhood experience of parental mental health
problems):
• Professionals' attitudes towards the person's ability to parent
• Custody and access to children
• Difficulties and positives of parenting
• Experience of local authority intervention
• Effects of hospitalisation on parenting
Mental Health Services:
• Expectations from professionals of service users
• Range and choice of services
• Experiences of compulsion
• Professionals' attitudes
• Notions of insight, compliance
• Involvement in decision-making
• Usefulness of the medical model
• Medication: side-effects, information, usefulness
• Coercion in treatments and services
• Hospitalisation: does a stay in hospital help? does hospitalisation have a negative impact?
how does hospitalisation affect housing, employment, friendships, parenting? how
voluntary is informal admission? experiences of staff? experiences of seclusion, locked
wards or physical intervention?
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• Alternative services: should services be user-run? would services be improved by
employing people with mental health problems?
User involvement:
• Involvement in groups?
• Function of groups?
• Professional attitudes to user groups
• Opportunistic buzz-word? does it have real meaning?
• Are users 'consumers'?
• What does 'consumerism' mean?
• How should users be involved? consultation? decision-making? user-run services?
• Level of actual and desired participation
• Relationships with professionals
• Representation? can users claim to be representative? do we need representativeness?
• Aims of user movement?
Education and training:






Appendix S: Consent Form
Consent Form
The purpose of this consent form is to ensure you understand the nature of this research and
agree to participation. It is also to establish the strict ethical guidelines you can expect me to
adhere to. I am interested in discussing the topics already mentioned in addition to any topics
you think may be relevant. You can agree to as many or as few interviews as you like and
you can decide how long you want each interview to last. You will be paid £5 per hour (or
part of an hour), in cash, plus travel expenses (and childcare expenses if required).
Please read the following guidelines and sign at the end if you agree to the guidelines. If you
disagree, we can discuss anything that is not to your liking.
• You can end an interview at any time and withdraw from the research without giving a
reason if you so wish
• You should not say anything that makes you feel uncomfortable or discuss anything you
are unhappy discussing with me
• Everything you say to me will be treated In the strictest of confidence. Your
confidentiality and anonymity is guaranteed
• Each interview will be tape recorded unless you do not agree to this. Tape recordings will
be transcribed (written word-for-word) by myself. No-one else will hear the tape
recording or read the transcription
• General findings will be published as a PhD thesis and, possibly, in journal and magazine
articles and a book. However, you will not be mentioned by name and identifying details
will not be included in the final thesis
354
• The PhD thesis will be held at the Templeman Library at the University of Kent and at
the British Library in London
• Feedback on the general findings of the research will be given if you would like to be
contacted upon completion of the research. You will be asked to provide comments on
the findings and, with your permission, such comments will be included in the final thesis
• At the end of the final interview, you will be asked to complete a questionnaire to give me
information on how you found the experience of participating in this research. This is so
that I know whether or not the experience was positive and how research can be improved
in the future. You can decline to complete this questionnaire if you wish.
• If you have any complaints about this research, please contact my supervisor, Frank
Keating at the Tizard Centre, Beverley Farm, University of Kent, Canterbury, Kent, CTI
7LZ . Tel: (01227) 764000 ext.3955 or ask someone to do this on your behalf.
I (name) understand the nature of the research and the
behaviour I can expect from Maya Float during the course of the research. I agree to




I acknowledge receipt of £ for participation




Appendix 7: Letter to request feedback





I am writing to you following your participation in my citizenship research in 2001.
Once again, thank you for your participation in the research; your contribution has
been very valuable. I have now completed the writing up of the research and wonder
whether you would like to receive a copy of the findings chapter. I would be happy to
send you a copy and would like to invite you to comment on the findings so that your
feedback can be included in the final thesis, which is due for submission at the end of
March 2005. I would be grateful if you could use the reply slip at the bottom of this
letter and the enclosed stamped addressed envelope to inform me whether or not you
wish to receive a copy of the findings. I look forward to hearing from you.
Yours sincerely
Maya Goia (formerly Float)
I do/do not (please delete as appropriate) wish to receive a copy of the research
findings.
Address:
Name:
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